Sandford v. Sandford

Opinion

Filed 9/2/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DEBRA SANDFORD et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, G064699

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-

00996238)

MICHAEL SANDFORD, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

DEBRA SANDFORD et al., G065223

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

MARK SANDFORD,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Ebrahim Baytieh, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Michael L. Sandford, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Hammers Law and Stephen G. Hammers; John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd for Defendant and Appellant Mark Sandford.

Gokal Law Group, Abbas Gokal, Ronald V. Larson and Omer A.

Khan for Plaintiffs and Respondents Debra Sandford and Linda Swoish.

* * *

This appeal arises from a dispute between siblings (Debra Sandford, Linda Swoish, Mark Sandford, Michael Sandford, and Pamela Baden) over the distribution of a trust.1 The trust calls for equal distributions to all five siblings, but it contains an equalization provision that permits the trustee to reduce a beneficiary’s share based on unpaid loans or gifts from the trust. The trial court relied on this provision to conduct an audit of informal financial dealings between family members going back 20 years. It then adjusted Michael’s and Mark’s share of the trust significantly downward, reflecting what the court determined to be early financial distributions from the trust. They appealed.

We conclude the trial court erred. The equalization provision permits a reduction for unpaid loans and gifts, but nothing more. The bulk of the court’s equalization orders concerned rental and sale proceeds from properties going back many years. To the extent Michael and Mark engaged in misconduct in those transactions, the trustee had a cause of action against them, but the court correctly found that any such causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. The court could not circumvent those

1 Debra Sandford, Mark Sandford, Michael Sandford, and their

parents (Jean and Dean Sandford) share the same last name. We refer to all the siblings and their parents by their first names for clarity and ease of reference.

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limitations periods by employing an interpretation at odds with the plain language of the trust.

On the other hand, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Mark’s petition to quiet title to a property called the Center Street property. The court determined that Mark failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a quitclaim deed from him to Jean conveyed bare legal title without the beneficial interest. To reverse that finding, Mark would need to demonstrate that the evidence compelled a factual finding in his favor. We are not persuaded. As to that issue, and the remaining issues raised in the briefs, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

I.

DEAN SANDFORD PASSES AND HIS ESTATE IS DISTRIBUTED Jean was the wife of Dean with whom she had five children, all of whom were parties to the underlying suit: Michael, Mark, Linda, Debra, and Pamela2. In 1988, Dean passed away unexpectedly and intestate. Michael, who is a lawyer, represented Jean in the probate of Dean’s estate. Jean disclaimed part of her interest in Dean’s half of the community property, which was then distributed among the five children.

At the time, Jean and Dean owned or had interests in multiple properties. As relevant to this appeal, those properties included the following:

The “Loretta” property was Jean and Dean’s residence, purchased in 1963, where all of the children grew up.

2 Pamela settled any claims against her prior to trial. She is not a

party to this appeal.

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The “Quincy” property was acquired by Jean and Dean in 1976.

After the probate of Dean’s estate, his 50 percent share was divided up equally among the five children, resulting in each owning 10 percent.

The “Wilken Way” property was a fourplex acquired in 1978.

Dean’s probate order lists his and Jean’s interest as one-third. Dean’s half of the one-third interest was distributed equally among the children.

The “Center Street” property was acquired in 1983, with Jean and Dean owning 50 percent, and Mark owning the other 50 percent. In the probate of Dean’s estate, his 25 percent interest was distributed equally to the five children.

In later years, Jean acquired two more properties relevant to this appeal. In 1996, she acquired the “Lakeview property” as her new residence. In 2000, Jean acquired the “Orange Park property,” which was ultimately rented out until 2018 when it was sold.

II.

THE QUITCLAIM DEEDS

In 1993, all the siblings signed quitclaim deeds in favor of Jean regarding their interests in the Center Street property, including Mark, who owned 55 percent. On the same day the quitclaim deeds were recorded, Jean refinanced the property. The quitclaim deeds specifically recited that they were given for “no consideration, inter-family transfer.”

