IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SANDRA McCALL, No. 88333-0-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SAFEWAY STORES INC.; and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Respondent.
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — Sandra McCall appeals from the CR 12(b)(5) dismissal
of her claim for damages against Safeway Stores Inc. based on insufficiency of
service of process and denial of her motion for reconsideration. Because the trial
court did not err, we affirm.
FACTS
Representing herself pro se, Sandra McCall filed a complaint for negligence
against Safeway Stores Inc. at 3:23 p.m. on November 26, 2024 based on an
incident that she asserted occurred on November 27, 2021. She alleged that while
shopping at a Safeway store in Auburn, she “stepped into a puddle of liquid
substance on the floor (fabric softener or laundry detergent), slipped, fell, and
subsequently sustained permanent injuries to her back.” McCall sought past,
present, and future damages for pain and suffering, special damages for past and
future medical expenses and lost wages, pre- and post-judgment interest on any No. 88333-0-I/2
award of monetary damages, recovery of “costs, disbursements and statutory
attorney fees,” and other just relief. On December 28, McCall mailed the summons
and complaint to Safeway’s registered agent. Safeway’s registered agent
recorded receipt of documents related to McCall’s case “[b]y [t]raceable [m]ail on
12/31/2024.”
On January 14, 2025, Safeway entered a notice of appearance that
expressly indicated that it appeared through its attorney “without waiving
objections as to improper service, venue, or jurisdiction.” On March 19, Safeway
filed its motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(5), along with a notice that the motion
would be heard with oral argument at 11 a.m. on April 25 and that “[w]ritten
responses and replies must be filed and served according to the deadlines in Local
Civil Rule 7.” On April 16, Safeway filed a reply to its motion to dismiss, noted that
McCall had not responded to its motion by “her deadline, April 14, 2025,” and again
sought dismissal of the action with prejudice both on the basis of CR 12(b)(5) and
due to McCall’s failure to respond.
On April 23, counsel appeared on McCall’s behalf and filed a response in
opposition at 9 a.m. on April 25, two hours before the scheduled start time for the
hearing on Safeway’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, Safeway objected to the
trial court’s consideration of McCall’s response brief due to its late filing and noted
that self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.
McCall’s counsel acknowledged that her response was untimely, stating, “It is
absolutely untimely,” and offered to stipulate to a continuance to allow Safeway
time to file a reply. The judge again explained, “[T]here has to be some meritorious
-2- No. 88333-0-I/3
reasons why [the motion] was filed late before I would consider your response”
and directed counsel to address that threshold matter. McCall’s counsel
emphasized that he had been retained only two days prior and further explained
the barriers his client faced based on her education level and socioeconomic
circumstances but ultimately did not respond to the trial court’s point that late
responses require express permission of the court, usually after a motion has been
filed. McCall summarized her position on the procedural question as “in the
interest of promoting access to justice.” Safeway argued that McCall had been
able to file a complaint without the assistance of counsel, reiterated that pro se
litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys under Washington law, and
emphasized that McCall “had the ample time [sic] and the opportunity” to timely
file her response to its motion. In light of the fact that the remedy Safeway sought
was the dismissal of McCall’s case, the trial court continued the matter for three
weeks to allow Safeway to reply to McCall response brief and expressly advised
that McCall was not permitted to file a surreply.
When the trial court took the matter up again on May 16, Safeway
emphasized that by mailing her initial pleadings, McCall failed to effectuate
personal service on it within the statute of limitations. McCall’s attorney
characterized the issue as one of first impression and argued that the term
“delivery” was not defined in the statute, hand-to-hand delivery was not required,
and ultimately emphasized what he referred to as “the equitable issue,” the
struggles of self-represented litigants, before he urged the trial court to “waive rules
to advance the cause of justice.” After Safeway presented its rebuttal argument,
-3- No. 88333-0-I/4
the trial court took the matter under advisement and indicated that it would issue
its written order at a later date. On May 19, the trial court adopted Safeway’s
proposed order without modification and dismissed McCall’s case.
