NO. 07-01-0380-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
FEBRUARY 8, 2002 ______________________________
SANDRA D. BURNS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee _________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 FOR LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2000-471243; HON. DRUE FARMER, PRESIDING _______________________________
Before QUINN, REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.
Appellant, Sandra D. Burns, appeals from a judgment under which she was
convicted of operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Through two
points of error, she contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence
obtained via an allegedly improper stop and admitting into evidence the results of her
intoxilyzer test. We affirm. Point One – Refusal to Suppress Evidence
Initially, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
suppress evidence obtained by the officer after he stopped her. The evidence was
purportedly subject to suppression because the officer lacked probable cause to stop her
for any traffic offense. We overrule the contention.
Standard of Review
The applicable standard of review was described by this court in State v. Wallett,
31 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2000, no pet.). We cite the litigants to same.
Next, a law enforcement officer need not have probable cause to stop an individual.
He need only have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Held v. State, 948
S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d). This enables him to
temporarily detain (for investigatory purposes) those engaged in the activities creating the
reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, in determining if such suspicion existed, we assess
whether a reasonable person in the position of the officer making the stop, with the
training, experience, and knowledge of the officer, could suspect that the vehicle or person
to be stopped has been or is connected to criminal activity. See United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 421-22, 101 S.Ct. 690, 697, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Martinez v. State, No.
07-01-0194 (Tex. App.–Amarillo January 29, 2002). And, because the perspective through
which we view the situation is that of the reasonable officer, the subjective thoughts and
intentions of the actual officer making the stop are not determinative. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), Martinez v. State,
2 supra.1
Application
Here, the record contains evidence illustrating that appellant traveled down a public
street at 4:40 a.m., made a wide turn, almost hit a curb on which stood the officer who
subsequently stopped appellant, and proceeded to drive down four city blocks while
weaving from her lane three times. Weaving alone has been held sufficient basis to
reasonably suspect one may be intoxicated and to justify an investigatory stop. Held v.
State, 948 S.W.2d at 51. Couple this with evidence of a turn which almost resulted in the
vehicle striking a curb and a pedestrian and we cannot but conclude that a reasonable
officer witnessing the events would have had legitimate grounds to undertake an
investigatory stop of appellant.
Point Two – Admitting the Results of the Breath Test
Appellant next complains of the trial court’s admission into evidence of the results
of her intoxilyzer tests. Two tests were taken, and the results of same revealed that she
had an alcohol concentration of .168 and .164, respectively. The admission of these
results was allegedly error because they were irrelevant, as that term was defined under
Texas Rule of Evidence 401. Furthermore, assuming they were relevant, their probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; so, they were
purportedly subject to exclusion under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. We overrule the point.
1 Again, the test focuses upon the conduct and deductions of a reasonable officer under the circumstances. Given this, we reject appellant’s suggestion that since the officer at bar stopped appellant because he thought he had probable cause to believe she com m itted a traffic offense, the Sta te c ould only justify the stop on that basis. Quite the contrary, if the circum stances perm it the court to de duc e tha t a reasonable officer could have justified the stop based upon the existence of circumstances creating reasonable suspicion that c rim inal activity w as afo ot, that is all the State need show, irrespective of the subjective m otivations of the actua l officer.
3 Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable to claims implicating the admission of evidence
is discussed in Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We
refer the litigants to it.
Application of Standard
To the extent that appellant believes the results were irrelevant, we note that the
legislature effectively resolved that dispute. Via §724.064 of the Texas Transportation
Code, it declared that “evidence of the alcohol concentration . . . as shown by analysis of
a specimen of the person’s blood, breath, or urine or any other bodily substance . . . is
admissible” in a prosecution arising from chapter 49 of the Penal Code. TEX . TRANSP .
CODE ANN . §724.064 (Vernon 1999). (Emphasis added). Needless to say, trying appellant
for operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated is prosecution arising under
Chapter 49 of the Penal Code. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . §49.04 (Vernon Supp.
2002)(appearing under chapter 49 of the Texas Penal Code and criminalizing the act of
operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated). Furthermore, the results or
the intoxilyzer tests here purportedly quantify the alcohol concentration found in appellant’s
body. Thus, the legislature made those results relevant pursuant to §724.064 of the
Transportation Code.
