Sandra Jean Watkins v. Wesley Homes

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 9, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00290
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 SANDRA JEAN WATKINS, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00290-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION 12 v. FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 13 WESLEY HOMES, 14 Defendant. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Wesley Homes’ motion for judgment on 17 the pleadings. Dkt. No. 26. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion and dismisses 18 this case. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff Sandra Walkins filed suit against her former employer, Wesley Homes, for 21 employment discrimination based on religion and age. Dkt. No. 4 at 1–3, 5. Watkins, who is 22 proceeding pro se, avers that she is Catholic and was born in 1971. Id. at 5, 7. The complaint 23 alleges that on May 14, 2024, Watkins was gone from work for 90 minutes while she “attended a 24 catholic mass funeral[.]” Id. at 4. She “let [her] supervi[s]or and lead know by email.” Id. “Two 1 (2) days later, [Watkins’s] supervisor sent [her] an email wanting to di[s]cuss the ‘issue.’” Id. The 2 supervisor purportedly “told [Watkins] that [she] was in need of ‘training.’” Id. Watkins avers that 3 “nothing in the employee handbook states anything about the need for training for attending a 4 funeral.” Id. She adds,

5 Nothing in the employee handbook states that you need to advise anyone on attending a funeral. I did however. Nor does it say that you will be [harassed] [] 6 into signing any “write up” or that you are in need of training. Also, several younger co-workers were treated differently than I was. 7 Id. at 5–6. The “alleged discriminatory acts” occurred on approximately May 16, 2024. Id. at 5. 8 Watkins states that she “quit[] due to hostile environment and age/religious discrimination.” Id. at 9 4. She seeks “ninety million dollars in punitive and exemplary damages due to the unfair treatment 10 because of [her] age and for attending a catholic funeral[.]” Id. at 7. She claims to have “suffered 11 great [mental] anguish,” has “not been able to gain fulltime employment,” “was denied 12 unemployment,” and has “not been able to pay [her] rent and [is] facing eviction.” Id. She “hold[s] 13 Wesley Homes, founded by the United [Methodist] Church of Des Moines, accountable for the 14 mental anguish and overwhelming financial stress that this has caused[.]” Id. 15 On or before November 20, 2024, it appears that Watkins filed a charge with the U.S. Equal 16 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which stated as follows: 17 I was hired by Wesley Homes, hereinafter Respondent, on or around August 29, 18 2022. I performed the duties of my position as Front Desk Concierge in a satisfactory manner. 19 During my employment, I expressed concerns to Respondent about my supervisor’s 20 poor communication. It is my belief that my supervisor overheard my complaints and decided to retaliate against me. On or about May 16, 2024, my supervisor 21 attempted to discipline me for attending a Catholic funeral during my break. Due to the unfair treatment and intolerable working conditions, I resigned from my 22 position on or about May 16, 2024.

23 I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my religious beliefs, Catholic, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 24 1 Dkt. No. 4-1 at 1 (unsigned and undated EEOC charge). As noted above, Watkins alleged that the 2 discrimination took place on a single day—May 16, 2024—and was based on religion. Id. The 3 EEOC issued Watkins a Determination and Notice of Rights on November 20, 2024, notifying 4 Watkins of her right to file suit within 90 days. Id. at 3. On February 13, 2025, Watkins filed her

5 proposed complaint with this Court. Dkt. No. 1–1. 6 Watkins complaint alleges “[u]nequal terms and conditions of . . . employment” and 7 “[r]etaliation” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination 8 in Employment Act of 1967. Id. at 3, 5. Wesley Homes answered the complaint on May 2, 2025. 9 Dkt. No. 14. In relevant part, Wesley Homes stated, 10 Defendant admits that Plaintiff informed her supervisor or lead by email that Plaintiff intended to take leave to attend a funeral but denies that Defendant 11 approved this leave or that Plaintiff provided Defendant with sufficient notice to consider her leave request. . . . Defendant admits Plaintiff’s supervisor coached 12 Plaintiff that her unexcused absence from her work location violated Defendant’s practices and policies. Defendant admits that its employee handbook does not have 13 a specific policy on attending funerals for residents but denies the implication that Defendant’s handbook does not have policies on workplace attendance. Defendant 14 admits Plaintiff voluntarily quit her employment. Defendant denies Plaintiff voluntarily quit her employment due to an alleged hostile work environment or age 15 or religious discrimination. Defendant denies that Defendant caused Plaintiff to suffer a hostile work environment or age or religious discrimination. 16 Id. at 2. 17 On November 21, 2025, Wesley Homes filed the present motion for judgment on the 18 pleadings. Dkt. No. 26. Watkins responded in opposition, Dkt. No. 28, to which Wesley Homes 19 replied, Dkt. No. 29.1 20 21 22 23 1 Watkins filed an improper surreply that did not comply with LCR 7(g), Dkt. No. 30, so the Court struck it as 24 procedurally improper. Dkt. No. 31. Even if the Court considered the surreply, the decision would remain the same. 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Legal Standard 3 “Analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) 4 because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken

