SANDOZ CROP PROTECTION CORPORATION
This text of 19 I. & N. Dec. 666 (SANDOZ CROP PROTECTION CORPORATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Immigration Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Interim Decision #3067
MATTER OF SANDOZ CROP PROTECTION CORPORATION
In Visa Petition Proceedings
CHI-N-36181
Decided by Commissioner May 20, 1988
(1)Specialized knowledge involves proprietary knowledge and an advanced level of expertise not readily available in the United States job market. This knowledge and expertise must be clearly different from those held by others employed in the same or similar occupations. Different procedures are not a proprietary right within this context unless the entire system and philosophy behind the proce- dures are clearly different from those of other firms, they are relatively complex, and they are protected from disclosure to competition. (2) A petitioner's ownership of patented products or copyrighted works, in and of itself, does not establish that a particular employee has specialized knowledge. In order to qualify, the beneficiary must himself or herself be a key person with knowledge which is critical for performance of the job duties and which is protect- ed from disclosure through patent, copyright, or company policy. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Melvyn E. Stein, Esquire I La Salle Street Chicago, Illinois 60602
This is an appeal from the adverse decision of the director, Northern Regional Service Center. The appeal will be dismissed. The petitioner manufactures and sells crop protection chemicals. It seeks to classify the beneficiary as an "L-4" intra-company transferee based upon its intent to employ him as a marketing manager. The beneficiary has been employed by the foreign enter- prise as a sales representative. The director denied the petition on the ground that the petition- er had failed to establish the beneficiary qualifies for "L-1" classifi- cation as a person who has been and would continue working in a capacity involving specialized knowledge_ On appeal, counsel asserts the beneficiary's knowledge of, and experience in, the marketing and sale of the petitioner's patented herbicide constitutes the necessary proprietary knowledge of a unique product to the specialized knowledge. According to counsel, the beneficiary's knowledge and skill are critical to the success of the petitioner's products in the United States.
666 Interim Decision #3067
"L-1" eligibility requires that a petitioner establish a beneficiary has been employed outside the United States in a qualifying mane.- • gerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized knowledge, for a qualifying firm, for the year prior to the benefi- ciary's application for admission to the United States. The petition- er must also demonstrate the beneficiary will be immediately em- ployed in a qualifying capacity. New regulations effective March 30, 1987, define "specialized knowledge." Specialized knowledge, as now described in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D) (1988), involves advanced knowledge and an ad- vanced level of expertise not readily available in the United States job market, with the petitioner having a proprietary right to the knowledge or its product. The petitioner's proprietary interest must be such that the knowledge required is clearly different from that held by others employed in the same or similar occupations. Different procedures are not a proprietary right within this context unless the entire system and philosophy behind the procedures are clearly different from those of other firms, they are relatively com- plex, and they are protected from disclosure to competition. According to supplementary information published with the new regulations on February 26, 1987: It was the Service's intention to provide clearer standards for determining special- ized knowledge. Although commenters would prefer to retain the definition in current regulations, the Service believes that a revision is appropriate to better articulate case law. 52 Fed. Reg. 5740-41 (1987). Most employees today are specialists and have been trained and given special knowledge. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded all employees with special knowledge or all employees performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as intra-compa- ny transferees. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dee_ 117 (Comm. 1981); Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). "L-1" petitions for other than managers and executives may only be approved for "persons with specialized knowledge, not for skilled workers." Matter of Penner, supra, at 52. Both of the above precedent decisions cite the House of Repre- sentatives report which accompanied Public Law 91-225 (1970) when the "L-1" provisions were first enacted into law. H.R. Rep. No. 851, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2750. That report states the purpose of the "L-1" provi- sions is to facilitate the admission of "key personnel" and "mana- gerial personnel." A petitioner's ownership of patented products and processes or copyrighted works, in and of itself, does not establish that a par-
CI7 Interim Decision #3067
dallier employee has specialized knowledge. In order to qualify, the beneficiary must be a key person with materially different knowl- edge and expertise which are critical for performance of the job duties; which are critical to, and relate exclusively to, the petition- er's proprietary interest; and which are protected from disclosure through patent, copyright, or company policy. The primary product the beneficiary has been marketing and selling in Canada is a specialized, patented herbicide agricultural chemical used to control broadleaf weeds. The petitioner argues the knowledge gained by the beneficiary managing two areas in Canada make him one of very few people able to market the herbi- cide for application to corn and wheat and for other specialized ap- plications to pasture lands, fallow land, industrial vegetation, grass seed, and perennial weeds. According to the petitioner, the market- ing of this herbicide requires a thorough knowledge of the product and the ability to communicate its use and effectiveness. The petitioner has not established that skills relating exclusively to its business are necessary for the beneficiary to perform his pro- posed duties of marketing this product. In fact, one of the benefi- ciary's duties is to communicate to customers the use and effective- ness of the patented product, and the petitioner has not established the beneficiary needs proprietary knowledge of the product to do this. In this proceeding, the petitioner has not established the benefi- ciary's knowledge is not related to common practices and is not readily available in the United States labor market. On the con- trary, the beneficiary's knowledge of the sale and marketing of her- bicides and the Canadian market is that normally expected of an employee in his position. It is not an advanced level of expertise which is materially different from that of others in similar posi- tions employed by competitors. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (MA 1966), holds, in visa petition proceedings, the burden of proof to establish eligibility for the benefit sought rests with the petitioner. Here, that burden has not been met. It is noted the record, as presently constituted, does not contain any evidence of a qualifying relationship between the United States and foreign enterprises. As the petition is otherwise not ap- provable, this issue does not need to be addressed further. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
19 I. & N. Dec. 666, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sandoz-crop-protection-corporation-bia-1988.