In 1995, a similar series of events transpired regarding the Quincy property. Again, the quitclaim deeds specifically recited they were given for “no consideration, inter-family transfer.” On the same day the quitclaim deeds were recorded, Jean took out a secured loan on the property.

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III.

JEAN ESTABLISHES A TRUST

In 1998, Jean executed the Jean A. Sandford Trust (1998 Trust), which nominated Debra, Pamela, and Linda as successor trustees, to the exclusion of Mark and Michael. However, just two years later, Jean restated her trust to include all five children as successor trustees. This trust is the operative trust in this proceeding.3 The trust contains an equalization provision at the heart of this appeal, which states the following:

“If Trustor has loaned funds to a child or a child’s family, . . . any unpaid loan shall be distributed as part of that child’s share. If Trustor has made unequal gifts to Trustor’s children or their respective spouses . . . those gifts shall be treated as advances toward each child’s equal share and the Trustee shall make reasonable distribution adjustments to equalize overall the gifts and inheritance of each child’s share.”

Around that same time, in 1999, Jean deeded 25 percent of the Quincy property to Mark, and another 25 percent to Michael, returning the trust to a 50 percent interest.

IV.

THE CHILDREN TAKE OVER FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Jean informed Linda around 2001 that she could no longer balance her checkbook, prompting Linda to manage Jean’s personal accounts. By 2002, Linda gradually started writing the checks to pay Jean’s bills, which Jean would sign. Around this time, Linda asked Mark to handle the checkbooks associated with the rental properties. He was already handling

3 Any nonspecific references to a trust in this opinion are to the

operative trust established in 2000. When we refer to the prior trust, we will specify the 1998 Trust.

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other aspects of the properties. By 2003, Linda was writing checks more frequently because Jean was beginning to have more difficulty.

In 2005, Mark decided to switch the rental accounts for Jean’s properties to a new bank, but he did not make Jean a signatory on the new accounts. Mark and his wife were the only signatories. Around that time, he and Jean decided to refinance Jean’s residence (the Lakeview property). The purpose of the loan, which was approximately $100,000, was to fix up some of the rental properties. The funds from that loan were deposited into an account in Mark’s name. Subsequently, he used those funds for personal expenses and investments.

Beginning in 2002, the Anaheim School District initiated efforts to acquire the Wilken Way property by eminent domain, and Michael represented the family in connection with that proceeding. For the sake of Jean’s mental stability, Michael initially asked the siblings to conceal the information from her. The lengthy process culminated with the sale of the property in 2008. Prior to the sale, Michael informed Jean of the proceedings and assured her he was taking care of everything. To facilitate the transaction, Jean purportedly executed a power of attorney in favor of Michael. However, Jean’s signature was forged, and Michael knew it. The funds from the sale were deposited into Michael’s law firm trust account. The net proceeds from the sale were approximately $829,000, which were allocated according to the following approximate percentages: 16.67 percent to Jean, 36.67 percent each to Michael and Mark, and 3.3 percent each to Debra, Pamela, and Linda.

Approximately $58,000 of Jean’s share of the proceeds were distributed to Linda to pay for Jean’s medical care. Michael claimed to invest the remainder of Jean’s proceeds from the Wilken Way sale (about $75,000)

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in another property (the Creekview Property) pursuant to an Internal Revenue Code section 1033 exchange to avoid capital gains taxes. (26 U.S.C § 1033 (section 1033 exchange).) However, Michael later admitted this was not true and stated that Jean’s approximately $75,000 had actually been distributed to Mark. Ultimately, Jean’s 2008 tax return was amended to reflect that the section 1033 exchange never occurred.

Although Jean had been showing signs of dementia as early as 2003, it was not until 2009 that two medical professionals declared she was no longer competent. At that time, the five children officially became trustees of the trust. Jean passed away in October 2014.

V.