5 as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th 6 Cir. 2012) (citation modified). Therefore, unlike with motions for summary judgment where the 7 entire evidentiary record is considered, when reviewing motions for judgment on the pleadings, 8 the Court considers only (1) the pleadings, (2) documents incorporated by reference into the 9 complaint, and (3) matters of judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 10 2003). The Court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the [relevant pleading] as true and construe[s] 11 them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 12 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 When deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must 14 assume the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising

15 from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). The court “need not 16 accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the 17 complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 18 Instead, the plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible 19 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 20 “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 21 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 22 (2009). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must include “more 23 than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A complaint “that offers

24 1 ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 2 do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 3 Because Watkins is proceeding pro se, the Court holds her complaint “to less stringent 4 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and construes her “filings liberally[.]” Hebbe

5 v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). However, pro se complaints 6 must still include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 7 relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)—a plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse compliance with this 8 bedrock requirement. See Am. Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 9 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the lenient pleading standard does not excuse a pro se 10 litigant from meeting basic pleading requirements); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 11 1992) (although the court has an obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings, it “may not 12 supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled” (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents 13 of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 14 B. Watkins Failed to State a Claim for Relief

15 Liberally construing Watkins’s complaint, she alleges claims of hostile work environment, 16 religious discrimination, retaliation, and age discrimination in violation of federal law. See Dkt. 17 No. 4 at 4–5. The Court analyzes each of these claims and finds that none state a cognizable claim 18 for relief. 19 1. Hostile Work Environment 20 To succeed on her hostile work environment claim, Watkins is required to establish that: 21 (1) she was subjected to a hostile work environment, and (2) Wesley Homes is liable for the 22 harassment that caused the hostile environment to exist. Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, 18 F.4th 643, 23 647 (9th Cir. 2021). To meet the first element, she must show: (1) she was subjected to verbal or

24 physical conduct of a sexual or racial nature; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) “the conduct 1 was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive 2 working environment.” Id. (citing Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 966 (9th 3 Cir. 2002)); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“When the workplace is 4 permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or

5 pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 6 environment, Title VII is violated.” (citation modified)). “To determine whether conduct was 7 sufficiently severe or pervasive,” courts examine “all the circumstances, including the frequency 8 of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a 9 mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 10 performance.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation 11 modified). “[O]ffhand comments[] and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 12 amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment[.]” Faragher v. City 13 of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 14 Construed liberally, Watkins’s complaint fails to allege conduct sufficiently severe or

15 pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment. Much of the complaint “offers ‘labels and 16 conclusions’ [and] ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action [that] will not do.’” 17 Iqbal, 556 at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). She avers that her supervisor “sent . . . an 18 email wanting to di[s]cuss the ‘issue’” related to Watkins leaving work to attend a funeral and the 19 supervisor told Watkins “that [she] was in need of ‘training[.]’” Dkt. No. 4 at 4. Watkins adds that 20 the employee handbook does not state “that you will be harased [sic] . . . into sig[n]ing any ‘write 21 up’ or that you are in need of training.” Id. at 5–6. She fails to identify or describe the alleged 22 harassment beyond a meeting with her supervisor where she was told she was “in need of training.” 23 Id. at 4–6 (citation modified). These allegations are not frequent or severe enough to constitute a

24 hostile work environment. Taken together, Watkins’s allegations identify one meeting in which 1 her supervisor said she needed training, and a vague allegation of harassment. See id. at 5–7. These 2 are not allegations of “physically threatening or humiliating” conduct, nor do they demonstrate an 3 “unreasonabl[e] interfere[nce] with . . . work performance.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. At most, 4 the allegations appear to demonstrate “isolated incidents” that “will not amount to discriminatory