To the extent that appellant invokes Texas Rule of Evidence 403, we read her
argument to implicate the concept of retrograde extrapolation.2 That is, she believes that
2 Retrograde extrapolation involves the computation back in time of the alcohol concentration found in one’s body based upon the speed with which the alcohol is eliminated from the body. Ma ta v. S tate, 46 S.W .3d 902, 908-909 (Tex. Crim . Ap p. 2001). Fu rtherm ore, th e speed with which alcohol is eliminated depends upon a myriad of factors, as discussed in Mata.
4 the State tendered the intoxilyzer results to illustrate that she had an alcohol concentration
of .08 or more while driving. Yet, because the tests were not administered until one and
one-half hours after she ceased driving, evidence of the rate at which she eliminated
alcohol from her body (i.e. retrograde extrapolation) was necessary to place the tests
results in context and render them meaningful. Without that evidence (which the State did
not present), the jury was allegedly free to view the results and simply conclude that since
her alcohol concentration exceeded .08 at the time of the test, it did so when the officer
stopped her.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NO. 07-01-0380-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
FEBRUARY 8, 2002 ______________________________
SANDRA D. BURNS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee _________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 FOR LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2000-471243; HON. DRUE FARMER, PRESIDING _______________________________
Before QUINN, REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.
Appellant, Sandra D. Burns, appeals from a judgment under which she was
convicted of operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Through two
points of error, she contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence
obtained via an allegedly improper stop and admitting into evidence the results of her
intoxilyzer test. We affirm. Point One – Refusal to Suppress Evidence
Initially, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
suppress evidence obtained by the officer after he stopped her. The evidence was
purportedly subject to suppression because the officer lacked probable cause to stop her
for any traffic offense. We overrule the contention.
Standard of Review
The applicable standard of review was described by this court in State v. Wallett,
31 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2000, no pet.). We cite the litigants to same.
Next, a law enforcement officer need not have probable cause to stop an individual.
He need only have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Held v. State, 948
S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d). This enables him to
temporarily detain (for investigatory purposes) those engaged in the activities creating the
reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, in determining if such suspicion existed, we assess
whether a reasonable person in the position of the officer making the stop, with the
training, experience, and knowledge of the officer, could suspect that the vehicle or person
to be stopped has been or is connected to criminal activity. See United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 421-22, 101 S.Ct. 690, 697, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Martinez v. State, No.
07-01-0194 (Tex. App.–Amarillo January 29, 2002). And, because the perspective through
which we view the situation is that of the reasonable officer, the subjective thoughts and
intentions of the actual officer making the stop are not determinative. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), Martinez v. State,
2 supra.1
Application
Here, the record contains evidence illustrating that appellant traveled down a public
street at 4:40 a.m., made a wide turn, almost hit a curb on which stood the officer who
subsequently stopped appellant, and proceeded to drive down four city blocks while
weaving from her lane three times. Weaving alone has been held sufficient basis to
reasonably suspect one may be intoxicated and to justify an investigatory stop. Held v.
State, 948 S.W.2d at 51. Couple this with evidence of a turn which almost resulted in the
vehicle striking a curb and a pedestrian and we cannot but conclude that a reasonable
officer witnessing the events would have had legitimate grounds to undertake an
investigatory stop of appellant.
Point Two – Admitting the Results of the Breath Test
Appellant next complains of the trial court’s admission into evidence of the results
of her intoxilyzer tests. Two tests were taken, and the results of same revealed that she
had an alcohol concentration of .168 and .164, respectively. The admission of these
results was allegedly error because they were irrelevant, as that term was defined under
Texas Rule of Evidence 401. Furthermore, assuming they were relevant, their probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; so, they were
purportedly subject to exclusion under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. We overrule the point.
1 Again, the test focuses upon the conduct and deductions of a reasonable officer under the circumstances. Given this, we reject appellant’s suggestion that since the officer at bar stopped appellant because he thought he had probable cause to believe she com m itted a traffic offense, the Sta te c ould only justify the stop on that basis. Quite the contrary, if the circum stances perm it the court to de duc e tha t a reasonable officer could have justified the stop based upon the existence of circumstances creating reasonable suspicion that c rim inal activity w as afo ot, that is all the State need show, irrespective of the subjective m otivations of the actua l officer.