CONFLICT ARISES AND THE PRESENT PETITIONS ARE FILED In the leadup to Jean’s death and afterwards, conflict began to arise among the siblings regarding the finances of the trust. In part, this was due to suspicions on the part of Debra and Linda stemming from the incomplete section 1033 exchange of the Wilken Way proceeds and the disposition of Jean’s funds, and in part it stemmed from a liquidity crisis the trust faced in which it lacked sufficient funds to pay ongoing expenses.

Debra and Linda initiated the current proceeding in May 2018 by filing a petition against Michael, Mark, and Pamela. The operative pleading is the fourth amended petition in which Debra and Linda sought instructions, an accounting, return of trust property, removal of Michael and Mark as trustees, an order deeming Michael and Mark to have predeceased Jean, and asserted causes of action against Michael and Mark for financial elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty.

Michael and Mark filed a petition in July 2019. Mark sought to quiet title to, and declaratory relief for, the Center Street and Lakeview

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properties, and he sought reimbursement of funds and for services rendered. Both Mark and Michael sought removal of Debra and Linda as trustees and for an order amending the education funds trust provisions to conform to the intention of the trustor.

In March 2020, the court suspended the powers of the cotrustees and appointed Bruce Hitchman as an independent temporary trustee.

VI.

TRIAL AND JUDGMENT

The trial on Debra and Linda’s petition and Mark and Michael’s petition lasted 22 nonconsecutive days. At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued a 64-page final statement of decision and judgment.

Generally speaking, on most contested issues, the court found Linda and Debra to be credible, and Mark and Michael to be not credible. With regard to the quitclaim deeds that the children signed in favor of Jean in the 1990’s for the Center Street and Quincy Properties, the court found the deeds conveyed both the legal and beneficial interests in the properties to Jean. The court denied all the relief requested in Mark and Michael’s petition, including claims for monetary damages, to quiet title, and to remove Debra and Linda as trustees.

The court ruled against Debra and Linda on their claim for financial elder abuse. It concluded that Michael and Mark did not take Jean’s property in bad faith or with the intent to harm her. The court also concluded the cause of action was barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations, as it accrued no later than May 2009 when the children became trustees, but the petition was not filed until 2018. The court also concluded the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was time-barred.

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The court found that Michael and Mark took on the duties of trustee of Jean’s properties starting in 2002, relying on the doctrine of trustee de son tort.4 The court granted Debra and Linda’s request to remove Michael and Mark as trustees. It issued an order requiring Michael and Mark to provide a full accounting of all trust assets in their possession from 2009 through 2020 and to relinquish any such property to the temporary trustee. The court granted Debra and Linda’s request for an order of attorney fees against Michael and Mark.

The court denied Debra and Linda’s request for an order deeming Michael and Mark to have predeceased Jean. And it denied Debra and Linda’s requests for damages. The court accepted the resignation of Debra and Linda as cotrustees of the trust and appointed Bruce Hitchman (the temporary trustee) as the sole trustee.

The court then ordered the trustee to distribute the res of the trust in compliance with the equalization provision, and the court issued numerous orders to guide the trustee in its implementation. It ordered various loans that Michael had failed to repay to be deemed early distributions. The court ordered that a $60,000 “helicopter loan” from 1993 be treated as an early distribution to Michael. It assessed another loan against Michael in the amount of $79,504.21. It ordered that an unpaid 2016 loan to Michael in the amount of $42,274.16 be deemed an early distribution.

The court also ordered that certain rental and sales proceeds be deemed early distributions to Michael and Mark subject to the equalization provision. As to the Wilken Way property, the court ordered that $18,500

4 We discuss this in more detail below. The doctrine essentially

creates a constructive trustee where a person voluntarily undertakes management of another’s property.

