SANDOZ INC. v. UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORPORATION

District Court, D. New Jersey·Decided April 6, 2021·No. 3:19-cv-10170-BRM-LHG·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SANDOZ, INC., et ano., Civil Action No.: 19-10170 Plaintiffs, v. UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORP., et ano. Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER OF THE SPECIAL DISCOVERY MASTER ______________________________________ REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL NON-PARTY LIQUIDIA TO BEAR THE COST OF RESPONDING TO DEFENDANT’S SUBPOENA LINARES, J. This matter comes before the Special Master by way of Defendant United Therapeutics Corp.’s Motion to Compel Non-Party Liquidia Technologies, Inc. (“Liquidia”) to Bear the Cost of Responding to Defendant’s Subpoena. (See Defendant UTC’s February 8, 2021 Letter Brief (“Def. Br.”)). On February 19, 2021, Non-Party Liquidia opposed Defendant’s Motion. (See Liquidia’s February 19, 2021 Opposition Letter Brief (“Liquidia Br.”)). Plaintiffs Sandoz, Inc. and RareGen, LLC (now Liquidia PAH)1 have not taken a position with regard to same. The Special Master has reviewed the submissions and relevant controlling law, and, for the reasons set forth below, hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.

1 Plaintiff RareGen officially changed its name to Liquidia PAH, LLC. (ECF Nos. 294, 295). I. FACTS The Special Master presumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural posture of this matter. As such, the Special Master will only recite the facts pertinent to the

subject dispute. In June of 2020, Liquidia announced that it would be acquiring Plaintiff RareGen (now Liquidia PAH), with the transaction ultimately closing by the end of the 2020 year. (Def. Br. at 1; Liquidia Br. at 1). This announcement was made while the underlying action was pending. (Compare Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-10170 (D.N.J.) with Def. Br. at 1, and Liquidia Br. at 1). Defendant served the subject subpoena on Liquidia as soon as Defendant learned of the merger. (Def. Br. at 1; Liquidia Br. at 1). Defendant’s subpoena demanded that Liquidia produce documents that pertained to the underlying action and/or Liquidia’s acquisition of Plaintiff RareGen (now Liquidia PAH). (Id.).

Defendant and Liquidia engaged in a prolonged discussion regarding the parameters and manner of Liquidia’s response to Defendant’s subpoena. (Def. Br. at 1; Liquidia Br. at 1). According to Liquidia, it “spent months” working with Defendant, but “no matter what Liquidia proposed, [Defendant] wanted more.” (Liquidia Br. at 1). At some point, Liquidia made a final offer of compromise to search and review over 25,000 documents with families. (Liquidia Br. at 3). However, a new issue developed. Liquidia agreed to review the aforementioned universe of documents if Defendant agreed to pay the estimated cost of $45,000, arguing that it should not be required to carry this cost because it was an “innocent bystander.” (Liquidia Br. at 3-4, 1). Defendant refused to pay for the cost of review and production asserting that Liquidia was an interested party and, therefore, responsible for the total cost of production. (Def. Br. at 1-2). Defendant and Liquidia have been unable to resolve this issue relating to the cost of responding to the subpoena. As such, Defendant has moved to compel Liquidia to bear the cost and fees associated with responding to Defendant’s subpoena. After careful consideration, and

for the reasons set forth below, the Special Master grants Defendant’s Motion. II. LEGAL STANDARD Generally, a non-party responding to the subpoena is required to pay the cost of same. See, e.g., Gould v. O’Neal, 2019 WL 4686991, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2019) (“a nonparty responding to a subpoena is typically required to pay its own costs of production.”). However, there is an affirmative duty on a party serving a subpoena to take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue expense on a person subject to the subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Pursuant to Rule 45, the Court may impose an appropriate sanction, such as reasonable attorney’s fees, on a party who fails to comply with this duty. Rule 45 also provides that when a

person served with a subpoena to produce documents objects, the serving party may move for an order compelling production. Such an order, if entered, must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer from “significant expense” resulting from compliance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) This general rule is not without exception. Rule 45 governs the procedure by which a non-party is protected from compliance with a subpoena, and, in pertinent part, sets forth that While Liquidia does not appear to be arguing for sanctions against Defendant UTC for any failure to comply with its duty to avoid imposing undue expense under subsection (d)(i) of Rule 45, nonetheless, the Court, or in this case the Special Master, is tasked with assuring that a non- party is not burdened with significant costs when the non-party complies with a duly issued subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii). Furthermore, the Third Circuit has explained that “[s]ignificant expenses must be borne by the party seeking [the] discovery.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 29 F. App’x 880, 882-83 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). The Special Master’s analysis does not end with the plain language of the Rules, however.

As Courts within the Third Circuit have explained, when a subpoena is directed to a person or entity that “is not a classic disinterested non-party, the court can order the non-party to produce the documents at its own expense.” In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2012 WL 298480, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012). To determine whether fee-shifting is appropriate, courts in their discretion consider “(1) whether the nonparty has an actual interest in the outcome of the case; (2) whether the nonparty can more readily bear the costs than can the requesting party; and (3) whether the litigation is of public importance.” 9 Moore’s Federal Practice § 45.41[3]; Miller v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 700412, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009). III. ANALYSIS

The primary focus of the Special Master’s analysis, as well as Defendant and Liquidia’s arguments, is whether or not Liquidia is an interested party such that it should bear the cost of subpoena compliance. According to Defendant, Liquidia is an interested party because Plaintiff RareGen (now Liquidia PAH) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Liquidia. (Def. Br. at 3 (citing Universal Del., Inc. v. Comdata Corp., 2010 WL 1381225, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2010)). Moreover, Defendant asserts that “Liquidia stands to receive a direct financial benefit should Plaintiffs … prevail on their claims,” since any injunctive relief awarded to Plaintiffs will result in Plaintiffs’ ability to promote generic treprostinil, which, in turn, will result in revenue for Liquidia as the parent company of Plaintiff RareGen (now Liquidia PAH). (Id.). Hence, Defendant avers that Liquidia should be responsible for the costs of complying with the subpoena because it stands to receive a direct financial benefit. (Id. (citing Cornell v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 2015 WL 4747260, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2015)). Liquidia begins by noting that its decision to acquire Plaintiff RareGen (now Liquidia PAH) should not be held against it, as it specifically “carved out” this litigation as part of the

merger transaction. (Liquidia Br. at 5, Exhibit C). Said exhibit specifically sets forth that Liquidia would have “no recoverable stake or standing in this Action.” (Id.). As such, Liquidia avers that its ownership of Plaintiff RareGen (now Liquidia PAH) should not be any indication that it is an interested party in the litigation.

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SANDOZ INC. v. UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORPORATION, (D.N.J. 2021).

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