On May 29, McCall filed a motion for reconsideration that asserted the trial
court had “both misinterpret[ed] and incorrectly applie[d] a definitional statute as a
non-waivable requirement which supersedes the civil rules adopted by our high
court.” She further contended that dismissal was improper because “a material
factual issue remain[ed] unresolved and require[d] jurisdictional discovery”;
essentially, “there could be evidence of second-hand service” that might support a
different outcome. (Emphasis added.) On that basis, McCall also sought, in the
alternative, “[l]imited jurisdictional discovery [to] allow the parties and [the] court to
determine whether the unwaivable in-person service requirement [Safeway] insists
upon was met.” On June 18, the trial court denied McCall’s motion for
reconsideration.
McCall timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Scope of Review on Appeal
McCall filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 2025 that designated only the
May 19 order that dismissed her case under CR 12(b)(5). However, she filed an
amended notice of appeal on July 16 and designated the trial court’s June 18 order
that denied her motion for reconsideration, in addition to the May 19 dismissal
order. McCall’s opening brief presents two assignments of error: that the trial court
erred when it concluded Safeway had not been personally served with McCall’s
-4- No. 88333-0-I/5
suit and abused its discretion when it denied her motion for reconsideration.
Because the assignment of error regarding the propriety of the trial court’s ruling
under CR 12(b)(5) is dispositive, we need not reach the merits of her challenge to
the order that denied reconsideration.
II. Motion to Dismiss under CR 12(b)(5)
CR 12 establishes the deadlines for the filing of an answer in a suit, but the
timeframes set out in the rule are premised on the method of service of process
used by the plaintiff. See CR 12(a). It further establishes that certain defenses,
enumerated in the rule, may be presented by a separate motion independent of an
answer. See CR 12(b). Relevant here, Safeway moved for dismissal under CR
12(b)(5), insufficiency of service of process. CR 12(d) establishes the procedure
for hearing CR 12(b) defenses and explicitly states that such motions “shall be
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SANDRA McCALL, No. 88333-0-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SAFEWAY STORES INC.; and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Respondent.
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — Sandra McCall appeals from the CR 12(b)(5) dismissal
of her claim for damages against Safeway Stores Inc. based on insufficiency of
service of process and denial of her motion for reconsideration. Because the trial
court did not err, we affirm.
FACTS
Representing herself pro se, Sandra McCall filed a complaint for negligence
against Safeway Stores Inc. at 3:23 p.m. on November 26, 2024 based on an
incident that she asserted occurred on November 27, 2021. She alleged that while
shopping at a Safeway store in Auburn, she “stepped into a puddle of liquid
substance on the floor (fabric softener or laundry detergent), slipped, fell, and
subsequently sustained permanent injuries to her back.” McCall sought past,
present, and future damages for pain and suffering, special damages for past and
future medical expenses and lost wages, pre- and post-judgment interest on any No. 88333-0-I/2
award of monetary damages, recovery of “costs, disbursements and statutory
attorney fees,” and other just relief. On December 28, McCall mailed the summons
and complaint to Safeway’s registered agent. Safeway’s registered agent
recorded receipt of documents related to McCall’s case “[b]y [t]raceable [m]ail on
12/31/2024.”
On January 14, 2025, Safeway entered a notice of appearance that
expressly indicated that it appeared through its attorney “without waiving
objections as to improper service, venue, or jurisdiction.” On March 19, Safeway
filed its motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(5), along with a notice that the motion
would be heard with oral argument at 11 a.m. on April 25 and that “[w]ritten
responses and replies must be filed and served according to the deadlines in Local
Civil Rule 7.” On April 16, Safeway filed a reply to its motion to dismiss, noted that
McCall had not responded to its motion by “her deadline, April 14, 2025,” and again
sought dismissal of the action with prejudice both on the basis of CR 12(b)(5) and
due to McCall’s failure to respond.
On April 23, counsel appeared on McCall’s behalf and filed a response in
opposition at 9 a.m. on April 25, two hours before the scheduled start time for the
hearing on Safeway’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, Safeway objected to the
trial court’s consideration of McCall’s response brief due to its late filing and noted
that self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.