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paid from the sale proceeds to Mark for work on the property be treated as an early distribution. It ordered that rental proceeds between 2002–2008 be treated as early distributions to Michael and Mark, in the amount of $107,537.50 each. As to Center Street, the court ordered that rent collected by Mark from 2002 through 2020 be treated as an early distribution in the amount of $537,930. As to the Quincy Property, the court ordered that half of the rental proceeds between 2002–2024 be treated as early distributions to Michael and Mark in the amount of $145,620 each. As to the Orange Park property, the court ordered that all rental proceeds from 2002 through 2018 be treated as an early distribution to Mark in the amount of $601,560.

Finally, the court ordered the trustee to pay Debra and Linda’s attorney fees. Michael and Mark appealed from the judgment. 5 DISCUSSION

Michael’s and Mark’s appeals raise many issues, which we have organized into four groups. First, they claim that the court’s resolution of many of the contested claims should have been in their favor because the statutes of limitations had elapsed. Second, they claim that the court erred in ruling that the quitclaim deeds the siblings signed conferred both legal and beneficial title to Jean. Third, Mark contends the court erred by calculating his early distributions as the gross rent of the properties he managed rather than the rent net of expenses. In the final part of the opinion, we will address some miscellaneous issues raised in the briefs, including attorney fees.

5 The trustee, Bruce Hitchman, also appealed from the judgment.

However, he later abandoned his appeal.

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I.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE EQUALIZATION PROVISION A. Statute of Limitations Mark and Michael contend that essentially all of Debra and Linda’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. They contend nearly all of the conduct at issue in the petition occurred in the 1990s through 2012. Moreover, the court found that Debra and Linda were on notice of Michael’s and Mark’s wrongdoing by 2009. Yet Debra and Linda did not file the petition until 2018. Accordingly, the claims of wrongdoing were time-barred.

Michael’s and Mark’s arguments suffer from a number of flaws—

most significantly, they fail to address what cause of action is barred and which statute of limitations actually applies. The only causes of action against Michael and Mark personally were for financial elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty, which the trial court already found to be time- barred. The remainder of the court’s orders were simply instructions given to the trustee pursuant to Probate Code section 17200, subdivision (b)(6). Probate Code section 17200 authorizes a petition “concerning the internal affairs of the trust” for the purpose of “[i]nstructing the trustee.” That statute does not contain a limitations period. Neither Mark nor Michael have identified any applicable statute of limitations to providing instructions to the trustee.

Michael’s and Mark’s arguments are best understood as an assertion that a trustee cannot reduce a distribution to a beneficiary based on time-barred debts. However, this proposition was rejected in Cook v. Cook (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1436 (Cook). There, a trust provided for equal distribution among four children, but, similar to the present case, it required

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the trustee to “‘allocate any debts owed to the settlors to the share created for the beneficiary owing said obligation.’” (Id. at p. 1439.) The trust attached a writing reflecting a loan made to one of the children over 10 years prior. (Ibid.) By the time the trustors died, the debt was about 20 years old, and the debtor/beneficiary argued it could not be offset against his share because the statute of limitations had run on the debt, and thus it was not a debt “owing” under the trust. (Id. at p. 1440.) The Court of Appeal disagreed. It noted that “[t]he settlors did not qualify the debts by stating that the trustee must offset only enforceable debts.” (Id. at p. 1442.) And it distinguished older case law excluding time-barred debts on the ground that the prior case law “did not involve a settlor’s or testator’s expressed intent to offset unpaid debts to implement a testamentary plan to treat each beneficiary equally.” (Id. at p. 1443.)

We agree with this approach. Within the bounds of legality, a settlor can distribute her funds however she wishes. (Prob. Code, § 15203 [“A trust may be created for any purpose that is not illegal or against public policy”].) If she wishes to alter her distribution based on time-barred debts, and the trust clearly reflects that intent, there is nothing illegal or impermissible about that. Broadly speaking, this is the legal framework the court applied here. That approach avoids running afoul of the statute of limitations because the court is simply implementing the testator’s intent. However, it sets up a more fundamental question: what does the trust actually say? B. The Court Misinterpreted the Equalization Provision Generally speaking, the trust calls for equal distributions to the five children, except it permits a beneficiary’s inheritance to be reduced by

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operation of the equalization provision. The interpretation of the equalization provision, therefore, is the fulcrum on which most of the court’s orders turn.

