Sandra Milena Arateco Munoz v. Pamela Bondi, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02951
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Sandra Milena Arateco Munoz, No. CV-25-02951-PHX-MTL

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Pamela Bondi, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Eileen S. 16 Willett (“R & R”) recommending that this Court deny the Petition for Habeas Corpus under 17 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner filed timely objections.1 18 In reviewing an R & R, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 19 the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 “[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s finding and recommendations de 21 novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 22 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original). The Court has no obligation to 23 review portions of the magistrate judge’s recommendations to which no party objects. See 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 25 1. Petitioner objects to the R & R because she did not receive a copy of the 26 response brief and the R & R and her reply were docketed almost simultaneously. The 27 1 The Court observes that Petitioner filed her objections on the docket twice. (See Doc. 16 28 and 17.) By all appearances, both filings appear to be the same and the Court concludes that Petitioner’s counsel filed twice by mistake. 1 objections also advance that arguments made in the reply should be considered, rather than 2 waived, because Petitioner filed her petition without counsel and she is now represented 3 by counsel. The Court finds this objection moot because it will consider all these arguments 4 in its de novo review of the R & R. 5 2. Petitioner next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that 6 Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing. The R & R found that the authority for 7 Petitioner’s detention is in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii),2 requiring mandatory detention of 8 an alien seeking asylum “for further consideration of the application for asylum.” Petitioner 9 cites no controlling authority abrogating the mandatory nature of detention applicable to 10 her circumstances. And the objections do not dispute the Magistrate Judge’s finding that 11 Petitioner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals is still in process. As for due 12 process, the R & R correctly observes that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in 13 Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), an alien 14 unlawfully present in the United States “has only those rights regarding admission that 15 Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 140. 16 3. Finally, Petitioner objects to the length of her detention as “unreasonably 17 prolonged.” She urges this Court to adopt the six-factor test employed by the District of 18 Minnesota in Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858-59 (D. Minn. 2019), to 19 determine the reasonableness of her detention. The Court declines to do so. See Veasna 20 Oth, Petitioner, v. Christopher Chestnut, in his official capacity, Facility Adm’r of 21 California City Det. Facility, et al., Respondents., No. 1:25-cv-01367 KES-HBK (HC), 22 2026 WL 323053, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026) (declining to adopt a “multi-part, judge 23 made reasonableness balancing test” to determine whether a petitioner’s detention was 24 prolonged as “unnecessary under the circumstances” given “relevant Supreme Court 25 precedents” (citation modified)). 26 . . . . 27 2 After the asylum officer determines that an alien seeking asylum presents a credible fear 28 of prosecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 1 The Court is unaware of—and Petitioner does not identify—any Ninth Circuit 2|| authority adopting the proposed test. Controlling Supreme Court precedent points in the 3|| opposite direction. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 304 (2018) (“[D]etention under § 1226(c) has a ‘definite termination point’: the conclusion of proceedings. As we 5 || made clear here, that ‘definite termination’—and not some arbitrary time limit devised by 6 || the courts—marks the end of the Government’s detention authority under § 1226(c).”); see 7\| also Veasna, 2026 WL 323053, at *5 (“Petitioner’s attempt to recast his challenge to his 8 || detention based solely on its length as a violation of due process essentially is an end-run 9|| of § 1[2]26(c)’s express language as already interpreted by the Supreme Court.”). Accordingly, the Court rejects this objection. 11 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED accepting the R & R (Doc. 14) in full. The Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied. Petitioner’s indefinite detention claim is 13 || denied without prejudice. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 15 || accordingly and close this case. 16 Dated this 11th day of February, 2026. 17

Michael T. Liburdi 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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