1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 SANEY MORN, Case No. 3:25-cv-00261-JAH-DEB 10 Plaintiff, 11 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 12 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT 13 AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SDPD OFFICER REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 14 BRET T. EDWARDS #SD6191, NOTICE AND TO INCORPORATE 15 Defendants. BY REFERENCE
16 [ECF No. 9] 17 18 Pending before the Court are the City of San Diego (“San Diego” or “the City”) and 19 Officer Bret T. Edwards’ (“Officer Edwards”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to 20 Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 12(b)(6), and Request for Judicial Notice and to Incorporate by Reference in 22 Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed concurrently with Defendants’ motion. 23 ECF Nos. 9-1 (“Motion”), 9-2 (“Request for Judicial Notice” or “RJN”). Plaintiff Saney 24 Morn (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition and Defendants filed a reply. ECF Nos. 25 12 (“Opp’n”), 13 (“Reply”). 26 After a thorough review of the parties’ submissions and for the reasons discussed 27 below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court also DENIES 28 Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice and to Incorporate by Reference. 1 BACKGROUND 2 On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging violations 3 of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure against 4 Officer Edwards, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violations of California state law 5 against San Diego and Officer Edwards for claims under the Bane Act, assault, battery, and 6 negligence. ECF No. 5 (“FAC”). 7 The facts underlying this suit arise from a traffic stop on January 8, 2024 (“Subject 8 Incident”). According to the Complaint, Officers Dante Parker and Cameron Watson 9 decided to initiate a traffic stop after observing Plaintiff enter a car with tinted windows. 10 FAC ¶¶ 27, 32. Officers Parker and Watson also observed Plaintiff wearing a crossbody 11 satchel as he entered his car and reported that “these satchels” are commonly used to 12 “conceal various types of weapons, including firearms.” Id. ¶ 28. The officers recognized 13 Plaintiff because they stopped him at 54th Street and Federal Avenue for driving the same 14 car with tinted windows on December 30, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 34, 37. 15 Despite determining they would make a traffic stop before Plaintiff entered the 16 vehicle for driving with tinted windows, in violation of California Vehicle Code § 17 26706(a), Officers did not initiate the stop until several minutes afterward, during which 18 time Plaintiff failed to come to a complete stop prior to making a westbound turn. Id. ¶¶ 19 32, 38–41. After the stop was initiated, Plaintiff pulled over on the shoulder of the 20 northbound I-805. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. At least six officers were on the scene and drew their 21 firearms toward Plaintiff’s car. Id. ¶¶ 43–44. 22 Plaintiff did not immediately exit the vehicle despite Officers commanding that he 23 do so. Id. ¶¶ 45–46. Instead, Plaintiff called 911 after pulling over out of fear of being 24 killed or harassed by the officers. Id. ¶¶ 46–47. Plaintiff eventually exited the car and 25 raised his hands in the air where they were visible to Officers, surrendering as directed. Id. 26 ¶¶ 48–49. Plaintiff then threw his crossbody satchel and hat into the car and backed 27 approximately 2.5 feet away from the car. Id. ¶ 50. After Plaintiff backed away from the 28 car, Officer Edwards’ ordered his police service dog (“K-9”), Magnus, to attack and bite 1 Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 53–54. After Plaintiff backed away from the dog; Magnus then jumped 2 into Plaintiff’s car. Id. ¶¶ 55–57. Despite the fact that Plaintiff was over ten feet from the 3 car and the satchel, Officer Edwards did not recall Magnus. Id. ¶ 58. Instead, Officer 4 Edwards instructed Magnus to attack again, causing Magnus to chase Plaintiff before 5 jumping on Plaintiff and biting his arm and resulting in Plaintiff falling to the ground in 6 pain. Id. ¶¶ 59–63, 83. Magnus continued to gnaw at Plaintiff’s arm while Plaintiff was 7 on the ground with three to four officers on top of him and three to four others surrounding 8 him with their weapons drawn. Id. ¶ 64. 9 Plaintiff was subsequently told by Officers he was being charged with evading a 10 peace officer in violation of California Penal Code § 2800.1(a) and obstruction under Penal 11 Code § 148(a)(1), both misdemeanors. Id. ¶ 67. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a 12 timely tort claim, pursuant to the California Government Claims Act1 (“GCA”), against the 13 City of San Diego. Id. ¶ 16. The City acknowledged receipt of Plaintiff’s claim on July 14 16, 2024, and later rejected Plaintiff’s claim without identifying any deficiency in the 15 submission despite Plaintiff’s express request on August 6, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Plaintiff 16 then filed the instant lawsuit. 17 DISCUSSION 18 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims for violations of the Bane 19 Act, assault, battery, and negligence on the sole ground that Plaintiff failed to comply with 20 the GCA. Mot. at 12. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for excessive 21 force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a factual challenge to the allegations in Plaintiff’s 22 FAC. Mot. at 13. Finally, Defendants move to dismiss all civil claims against Officer 23 Edwards based on their argument that Officer Edwards is entitled to qualified immunity. 24 Mot. at 19. 25 // 26