Our task of interpreting the trust begins with the language of the trust document. “The intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument.” (Prob. Code, § 21102, subd. (a).) “‘The centerpiece of interpretation, of course, is the language contained in . . . the trust document.’” (Stadel Art Museum v. Mulvihill (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 283, 293.) “The words of an instrument are to be given their ordinary and grammatical meaning unless the intention to use them in another sense is clear and their intended meaning can be ascertained.” (Prob. Code, § 21122.) “In interpreting a document such as a trust, it is proper for the trial court in the first instance and the appellate court on de novo review to consider the circumstances under which the document was made so that the court may be placed in the position of the testator or trustor whose language it is interpreting, in order to determine whether the terms of the document are clear and definite, or ambiguous in some respect.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Marshall (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 447, 453.) Unless the trial court’s interpretation of ambiguous terms turns on the resolution of contested extrinsic evidence, our review is de novo. (Scharlin v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 162, 168.)

The trial court broadly interpreted the equalization provision to mean that any financial benefit a beneficiary took from the trust must be accounted for and deducted from that beneficiary’s share. This resulted in what amounted to a 20-year audit of informal financial dealings between family members.6

6 With regard to the family’s pattern of informal financial

dealings, the court noted: “For decades, when it came to Jean’s assets and

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However, the text of the equalization provision does not, on its face, permit the broad-ranging investigation the trial court conducted. Instead, its plain language is focused on loans and gifts. It states, “If Trustor has loaned funds to a child or a child’s family, . . . any unpaid loan shall be distributed as part of that child’s share. If Trustor has made unequal gifts to Trustor’s children or their respective spouses . . . those gifts shall be treated as advances toward each child’s equal share and the Trustee shall make reasonable distribution adjustments to equalize overall the gifts and inheritance of each child’s share.” The ordinary meaning of the words in this provision requires an adjustment for unpaid loans and for gifts, and nothing more.

In concluding otherwise, the trial court relied on circumstances surrounding the execution of the trust, which were as follows. In 1993, one of Michael’s companies had borrowed $100,000 from Jean. In 1994, Michael had borrowed $60,000 from Jean to invest in a helicopter-related investment. Separately, in 1993, Michael and Mark collectively borrowed $40,000 from Jean. David Swoish (Linda’s husband) testified that in 1996, Jean had a conversation with David in which she broke down in tears and asked David to protect her from Michael and Mark because they had borrowed over $100,000 from her individual retirement account (IRA) and had not paid it back. David then had a conversation with Mark where he relayed Jean’s concerns and Mark agreed to pay the money back. Marr Leisure, Jean’s financial advisor, testified that Jean’s IRA faced liquidity problems around 1996. As a result of her age, she was required to take distributions, but there

income, the members of the Sandford family, including Debra and Linda, conducted themselves in an informal way that certainly flew in the face of the rigid guidelines of accounting principles and arms-length transacting.”

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was little liquid cash due to the loans Michael had taken from her account. Jean told Leisure that she wanted to divide her estate evenly between her children, but wanted to reduce Michael’s and Mark’s shares based on the unpaid loans they owed her. After Leisure spoke with Michael, some of the loans were repaid, and in 1997 her IRA regained sufficient liquidity. Debra testified that in 1998, around the time of the 1998 Trust, Jean told her that she was disappointed in Mark and Michael for not repaying the loans she gave them, and that was the reason she did not initially name them as successor trustees. The estate planning attorney who drafted the 1998 Trust (James MacDonald) sent Jean a letter in 1998 describing the trust as “accomplish[ing] your objectives of making sure that the loans you have advanced to the boys are allocated to their shares . . . .” Jean’s estate planning attorney in connection with the operative trust, Scott Richmond, testified that Jean discussed the loans that Michael and Mark had taken out, and she expressed frustration that all of her financial assistance was going to Mark and Michael, but not Debra, Linda, and Pamela.

