No. 04-736
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2005 MT 230N
RICHARD SANDERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Musselshell, Cause No. DV 2002-022 The Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Richard Sanders, pro se, Roundup, Montana
For Respondents:
Ann Hefenieder, Special Assistant Attorney General, Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Division, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 3, 2005
Decided: September 14, 2005 Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as
a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Richard Sanders (Sanders), pro se, appeals from the Order of the District Court of the
Fourteenth Judicial District, Musselshell County, dismissing his claim against the State of
Montana, Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement
Division (CSED). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Sanders and Laura Lonebear (Lonebear) were married on November 18, 1979, in
Forsyth, Montana. Lonebear is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe; Sanders is not.
The couple has three sons who are enrolled members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. All
three are now emancipated.
¶4 On September 29, 1982, Lonebear filed an action for divorce in the Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Court in Lame Deer, Montana. Sanders objected to the tribal court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over him. The tribal court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of Lonebear’s action. Thus, on December 10, 1982, the tribal
court issued a decree which dissolved the marriage, divided the couple’s property, awarded
custody of the children to Lonebear, and ordered Sanders to pay child support in the amount
2 of $150.00 per month, per child. As Sanders was incarcerated at the time, the decree
specified that he meet this obligation “[w]hen he is employed.”
¶5 Sanders instituted an action in federal district court, challenging the tribal court’s
jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. The federal district court concluded that the tribal
court’s exercise of jurisdiction was proper. Sanders appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision without a published opinion. Sanders
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and
remanded the matter for further consideration in light of National Farmers Union Ins. Cos.
v. Crow Tribe of Indians (1985), 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818. Sanders
v. Robinson (1985), 472 U.S. 1014, 105 S.Ct. 3472, 87 L.Ed.2d 609. On remand, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the marriage dissolution action.
Sanders v. Robinson (9th Cir. 1988), 864 F.2d 630, 634, amended on other grounds, 1988
U.S. App. LEXIS 17047.
¶6 Sanders also appealed the dissolution decree to the Northern Cheyenne Appellate
Court, which upheld the exercise of tribal jurisdiction, but remanded the custody
determination and property division in order to correct due process violations. Having
addressed these issues, the court proceeded to uphold Sanders’ child support obligation
contained in the dissolution decree, stating “[t]he Dissolution Decree issued in this matter
on December 10, 1982, is affirmed in all other aspects.”
¶7 The CSED initiated its effort to enforce Sanders’ child support obligation in February
of 1986. On July 10, 1986, the CSED issued a contested case Notice of Intent to Withhold
3 Income. A hearing was held on the Notice, and an order was issued determining that income
withholding was appropriate. On February 23, 1996, the CSED issued a contested case
Supplemental Notice of Intent to Withhold Income. Sanders received the Notice at his home
in Tijuana, Mexico, together with a Request for Hearing form. Sanders did not request a
hearing, but returned the documents to the CSED.
¶8 Pursuant to a request by Sanders, the tribal court’s decree was modified on June 4,
1997. Sanders signed the modification consent order, indicating his consent to the terms of
that order, which required him to pay child support in the amount of $63.00 per month, per
child, regardless of his employment status. Sanders requested and received hardship
adjustments of withholding amounts for past-due support on six occasions between 1997 and
2000. In 1998, Sanders requested an administrative review on the CSED’s interception of
his federal income tax refund. The administrative review was convened on May 12, 1998,
but Sanders did not appear in person or by telephone.
