Sanderson v. The Columbus

21 F. Cas. 329, 8 Leg. Int. 31
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided November 15, 1850·Published

Opinion

Before

KANE, District Judge.

The leading facts upon which my decree in this case will rest are these: The steam propeller Columbus left Philadelphia on the 30th of November, 1848, for Charleston, S. C., and at half past two o’clock in the morning of the 3d December, (civil time,) she was in the neighborhood of Cape Lookout Shoals, heading south-west, on her starboard tack, going about nine knots an hour. The schooner Mission, a new vessel of 112 tons, was returning to Edenton, N. C., with a cargo of salt from Rum Key. She was on her larboard tack, steering north-east, going at the rate of five knots, or something less. The wind was fresh from the north-west; the sea was rough from the action of the south-east wind that had prevailed for some days before; it was a starlight night. It is said that the two vessels were about three hundred yards from each other, perhaps less, perhaps a little more, when the look out man ot the steamer saw the schooner approaching bearing about a point, or a point and a half, on the steamer’s larboard bow. The engine was stopped at once and reversed; but there was no hail on either side, and neither vessel varied her course. The consequence was a collision of the steamer’s bow and the starboard quarter of the schooner, and the schooner sank immediately.

Whatever of controversy there may be as to other supposed or asserted facts, I believe that there is nothing in this succinct recital I have made which does not consist with the proofs exhibited in the case, and relied on by the respondents; and, if my views are just, it is not necessary to go beyond it. The question, whether the captain of the schooner was or was not improperly below at the time of collision, or whether the lookout man of the schooner was asleep, it might, perhaps, be difficult to decide; since the two persons whose evidence upon it would be of most interest were lost with the vessel. But the present issue connects itself no further with the conduct of the parties than as that conduct may have contributed to bring about the collision.

I am to decide the simple question: Was the collision occasioned by the fault of one, or of the other vessel, or was it unavoidable? And this question, thougli perhaps at first glance an embarrassing one to a person unfamiliar with those usages of navigation that form part of the law of the sea, admits of an easy solution with reference to them. 1 have been a little surprised to learn from some of the skillful seamen who have been examined in this case how little is known of those usages on shipboard. It is a rule, founded altogether in reason, and long and thoroughly recognized in the admiralty, that, on the open seas, vessels going free shall [330]*330give way to thosé that are going elosehauled; and the correlative is equally well established, that a vessel going elosehauled, when meeting a vessel going free, shall hold her course. These are absolute rules; and the vessel that violates either of them becomes answerable for any collision which may be the consequence. The reason of them is plain. The vessel going free has the command of her movements much more fully than the one that is elosehauled. She can pass in either direction by a simple inclination of her helm, and without considerable loss of way; while the elosehauled vessel can turn only in one direction, unless she goes into stays, and loses her course by the ma-noeuvre, — hence the duty of the vessel going free. And as the vessel going elosehauled might, by changing her course, place herself in the way of the other vessel, while that was conforming to the rule for the purpose of avoiding her, the duty enjoined on the elosehauled vessel is equally reasonable. The same considerations which at first suggested these rules for sailing vessels, have, since steam has begun to be extensively applied as a motive power in navigation, grafted on them a rule applicable to steamers; viz. that a steamer shall be regarded always as a vessel going free, and must give way in consequence to a sailing vessel going close hauled. And this extension of the first rule implies a similar extension of the second; viz. that a vessel going elosehauled, and meeting a steamer, shall not be at liberty to change her course. I have not indeed met a reported case which called for the enunciation of the rule thus modified; but I cannot doubt that as the argument which led to the original rule would apply with equal force to its modification also, the courts of admiralty would enforce both alike.

The application of these rules to the few facts I have recited may decide the present case. It was the duty of the Mission to hold her course; and it is conceded that she did so. The steamer, on the other hand, was bound to give way, — not merely to check her progress, but to change her course; in a word, to prevent the collision. It is conceded that she did not do so.

To relieve herself from the liability which should follow from this state of facts, two excuses are offered on behalf of the steamer; (1) That when the schooner was first descried, the distance between the two vessels was not sufficient to permit the steamer to give way in time; (2) that from the courses the two vessels were steering, heading nearly towards each other, with but three points of the compass or about thirty-four degrees of divergence between them, the steamer could not know in time which way the schooner was steering, and could not decide therefore in which direction she. the steamer, ought to pass in order to avoid her. The first of these excuses is clearly a mistake, if the evidence is correct that the steamer had overcome or nearly ■ overcome her momentum before the collision. For it requires no argument to show that a steamer going nine knots an hour can change her direction by shifting her helm much more promptly than she can bring herself to a state of rest in the water; and this remark is especially true of propellers generally, which answer their helm more readily than other vessels, and is sworn to be true in reference to the Columbus. Besides, it is demonstrable from the allegations of the witnesses themselves, which are in proof, that the accident could not have taken place had the steamer changed her helm in either direction, or had she even kept on her way. The medium rate of the steamer’s motion from the moment of seeing the schooner to the moment of the encounter was about 4ys knots, or a little more. I say a little more, because the steamer was going at the rate of nine knots an hour at first, and because I think the manner in which the two vessels struck, and the character of the injury sustained by the schooner, as well as the fact that one of the drowning seamen from the wreck drifted past the steamer, go to show that the steamer’s motion had not been entirely arrested when they came together. The schooner’s rate of motion being something less than five knots or about the same as the medium rate of the steamer, the two vessels passed over very nearly equal spaces in the same time, and a simple trigonometrical computation from the elements given in the evidence (viz. their distance, 300 yards, and their bearing, iy> points) determines for us that each passed over 157 yards before they met. Had the steamer kept up her speed of 9 knots, she would have passed over more than 300 yards instead of 157, and as her length is only 165 feet, and the schooner’s only 76, it is clear they would have passed each other in safety. Another result from the same computation is that the vessels were approaching each other for about a minute and an eighth after the schooner was descried, a space of time abundantly sufficient to have allowed the steamer to give way by changing her helm.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Sanderson v. The Columbus, 21 F. Cas. 329, 8 Leg. Int. 31 (E.D. Pa. 1850).

21 F. Cas. 329 (Sanderson v. The Columbus) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.