5 changes in the terms and conditions of employment[.]” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Therefore, the 6 Court dismisses Watkins’s hostile work environment claim. 7 2. Religious Discrimination 8 Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate 9 against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). For 10 purposes of Title VII, “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and 11 practice . . . unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 12 employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 13 employer’s business.” Id. § 2000e(j). A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of religious 14 discrimination under Title VII by demonstrating that: “(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class;

15 (2) [s]he was qualified for h[er] position; (3) [s]he experienced an adverse employment action; and 16 (4) similarly situated individuals outside h[er] protected class were treated more favorably, or other 17 circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of 18 discrimination.” Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) 19 (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2004)). 20 Construed liberally, Watkins’s complaint fails to allege facts showing that she 21 “experienced an adverse employment action[.]” Fonseca, 374 F.3d at 847. To establish that 22 element, a plaintiff must show “some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions[.]” 23 Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 359 (2024). Watkins makes no such claim.

24 She avers that her supervisor “sent . . . an email wanting to di[s]cuss the ‘issue’” related to Watkins 1 leaving work to attend a Catholic funeral and the supervisor told Watkins “that [she] was in need 2 of ‘training[.]’” Dkt. No. 4 at 4. Watkins does not aver how the meeting with her supervisor and 3 the comment that she needed training negatively affected the terms and conditions of her 4 employment.

5 Watkins states that she “quit[] due to hostile environment and age/religious 6 discrimination.” Id. While a constructive discharge can constitute an adverse action at least in some 7 circumstances, Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1377 n.10 (9th Cir. 1988), Watkins has not alleged 8 sufficient facts to state a claim for constructive discharge. “Under the constructive discharge 9 doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions 10 is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes.” Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 11 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004). To establish that she was constructively discharged, a plaintiff “must 12 make a further showing” beyond demonstrating a hostile work environment: “[s]he must show that 13 the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting 14 response.” Id. at 134. “Creation of a hostile work environment is a necessary predicate to a hostile-

15 environment constructive discharge case.” Id. at 149. Here, because Watkins’s allegations are 16 insufficient to demonstrate a hostile work environment, they are also insufficient to establish “the 17 graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge[.]” Id.2 Therefore, the Court dismisses 18 Watkins’s religious discrimination claim. 19 20 21

22 2 Additionally, Watkins failed to allege that “similarly situated individuals outside h[er] protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Fonseca, 374 F.3d at 847. Although Watkins generally alleges that she was treated differently than 23 some of her colleagues, she does not identify how she was treated differently. See Dkt. No. 4 at 6. Her vague allegations of different treatment are “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” and insufficient to state a 24 claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 1 3. Retaliation 2 “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove (1) she engaged in a 3 protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal 4 connection between the two.” Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir.

5 2008). Among other issues, Watkins has not alleged that she suffered an adverse employment 6 action, as discussed above. Moreover, it appears that any alleged adverse employment action was 7 not causally related to a protected activity. Protected activity is that which “opposes a specific 8 employer’s discriminatory practices.” EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 9 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[A] simple assertion that an employer is personally bigoted, without more, is not 10 statutorily protected opposition to an ‘unlawful employment practice.’”). Watkins avers that the 11 retaliation was due to “[her] supervisor overhear[ing] [her] complaints” about her “supervisor’s 12 poor communication[.]” Dkt. No. 4-1 at 1. Opposing a supervisor’s communication style, without 13 more, is not a protected activity. See Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1013. Therefore, Watkins’s 14 retaliation claim must be dismissed.