McCall’s counsel acknowledged that her response was untimely, stating, “It is
absolutely untimely,” and offered to stipulate to a continuance to allow Safeway
time to file a reply. The judge again explained, “[T]here has to be some meritorious
-2- No. 88333-0-I/3
reasons why [the motion] was filed late before I would consider your response”
and directed counsel to address that threshold matter. McCall’s counsel
emphasized that he had been retained only two days prior and further explained
the barriers his client faced based on her education level and socioeconomic
circumstances but ultimately did not respond to the trial court’s point that late
responses require express permission of the court, usually after a motion has been
filed. McCall summarized her position on the procedural question as “in the
interest of promoting access to justice.” Safeway argued that McCall had been
able to file a complaint without the assistance of counsel, reiterated that pro se
litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys under Washington law, and
emphasized that McCall “had the ample time [sic] and the opportunity” to timely
file her response to its motion. In light of the fact that the remedy Safeway sought
was the dismissal of McCall’s case, the trial court continued the matter for three
weeks to allow Safeway to reply to McCall response brief and expressly advised
that McCall was not permitted to file a surreply.
When the trial court took the matter up again on May 16, Safeway
emphasized that by mailing her initial pleadings, McCall failed to effectuate
personal service on it within the statute of limitations. McCall’s attorney
characterized the issue as one of first impression and argued that the term
“delivery” was not defined in the statute, hand-to-hand delivery was not required,
and ultimately emphasized what he referred to as “the equitable issue,” the
struggles of self-represented litigants, before he urged the trial court to “waive rules
to advance the cause of justice.” After Safeway presented its rebuttal argument,
-3- No. 88333-0-I/4
the trial court took the matter under advisement and indicated that it would issue
its written order at a later date. On May 19, the trial court adopted Safeway’s
proposed order without modification and dismissed McCall’s case.
On May 29, McCall filed a motion for reconsideration that asserted the trial
court had “both misinterpret[ed] and incorrectly applie[d] a definitional statute as a
non-waivable requirement which supersedes the civil rules adopted by our high
court.” She further contended that dismissal was improper because “a material
factual issue remain[ed] unresolved and require[d] jurisdictional discovery”;
essentially, “there could be evidence of second-hand service” that might support a
different outcome. (Emphasis added.) On that basis, McCall also sought, in the
alternative, “[l]imited jurisdictional discovery [to] allow the parties and [the] court to
determine whether the unwaivable in-person service requirement [Safeway] insists
upon was met.” On June 18, the trial court denied McCall’s motion for
reconsideration.
McCall timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Scope of Review on Appeal
McCall filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 2025 that designated only the
May 19 order that dismissed her case under CR 12(b)(5). However, she filed an
amended notice of appeal on July 16 and designated the trial court’s June 18 order
that denied her motion for reconsideration, in addition to the May 19 dismissal
order. McCall’s opening brief presents two assignments of error: that the trial court
erred when it concluded Safeway had not been personally served with McCall’s
-4- No. 88333-0-I/5
suit and abused its discretion when it denied her motion for reconsideration.
Because the assignment of error regarding the propriety of the trial court’s ruling
under CR 12(b)(5) is dispositive, we need not reach the merits of her challenge to
the order that denied reconsideration.
II. Motion to Dismiss under CR 12(b)(5)
CR 12 establishes the deadlines for the filing of an answer in a suit, but the
timeframes set out in the rule are premised on the method of service of process
used by the plaintiff. See CR 12(a). It further establishes that certain defenses,
enumerated in the rule, may be presented by a separate motion independent of an
answer. See CR 12(b). Relevant here, Safeway moved for dismissal under CR
12(b)(5), insufficiency of service of process. CR 12(d) establishes the procedure
for hearing CR 12(b) defenses and explicitly states that such motions “shall be
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.” This
is so because, under Washington law, “‘[b]eyond due process [requirements],
statutory service requirements must be complied with in order for the court to finally
adjudicate the dispute between the parties.’” Ronald Wastewater Dist. v. Olympic
View Water & Sewer Dist., 196 Wn.2d 353, 370, 474 P.3d 547 (2020) (alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wn.2d
726, 734, 903 P.2d 455 (1995)). “Proper service of the summons and complaint
is a prerequisite to a court obtaining jurisdiction over a party.” Harvey v. Obermeit,
163 Wn. App. 311, 318, 261 P.3d 671 (2011). “This court reviews de novo if
-5- No. 88333-0-I/6
service of process was proper.” Scanlan v. Townsend, 181 Wn.2d 838, 847, 336
P.3d 1155 (2014).
