Sandgrund v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission

215 F. Supp. 2d 178, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15594, 2002 WL 1941453
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 23, 2002
DocketCivil Action 01-01431 (RWR/JMF)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 215 F. Supp. 2d 178 (Sandgrund v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Sandgrund v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 215 F. Supp. 2d 178, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15594, 2002 WL 1941453 (D.D.C. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter was referred to me by Judge Roberts. I herein resolve plaintiffs Motion for a Supplemental Vaughn Index [# 10]. For the reasons stated below, I find that defendant’s Vaughn index adequately describes some, but not all, of the nature of the documents withheld. Therefore, plaintiffs motion will be denied in part and granted in part.

BACKGROUND

Amy Sandgrund, (“Sandgrund” or “Plaintiff’) brings this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). 1 On November 2, 2000, Sandgrund submitted a request for documents held by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission” or “Defendant”). On November 24, 2000, defendant denied plaintiffs request, claiming that the documents responsive to her request were exempt under exemptions 7(A) and 17 C.F.R.200.80(b)(7)(i)(A) as “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,”, the release of which “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C.A. 552(b)(7)(A). The Commission asserted other FOIA exemptions. 2

On February 28, 2001, plaintiff again sought the documents listed in her original request, and was rebuffed by defendant on the same grounds. On March 20, 2001, plaintiff appealed and on April 9, 2001, defendant denied plaintiffs appeal claiming that the application of exemption 7(A) was still appropriate because disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with its ongoing enforcement proceedings. On June 27, 2001, plaintiff brought this action seeking to enjoin defendant from withholding the requested documents.

The documents in question were originally gathered in connection with an investigation entitled In the Matter of Health Professionals, Inc., File No. HO-2641 (“HPI”), 3 where the Commission suspected unusual trading of the HPI stock. Defendant claims that its investigations quickly led to D.H. Blair (“Blair”) and others as being responsible for virtually all the trading of HPI. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot.Sum. J.”) at 3. During the HPI investigations, the Commission developed evidence impheating Blair and others in possible securities law *180 violations. In particular, the evidence indicated that Blair may have been complicit with HPI in committing these violations. Consequently, the Commission opened a separate investigation against Blair.

In the present motion, plaintiff seeks a supplemental Vaughn 4 index of documents responsive to its FOIA request. 5 Plaintiff claims that defendant submitted affidavits 6 describing the withheld documents in extremely broad, categorical terms, 7 thereby hampering her ability to substantively evaluate the claimed FOIA exemption. Consequently, according to plaintiff, defendant should be required to further identify the documents that corresponds to Categories A, B, C, and F 8 of defendant’s Vaughn index. In addition, plaintiff seeks a more detañed statement justifying each of defendant’s refusals to release the requested records.

ANALYSIS

Applicable Standards

The purpose of the Vaughn index is to identify the documents in dispute and to set forth the government’s explanation of why it is withholding each particular document. The index can be useful to the plaintiff and to the court, as it precludes the need for in camera inspection of the documents. But, in order to advance the court’s review process, the index must be detaüed enough to permit “meaningful review” by the court. Students Against Genocide (SAGE) v. Department of State, 50 F.Supp.2d 20, 26 (D.D.C.1999) (citing King v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.Cir.1987)); See also Greenberg v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 10 F.Supp.2d 3, 14 (D.D.C.1998).

In assessing the adequacy of a Vaughn Index, it is the function served, rather than the form, that is crucial. Ferranti v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 177 F.Supp.2d 41, 45 (D.D.C.2001); See also Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“the materials provided by the agency may take any form so long as they give the reviewing court a reasonable basis to evaluate the claim of privilege”). An agency may satisfy its Vaughn requirements by taking “a generic approach, grouping documents into relevant categories that are sufficiently distinct to allow a court to grasp ‘how each category of ... documents, if disclosed, would interfere with the investigation.’ ” Bevis v. Department of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C.Cir.1986).

Although, agencies may rely on the declarations of its officials creating its *181 Vaughn index, “the declarations must be clear, specific and adequately detailed; they must describe the withheld information and the reason for nondisclosure in a factual and non-conclusory manner.” Ferranti v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 177 F.Supp.2d at 45.

In Bevis, the court explained that “the hallmark of an acceptable ... category is [that which] allows the court to trace a rational link between the nature of the document and the alleged likely interference.” 801 F.2d at 1389. Examples of categories that suffice are those identified as “the identities of possible witnesses and informants,” “report on the location and viability of potential evidence,” and “polygraph reports.” Id. at 1390. On the other hand, examples of categories that do not suffice are those identified merely as “teletypes,” “airtels,” or “letters,” since they provide no basis for judicial assessment of the claimed potential interference. Id. Essentially, the agency’s index must not be drawn in conclusory terms that would frustrate or impede the court’s ability to conduct a de novo review. Carter v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 393 (D.C.Cir.1987). See also Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C.Cir.1980).

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Bluebook (online)
215 F. Supp. 2d 178, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15594, 2002 WL 1941453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sandgrund-v-us-securities-exchange-commission-dcd-2002.