USCA4 Appeal: 24-1679 Doc: 43 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 1 of 8
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1679
SANDRA YESENIA ESCOBAR-AMAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Submitted: August 20, 2025 Decided: October 17, 2025
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Vincent Rivas-Flores, KONARE LAW, Frederick, Maryland, for Petitioner. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel, Nancy E. Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1679 Doc: 43 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 2 of 8
PER CURIAM:
Sandra Escobar-Amaya petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals
order upholding the denial of her asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against
Torture claims. Escobar-Amaya claimed that she had been battered and abused by her
former partner, and that she fled El Salvador for the United States to escape further abuse.
The immigration judge rejected those claims and ordered Escobar-Amaya removed to El
Salvador.
In denying relief, the immigration judge (IJ) relied mostly on an adverse credibility
finding: that Escobar-Amaya’s claims of abuse were not credible because her testimony
on critical details was both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with prior sworn
statements. On the Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim – as to which the credibility
determination was not entirely dispositive, see Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 371 (4th
Cir. 2004) – the IJ went on to find Escobar-Amaya’s additional evidence insufficient to
establish the requisite likelihood of torture.
Escobar-Amaya appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). She argued,
first, that the inconsistencies identified by the IJ reflected mental incompetency, not a lack
of credibility, and that together with a psychological report in the record, those
inconsistencies should have prompted the IJ to conduct a mental competency assessment.
See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479–80 (BIA 2011). Had the IJ done so, she
insisted, he would have found her incompetent, triggering a “safeguard” requiring him to
disregard her inconsistent statements and put aside his credibility concerns. See Matter of
J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609, 610–12 (BIA 2015). As to her CAT claim, Escobar-Amaya
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further argued that the IJ erred by disregarding country-conditions evidence that would
have shown, she said, that a custody dispute with her ex-partner put her at risk of torture.
The BIA disagreed. First, it found that the IJ did not err in failing to conduct a
competency assessment: Escobar-Amaya’s counsel never raised any concern about
competency or sought a competency hearing; her psychological evaluation, conducted
months earlier, did not suggest any inability to participate intelligently in removal
proceedings; and her inconsistent answers alone did not merit a competency inquiry. The
BIA also sustained, as not clearly erroneous, the IJ’s finding as to unlikelihood of future
torture. Escobar-Amaya timely petitioned this court for review under 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1252(b)(1) and (d), raising the same objections she raised before the BIA.
Starting with the competency issue, we review an IJ’s “factual finding of
competency . . . under the substantial evidence standard.” Diop v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 70, 75
(4th Cir. 2015). Here, however, the IJ did not make express “factual finding[s] of
competency” like those in Diop, id., and we are instead reviewing the BIA’s after-the-fact
assessment of the appellate record. Our court has not considered whether Diop’s
substantial evidence standard applies in this context, as well. Neither have the parties
directly addressed the question, though the government cites Diop and the substantial
evidence standard while Escobar-Amaya calls for de novo review of the BIA’s decision.
We conclude that we need not resolve the standard of review issue here, because even
under Escobar-Amaya’s preferred, de novo standard, we find no error in the BIA’s
competency-related determination.
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The BIA’s procedure for assessing mental competency in immigration proceedings
requires the IJ to “consider whether there is good cause to believe that the alien lacks
sufficient competency to proceed without safeguards” by looking for “indicia of
incompetency” at the noncitizen’s hearing and in the evidentiary record. Matter of M-A-
M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479; see Diop, 807 F.3d at 75 (relying on Matter of M-A-M-). Such
indicia may include, for example, an “inability to understand and respond to questions, [an]
inability to stay on topic, or a high level of distraction” exhibited by a noncitizen at her
hearing. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479. It may also include “direct
assessments” of mental health, such as medical reports or testimony from health
professionals, included in the record. Id. If, and only if, the IJ finds such “indicia of
incompetency,” the IJ “must take measures to determine whether [the noncitizen] is
competent to participate in proceedings.” Id. at 480.
We have independently reviewed the record here, and we agree with the BIA that
no competency assessment was required. First, neither Escobar-Amaya nor her attorney
raised mental illness or incompetency at her hearing. Second, the transcript of Escobar-
Amaya’s hearing before the IJ reveals that she “ha[d] a rational and factual understanding
of the nature and object of the proceedings.” Id. at 479 (defining competency for
immigration proceedings). Indeed, Escobar-Amaya engaged in several long periods of
back and forth with the IJ in which she appeared clearly able to understand and respond to
questions. Third, although Escobar-Amaya was unable to recall certain details central to
her claims of abuse and torture – or unable to reconcile conflicting details she had
reported – “the mere inability to remember certain events and give certain testimony does
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not amount to mental incompetency.” Salgado v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir.
2018).