When a defendant challenges service of process, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of proper service. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by providing a declaration of a process server, regular in form and substance. Then the challenging party must show by clear and convincing evidence that service was improper.
Northwick v. Long, 192 Wn. App. 256, 261, 364 P.3d 1067 (2015) (footnotes
omitted). Our appellate courts have long held that “the defense of insufficient
service of process is waived unless the party asserts it either in a responsive
pleading or in a motion under CR 12(b)(5).” French v. Gabriel, 116 Wn.2d 584,
588, 806 P.2d 1234 (1991); see also Harvey v. Obermeit, 163 Wn. App. 311, 323,
261 P.3d 671 (2011); O’Neill v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 124 Wn. App. 516, 527,
125 P.3d 134 (2004); Gerean v. Martin-Joven, 108 Wn. App. 963, 972-73, 33 P.3d
427 (2001); Davidheiser v. Pierce County, 92 Wn. App. 146, 155, 960 P.2d 998
(1998).
Here, McCall does not dispute that she mailed the summons and complaint
to Safeway’s registered agent in late December 2024. She attached to her
response to Safeway’s motion to dismiss a printed record of the United States
Postal Service (USPS) tracking information that matched the tracking number on
the photocopy of the USPS label that Safeway had included with its motion. The
printout of the tracking history begins with the entry “USPS in possession of item”
in Auburn at 10:00 a.m. on December 28, 2024 and concludes with a notation,
“Delivered, Individual Picked Up at Postal Facility,” and information that indicates
it was picked up at 6:24 a.m. on December 31, 2024. This was the only evidence,
-6- No. 88333-0-I/7
other than her declaration, that she proffered in support of denial of the motion to
dismiss. As both parties recognized, the question of commencement of the action
through proper service of process was dispositive in this case because McCall filed
her negligence action against Safeway the day before the statute of limitations was
due to expire.
A. Statute of Limitations
RCW 4.16.005 explains, absent exceptions not applicable here, that
“actions can only be commenced within the periods provided in this chapter after
the cause of action has accrued.” Personal injury actions, like the one McCall
sought to bring against Safeway, must be commenced within three years. RCW
4.16.080(2). A cause of action in negligence accrues when a plaintiff “suffers
appreciable harm as a consequence of negligence . . . the infliction of actual and
appreciable damage will trigger the running of the statute of limitations.” Gazija v.
Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 219, 543 P.2d 338 (1975). Critically here,
[f]or the purpose of tolling any statute of limitations an action shall be deemed commenced when the complaint is filed or summons is served whichever occurs first. If service has not been had on the defendant prior to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall cause one or more of the defendants to be served personally . . . within ninety days from the date of filing the complaint. . . . If. . . following filing, service is not so made, the action shall be deemed to not have been commenced for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.
RCW 4.16.170 (emphasis added).
Compliance with the applicable statute of limitations and rules and statutes
regarding commencement of actions is essential because, “[f]rom the time of the
commencement of the action by service of summons, or by filing of a complaint, or
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as otherwise provided, the court is deemed to have acquired jurisdiction and to
have control of all subsequent proceedings.” RCW 4.28.020. In order to proceed
with her claim for damages against Safeway, McCall carries the burden to
establish that she had satisfied these distinct, but complimentary requirements
such that commencement of the action occurred within the statute of limitations.
B. Civil Rules on Commencement of Action and Service of Process
Our civil rules establish the means by which an action may be commenced.