These circumstances introduce no ambiguity to, and are entirely consistent with, the plain language of the equalization provision. The evidence demonstrated that Jean was focused on unpaid loans at the time she executed both trusts. The plain language of the equalization provision clearly reflects that intent.

Because the trial court’s interpretation went well beyond the plain language, and no factual circumstances warranted departing from the plain language, the court erred. The equalization provision applies to loans and gifts, and nothing more. The bulk of the court’s orders in this case concerned the proceeds of properties—specifically, rental proceeds and sales proceeds. The equalization provision does not apply to those transactions. To

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the extent Mark or Michael breached their fiduciary duties in carrying out those transactions, Jean or a successor trustee would have had a cause of action against them. But as the trial court found, and as everyone acknowledges on appeal, the statute of limitations had long since run on such claims.

Our conclusion is buttressed by yet another finding the trial court made concerning Jean’s desire to eliminate conflict between the siblings. The court found, “During her lifetime, [Jean] did her utmost best to eliminate money-driven conflicts between her five children. [Jean] worked hard to especially eliminate money-driven conflicts between her children after her passing. Simply stated, [Jean] did not want her children to fight over her money after she dies.” In our view, Jean’s intent to eliminate conflicts between her children is wholly inconsistent with an interpretation of the equalization provision that mandates a 20-year audit of informal financial arrangements. If that is what she meant, she all but guaranteed conflict between the children. As we have concluded above, however, that is not what she meant. The text of the equalization provision does not support such a broad mandate. Nothing about the circumstances suggests that she intended to equalize anything other than loans and gifts, as she plainly stated.

The trial court issued numerous orders in this case, which it numbered sequentially. We affirm the trial court’s orders pertaining to unpaid loans—even time-barred loans—under the authority of Cook. Those include orders 28, 29, and 31. However, we reverse the orders pertaining to equalization of rental and sales proceeds, which are orders 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 30. We also reverse order 20, as it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the equalization provision. Because we reverse the court’s orders pertaining to rental proceeds, we need not address Michael and Mark’s

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contentions that the court erred by basing its orders on gross rental proceeds rather than net rental proceeds.

II.

TITLE ISSUES

Michael and Mark challenge the trial court’s findings that certain quitclaim deeds transferred full beneficial ownership of properties to Jean. One of those properties in dispute, the Wilken Way property, is moot in light of our holding above. It was sold in 2008 and the proceeds were distributed around that time. Any cause of action concerning those proceeds is time-barred, and the equalization provision does not apply because the proceeds were not loans or gifts.

We also need not address the Quincy property. Although Michael purports to appeal from the trial court’s orders regarding the Quincy property, his entire discussion of the evidence pertains only to the Wilken Way property. He occasionally lumps those two properties together in his briefing, but his failure to discuss the evidence concerning Quincy results in a forfeiture on appeal. (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589 [“An appellant who fails to cite accurately to the record forfeits the issue or argument on appeal that is presented without the record reference”].) The imposition of a forfeiture is particularly appropriate in a case with a large record, which, in this case, exceeds 20,000 pages.

That leaves just the Center Street property. Mark contends the trial court erred in denying his petition to quiet title to Center Street. We address that property now.

The trial court did not directly rule on the ownership of Center Street, but it did so by implication, ruling that 100 percent of the rental proceeds were to be deducted from Mark’s share under the equalization

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provision. Although that ruling is reversed, the court also ordered the trustee to liquidate all trust properties, and thus ownership of Center Street is still a relevant and contested issue.

The trial court ruled that all of the quitclaim deeds produced during the trial resulted in the transfer of full legal title and beneficial ownership. In so ruling, the court relied on two statutes. The first was Civil Code section 1105, which states, “A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real property, unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended.” The second was Evidence Code section 662, which provides, “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” “The presumption can be overcome only by evidence of an agreement or understanding between the parties that the title reflected in the deed is not what the parties intended.” (In re Marriage of Brooks & Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 189–190, italics added, abrogated on other grounds in In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1405.)