We also agree with the BIA that Escobar-Amaya’s psychological evaluation
demonstrates her ability, not inability, to understand and respond to questions – even
questions about the most seemingly traumatic aspects of her experience in El Salvador. To
be sure, the report diagnosed Escobar-Amaya with conditions that can be associated with
symptoms like “lack of concentration” and “memory problems,” and she self-reported
having “[p]roblems with memory and concentration.” J.A. 189–90. But the report did not
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-1679 Doc: 43 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 1 of 8
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1679
SANDRA YESENIA ESCOBAR-AMAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Submitted: August 20, 2025 Decided: October 17, 2025
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Vincent Rivas-Flores, KONARE LAW, Frederick, Maryland, for Petitioner. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel, Nancy E. Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1679 Doc: 43 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 2 of 8
PER CURIAM:
Sandra Escobar-Amaya petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals
order upholding the denial of her asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against
Torture claims. Escobar-Amaya claimed that she had been battered and abused by her
former partner, and that she fled El Salvador for the United States to escape further abuse.
The immigration judge rejected those claims and ordered Escobar-Amaya removed to El
Salvador.
In denying relief, the immigration judge (IJ) relied mostly on an adverse credibility
finding: that Escobar-Amaya’s claims of abuse were not credible because her testimony
on critical details was both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with prior sworn
statements. On the Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim – as to which the credibility
determination was not entirely dispositive, see Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 371 (4th
Cir. 2004) – the IJ went on to find Escobar-Amaya’s additional evidence insufficient to
establish the requisite likelihood of torture.
Escobar-Amaya appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). She argued,
first, that the inconsistencies identified by the IJ reflected mental incompetency, not a lack
of credibility, and that together with a psychological report in the record, those
inconsistencies should have prompted the IJ to conduct a mental competency assessment.
See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479–80 (BIA 2011). Had the IJ done so, she
insisted, he would have found her incompetent, triggering a “safeguard” requiring him to
disregard her inconsistent statements and put aside his credibility concerns. See Matter of
J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609, 610–12 (BIA 2015). As to her CAT claim, Escobar-Amaya
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further argued that the IJ erred by disregarding country-conditions evidence that would
have shown, she said, that a custody dispute with her ex-partner put her at risk of torture.
The BIA disagreed. First, it found that the IJ did not err in failing to conduct a
competency assessment: Escobar-Amaya’s counsel never raised any concern about
competency or sought a competency hearing; her psychological evaluation, conducted
months earlier, did not suggest any inability to participate intelligently in removal
proceedings; and her inconsistent answers alone did not merit a competency inquiry. The
BIA also sustained, as not clearly erroneous, the IJ’s finding as to unlikelihood of future
torture. Escobar-Amaya timely petitioned this court for review under 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1252(b)(1) and (d), raising the same objections she raised before the BIA.
Starting with the competency issue, we review an IJ’s “factual finding of
competency . . . under the substantial evidence standard.” Diop v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 70, 75
(4th Cir. 2015). Here, however, the IJ did not make express “factual finding[s] of
competency” like those in Diop, id., and we are instead reviewing the BIA’s after-the-fact
assessment of the appellate record. Our court has not considered whether Diop’s
substantial evidence standard applies in this context, as well. Neither have the parties
directly addressed the question, though the government cites Diop and the substantial
evidence standard while Escobar-Amaya calls for de novo review of the BIA’s decision.
We conclude that we need not resolve the standard of review issue here, because even
under Escobar-Amaya’s preferred, de novo standard, we find no error in the BIA’s
competency-related determination.
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The BIA’s procedure for assessing mental competency in immigration proceedings
requires the IJ to “consider whether there is good cause to believe that the alien lacks
sufficient competency to proceed without safeguards” by looking for “indicia of
incompetency” at the noncitizen’s hearing and in the evidentiary record. Matter of M-A-
M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479; see Diop, 807 F.3d at 75 (relying on Matter of M-A-M-). Such
indicia may include, for example, an “inability to understand and respond to questions, [an]
inability to stay on topic, or a high level of distraction” exhibited by a noncitizen at her
hearing. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479. It may also include “direct
assessments” of mental health, such as medical reports or testimony from health
professionals, included in the record. Id. If, and only if, the IJ finds such “indicia of
incompetency,” the IJ “must take measures to determine whether [the noncitizen] is
competent to participate in proceedings.” Id. at 480.
We have independently reviewed the record here, and we agree with the BIA that
no competency assessment was required. First, neither Escobar-Amaya nor her attorney
raised mental illness or incompetency at her hearing. Second, the transcript of Escobar-
Amaya’s hearing before the IJ reveals that she “ha[d] a rational and factual understanding
of the nature and object of the proceedings.” Id. at 479 (defining competency for
immigration proceedings). Indeed, Escobar-Amaya engaged in several long periods of
back and forth with the IJ in which she appeared clearly able to understand and respond to
questions. Third, although Escobar-Amaya was unable to recall certain details central to
her claims of abuse and torture – or unable to reconcile conflicting details she had
reported – “the mere inability to remember certain events and give certain testimony does
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1679 Doc: 43 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 5 of 8
not amount to mental incompetency.” Salgado v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir.
