Saner v. Healthcare Computer Corp.

879 F. Supp. 1116, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20358, 1994 WL 776322
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedDecember 20, 1994
DocketNo. CIV-93-2055-T
StatusPublished

This text of 879 F. Supp. 1116 (Saner v. Healthcare Computer Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Saner v. Healthcare Computer Corp., 879 F. Supp. 1116, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20358, 1994 WL 776322 (W.D. Okla. 1994).

Opinion

[1118]*1118 ORDER

RALPH G. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims for punitive damages as well as plaintiffs third cause of action. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for summary judgment. Because each motion raises similar issues, both motions will be addressed in this order.

Plaintiffs claims in this action are based on his former employment as a sales executive for defendant. Plaintiff contends that, by terminating his employment, defendant breached the employment contract, executed by the parties. Plaintiff further contends that defendant’s conduct in doing so is a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith which plaintiff contends existed in that contract. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant breached the terms of a commission agreement between the parties and that it also failed to reimburse plaintiff for certain business expenses plaintiff advanced from his own funds. Finally, plaintiff contends that defendant wrongfully failed to purchase health insurance for plaintiff, although defendant deducted funds for that purpose from plaintiffs compensation.

Summary judgment may be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the facts presented must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2806, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982); Manders v. State of Oklahoma, 875 F.2d 263, 264 (10th Cir.1989). Only disputes over facts which are material will preclude summary judgment; a material fact is one which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and such facts are genuinely disputed “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is also properly entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment initially argues that, with respect to plaintiffs third cause of action, plaintiff cannot prevail because that claim does not plead a cognizable cause of action. Plaintiff expressly alleges that defendant withheld funds from his compensation checks and that he was told such funds would be utilized to purchase health insurance for plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff then alleges that defendant failed to purchase health insurance and that plaintiff did not discover this failure until he incurred medical expenses exceeding $12,000.00. Defendant correctly notes that plaintiff does not clearly identify the legal theory on which this claim is based. In the response to the motion for summary judgment, however, plaintiff states his claim is based on the alleged breach of an oral promise. He also refers to the former employer’s “deceit.” In any event, the facts pled, if true, would support a cause of action for breach of an oral agreement. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to judgment on that basis.

Alternatively, defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment on the third cause of action because the statute of limitations has expired on any claim asserted. Plaintiff expressly pleads that the monies deducted from his compensation checks occurred during the period of January 1, 1991 until August 1992. This lawsuit was not filed until October 1994. Defendant argues that, assuming plaintiff seeks to assert a tort claim, the applicable Oklahoma statute of limitations is two years. Okla.Stat. tit. 12 § 95 (third). Therefore, this cause of action would have to have been asserted no later than August 1994 to avoid expiration of the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff responds by arguing the cause of action is based on the breach of an oral agreement, which is governed by the three year statute of limitations set forth in Okla.Stat. tit. 12 § 95 (second). Thus, plain[1119]*1119tiff argues, the claim was brought within the three year period. Plaintiff apparently does not intend to assert a claim based on misrepresentation or conversion. Such claims would be barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations, and no facts are pled to avoid that bar. Inasmuch as plaintiff pursues this cause of action as a breach of an oral agreement, the claim is not barred because it appears to have been brought within three years of the occurrence.1 Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts to avoid a ruling that the statute of limitations has expired on this claim. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the third cause of action is DENIED.

Defendant’s motion also seeks judgment on plaintiffs claim for punitive damages arising from a purportedly tortious breach of the employment contract. Defendant argues that punitive damages are not available for breach of contract in Oklahoma under Okla. Stat. tit. 2359, and that courts have authorized some only in cases involving insurance contracts. See Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla.1977); Okla.Stat. tit. 23 § 9. Oklahoma courts have, in fact, rejected a claim for punitive damages where plaintiff has alleged a breach of contract which was committed falsely, fraudulently, willfully and maliciously. Burton v. Juzwik, 524 P.2d 16, 19-20 (Okla.1974).

Plaintiff responds that the employment contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and it is the breach of that covenant on which plaintiffs claim for punitive damages rests. Plaintiff relies on Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla.1989), and cites that portion of the decision which states that “a tort may arise in the course of the performance of a contract and that tort may then be the basis for recovery even though it is the contract that creates the relationship between the parties.” Id. at 28. Plaintiff overlooks the fact that this statement was in the context of the Burk court’s decision that recognizing a new cause of action in tort for termination of an at-will employee where such termination was contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. Id. More important, however, plaintiff overlooks the fact that the Burk

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Burk v. K-Mart Corp.
1989 OK 22 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1989)
Burton v. Juzwik
1974 OK 80 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1974)
Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
713 P.2d 1027 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1986)
Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.
577 P.2d 899 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
879 F. Supp. 1116, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20358, 1994 WL 776322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/saner-v-healthcare-computer-corp-okwd-1994.