CR 3(a) states, “Except as provided in rule 4.1, a civil action is commenced by
service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of a complaint, as provided
in rule 4 or by filing a complaint.” Process is then addressed in CR 4. CR 4(d)(2)
requires that “personal service of summons and other process shall be as provided
in RCW 4.28.080-.090.” However, CR 4(d)(4) also notes,
In circumstances justifying service by publication [as set out in CR 4(d)(3)], if the serving party files an affidavit stating facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that service be made by any person over 18 years of age, who is competent to be a witness, other than a party, by mailing copies of the summons and other process to the party to be served at the party’s last known address or any other address determined by the court to be appropriate. Two copies shall be mailed, postage prepaid, one by ordinary first class mail and the other by a form of mail requiring a signed receipt showing when and to whom it was delivered. The envelopes must bear the return address of the sender. The summons shall contain the date it was deposited in the mail and shall require the defendant to appear and answer the complaint within 90 days from the date of mailing. Service under this subsection has the same jurisdictional effect as service by publication.
(Emphasis added.) Further, CR 4(g) provides the relevant requirement regarding
return of service:
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Proof of service shall be as follows: .... (4) If served as provided in subsection (d)(4), the affidavit of the serving party stating that the copies of the summons and other process were sent by mail in accordance with the rule and directions by the court, and stating to whom, and when, the envelopes were mailed.
The plain language of CR 4(d)(2) required McCall to serve Safeway “as provided
in RCW 4.28.080-.090” unless she sought leave of the court under CR 4(d)(4) to
effectuate service by mail. If such permission was granted, return of service would
be demonstrated by an affidavit containing the information described in CR 4(g)(4).
C. Statutory Requirements for Service of Process on Corporate Entity
The version of RCW 4.28.080 in effect at the time McCall filed her
negligence action and attempted service plainly states that “[s]ervice made in the
modes provided in this section is personal service” in conformance with the
language of CR 4, set out supra. Former RCW 4.28.080 (2015). The statute
further directs, in relevant part, that
[t]he summons shall be served by delivering a copy thereof, as follows: .... (9) If against a company or corporation other than those designated in subsections (1) through (8) of this section, to the president or other head of the company or corporation, the registered agent, secretary, cashier or managing agent thereof or to the secretary, stenographer or office assistant of the president or other head of the company or corporation, registered agent, secretary, cashier, or managing agent.
Former RCW 4.28.080(9). Safeway conceded in its motion to dismiss that
subsection (9) controlled in this case. It also cited, without analysis, RCW
23.95.450 which states in subsection (1) that a “represented entity may be served
-9- No. 88333-0-I/10
with any process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law by serving its
registered agent.”
Accepting Safeway’s position that subsection (9) applies, which McCall
apparently understood to some extent given that she mailed the summons and
complaint to its registered agent, the Civil Rules and statutes set out in this section
nonetheless required additional steps in order establish compliance such that the
action was properly commenced within the statute of limitations. McCall failed to
carry her burden in that regard.
III. Dismissal for Insufficient Service Was Proper
McCall attempted to frame this issue as one of statutory interpretation and,
to the extent that it sought to meet those arguments, Safeway responded with its
own contrary, but related analysis. However, the controlling case law is clear;
when Safeway challenged the sufficiency of service of process, McCall had the
burden to establish a prima facie case of proper service under the applicable rules
and statutes. Accordingly, this is not a question of statutory interpretation and
certainly not, as McCall’s counsel contended in the trial court, one of first
impression. The matter before us presents the simple question of whether McCall
made her threshold showing that she completed service of process such that the
applicable statute of limitations was tolled.
Toward that end, if McCall sought to effectuate service by mail, she was
required to first seek the trial court’s permission. Our state Supreme Court has
explained,
- 10 - No. 88333-0-I/11
Under CR 4(d)(4), a party may conduct service by mail. A court will issue an order allowing service by mail when there are “circumstances justifying service by publication” and if the serving party demonstrates, by affidavit, facts which show that service by mail is just as likely to give actual notice as service by publication.
Jones v. Stebbins, 122 Wn.2d 471, 475, 860 P.2d 1009 (1993). Thus, a litigant
must either effectuate personal service of a corporation or seek an order allowing
service by mail and provide the requisite affidavit as proof of service.
