Sandoval v. Guldseth

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedApril 1, 2020
Docket3:19-cv-01584
StatusUnknown

This text of Sandoval v. Guldseth (Sandoval v. Guldseth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sandoval v. Guldseth, (S.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 Case No.: 19-cv-1584-BAS-RBB 11 ALBERTO SANDOVAL, CDCR # AM-0186, 12 ORDER DIRECTING U.S. Plaintiff, MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE 13 OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT v. UPON DEFENDANTS PURSUANT 14 TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND Fed. R. DAVID GULDSETH, M.D. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 15 ROMAN B. CHAM, M.D., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 8.) 19 Having conducted the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 20 1915A, the Court finds that the FAC sufficiently states claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 21 1983 and directs service of the FAC on Defendants. 22 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 23 On August 23, 2019, Alberto Sandoval (“Plaintiff”), incarcerated at the Richard J. 24 Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California filed a pro se civil rights 25 Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF No. 1, Compl.) In addition, Plaintiff 26 filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (See ECF No. 2.) 27 1 On October 7, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 2 simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim against correctional 3 officials at RJD pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2) and § 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 5 at 4 10.) The Court also severed all claims against correctional officials at Valley State Prison 5 (“VSP”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and directed the Clerk of Court to 6 terminate these Defendants from the Court’s docket. (See id.) 7 Plaintiff was given forty-five (45) days leave to file an amended complaint in order 8 to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (See id.) Plaintiff 9 later requested, and received, an extension of time to file his amended complaint. (See 10 ECF Nos. 6, 7.) On January 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed the FAC. (See ECF No. 8.) 11 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING 12 For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the FAC contains sufficient factual 13 matter to state a claim for relief plausible on its face, thus satisfying the screening standard. 14 A. Standard of Review 15 As the Court previously stated, because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, 16 his FAC requires a pre-Answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 17 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP 18 complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks 19 damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 20 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 21 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of 22 [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the 23 expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 24 (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 25 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 26 which relief can be granted under [Section] 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal 27 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 1 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 2 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to Section 1915A “incorporates the familiar 3 standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 4 Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual 5 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 7 1121. While the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in 8 civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit 9 of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. 10 Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements 11 of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 12 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 13 B. Factual Allegations 14 Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a “large complex tear of the medial meniscus.” 15 (FAC at 3.) As a result of this condition, Plaintiff “suffers from extreme” and “persistent 16 pain and swelling” in his right knee. (Id.) This condition “hampers his ability to walk” 17 and “substantially limits [Plaintiff’s] major life’s activities, including but not limited to, 18 walking, standing, lifting, bending and working.” (Id.) 19 On January 12, 2016, Dr. John Casey, M.D.1 “recommended a total knee 20 replacement” for Plaintiff. (FAC at 3.) Dr. Casey noted that “the only treatment that is 21 going to alleviate [Plaintiff’s] discomfort is going to be a right total knee replacement.” 22 (Id.) 23 Plaintiff was examined by Dr. David Guldseth, M.D., his “Personal Care Provider,” 24 on February 8, 2017. (FAC at 5.) Plaintiff alleges Guldseth disregarded Casey’s 25 recommendation and instead determined Plaintiff’s condition could be “treated with pain 26

27 1 Dr. Casey is not a named Defendant. 1 medications rather than recommended surgery.” (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a “request to be 2 referred back to an orthopedic surgeon to treat his right knee condition and his need for a 3 right total knee replacement surgery” on February 28, 2017.

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Bluebook (online)
Sandoval v. Guldseth, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sandoval-v-guldseth-casd-2020.