Sanderson v. Towne

Supreme Court of Vermont

Sanderson v. Towne

409 A.2d 585, 137 Vt. 539, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1098

CourtSupreme Court of Vermont

DecidedNovember 5, 1979

DocketNo. 137-79

StatusPublished

This text of 409 A.2d 585 (Sanderson v. Towne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sanderson v. Towne, 409 A.2d 585, 137 Vt. 539, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1098 (Vt. 1979).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

In this pro se appeal plaintiffs seek reversal of an order entered for defendant in an action brought by them for recovery of a partial down payment on the purchase of a mobile home.

The parties waived formal findings at trial. While this shortage makes appellate review more difficult, it does not preclude consideration, and this Court will examine the evidence to determine whether a given result is supportable. Harrigan v. Harrigan, 135 Vt. 249, 250, 373 A.2d 550 (1977).

The term of the agreement that forms the basis of this suit provided that the down payment was “to be returned if financing [was] not available for either party.”

The record discloses that plaintiffs in good faith attempted to procure financing from two banks but were denied both times, once orally and once in writing. Since financing, an express condition of the agreement, was not available through no fault of the plaintiffs, performance was excused and the [540]*540down payment should have been returned. Nebaco, Inc. v. Riverview Realty Co., 87 Nev. 55, 57, 482 P.2d 305, 307 (1971). See generally 18 Williston on Contracts §§ 1968-1972 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1978).

Judgment vacated and judgment entered for the plaintiffs.

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Per Curiam.

In this pro se appeal plaintiffs seek reversal of an order entered for defendant in an action brought by them for recovery of a partial down payment on the purchase of a mobile home.

The parties waived formal findings at trial. While this shortage makes appellate review more difficult, it does not preclude consideration, and this Court will examine the evidence to determine whether a given result is supportable. Harrigan v. Harrigan, 135 Vt. 249, 250, 373 A.2d 550 (1977).

The term of the agreement that forms the basis of this suit provided that the down payment was “to be returned if financing [was] not available for either party.”

The record discloses that plaintiffs in good faith attempted to procure financing from two banks but were denied both times, once orally and once in writing. Since financing, an express condition of the agreement, was not available through no fault of the plaintiffs, performance was excused and the [540]*540down payment should have been returned. Nebaco, Inc. v. Riverview Realty Co., 87 Nev. 55, 57, 482 P.2d 305, 307 (1971). See generally 18 Williston on Contracts §§ 1968-1972 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1978).

Judgment vacated and judgment entered for the plaintiffs.

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Bluebook (online)

409 A.2d 585, 137 Vt. 539, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1098, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanderson-v-towne-vt-1979.

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