Sandra S. Trammell v. Kenneth S. Apfel

Eighth Circuit

Sandra S. Trammell v. Kenneth S. Apfel

8 F. App'x 591

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedMay 10, 2001

Docket00-2074

StatusUnpublished

This text of 8 F. App'x 591 (Sandra S. Trammell v. Kenneth S. Apfel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Sandra S. Trammell v. Kenneth S. Apfel, 8 F. App'x 591 (8th Cir. 2001).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In June 1996, Sandra S. Trammell sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, complaining of tachycardia, gastritis, shortness of breath, fatigue, weakness, chest pain, and anxiety. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined Trammell was not disabled because she did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments within the meaning of the regulations. The Appeals Council later denied Trammell’s request for review, after considering records of Trammell’s treating physician, some of which predated, but *592 were not submitted before, the ALJ’s decision.

After Trammell commenced this federal court action and the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Trammell appeals.

Having reviewed the record, including relevant evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, we are convinced Trammell met her burden of showing she had impairments which would have had more than a minimal effect on her ability to work, and for which, contrary to the ALJ’s belief, she received ongoing treatment. See Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996) (claimant bears burden of establishing she has severe impairment; sequential evaluation process may be terminated for lack of severe impairment only when claimant’s impairments would have no more than minimal effect on her ability to work). Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. On remand, the ALJ should proceed with the sequential evaluation process and determine whether Trammell could return to her former work, and if not, whether there were any jobs in the national economy she could perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2000) (discussing five:step sequential evaluation process). Other arguments advanced by Trammell’s counsel have little to do with the facts of this case, and do not merit further discussion.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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PER CURIAM.

In June 1996, Sandra S. Trammell sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, complaining of tachycardia, gastritis, shortness of breath, fatigue, weakness, chest pain, and anxiety. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined Trammell was not disabled because she did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments within the meaning of the regulations. The Appeals Council later denied Trammell’s request for review, after considering records of Trammell’s treating physician, some of which predated, but *592 were not submitted before, the ALJ’s decision.

After Trammell commenced this federal court action and the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Trammell appeals.

Having reviewed the record, including relevant evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, we are convinced Trammell met her burden of showing she had impairments which would have had more than a minimal effect on her ability to work, and for which, contrary to the ALJ’s belief, she received ongoing treatment. See Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996) (claimant bears burden of establishing she has severe impairment; sequential evaluation process may be terminated for lack of severe impairment only when claimant’s impairments would have no more than minimal effect on her ability to work). Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. On remand, the ALJ should proceed with the sequential evaluation process and determine whether Trammell could return to her former work, and if not, whether there were any jobs in the national economy she could perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2000) (discussing five:step sequential evaluation process). Other arguments advanced by Trammell’s counsel have little to do with the facts of this case, and do not merit further discussion.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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