2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U No. 2-19-0203 Order filed December 3, 2019
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
GABRIEL SANDOVAL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Du Page County. Plaintiff and Counterdefendant- ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Nos. 18-SR-1105 ) 18-SR-1172 ) MARIA MEDEIROS, ) ) Honorable Defendant and Counterplaintiff- ) Peter W. Ostling Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Although the trial court erred in deeming plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim barred as a matter of law, its finding that plaintiff did not perform under the contract was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and thus it properly ruled for defendant.
¶2 Plaintiff, Gabriel Sandoval, appeals pro se from the judgment of the circuit court of
Du Page County denying his breach-of-contract claim and granting defendant Maria Medeiros’s
counterclaim. Even though the trial court erred in barring, as a matter of law, recovery on the 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
written contract, the trial court’s finding that plaintiff did not perform under the contract was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Sandoval filed a three-count complaint against Medeiros. Count I alleged a breach of a
written contract for home improvements, including installation of a bamboo floor. Counts II and
III alleged, respectively, a claim for quantum meruit and a claim for unjust enrichment. Medeiros
filed a counterclaim, alleging that Sandoval defectively installed the floor and seeking
compensation for the cost of a replacement floor.
¶5 The following facts were established at a bench trial. Sandoval prepared a written contract
to provide home improvements for Medeiros at her new residence. The contract called for
Sandoval, among other things, to install a bamboo floor throughout the home. Medeiros was
required to provide all of the materials, including the flooring. The total cost of the contract was
$14,500. Medeiros signed the contract and initially paid Sandoval $7500.
¶6 Medeiros purchased the flooring from Menard’s. According to Sandoval, although he
accompanied Medeiros when she selected the flooring, he had no input into the product she chose,
other than making a few suggestions. The floor was “floating,” which did not require nails or glue.
¶7 Medeiros had no experience with the installation of flooring. She relied on Sandoval’s
experience in selecting the proper flooring. She paid approximately $5000 for the flooring, trim,
and underlayment. Sandoval then picked up the flooring materials and took them to Medeiros’s
new residence.
¶8 After the floor was installed, Medeiros discovered that, when she walked on it, it bounced.
When Medeiros advised Sandoval that the floor bounced, he told her that it was normal for a
floating floor. Sandoval claimed that some of the wood was warped and that Medeiros failed to
-2- 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
maintain adequate air conditioning in the unit, which increased the humidity, causing further
warping. He also maintained that the underlying concrete floor was uneven, which contributed to
the floor bouncing. According to Medeiros, after Sandoval attempted to repair the floor, it still
bounced and there were numerous scratches and glue residue in the cracks between the boards.
The floor also had sharp edges that had to be covered with rugs.
¶9 A proposed written amendment for additional work, prepared by Sandoval, included,
among other things, a statement that Medeiros acknowledged that the concrete was not level and
that the parties had not agreed to level it before installing the flooring. Medeiros refused to sign
the amendment.
¶ 10 In support of her counterclaim, Medeiros presented the affidavit of Gavriel Russ of
Transylvania Flooring. Russ stated that the floor was defectively installed and needed to be
replaced. An exhibit attached to the affidavit showed that the replacement cost was $8887.
Sandoval objected to the affidavit, arguing that it was incoherent. The trial court overruled the
objection and admitted the affidavit.
¶ 11 The trial court found that, because the written contract did not include the total cost of all
of the work, did not list the materials with reasonable particularity, and did not include Sandoval’s
business name and address, and because there was no evidence that Sandoval had provided a
consumer-rights brochure, the contract violated the Home Repair and Remodeling Act (Act) (815
ILCS 513/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Because the contract violated the Act, the court ruled that it was
unenforceable.
¶ 12 The trial court further denied Sandoval any recovery on his claims for quantum meruit and
unjust enrichment. In doing so, the court found that Sandoval was not credible. It noted that he
was unfamiliar with the industry standards for installation of the flooring. The court also found
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that Sandoval was not believable when he testified that he did not have any input in selecting the
flooring. The court further noted the evasive nature of some of Sandoval’s answers during cross-
examination. The court found that Sandoval failed to provide competent and credible evidence of
the reasonable value of the work performed. Thus, the court entered judgment against Sandoval
and in favor of Medeiros on all three counts of the complaint.
¶ 13 As for the counterclaim, the trial court found that the affidavit and the attached exhibit
showed that the flooring was defectively installed and that the replacement cost was $8887. Thus,
the court entered judgment on the counterclaim. Sandoval, in turn, filed this timely appeal.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, Sandoval’s only contention is that a violation of the Act did not bar him from
recovering on his contract claim. Although Medeiros did not file a response brief, because the
issues are relatively simple, we will decide them. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis
Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).