Here, McCall did not personally serve Safeway; service was by mail. Yet
she has produced no evidence that she complied with the foregoing requirements
for service by mail. She did not obtain the required order, and, most critically,
neither filed an affidavit of service, nor contended elsewhere in any pleading or
declaration that, even without the court’s permission, she complied with the
requirements of CR 4(d)(4) and served the requisite number of copies, “one by
ordinary first class mail and the other by a form of mail requiring a signed receipt
showing when and to whom it was delivered.” 1 (Emphasis added.) Critically here,
CR 4(d)(5) explicitly states that a “voluntary appearance of a defendant does not
preclude the defendant’s right to challenge . . . insufficiency of service of process
pursuant to rule 12(b).” Our appellate courts have consistently reiterated that
principle established by the plain language of the rule. See, e.g., Lybbert v. Grant
County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 44, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000); French, 116 Wn.2d at 594; Crouch
v. Friedman, 51 Wn. App. 731, 735, 754 P.2d 1299 (1988); Adkinson v. Digby, Inc.,
1 Further, “our State has long required service of process to be made by a person other
than a plaintiff. This requirement is consistent with the principle of law that a person may not execute process in [their] own favor.” Crouch v. Friedman, 51 Wn. App. 731, 733, 754 P.2d 1299 (1988) (citation omitted). McCall does not engage with this additional aspect of the governing rules regarding service of process.
- 11 - No. 88333-0-I/12
99 Wn.2d 206, 210, 660 P.2d 756 (1983). Accordingly, the fact that Safeway
voluntarily appeared within the 90-day period following McCall’s filing of the
complaint does not assist her with regard to the prima facie showing.
On these facts, the tactical decision of McCall’s counsel to pivot away from
the evidentiary burden and toward statutory interpretation makes a certain amount
of sense, as does the emphasis on what counsel termed “the equitable issue” in
the trial court, but was more properly understood as an attempt to obtain a waiver
of the requirements of the rules and statutes set out herein. 2 While McCall’s
counsel emphasized the difficulties self-represented parties often face when
navigating the legal system, and presented slides that featured headlines on the
topic, the fact remains that McCall competently drafted a fairly sophisticated
complaint for damages and filed it just before the expiration of the statute of
limitations. The fact that she mailed the summons and complaint to Safeway’s
registered agent supports the conclusion that she was able to conduct at least
some research regarding commencement of an action against a corporate entity.
These considerations actually cut against her arguments for waiver and, even if
McCall had been less successful in her efforts to preserve her claims against
Safeway, to the extent she seeks a holding from this intermediate appellate court
to overturn longstanding precedent that holds self-represented parties to the same
standard as attorneys, we decline that request as well.
2 Section B of McCall’s response to the motion to dismiss was entitled, “Justice is furthered
by waiving the formal service rules because Safeway is present and unprejudiced by the service method employed” (emphasis added), and she specifically argued that the answer to the issue of the financial inequity or power differential of the parties “is clear: waiver or a finding of substantial compliance is most consistent with both the civil rule’s purpose and the interests of justice.”
- 12 - No. 88333-0-I/13
McCall failed to carry her evidentiary burden to make a prima facie showing
of any compliance with the relevant rules and statutes regarding service of process
for purposes of commencing an action. Her declaration submitted with her
response in opposition to Safeway’s motion to dismiss simply presented
biographical facts about her and reiterated or expanded on the assertions set out
in her complaint; nowhere did McCall address the matter at the heart of the motion.
Similarly, at the May 16 hearing on the motion, McCall’s counsel went on at great
length about access to justice and public disdain for attorneys but, given that the
question of the propriety of service of process is one tied to the court’s ability to
exercise jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court properly avoided accepting
counsel’s policy arguments over the established rules, statutes, and caselaw
analyzed herein. 3
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
3 Further, to adopt an unprincipled and unbounded rule, as McCall urged in the trial court
and now on appeal, that a person’s hardships in life regarding poverty, substance use and abuse, domestic violence, and other equally serious matters may justify waiver of court rules and legislative enactments regarding service of process that go to the heart of a structured legal system, could result in wild disparities in outcomes and could undermine the very access to justice for which her counsel argued. In the absence of relevant Supreme Court precedent, we decline to unilaterally amend the applicable rules and statutes (as set forth herein), based on the considerations McCall emphasizes here or any other equally compelling considerations. Such a holding would exceed our proper role as an intermediate appellate court.
- 13 -