15 4. Age Discrimination 16 Finally, Wesley Homes argues that “Ms. Watkins failed to even include her age 17 discrimination claim in her EEOC charge.” Dkt. No. 26 at 7. Watkins does not dispute this 18 assertion in her response. See generally Dkt. No. 28. The Court’s review of the EEOC charge 19 confirms that age discrimination is not mentioned. See Dkt. No. 4-1. 20 A plaintiff may not commence an age discrimination suit against a private employer 21 without first filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). “Incidents 22 of discrimination not included in an EEOC charge may not be considered by a federal court unless 23 the new claims are ‘like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge,’”

24 Green v. L.A. Cty. Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brown 1 v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Tr., 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984)), which is 2 not the case here. Watkins complaint alleges only that “several younger co-workers were treated 3 differently than [she] was,” Dkt. No. 4 at 6, but offers no connection to the allegations of religious 4 discrimination in her EEOC charge, Dkt. No. 4-1 at 1. The Court sees no overlap between the two

5 claims such that the age discrimination claim could “reasonably be expected to grow out of the 6 charge” of religious discrimination. Huang v. Seattle Pub. Lib., No. C14-1986RAJ, 2016 WL 7 3405486, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 21, 2016) (quoting Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th 8 Cir. 1990)); see also Howard v. Kiewit P. Corp., No. CIV. 05-00525ACK/KSC, 2006 WL 278603, 9 at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 19, 2006) (“The Court finds that claims for race and color discrimination are 10 not like or reasonably related to the allegations for age and disability discrimination contained in 11 the EEOC charge; nor are they within the scope of an EEOC . . . investigation that could reasonably 12 have been expected to grow out of the charge.”) Accordingly, Watkins’s age discrimination claim 13 is dismissed.3 Because the deadline to file an EEOC charge has elapsed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), 14 the dismissal as to age discrimination is with prejudice.

15 C. Leave to Amend 16 As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissal based on a 12(c) motion without leave to amend 17 “is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that an amendment could not cure the deficiency.” 18 Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 15(a)(2) directs district 19 courts to “freely give leave” to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 15(a)(2). As the language of the rule suggests, the standard for leave to amend is “very liberal.” 21 AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). This is because 22 “the underlying purpose of Rule 15” is “to facilitate [a] decision on the merits, rather than on the 23 3 Even if Watkins had exhausted this claim, it would fail on the pleadings because, like with her religious 24 discrimination claim, Watkins fails to allege an adverse action. 1 pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation 2 modified). Still, courts can deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile. Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n 3 of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cnty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013). 4 Wesley Homes avers that each of “Watkins’s claims is missing some or all of the essential

5 elements, meaning she could not prevail on these claims even if she had a chance to amend” and 6 argues that “Watkins would have to fabricate allegations to avoid dismissal, which would violate 7 her duties under FRCP 11(b).” Dkt. No. 26 at 8. While the Court agrees that each of Watkins’s 8 claims—as pleaded in her complaint—is missing some or all of the essential elements, it does not 9 necessarily follow that amendment would be futile. It is possible that additional facts exist that 10 could cure the deficiencies outlined above. As to Wesley Homes’ concerns that Watkins may 11 “fabricate allegations to avoid dismissal,” the Court notes that both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 11 and Local Civil Rule 11 apply to pro se plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (permitting sanctions 13 against a “party” that violates the rule); LCR 11 (“An attorney or party who without just cause 14 fails to comply with any of the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, these rules, or an

15 order of the court . . . may, in addition to or in lieu of the sanctions and penalties provided 16 elsewhere in these rules, be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs and may 17 be subject to such other sanctions as the court may deem appropriate.”). A violation of either rule 18 through, for example, fabricating allegations, could result in serious sanctions, including but not 19 limited to requiring the violator to pay the opposing party’s attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Rider v. 20 JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., No. 20-CV-06888-LHK, 2021 WL 229308, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 21 2021) (ordering pro se plaintiff to pay defendant $6,900.67 in attorneys’ fees for her violations of 22 Rule 11). 23 In keeping with the purpose of Rule 15, the Court will grant Watkins an opportunity to

24 amend her claims to the extent they are not futile. Therefore, Watkins may amend her religious 1 discrimination claims but not her age discrimination claim, which was dismissed with prejudice. 2 The filing of an amended complaint will supersede all previous complaints, so Watkins should 3 ensure that her amended complaint contains all intended allegations. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 4 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting the “well-established doctrine that an amended pleading

5 supersedes the original pleading”). Any amended complaint must clearly set forth the “who, what, 6 where, when, and why” necessary for the Court and Wesley Homes to understand what Watkins 7 is alleging. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Wesley Homes’ Motion to 10 Dismiss, Dkt. No. 26, and dismisses the complaint with leave to amend as described above. If 11 Watkins does not file an amended complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order, the Court 12 will close this case. 13 Dated this 9th day of February, 2026. 14 A

15 Lauren King United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24