2018).
We also agree with the BIA that Escobar-Amaya’s psychological evaluation
demonstrates her ability, not inability, to understand and respond to questions – even
questions about the most seemingly traumatic aspects of her experience in El Salvador. To
be sure, the report diagnosed Escobar-Amaya with conditions that can be associated with
symptoms like “lack of concentration” and “memory problems,” and she self-reported
having “[p]roblems with memory and concentration.” J.A. 189–90. But the report did not
make any independent findings of memory or concentration issues; to the contrary, it found
that Escobar-Amaya spoke consistently and in detail about the experiences that led her to
leave El Salvador and that “[h]er concentration, attention, and memory all appeared to be
within normal limits.” J.A. 188, 190–91.
Finally, we note that Escobar-Amaya’s purported indicia of incompetency do not
approach the severity of those found in the two BIA precedents upon which she relies. In
Matter of M-A-M-, the record included “several psychiatric reports that diagnose[d] [the
noncitizen] with mental illness” and indicated that the noncitizen had been found
incompetent and unfit to proceed with trial in criminal proceedings. 25 I. & N. Dec. at 484.
Further, the noncitizen there explicitly raised his mental illness, discussed his need for
medication, and asked to see a psychiatrist during his hearing. Id. In Matter of J-R-R-A-,
the noncitizen “laughed inappropriately during the hearing,” and his counsel expressed
concern to the IJ that the noncitizen had a cognitive disability that affected his ability to
testify. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 609–10. The record here includes no comparable facts.
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Instead, Escobar-Amaya relies for “indicia of incompetency” mostly on
inconsistencies in her testimony – the very same inconsistencies that undergirded the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination. The BIA rejected this effort to “recast adverse
credibility findings, without more, as evidence of incompetency,” J.A. 4, and we agree.
Escobar-Amaya cites no authority finding inconsistent testimony sufficient to trigger a
competency assessment. To the contrary, as the BIA explained, it is clear that “a noncitizen
may testify inconsistently and express confusion when asked to explain discrepancies
without implicating competency to proceed in removal proceedings.” Id.
Because the IJ did not err in failing to conduct a competency inquiry in this case, he
was not required to set aside his credibility determination on competency grounds. See
Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 611–12. And because an adverse credibility finding
suffices to defeat asylum and withholding of removal claims where, as here, the noncitizen
lacks independent evidence of her persecution, the IJ did not err in denying those claims.
See Camara, 378 F.3d at 369–70.
Escobar-Amaya’s argument on her CAT claim is also unavailing. Here, the parties
agree that we review the agency’s findings of fact only for substantial evidence. See
Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 2019). If the agency “arbitrarily
ignore[s] relevant evidence,” then we may overturn its decision as an abuse of discretion.
Id. And when, as here, “the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision with an opinion of its own, we
review both decisions.” Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 456 (4th Cir. 2018).
Having carefully reviewed the record, we find no ground for disturbing the agency’s
determination that Escobar-Amaya failed to make the necessary showing that “it is more
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likely than not that [] she would be tortured” if removed to El Salvador. See Rodriguez-
Arias, 915 F.3d at 971 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). Escobar-Amaya principally
faults the BIA and IJ for failing to consider expert evidence regarding what she describes
as “custody battles in countries like El Salvador that lack proper protection for battered
women,” which she says would support her claim that her own custody dispute with her
ex-partner is likely to escalate to torture if she returns. But, as Escobar-Amaya herself
recognizes, an IJ’s adverse credibility finding can render such country-conditions evidence
irrelevant, and that is the case here: Escobar-Amaya did not establish she falls within the
group to which the country-conditions evidence pertains – battered or abused women –
because her testimonial evidence to that effect was not credible. Moreover, apart from her
competency-related objection, which we have disposed of already, Escobar-Amaya has not
challenged that credibility finding. Thus, as the BIA found, the country-conditions
evidence on which Escobar-Amaya relies was not relevant to her claim, and the IJ did not
err by declining to consider it and instead denying her CAT claim. Accord Ibarra Chevez
v. Garland, 31 F.4th 279, 293 (4th Cir. 2022). *
* Escobar-Amaya points to one aspect of her testimony credited by the IJ, in which she described an angry and potentially threatening statement made by her ex-partner to her mother in connection with her custody dispute, and argues that it establishes the requisite connection between her claim and her country-conditions evidence. The IJ interpreted the statement to Escobar-Amaya’s mother as constituting (at most) a threat of physical harm to the mother – but, Escobar-Amaya says, the country-conditions evidence shows why it should be understood as a threat against her, as well. This argument suffers from the same flaw as the rest of Escobar-Amaya’s country-conditions claims: It is still the case that the country-conditions evidence applies, by its terms, only to battered or abused women, and the IJ reasonably found a lack of credible evidence that Escobar-Amaya was battered or abused.
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Accordingly, we deny Escobar-Amaya’s petition for review. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED