Sandra Talley v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 22, 2024
DocketDC-3443-22-0447-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sandra Talley v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Sandra Talley v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sandra Talley v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SANDRA TALLEY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-3443-22-0447-I-1

v.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY DATE: March 22, 2024 COMMISSION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Sandra Talley , North Chesterfield, Virginia, pro se.

Lisa Schneiderman , Rockville, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Based on evidence the parties submit on review, we VACATE the initial decision, but still DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the appellant’s locality pay reduction was not an appealable adverse action.

BACKGROUND The appellant was an agency employee with a duty location of Rockville, Maryland, in the “Washington-Baltimore-Arlington, DC-MD-VA-WV-PA” locality pay area. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 13 at 12, Tab 19 at 7. She had been teleworking through a temporary agency telework policy when, in March 2022, she submitted reasonable accommodation requests for, among other things, a work environment that limited her potential exposure to COVID-19. IAF, Tab 17 at 5-7, 29, 31. To support her requests, she submitted a doctor’s note advising that she avoid significant time in crowded and/or poorly ventilated indoor spaces. Id. at 44. In response, in May 2022, the agency offered her full-time telework as an accommodation. Id. at 42. The appellant did not accept the offer, citing the reduction in her locality pay that would result from her working from her home in North Chesterfield, Virginia, which was in the Richmond, Virginia locality pay area. Id. at 39-41; IAF, Tab 12 at 4, Tab 13 at 28-29, 42-43. She instead requested an in-office work environment and schedule that would comport with an updated doctor’s note. IAF, Tab 17 at 44. The agency agreed to accommodate the conditions in the note with the exception 3

of a 100% masking recommendation for others in her shared office space, which it deemed unreasonable when community COVID-19 levels were low or medium. Id. at 44-45. The agency agreed, however, to provide the appellant with a schedule that would permit her to work when fewer staff were onsite and exempt her from travel obligations. Id. Before the agency effected any change to her locality pay, the appellant filed an appeal with the Board. IAF, Tab 1. In response to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order, the appellant asserted that the basis for her appeal was the agency’s offer of two possible accommodations that forced her, because the in-office option was inconsistent with her doctor’s note, to telework with a reduced locality pay. IAF, Tab 12 at 4. The appellant continued to telework during the agency’s consideration of her accommodation request, while receiving locality pay based on the Rockville, Maryland duty location. IAF, Tab 17 at 46; Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 6 at 10-11. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, finding that the appellant was contesting a decrease in locality pay that had not yet occurred. IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID). The appellant filed a petition for review, followed by a supplement containing evidence that she acceded to the offer of full-time telework and that her locality pay had been reduced to the Richmond, Virginia locality rate. PFR File, Tab 1, Tab 3 at 13, 15. The agency responded with evidence confirming the appellant’s placement on full-time telework, change in duty station, and reduction in locality pay. Id., Tab 4 at 12-24, 26. The appellant filed a reply. 2 PFR File, Tab 6. 2 We consider the evidence submitted on review which postdates the close of the record below and implicates the Board’s jurisdiction, including the evidence cited in this decision, because the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See Lovoy v. Department of Health & Human Services , 94 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 30 (2003) (considering new arguments raised on review because the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b). We do not, however, consider the evidence the appellant submits for the first time on review which does not postdate the close of record below because she does not show that it was unavailable before the record closed below 4

ANALYSIS

The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary; it is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Generally, a reduction in pay is an appealable action. 5 U.S.C. § 7512(4). Assuming, without deciding, that the Board’s jurisdiction encompasses locality pay reductions, 5 C.F.R. § 752.401(b)(15) provides that a reduction in pay from a rate that is contrary to law or regulation is not an appealable adverse action. In Cook v. Department of the Air Force , 251 F. App’x 675, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) concluded that the reduction of a petitioner’s locality rate based on his geographic reassignment was due to the fact that maintaining his pre- reassignment rate would have been contrary to law, and was thus not appealable. 3 In response to the petitioner’s claim that his reassignment was involuntary, the Federal Circuit determined that, because his pay reduction was not appealable under 5 C.F.R. § 752.401(b)(15), whether his reassignment was involuntary was irrelevant. Id. The same reasoning applies here.

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Related

Cook v. Department of the Air Force
251 F. App'x 675 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Sandra Talley v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sandra-talley-v-nuclear-regulatory-commission-mspb-2024.