¶ 16 We first decide whether the trial court erred in ruling that Sandoval was barred by the Act
from recovering on his contract claim. It did.
¶ 17 Our supreme court has held that an oral contract is not rendered unenforceable merely
because it violated the Act. K. Miller Construction Co. v. McGinnis, 238 Ill. 2d 284, 298-301
(2010). Indeed, the court noted that a recent amendment to the Act clarified that the sole remedy
for a violation of the Act is under section 10a of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/10a (West 2008)). McGinnis, 238 Ill. 2d at 298. Although McGinnis
applied to an oral contract that violated the Act, we see no reason that it should not apply equally
to a written contract. See Sutter Siding & Remodeling, Inc. v. Baker, 2017 IL App (4th) 150956-
-4- 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
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2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U No. 2-19-0203 Order filed December 3, 2019
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
GABRIEL SANDOVAL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Du Page County. Plaintiff and Counterdefendant- ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Nos. 18-SR-1105 ) 18-SR-1172 ) MARIA MEDEIROS, ) ) Honorable Defendant and Counterplaintiff- ) Peter W. Ostling Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Although the trial court erred in deeming plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim barred as a matter of law, its finding that plaintiff did not perform under the contract was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and thus it properly ruled for defendant.
¶2 Plaintiff, Gabriel Sandoval, appeals pro se from the judgment of the circuit court of
Du Page County denying his breach-of-contract claim and granting defendant Maria Medeiros’s
counterclaim. Even though the trial court erred in barring, as a matter of law, recovery on the 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
written contract, the trial court’s finding that plaintiff did not perform under the contract was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Sandoval filed a three-count complaint against Medeiros. Count I alleged a breach of a
written contract for home improvements, including installation of a bamboo floor. Counts II and
III alleged, respectively, a claim for quantum meruit and a claim for unjust enrichment. Medeiros
filed a counterclaim, alleging that Sandoval defectively installed the floor and seeking
compensation for the cost of a replacement floor.
¶5 The following facts were established at a bench trial. Sandoval prepared a written contract
to provide home improvements for Medeiros at her new residence. The contract called for
Sandoval, among other things, to install a bamboo floor throughout the home. Medeiros was
required to provide all of the materials, including the flooring. The total cost of the contract was
$14,500. Medeiros signed the contract and initially paid Sandoval $7500.
¶6 Medeiros purchased the flooring from Menard’s. According to Sandoval, although he
accompanied Medeiros when she selected the flooring, he had no input into the product she chose,
other than making a few suggestions. The floor was “floating,” which did not require nails or glue.
¶7 Medeiros had no experience with the installation of flooring. She relied on Sandoval’s
experience in selecting the proper flooring. She paid approximately $5000 for the flooring, trim,
and underlayment. Sandoval then picked up the flooring materials and took them to Medeiros’s
new residence.
¶8 After the floor was installed, Medeiros discovered that, when she walked on it, it bounced.
When Medeiros advised Sandoval that the floor bounced, he told her that it was normal for a
floating floor. Sandoval claimed that some of the wood was warped and that Medeiros failed to
-2- 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
maintain adequate air conditioning in the unit, which increased the humidity, causing further
warping. He also maintained that the underlying concrete floor was uneven, which contributed to
the floor bouncing. According to Medeiros, after Sandoval attempted to repair the floor, it still
bounced and there were numerous scratches and glue residue in the cracks between the boards.
The floor also had sharp edges that had to be covered with rugs.
¶9 A proposed written amendment for additional work, prepared by Sandoval, included,
among other things, a statement that Medeiros acknowledged that the concrete was not level and
that the parties had not agreed to level it before installing the flooring. Medeiros refused to sign
the amendment.
¶ 10 In support of her counterclaim, Medeiros presented the affidavit of Gavriel Russ of
Transylvania Flooring. Russ stated that the floor was defectively installed and needed to be
replaced. An exhibit attached to the affidavit showed that the replacement cost was $8887.
Sandoval objected to the affidavit, arguing that it was incoherent. The trial court overruled the
objection and admitted the affidavit.
¶ 11 The trial court found that, because the written contract did not include the total cost of all
of the work, did not list the materials with reasonable particularity, and did not include Sandoval’s
business name and address, and because there was no evidence that Sandoval had provided a
consumer-rights brochure, the contract violated the Home Repair and Remodeling Act (Act) (815
ILCS 513/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Because the contract violated the Act, the court ruled that it was
unenforceable.
