Sandrowicz, A. v. Sparaney, R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 6, 2023
• Docket: 300 MDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A04029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

AMY SANDROWICZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RALPH SPARANEY : : Appellant : No. 300 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 13, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at No(s): 2018 FC 41633

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MARCH 6, 2023

Appellant Ralph Sparaney appeals from the Order entered by the

Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas on January 13, 2022, in this equitable

distribution case. Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion

in affirming and adopting the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation

(“Report”),1 which awarded the marital house to Appellee Amy Sandrowicz.

After careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion and affirm the order.

Appellant and Appellee married in September 2010 and separated in

November 2018.2 Appellee filed for a no-fault divorce pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. ____________________________________________

1 We have replaced references to “master” with “hearing officer” throughout this Memorandum in accordance with the October 19, 2021 revision to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.51, effective January 1, 2022.

2 We derive the factual recitation from the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation, dated September 9, 2021, which the trial court adopted. J-A04029-23

§ 3301(c). At the time of the relevant proceedings, Appellee was in good

health, and working full-time as an eighth-grade teacher, consistent with her

two-decade career. Appellant was receiving a reduced income in the form of

workers’ compensation benefits as a result of a spinal fracture suffered in April

2018 while employed as a driver for U.P.S.

The trial court appointed a hearing officer in January 2021. After several

conferences, the hearing officer presided over a hearing in August 2021 and

issued his report on September 9, 2021. The only disputed issues before the

hearing officer were the allocation of the marital house and Appellant’s

potential lump sum workers’ compensation settlement payment.3

According to the Report, the parties purchased the marital house in

August 2007, prior to the marriage. The hearing officer found the value of the

house to be $110,000.00 and the parties’ equity in the house to be $6,997.45,

after taking into consideration the two outstanding mortgages and expenses

associated with any potential sale of the house.4

After considering the household expenses paid by both parties, the

hearing officer ascertained that Appellee was financially able to maintain the

house, including real estate taxes, while Appellant was “just able to pay

____________________________________________

3 The parties stipulated to numerous issues including the waiver of interest in each other’s pension and bank accounts as well as waiving any claim for alimony, alimony pendente lite, and spousal support. Report, 9/9/21, at 1 (unpaginated). Additionally, the parties agreed to distribute the personal and household property themselves. Id.

4 Id. at 2.

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certain bills, which do not include all household related expenses.”5 Moreover,

Appellee would not need to refinance the mortgages because she, unlike

Appellant, was the party named on the mortgage notes. In contrast, the

hearing officer found that Appellant would be unable to refinance the house,

as would be required, given his current employment situation. Additionally,

Appellee had the financial ability to buy out Appellant’s share of the house,

but Appellant did not.

Applying these findings to the equitable distribution factors set forth in

the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S § 3502(a), the hearing officer recommended

distribution of the house to Appellee, with Appellee paying Appellant

$3,498.73, representing 50% of the equity in the house. 6 He additionally

recommended that any lump sum workers’ compensation settlement obtained

by Appellant should be Appellant’s sole property.

On September 28, 2021, Appellant filed exceptions to the Report,

contesting the award of the marital house to Appellee. On November 30,

2021, after oral argument, the trial court denied Appellant’s exceptions. The

court additionally affirmed and adopted the Report following a de novo review

of the record. The court entered the Divorce Decree on January 13, 2022.

5 Id. at 3.

6 Id. at 4.

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Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on February 11, 2022. Appellant and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Before this Court, Appellant

presents the following question:

Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of discretion and/or err in affirming the Report and Recommendation of the [Hearing Officer] in this matter, when the [Hearing Officer] did not give adequate weight and consideration to the Equitable Distribution factors enumerated under Pennsylvania law in 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 3502(a) in dividing the marital assets between the [p]arties, specifically, in awarding the marital home to Appellee?

Appellant’s Br. at 3.

A.