Where the presumption of title is overcome, a resulting trust arises. “‘A resulting trust arises by operation of law from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to take the beneficial interest. [Citations.] Such a resulting trust carries out and enforces the inferred intent of the parties.’” (Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 834, 847.) “The trustee has no duties to perform, no trust to administer and no purpose to carry out except the single task of holding onto or conveying the property to the beneficiary.” (Id. at p. 848.) A resulting trust commonly arises where one party takes title to property but another furnishes the consideration for it. This is because it is

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the natural presumption that the person on title holds it for the one who paid for it. (Estate of Yool (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 867, 874.)

Because Evidence Code section 662 and the doctrine of resulting trusts present a factual question regarding the parties’ agreement, understanding, or intent, we review the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence. “Under the substantial evidence standard, our review ‘begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, [that] will support the [factfinder’s] determination.’ [Citation.] Evidence that supports the judgment must be accepted, conflicting evidence must be rejected, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the verdict. [Citations.] ‘We do not review the evidence to see if there is substantial evidence to support the losing party’s version of events, but only to see if substantial evidence exists to support the verdict in favor of the prevailing party.’ [Citation.] ‘Even if the [factfinder’s] findings are against the weight of the evidence, they will be upheld if supported by evidence that is of ponderable legal significance and reasonable in nature.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1068–1069.)

The substantial evidence test takes on an even more demanding character when, as here, the appellant bore the burden of proof at trial but failed to meet that burden. Because the trial court did not make an affirmative finding of a particular fact, it makes little sense to ask whether the evidence supported a factual finding. Instead, the court found a failure of proof. “[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was

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(1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, italics added, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7)

Mark’s argument begins with the fact that he was originally a 50 percent owner of the Center Street property. He then contends the quitclaim deeds executed by the siblings were merely to facilitate a refinancing, noting that the Center Street property was refinanced on the same day the quitclaim deeds were recorded and that the deeds were given for no consideration. Finally, he relies on the fact that Jean’s subsequent tax returns reflected her ownership of only 25 percent of Center Street. We conclude that Mark’s evidence did not compel a finding in his favor as a matter of law.

At trial, Mark acknowledged that he intended for the reconveyance of the Center Street property, but “probably forgot about it.” He did not know why the Center Street property was not reconveyed to him between 1993 and 2000. He did not address the issue as to the title until he and Michael filed their petition in 2019. The trial court found that Mark’s testimony concerning the circumstances of the signing of the quitclaim deeds was not credible. It is not our role to revisit the court’s credibility findings. (Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 786 [“‘[i]t is the trial court’s role to assess the credibility of the various witnesses . . . . We have no power to . . . consider the credibility of witnesses . . . .’”].) While Center Street was refinanced on the same day the quitclaim deeds were recorded, there was no compelling evidence that the quitclaim deeds merely transferred legal title to facilitate that transaction, as opposed to full legal and beneficial title, as the

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law presumes. The primary evidence to support Mark’s version of those events was his own testimony, which the court rejected.

Mark’s other evidence was Jean’s tax returns, which the trial court also expressly considered and concluded they were insufficient to satisfy his burden of clear and convincing evidence. Mark has not cited any authority that tax returns are conclusively, or even presumptively, correct. While we have not found any authority in the probate context, in the family law context the court in In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519 conducted an extensive legal analysis and concluded that tax returns are not presumptively correct, noting that they are subject to being manipulated. (Id. at pp. 543–544.) Although there was no explicit finding of manipulation here, the court expressed a similar concern that “during the relevant times, [Michael and Mark] had the full trust of Jean, Debra, and Linda which allowed Michael and Mark to do as they wished without regard to their fiduciary duty to Jean and Jean’s interests.” And, indeed, there was at least one example of Jean’s tax returns being manipulated: Michael’s false claim that he had completed a section 1033 exchange on her behalf.