27 1 Formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act, or the “TCA.” Cal. Gov. Code § 810 28 et seq. 1 I. Legal Standard 2 A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 3 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Claims need only be plausible, 4 meaning a complaint need only allege enough “factual content that allows the court to draw 5 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 6 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 7 (2007)). 8 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6); 9 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 10 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 11 that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 12 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 13 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 14 alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for 15 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. In reviewing a motion 16 to dismiss, the Court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and construe all 17 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 18 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). 19 However, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 20 factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is the 21 Court “required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the 22 Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely 23 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. 24 Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). “In sum, 25 for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and 26 reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling 27 the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 28 citation and quotations omitted). 1 “Dismissal is improper unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 2 no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Abramson v. 3 Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation and quotation marks 4 omitted). If the Court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, “leave to amend 5 should be granted if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect.” 6 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation and 7 quotations omitted); see also Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). 8 II. State Law Claims 9 In general, “district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when 10 assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)[.]” Khoja v. Orexigen 11 Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 12 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)). Two doctrines permit consideration of materials 13 beyond the pleadings without converting the motion to a summary judgment proceeding: 14 judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, and incorporation by reference. Id. 15 District courts may consider extrinsic evidence on which the “complaint necessarily 16 relies if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the 17 plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 18 12(b)(6) motion.” See Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998 (citing Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 19 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, a court may treat 20 such a document as “part of the complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true 21 for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. (internal citations omitted). 22 Here, Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims is proper 23 because “Plaintiff failed to comply with the California Government Claims Act when he 24 did not file a claim for the [Subject Incident].” Mot. at 12. Defendants concede that the 25 FAC properly alleges “Plaintiff filed a timely tort claim under the act on June 25, 2024, 26 and that the claim was rejected by the City on August 6, 2024,” but argue that “[t]he only 27 claim filed by Plaintiff was for an incident that occurred at a different location on a different 28 date” rather than for the Subject Incident. Mot. at 13. It follows that Defendants’ sole 1 basis to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims challenges Plaintiff’s factual compliance with 2 the GCA, and not the sufficiency of the allegations of the claims themselves. 3 Thus, in assessing Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims, the 4 only issue for the Court to consider is whether Plaintiff complied with the requirements of 5 the GCA prior to filing his state law claims with this Court.2 Accordingly, the Court will 6 first determine whether Defendants are entitled to judicial notice of the document on which 7 Defendants base their challenge to Plaintiff’s compliance before evaluating whether 8 Plaintiff properly alleges substantial compliance with the GCA. 9 1. Request for Judicial Notice of Public Liability Claim Form 10 Rule 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not 11 subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “A fact is not subject to reasonable 12 dispute if it is generally known, or can be accurately and readily determined from sources 13 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (quoting Fed. 14 R. Evid. 201(b)). 15 Defendants move the Court to take judicial notice of the “only” claim allegedly 16 submitted by Plaintiff to the City of San Diego. RJN at 3, 20–27 (“Claim Form”). Notably, 17 Defendants’ request provides no argument explaining why judicial notice of the Claim 18 Form is proper under Rule 201, nor do Defendants make any representations to this Court 19 as to the Claim Form’s authenticity or completion. See generally RJN. 20 Plaintiff argues that judicial notice is improper because the Claim Form is 21 “incomplete and thus misrepresents what the Defendants received as part of the timely 22 TCA submission provided by Plaintiff.” ECF No. 12-1 at 9. Specifically, Plaintiff argues 23
