Sandy Campbell v. Department of Transportation

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 3, 2026
DocketSF-315H-24-0696-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sandy Campbell v. Department of Transportation (Sandy Campbell v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sandy Campbell v. Department of Transportation, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SANDY CAMPBELL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-315H-24-0696-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DATE: March 3, 2026 TRANSPORTATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Sandy Campbell , Kent, Washington, pro se.

Christopher T. Hall , Karen Sealy , and Rodney Love , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We agree with the administrative judge’s findings in the initial decision, which the appellant’s arguments on review provide no reason to disturb. The record supports the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that he was an “employee” as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A), as he had not completed his probationary period and had less than 1 year of civilian service at the time of his termination. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 26, 28-29, 32, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 10-13. For the first time on review, the appellant argues that his employment lasted longer than 1 year because he had a pending “medical leave” request on the date of his termination. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 3. The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. See Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016); Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). Here, the appellant has not explained why this argument could not have been raised before the administrative judge, and thus we need not consider it. In any event, we find that there is no legal authority 3

prohibiting an agency from terminating an employee with a pending leave request on the date of his termination. At any rate, the appellant was terminated when the agency notified him in writing as to why he was being separated and the effective date of the action. See Honea v. Department of Homeland Security , 118 M.S.P.R. 282, ¶¶ 6-7, 10 (2012), aff’d, 524 F. App’x 623 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 5 C.F.R. § 315.804(a) (2024). As correctly observed by the administrative judge, the appellant received the termination letter on August 20, 2024, several days before the anniversary date of his appointment, which informed him that his termination was effective that same day. ID at 11-12; IAF, Tab 2 at 3, Tab 9 at 28-30, 32. On review, the appellant asserts that his termination was based on “political affiliation,” which is a slight recharacterization of the “political intimidation” claim he raised before the administrative judge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 11-12; IAF, Tab 7 at 4, 16-17. We find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s explained conclusion that the appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation of discrimination based on “partisan political reasons,” i.e., discrimination based on his affiliation with a political party or candidate, which could have been a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b) (2024). 2 ID at 15; see Rhodes v. Department of Commerce, 86 M.S.P.R. 476, ¶ 9 (2000). We similarly find that the appellant has not provided any basis to disturb the administrative judge’s explained conclusion that the appellant has not nonfrivolously alleged any other basis for jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 (2024). We agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s claims of prohibited personnel practices, such as discrimination, reprisal, and sexual harassment, absent an otherwise

2 Effective June 24, 2025—after the appellant’s termination—OPM rescinded subpart H of part 315 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to Executive Order No. 14,284. Strengthening Probationary Periods in the Federal Service, 90 Fed. Reg. 26727-01 (June 24, 2025). 4

appealable action. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3; ID at 16 n.8; see Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 13 (2012). In his petition for review, the appellant states that he is “also filling [sic] a future IRA appeal over [his] termination and also submit[s] for administrative remedies with OSC.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. The administrative judge informed him of his burden to establish jurisdiction over an individual right of action (IRA) appeal. IAF, Tab 6; ID at 16-17. The appellant has indicated that he has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. As such, we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the Board lacks IRA jurisdiction at this time. ID at 17. However, our decision is without prejudice to the appellant filing an IRA appeal should he first exhaust his remedies with OSC. With his petition for review, the appellant submits for the first time documents related to his equal employment opportunity (EEO) claims. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-28. The appellant has not explained why he did not submit them previously. See Fox v. U.S. Postal Service, 81 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶¶ 4-5 (1999) (explaining that the Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on petition for review when it was previously available but a party elected not to file it with the administrative judge).

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Related

Honea v. Merit Systems Protection Board
524 F. App'x 623 (Federal Circuit, 2013)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Sandy Campbell v. Department of Transportation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sandy-campbell-v-department-of-transportation-mspb-2026.