Ultimately, it was the trial court’s role to weigh the evidence, including the tax returns, and it found that Mark failed to meet the heavy burden of clear and convincing evidence. Mark has not cited any authority on appeal that would permit us to conclude that the trial court was compelled to make a contrary finding as a matter of law. Accordingly, we defer to the court’s findings and affirm its denial of Mark’s quiet title action.

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III.

ATTORNEY FEES

Michael and Mark contend that if we reverse a substantial portion of the judgment, which we have, then we should reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees as well. We agree.

Probate Code section 1002 provides, “either the superior court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs to be paid by any party to the proceedings, or out of the assets of the estate, as justice may require.” “‘Where the expense of litigation is caused by the unsuccessful attempt of one of the beneficiaries to obtain a greater share of the trust property, the expense may properly be chargeable to that beneficiary’s share.’” (Estate of Ivey (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 873, 883.)7 Here, the trial court awarded Debra and Linda their attorney fees from the assets of the trust generally, but awarded Michael and Mark’s attorney fees out of their own shares of the trust. Although the court did not explicitly recite the factual basis for its award of attorney fees, it was presumably due to the relative success and lack of success of Debra and Linda on the one hand, and Michael and Mark on the other. Because our holding significantly alters that balance of success, we reverse the court’s attorney fee awards.

7 The parties all assume that the reference to “costs” in Probate

Code section 1002 includes attorney fees. The statute does not specify attorney fees. The parties did not provide any authority that section 1002 includes attorney fees. We express no opinion on the matter. The parties are free to litigate this issue further on remand.

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IV.

REMAINING ISSUES

Michael’s and Mark’s briefs raise other issues, but we conclude they are either moot in light of our holdings or forfeited due to the lack of briefing.

Michael contends the trial court erred by directing the trustee to establish an education fund for qualifying grandchildren. However, besides stating that he was appealing from that order, he did not include any argument under a separate heading, any factual discussion with references to the record, nor any legal arguments relevant to the issue. Accordingly, it is forfeited. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [“Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading”]; Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207 [“When an appellant raises an issue ‘but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived’”].)

Michael also appeals from the trial court’s order that he conduct a formal accounting of trust assets, but for the same reason, we deem the argument forfeited. It was mentioned in his brief as an appealed issue, but there is no heading, no argument, and no factual discussion supporting the issue.

Finally, both Michael and Mark dispute the trial court’s finding that the doctrine of trustee de son tort applies to them. The doctrine of trustee de son tort essentially creates a constructive trustee under certain circumstances. “‘One who has assumed the relation and undertaken to act in the capacity of a trustee and who has thereby come into the possession and control of the money or property of another cannot be heard to deny the

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validity of the trust under which he has admittedly acted and the benefits of which he has received and holds. [Citation.] . . . [A] person may become a trustee by construction by intermeddling with and assuming the management of property without authority, and . . . during the possession and management thereof by such constructive trustees they are subject to the same rules and remedies as other trustees, and cannot avoid their liability as such by showing that they were not in fact trustees, nor can they set up the statute of limitations.’” (King v. Johnston (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1505– 1506 [citing England v. Winslow (1925) 196 Cal. 260, 267].)

However, in their briefs, Michael and Mark only discuss the trustee de son tort doctrine in connection with their contention that the trial court relied on that doctrine to make an equitable exception to the statute of limitations. Because we have resolved the statute of limitations issues through our interpretation of the equalization provision and by reference to the rule announced in Cook, we need not address whether the court committed the error Mark and Michael claim, nor whether substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that the trustee de son tort doctrine applies to them.

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DISPOSITION

The trial court’s orders pertaining to the equalization of sales and rental proceeds, which are orders 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 30 in the final statement of decision and judgment, are reversed. The court’s orders concerning attorney fees are reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Mark and Michael shall recover their costs incurred on appeal.

SERVINO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, P.J.

SCHWARM, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.