24 2 The Court has no obligation to consider any arguments not properly pled in the parties’ briefs, or to perform a sua sponte review the sufficiency of the allegations in the FAC. 25 Thus, to the extent Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for reasons not stated in 26 their Motion, the Motion is denied. See 5B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2015) (“All federal courts are in 27 agreement that the burden is on the moving party to prove that no legally cognizable claim 28 for relief exists.”). 1 that the document is not what Defendants purport it to be because Defendants failed to 2 include a letter that was submitted as part of Plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 9. Plaintiff argues, 3 “[t]o the extent the Court is going to take judicial notice and incorporate the online claim 4 the Court should also consider the letter that was submitted with the online claim, attached 5 as Exhibit A.” Id. 6 Here, the Court’s inability to verify the authenticity of the Claim Form creates a 7 reasonable dispute as to the facts contained therein. On its face, the Claim Form provides 8 an opportunity to upload supporting documents, and a document titled “2024.06.25_Tort 9 Claim.pdf” appears in the attachment field at the end of the Claim Form submitted by 10 Defendants. See RJN at 27. However, not only do Defendants fail to provide any 11 attachment to their version of the Claim Form, Defendants fail to explain why their version 12 omits the listed attachment.3 Moreover, Defendants’ objection that Plaintiff’s proposed 13 attachment lacks authentication and is hearsay, at best, falls short of a denial that the 14 document is what it purports to be and fails to provide an alternative explanation as to the 15 contents of the missing attachment. See Reply at 2. Thus, at a minimum, the Court agrees 16 that the Claim Form appears incomplete on its face and finds that the missing attachment 17 creates a reasonable basis to dispute whether the form produced by Defendants accurately 18 reflects the complete submission. See, e.g., Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. All Star Auto 19 Wrecking, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148–49 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (denying judicial notice 20 where incompleteness created a reasonable basis to dispute whether the produced version 21
22 3 It is also unclear how Defendants obtained a copy of the alleged Claim Form, or of the operative version of any claim allegedly submitted by Plaintiff to the City, given that 23 submitted claims are not available to the public on the City of San Diego’s website, the 24 City liberally allows claimants to amend their claims with additional documentation after submission, and claims may be submitted with the City via submission of the Public 25 Liability Claim Form using the online claims portal or by mailing or personally delivering 26 a completed RM-9 form “or any written form that complies with the California Government Code” to the City. See Services: Public Liability, City of San Diego, 27 https://www.sandiego.gov/riskmanagement/services/liability (last visited March 30, 28 2026). 1 accurately represents the complete record); United States v. Boeing Co., 670 F. Supp. 3d 2 1185, 1194 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (same); Jonathan King Speaks v. Looney, 2026 WL 3 412948, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (denying notice of documents “missing exhibits and 4 therefore incomplete”). 5 Moreover, even if the Claim Form was subject to judicial notice, Defendants seek 6 judicial notice of the Claim Form to argue the facts contained therein establish that Plaintiff 7 failed to comply with the requirements of the GCA. See Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (“[j]ust 8 because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every 9 assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its truth”). Taking these 10 facts as true would create a version of events that directly contradict the facts pled in the 11 FAC. Judicial notice exists to give courts a fuller picture of documents that form the basis 12 of a plaintiff’s claim—not to furnish a mechanism for introducing facts that contradict the 13 pleadings at the dismissal stage. Id. (explaining that undermining the pleading burden by 14 allowing defendants to “present their own version of the facts at the pleading stage . . . is 15 not the purpose of judicial notice or the incorporation-by-reference doctrine”). While it is 16 true a court may consider documents subject to judicial notice, this Court cannot take 17 judicial notice of those documents for the truth of any matter asserted therein without first 18 converting the motion into a Rule 56 motion and providing Plaintiff an opportunity to 19 respond. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 20 citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants improperly request 21 judicial notice of facts subject to reasonable dispute. 22 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request to judicially notice 23 the Claim Form. For the same reasons, the Court will not consider the Claim Form in 24 assessing the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his compliance with the GCA. 25 See Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998. 