¶ 12 The trial court further denied Sandoval any recovery on his claims for quantum meruit and
unjust enrichment. In doing so, the court found that Sandoval was not credible. It noted that he
was unfamiliar with the industry standards for installation of the flooring. The court also found
-3- 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
that Sandoval was not believable when he testified that he did not have any input in selecting the
flooring. The court further noted the evasive nature of some of Sandoval’s answers during cross-
examination. The court found that Sandoval failed to provide competent and credible evidence of
the reasonable value of the work performed. Thus, the court entered judgment against Sandoval
and in favor of Medeiros on all three counts of the complaint.
¶ 13 As for the counterclaim, the trial court found that the affidavit and the attached exhibit
showed that the flooring was defectively installed and that the replacement cost was $8887. Thus,
the court entered judgment on the counterclaim. Sandoval, in turn, filed this timely appeal.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, Sandoval’s only contention is that a violation of the Act did not bar him from
recovering on his contract claim. Although Medeiros did not file a response brief, because the
issues are relatively simple, we will decide them. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis
Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).
¶ 16 We first decide whether the trial court erred in ruling that Sandoval was barred by the Act
from recovering on his contract claim. It did.
¶ 17 Our supreme court has held that an oral contract is not rendered unenforceable merely
because it violated the Act. K. Miller Construction Co. v. McGinnis, 238 Ill. 2d 284, 298-301
(2010). Indeed, the court noted that a recent amendment to the Act clarified that the sole remedy
for a violation of the Act is under section 10a of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/10a (West 2008)). McGinnis, 238 Ill. 2d at 298. Although McGinnis
applied to an oral contract that violated the Act, we see no reason that it should not apply equally
to a written contract. See Sutter Siding & Remodeling, Inc. v. Baker, 2017 IL App (4th) 150956-
-4- 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
U, ¶¶ 28-29 (applying McGinnis to a written contract). Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in
barring Sandoval, as a matter of law, from recovering under the written contract.
¶ 18 However, we may affirm a judgment on any basis in the record, even if the trial court did
not rely on that reasoning. Trilisky v. City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 182189, ¶ 29.
¶ 19 To recover under a theory of quantum meruit, a plaintiff must prove that no written contract
existed. Jameson Real Estate, LLC v. Ahmed, 2018 IL App (1st) 171534, ¶ 61. Similarly, unjust
enrichment is not an available remedy where an actual contract exists. Gagnon v. Schickel, 2012
IL App (1st) 120645, ¶ 29. Here, because there was a written contract, Sandoval was limited to
recovery under that contract.
¶ 20 To recover under a written contract, a plaintiff is required to prove the existence of a valid,
enforceable contract, that he performed as required by the contract, that the defendant breached
the contract, and that damages resulted. Carlson v. Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, 2016 IL
App (1st) 143853, ¶ 13. The interpretation of a contract presents a legal question that we review
de novo. Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 219 (2007). However, whether the contract was
breached is a question of fact, and the trial court’s finding in that regard will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Timan v. Ourada, 2012 IL App
(2d) 100834, ¶ 24. For a finding to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, the opposite
conclusion must be clearly apparent. Short v. Pye, 2018 IL App (2d) 160405, ¶ 53. That standard
affords great deference to the trial court, because it is able to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and
is in a superior position to assess credibility and resolve conflicts in the testimony. Wade v. Stewart
Title Guaranty Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59.
¶ 21 In this case, the trial court found that Sandoval was not credible. Specifically, the court
did not believe his testimony that he did not provide input on the selection of the flooring. The
-5- 2019 IL App (2d) 190203-U
court also found that he was not familiar with industry standards on the installation of the flooring.
The court further found that Sandoval was evasive during cross-examination and failed to provide
competent and credible evidence of the value of the work performed. Thus, the court found that
Sandoval did not perform as required by the contract.
¶ 22 Sandoval does not contest those findings on appeal. Thus, he has forfeited any claim that
they were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v.
Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 23. Even if he had, they were not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Our review of the record does not show that the opposite conclusion was clearly
apparent.
¶ 23 Because the trial court correctly found that Sandoval did not prove that he properly
installed the flooring, he failed to establish a necessary element of his contract claim. Accordingly,
he was not entitled to recover on his breach-of-contract claim. Thus, on that basis the trial court
properly denied Sandoval relief.
¶ 24 That leaves the counterclaim. Again, because Sandoval does not challenge the ruling on
the counterclaim, he has forfeited it. See Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 23. Were we to address it,
the finding that Medeiros proved her counterclaim was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. As the trial court found, the evidence showed that the floor was defectively installed
and that the undisputed replacement cost was $8887. Thus, the court properly entered judgment
for Medeiros on her counterclaim.
¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
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