Equitable distribution is governed by 23 Pa.C.S § 3502(a), which

provides that the court “shall equitably divide, distribute or assign, in kind or

otherwise, the marital property between the parties without regard to marital

misconduct in such percentages and in such manner as the court deems just

after considering all relevant factors.”7 In applying the statutory factors, “[a]

7 Section 3502 states that relevant factors include the following:

(1) The length of the marriage.

(2) Any prior marriage of either party.

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.

(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of equitable

distribution.” Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d 520, 523 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

This Court reviews “a challenge to the trial court’s equitable distribution

scheme for an abuse of discretion.” Id. We will not find an abuse of discretion

“unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised

(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income.

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker.

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.

(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.

(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which ramifications need not be immediate and certain.

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate and certain.

(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any dependent minor children.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).

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was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill

will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.” Carney v. Carney,

167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). When reviewing an

award of equitable distribution, “we measure the circumstances of the case

against the objective of effectuating economic justice between the parties and

achieving a just determination of their property rights.” Hayward v.

Hayward, 868 A.2d 554, 558 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

In cases where the parties appeared before a hearing officer, the

hearing officer’s “report and recommendation, although only advisory, is to be

given the fullest consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of

witnesses, because the [hearing officer] has the opportunity to observe and

assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.” Childress v. Bogosian,

12 A.3d 448, 455–56 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). However, the

hearing officer’s “report is not controlling, either on the lower court or on the

appellate court.” Rothrock v. Rothrock, 765 A.2d 400, 404 (Pa. Super.

2000). Instead, “[t]he reviewing court must consider the evidence, its

weight[,] and the credibility of the witnesses, de novo.” Id.

B.

Before this Court, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in affirming the Report, reiterating that the hearing officer “did not

give appropriate consideration and weight” to the equitable distribution factors

set forth in Section 3502(a). Appellant’s Br. at 7. Appellant does not contest

the hearing officer’s factual findings but rather the conclusion drawn from the

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facts. Specifically, Appellant contends that the hearing officer did not properly

weigh Subsection (a)(5),“[t]he opportunity of each party for future

acquisitions of capital assets and income,” and Subsection (a)(10), ”[t]he

economic circumstances of each party at the time that the division of property

is to become effective.” Id. at 9 (quoting 23 Pa. C.S. § 3502(a)(5), (10)).

Appellant asserts that the hearing officer, and thus the trial court, failed

to consider appropriately the fact that “Appellee has a greater ability than

Appellant to gain future acquisitions of capital assets and income, based on

her employment, and Defendant’s lack of employment” and that “Appellee

was more financially secure than Appellant.” Id. at 9-10. In contrast to the

hearing officer and trial court’s conclusion that these facts favor distribution

of the house to Appellee, Appellant contends that these factors favor awarding

the house to him, given that Appellee “would be in a better position to . . .

locate and purchase another home.” Id. at 10. He asks the Court to overturn

the award or alternatively to reverse and remand for further hearing. Id. at

11.

In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court rejected Appellant’s

argument. In so doing, the court noted that the hearing officer “observed the

parties, weighed the parties’ credibility, and reached the appropriate

determination after considering the relevant equitable distribution factors. Tr.

Ct. Op., 3/11/22, at 9. The court concluded that “there was no reason to

disturb the [hearing officer’s] findings that [Appellee’s] income was stable and

determinable into the future, while [Appellant’s] income was reduced and

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more nebulous moving forward.” Id. at 7. Moreover, the court found the

record supported the hearing officer’s “ultimate conclusion that [Appellant]

was more financially secure and could afford to maintain the marital home,

while [Appellee] was less financially secure and could not afford the marital

home, based on the testimony.” Id. at 9. After review de novo, we agree.

Upon careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in adopting the Report. Instead, the trial court

carefully considered each relevant factor of Section 3502(a), including

subsections (5) and (10), and weighed the economic situations of the parties,

especially in regard to whether Appellant or Appellee could feasibly cover costs

of ownership of the marital house. The record supports the hearing officer

and the trial court’s conclusion that Appellee rather than Appellant was better

able to afford the house. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order

adopting the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation, which distributed

the marital house to Appellee, less payment of 50% of the equity to Appellant.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 03/06/2023

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