26 2. Compliance Under the California Government Claims Act 27 As an initial matter, the Court finds, and the parties agree, that under California law, 28 “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to [the GCA] is a condition precedent to 1 a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.” State of California v. 2 Super. Ct. (Bodde), 90 P.3d 116, 120 (Cal. 2004) (internal citations and quotations 3 omitted). “Only after the public entity’s board has acted upon or is deemed to have rejected 4 the claim may the injured person bring a lawsuit alleging a cause of action in tort against 5 the public entity.” Le Mere v. L.A. Unified School Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, (Cal. Ct. 6 App. 2019); see also Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 7 1995) (“The California Tort Claims Act requires, as a condition precedent to suit against a 8 public entity, the timely presentation of a written claim and the rejection of the claim in 9 whole or in part.”) (internal citation omitted). Thus, to state a claim for a tort action against 10 a public entity or public employee under California law, “a plaintiff must allege facts 11 demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement.” Bodde, 12 90 P.3d at 123. 13 The GCA is not intended to function as a trap for plaintiffs who make a good faith 14 effort to comply. See Gen. Sec. Servs. Corp. v. Cnty. of Fresno, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 15 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“the statute should not be applied to snare the unwary where its 16 purpose is satisfied”) (internal citations omitted); Nguyen v. Los Angeles Cnty. 17 Harbor/UCLA Med. Ctr., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 711 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1992), modified 18 (Sept. 4, 1992) (explaining the GCA’s purpose is “to provide a public entity with sufficient 19 information to enable it to investigate . . . claims, assess liability, and … where appropriate, 20 settle [] without the expense of litigation”). For this reason, dismissal for noncompliance 21 with the GCA is warranted at the pleading stage where the inadequacy of compliance is 22 apparent from materials properly before the court. See Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4; Bodde, 90 23 P.3d at 122. For example, this occurs where the complaint or an exhibit attached to it by 24 the plaintiff is facially insufficient, such as where dates alleged in the complaint place the 25 filing outside the statute of limitations period with no allegation of tolling or equitable 26 estoppel. See, e.g., Julian v. City of San Diego, 229 Cal. Rptr. 664, 175 (Cal. App. 4th 27 Dist. 1986) (“Failure to commence an action within the prescribed period constitutes a 28 valid ground for dismissal, absent waiver, estoppel or a tolling period.”); Frazier v. City of 1 Fresno, 2023 WL 4108322, at *38 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2023) (dismissing a late-filed claim). 2 The Court finds no such defect in the FAC, nor do Defendants allege that one exists. 3 Here, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff timely submitted a tort claim by the statutory 4 deadline, that the City acknowledged receipt of the claim, and that the City considered but 5 rejected the claim. See FAC ¶¶ 16–18. Nothing alleged on the face of the FAC establishes 6 that the submission was untimely, that Plaintiff failed to properly file a claim, or that the 7 suit rests on an entirely different factual foundation from what was presented to the City. 8 See id. On the contrary, the FAC alleges the claim was submitted pursuant to the GCA. 9 Moreover, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument as inappropriate at the motion to dismiss 10 stage because the entire argument rests on the Court’s consideration of the contents of the 11 purported Claim Form to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claim described a different incident 12 from the one giving rise to liability in this action. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688 (“Indeed, actual 13 challenges to a plaintiff’s complaint have no bearing on the legal sufficiency of the 14 allegations under Rule 12(b)(6).”). Thus, in accepting all factual allegations in the FAC as 15 true and construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the 16 Court finds the FAC alleges sufficient facts alleging Plaintiff’s compliance with the GCA.4 17 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims for failure 18 to state a claim is DENIED. 19 III. Excessive Force Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 20 To plausibly state a claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must 21 allege that a government official used force in the course of an arrest that was “objectively 22 unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment and that the official acted under color of state 23
24 4 The Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s compliance with the GCA here. Whether Plaintiff’s submission substantially complied with the GCA remains open for 25 resolution on a more developed record. Specifically, the Court will address issues 26 regarding the correct Claim Form, the sufficiency of its contents, and Plaintiff’s argument that the City’s failure to identify any deficiencies within twenty days operated as a waiver 27 by Defendants under Cal. Gov. Code § 910.8 at the proper evidentiary stage of this 28 proceeding and upon review of adequate offers of proof by both parties. 1 law. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395 (1989). As a threshold matter, the FAC 2 alleges, and Defendants do not dispute, that Officer Edwards acted under color of state law. 3 FAC ¶¶ 24, 85. Officer Edwards was on duty as an SDPD officer, responded to the traffic 4 stop in that capacity, and deployed Magnus pursuant to his authority as a K-9 handler. Id. 5 Thus, the Court finds the FAC properly alleges facts in support. 