3 Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable to claims implicating the admission of evidence
is discussed in Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We
refer the litigants to it.
Application of Standard
To the extent that appellant believes the results were irrelevant, we note that the
legislature effectively resolved that dispute. Via §724.064 of the Texas Transportation
Code, it declared that “evidence of the alcohol concentration . . . as shown by analysis of
a specimen of the person’s blood, breath, or urine or any other bodily substance . . . is
admissible” in a prosecution arising from chapter 49 of the Penal Code. TEX . TRANSP .
CODE ANN . §724.064 (Vernon 1999). (Emphasis added). Needless to say, trying appellant
for operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated is prosecution arising under
Chapter 49 of the Penal Code. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . §49.04 (Vernon Supp.
2002)(appearing under chapter 49 of the Texas Penal Code and criminalizing the act of
operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated). Furthermore, the results or
the intoxilyzer tests here purportedly quantify the alcohol concentration found in appellant’s
body. Thus, the legislature made those results relevant pursuant to §724.064 of the
Transportation Code.
To the extent that appellant invokes Texas Rule of Evidence 403, we read her
argument to implicate the concept of retrograde extrapolation.2 That is, she believes that
2 Retrograde extrapolation involves the computation back in time of the alcohol concentration found in one’s body based upon the speed with which the alcohol is eliminated from the body. Ma ta v. S tate, 46 S.W .3d 902, 908-909 (Tex. Crim . Ap p. 2001). Fu rtherm ore, th e speed with which alcohol is eliminated depends upon a myriad of factors, as discussed in Mata.
4 the State tendered the intoxilyzer results to illustrate that she had an alcohol concentration
of .08 or more while driving. Yet, because the tests were not administered until one and
one-half hours after she ceased driving, evidence of the rate at which she eliminated
alcohol from her body (i.e. retrograde extrapolation) was necessary to place the tests
results in context and render them meaningful. Without that evidence (which the State did
not present), the jury was allegedly free to view the results and simply conclude that since
her alcohol concentration exceeded .08 at the time of the test, it did so when the officer
stopped her. And, being allowed to so speculate created a substantial danger of unfair
prejudice. Assuming arguendo that this argument may have merit under some
circumstances, it does not given those before us.
The officer who arrested appellant for “driving while intoxicated” had opportunity to
witness certain conduct and circumstances before making the arrest. That conduct
consisted of appellant 1) making a wide turn on a public street and “almost colliding with
the curb where” the officer stood, 2) weaving three times as she drove down a four block
stretch of road, 3) having “a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath,” 4)
appearing “a little disoriented,” 5) appearing “a little confused,” and 6) failing to
satisfactorily perform the various sobriety tests administered to her. The sobriety tests
consisted of her attempting to recite her A, B, C’s in a way directed by the officer, stand on
one foot while counting to 30, touch her nose with her finger, and walk heel to toe in a
straight line for nine paces, turn around, and repeat the task. Her inability to perform the
tests indicated that she suffered from impaired mental and physical faculties. And, when
her inability to perform the tests is coupled to the evidence that her breath smelled of
alcohol, one could rationally conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant was
5 operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.3 Consequently, we hold that
the trial court’s decision to reject appellant’s attempt to exclude the evidence via Rule 403
fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement and evinced an exercise of legitimate
discretion.4
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Brian Quinn Justice
Do not publish.
3 According to statu te, the Sta te m ay prove one to be intoxicated by 1) establishing that the person did not have the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol or any other substance into the body or 2) having an alcohol concentration of .08 or m ore. T EX . P ENAL C ODE A N N . §49.01(2) (Vern on Sup p. 2002).
4 In holding as we do, we need not address the State’s proposition that §724.064 of the Texas Transportation Code permits the admission of intoxilyzer results irrespective of the limitations expressed in Rule 403. We do note, however, that Rule 403 has been applied in situations wherein the legislature has previously dec lared particular eviden ce a dm issible. See e.g., Mc Co y v. S tate, 10 S.W .3d 50 (Tex. App.–A m arillo 199 9, no pet. ) (involving a rt. 38.37 of the T exa s Code of C rim inal Pro ced ure).