6 Because “the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of 7 precise definition or mechanical application,” courts must evaluate the totality of the 8 circumstances of each particular case. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 9 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). Graham identified three primary factors: the severity of the 10 crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or 11 others, and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 12 by flight. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has further elaborated that 13 courts must consider the type and amount of force used, the importance of the government 14 interests at stake, and the balance between those interests and the individual’s Fourth 15 Amendment right to be free from unreasonable intrusion. Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 16 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 Here, Defendants’ Motion provides no arguments explaining why Plaintiff’s 18 allegations fail to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See generally Mot. Rather than 19 identifying any deficiencies in the FAC, Defendants’ Motion prematurely asks this Court 20 to weigh the elements of Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force and consider evidence outside 21 of the pleadings, under the incorporation-by-reference and judicial notice doctrines, to 22 evaluate the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. Mot. at 11. For example, Defendants spend five 23 pages applying the excessive force factors set forth in Graham to argue the Court should 24 find, inter alia, “that the intrusion was moderate because Officer Edwards did not allow 25 Magnus to bite Plaintiff for a prolonged period or while unattended,” the Graham factors 26 “weigh[] heavily in favor of Officer Edwards,” and “Magnus’s bite to Plaintiff’s forearm 27 is outweighed by the reasonable need for the government to apprehend felony suspects.” 28 Id. at 13–19. The Motion reads more like a motion for summary judgment and Defendants 1 even cite to the summary judgment standard as the basis for dismissal: 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court held, in the context of a motion for summary judgment, that a court should not adopt the plaintiff’s 3 version of events when it is “so utterly discredited by the record.” Scott 4 v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (discussing the discrepancies between the plaintiff’s claims and evidence versus a video of a pursuit). 5 Under Scott v. Harris, Plaintiff’s fictitious recitation of facts in his 6 Complaint should be disregarded and/or augmented by the BWC footage. 7 8 Reply at 6 (emphasis added). 9 To the extent Defendants seek to convert their motion to dismiss to a motion for 10 summary judgment under Rule 56, the Court declines the request at this stage of the 11 litigation. Although both parties here have submitted evidence outside the pleadings and 12 acknowledged that the Motion could be converted under Rule 12(d), the Court finds 13 conversion of the Motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment is inappropriate here 14 given that the parties are still early in the discovery process and any evidence submitted by 15 the parties in support of this Motion is “minimal, incomplete, and unnecessary.” See 16 Barnes v. Sea Hawai’i Rafting, LLC, 493 F. Supp. 3d 972, 976-77 (D. Haw. 2020), aff’d 17 sub nom. Barnes v. Kris Henry, Inc., 2022 WL 501582 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022) (finding it 18 inappropriate to convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment and collecting 19 cases); Shaver v. Operating Eng’rs Loc. 428 Pension Tr. Fund, 332 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th 20 Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court properly declined to review evidence and convert 21 motion because the submitted evidence was “superfluous because the non-moving party 22 does not have to substantiate its allegations; the Court presumes everything it claims is true 23 anyway”). 24 Defendants also misstate the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) and expressly admit they 25 submit to this Court’s consideration materials beyond the pleading—a police report, 26 Google map printout, and body-worn camera footage5—to impermissibly present their own 27
28 1 version of the facts at the pleading stage: 2 Here, the exhibits in Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice and Incorporation by Notice, including police report, Google map, and 3 body-worn camera (BWC) footage, flatly contradict the allegations 4 in the Complaint. 5 … 6 With this information, it is abundantly clear that Plaintiff’s complaint is blatantly contradicted by the Google map, police report, and BWC 7 footage. All allegations in the complaint that do not comport with that 8 undisputable evidence must be stricken in deciding this motion. Without the clearly contradicted allegations, the conclusory 9 allegations, and the legal conclusions dressed and [sic] factual 10 allegations, Plaintiff does not present a plausible claim for excessive force. 11 Moreover, the remaining facts demonstrate that Officer Edwards’ use 12 of force was constitutional under the Graham standards. 13 Reply at 7; RJN at 3–19. This is not the standard under Rule 12(b)(6). Nor can this Court 14 permit “the unscrupulous use of extrinsic documents to resolve competing theories against 15 the complaint [which] risks premature dismissals of plausible claims that may turn out to 16 be valid after discovery.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 998. “Such undermining of the usual 17 pleading burdens is not the purpose of judicial notice or the incorporation-by-reference 18 doctrine.” Id. at 999 (“If defendants are permitted to present their own version of the facts 19 at the pleading stage—and district courts accept those facts as uncontroverted and true—it 20 becomes near impossible for even the most aggrieved plaintiff to demonstrate a sufficiently 21 ‘plausible’ claim for relief.”). As previously discussed, judicial notice exists to give courts 22 a fuller picture of documents that form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim—not to furnish a 23 mechanism for introducing facts that contradict the pleadings at the dismissal stage. Id. 24 Ultimately, Defendants’ arguments in support of their Motion make it abundantly 25 clear that Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for excessive force. Defendants’ 26
27 Officer Watson’s Arrest Report, as well as judicially notice a Google Map illustrating the 28 geography of both the December 30, 2023, incident and the Subject Incident. RJN at 2–3. 1 concession in their Reply lands a fatal blow to Defendants’ Motion under the Rule 12(b)(6) 2 standard: “once the Court disregards the blatantly contradicted facts in the complaint, 3 there is insufficient facts to state this claim.” Reply at 11. Thus, based on Defendants’ 4 admissions, Plaintiff’s arguments in support, and in accepting all factual allegations in the 5 FAC as true and construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 6 the Court finds the FAC alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for excessive force under 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 8 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for 9 excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 10 In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to consider Defendants’ request for 11 judicial notice and incorporation-by-reference of the police report, the Google map, and 12 body-worn camera footage as the request is moot. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 907–08; 13 Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998. 14 IV. Qualified Immunity 15 Defendants move to dismiss all civil claims against Officer Edwards based on their 16 argument that Officer Edwards is entitled to qualified immunity. Mot. at 19. 17 “Qualified immunity shields an official from damages in a civil suit unless the 18 plaintiff can make the showing that the official’s actions violated a constitutional right, and 19 that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violative conduct.” Sanderlin v. 20 Dwyer, 116 F.4th 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 21 875 (9th Cir. 2012)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Qualified immunity 22 balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they 23 exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, 24 and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 25 26 6 The Court reiterates it has no obligation to consider any arguments not properly pled in 27 the parties’ briefs. Thus, to the extent Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for 28 deficiencies not stated in their Motion, the Motion is denied. See supra note 2. 1 223, 231 (2009). 2 “When qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the precise factual basis 3 for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to identify.” Id. at 238-9 (internal citations 4 omitted). Thus, qualified immunity determinations at the motion to dismiss stage are only 5 appropriate in narrow circumstances, as the facts are construed in Plaintiff’s favor and 6 constitutional determinations in a factual vacuum pose special risks. Id. at 239 (disfavoring 7 qualified immunity determinations at the pleadings stage because “whether there was a 8 violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed”). 9 Courts evaluating a government officials’ claim for qualified immunity consider: 10 “(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a 11 constitutional right, and (2) if so, whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of 12 the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 13 (2001)). Courts may address these questions in either order “in light of the circumstances 14 in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 236. 15 Here, as the first prong, the Court has already held that Plaintiff plausibly alleges 16 sufficient facts to state a claim for violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free 17 from excessive force. See supra section III. Specifically, Defendants admit—albeit via a 18 challenge on the merits—that the FAC alleges facts showing how, under Graham, Officer 19 Edwards’ K-9 deployments constituted objectively unreasonable force. Aside from their 20 factual challenge to the version of events alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC, Defendants do not 21 otherwise identify an independent basis for challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim 22 alleging a constitutional violation. See Mot. at 19 (“As discussed above, the Court should 23 find that Officer Edwards did not violate Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.”). As 24 discussed, such factual challenges are not considered to determine whether Plaintiff 25 plausibly alleges a claim under the standard contemplated by Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, 26 the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for a violation of a 27 constitutional right on the record properly before the Court at this stage of the litigation. 28 The Court now turns to the second prong. 1 As to the second prong, the right to be free from objectively unreasonable K-9 2 force7—including successive K-9 deployments after a suspect has surrendered, is already 3 on the ground, or pinned by multiple officers—was clearly established in this Circuit at the 4 time of the Subject Incident. See generally Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (discussing use of 5 force against a plaintiff during an investigatory stop); see also, e.g., Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 6 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judgment in favor of officer and finding a 7 genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of the K-9 force where the suspect 8 claimed he attempted to surrender upon encountering the police dog and repeatedly asked 9 officers to call it off); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701–02 (9th Cir. 2005) 10 (denying summary judgment in finding sufficient evidence that K-9 force was excessive 11 where the plaintiff had already been pinned to the ground by multiple officers); cf. Miller, 12 340 F.3d at 965–66) (affirming district court’s holding that K-9 force was reasonable where 13 the suspect was a fugitive felon reasonably believed to be armed). Particularized prior case 14 law is not required to put a reasonable officer on notice that continued K-9 force against a 15 compliant, subdued suspect is unlawful. See White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017); 16 Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1994) (“No particularized case law is 17 necessary for a deputy to know that excessive force has been used when a deputy sics a 18 canine on a handcuffed arrestee who has fully surrendered and is completely under 19 20 7 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is based on alleged violations of Plaintiff’s “right to 21 freedom of movement,” “freedom from unreasonable seizures,” and the “right to be free 22 from the use of excessive force.” FAC ¶¶ 71–72. In support, the FAC alleges, inter alia, that Plaintiff was unarmed, had both hands visible, had already surrendered, and had more 23 than six officers pointing firearms at Plaintiff when Officer Edwards “ordered his K-9 to 24 repeatedly attack and violently gnaw” at Plaintiff. FAC ¶¶ 74–83. Although Defendants’ Motion addresses only the K-9 force, Plaintiff clarifies that he “does not concede the 25 reasonableness of the officers’ conduct in drawing their weapons at Plaintiff, but chooses 26 not to analyze that use of force for the purposes of Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss since officers’ use of force went well above and beyond the drawing of weapons.” 27 Opp’n at 28 n.6. Accordingly, the Court notes that the facts in support of Plaintiff’s Fourth 28 Amendment claim are not limited to Officer Edwards’ use of K-9 deployments. 1 control.”); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1447 (same). Thus, a reasonable officer would have known 2 that continuing to deploy K-9 force against a suspect on the ground with multiple officers 3 physically restraining him was constitutionally prohibited. 4 Defendants’ qualified immunity argument rests primarily on the assertion that 5 Defendants’ factual account of events—rather than Plaintiff’s—accurately depicts what 6 occurred. As discussed, factual disputes between the parties cannot provide the basis to 7 undermine a claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Khoja, 899 F.3d at 998; Lee, 250 F.3d 8 at 688. Grey areas in the law may support a qualified immunity defense, but disagreements 9 about the facts do not. See Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 968 (9th Cir. 10 2010) (noting qualified immunity is a “pure question of law”) (internal citations and 11 quotation marks omitted); see also Stephenson v. California, 761 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1261 12 (C.D. Cal. 2025), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stephenson v. McKee, 2025 WL 1143493 13 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) (at the summary judgment stage, defendants are “only entitled to 14 qualified immunity as a matter of law if, taking the facts in the light most favorable to 15 [Plaintiff], they violated no clearly established constitutional right”) (internal citation 16 omitted); Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. 17 Thompson v. Copeland, 586 U.S. 947 (2018) (citing Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police 18 Dep’t, 756 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding “if genuine issues of material fact [at 19 the summary judgment stage] prevent a determination of qualified immunity, the case must 20 proceed to trial”). Moreover, because all reasonable inferences must be drawn in Plaintiff’s 21 favor at this juncture, any factual uncertainty regarding the circumstances of the K-9 22 deployments resolves in Plaintiff’s favor. 23 Thus, accepting all factual allegations in the FAC as true and construing all 24 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that 25 Defendants fail to establish that Officer Edwards is entitled to qualified immunity. 26 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as to Officer 27 Edwards on the basis of qualified immunity is DENIED. 28 // 1 CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 3 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 1 (Excessive Force under 42 U.S.C. □ 4 1983) is DENIED. 5 2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2 (Bane Act) is DENIED. 6 3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 3 (Assault) is DENIED. 7 4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 4 (Battery) is DENIED. 8 5. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 5 (Negligence) is DENIED. 9 6. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice and to Incorporate by Reference 1 10 DENIED. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. | | | | | 12 || DATED: March 30, 2026 13 JOHN A. HOUSTON TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12