¶9 On April 19, 2002, Sanders instituted an action in state District Court, challenging the
CSED’s efforts to enforce the child support obligation contained in the tribal court’s
dissolution decree. On January 3, 2003, the District Court held a hearing on the matter. On
March 14, 2003, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, dismissing Sanders’ cause of action against the CSED. In doing so, the District Court
concluded that issues regarding the validity of the tribal court’s dissolution decree were res
judicata, having been determined by the Northern Cheyenne Appellate Court and the federal
courts. The District Court also concluded that the Northern Cheyenne Appellate Court’s
4 affirmation of Sanders’ child support obligation was res judicata. Further, the District Court
concluded that Sanders could not assert a statute of limitations challenge to the CSED’s child
support collection actions because he waived the defense during the last contested case
action when he failed to request a hearing. Finally, the District Court determined that
Sanders owed past-due child support in the amount of $21,224.45, but later amended the
calculation and determined that Sanders owed $19,011.45. The calculation accounted for,
inter alia: (1) child support payments made to Lonebear by Jack Badhorse, who was
Lonebear’s common law husband for a period of time after the dissolution of her marriage
with Sanders; and, (2) public assistance benefits received by Lonebear.
¶10 The CSED undertook enforcement action against Sanders, proceeding based on an
incorrect calculation of his debt. Consequently, Sanders filed a motion in the District Court
for a hearing on the issue. The CSED acknowledged the error and modified its enforcement
efforts accordingly. Thus, the District Court denied Sanders’ motion for a hearing, finding
the issue moot.
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No. 04-736
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2005 MT 230N
RICHARD SANDERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Musselshell, Cause No. DV 2002-022 The Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Richard Sanders, pro se, Roundup, Montana
For Respondents:
Ann Hefenieder, Special Assistant Attorney General, Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Division, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 3, 2005
Decided: September 14, 2005 Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as
a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Richard Sanders (Sanders), pro se, appeals from the Order of the District Court of the
Fourteenth Judicial District, Musselshell County, dismissing his claim against the State of
Montana, Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement
Division (CSED). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Sanders and Laura Lonebear (Lonebear) were married on November 18, 1979, in
Forsyth, Montana. Lonebear is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe; Sanders is not.
The couple has three sons who are enrolled members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. All
three are now emancipated.
¶4 On September 29, 1982, Lonebear filed an action for divorce in the Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Court in Lame Deer, Montana. Sanders objected to the tribal court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over him. The tribal court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of Lonebear’s action. Thus, on December 10, 1982, the tribal
court issued a decree which dissolved the marriage, divided the couple’s property, awarded
custody of the children to Lonebear, and ordered Sanders to pay child support in the amount
2 of $150.00 per month, per child. As Sanders was incarcerated at the time, the decree
specified that he meet this obligation “[w]hen he is employed.”
¶5 Sanders instituted an action in federal district court, challenging the tribal court’s
jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. The federal district court concluded that the tribal
court’s exercise of jurisdiction was proper. Sanders appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision without a published opinion. Sanders
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and
remanded the matter for further consideration in light of National Farmers Union Ins. Cos.
v. Crow Tribe of Indians (1985), 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818. Sanders
v. Robinson (1985), 472 U.S. 1014, 105 S.Ct. 3472, 87 L.Ed.2d 609. On remand, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the marriage dissolution action.
Sanders v. Robinson (9th Cir. 1988), 864 F.2d 630, 634, amended on other grounds, 1988
U.S. App. LEXIS 17047.
¶6 Sanders also appealed the dissolution decree to the Northern Cheyenne Appellate
Court, which upheld the exercise of tribal jurisdiction, but remanded the custody
determination and property division in order to correct due process violations. Having
addressed these issues, the court proceeded to uphold Sanders’ child support obligation
contained in the dissolution decree, stating “[t]he Dissolution Decree issued in this matter
on December 10, 1982, is affirmed in all other aspects.”
¶7 The CSED initiated its effort to enforce Sanders’ child support obligation in February
of 1986. On July 10, 1986, the CSED issued a contested case Notice of Intent to Withhold
3 Income. A hearing was held on the Notice, and an order was issued determining that income
withholding was appropriate. On February 23, 1996, the CSED issued a contested case
Supplemental Notice of Intent to Withhold Income. Sanders received the Notice at his home
in Tijuana, Mexico, together with a Request for Hearing form. Sanders did not request a
hearing, but returned the documents to the CSED.
¶8 Pursuant to a request by Sanders, the tribal court’s decree was modified on June 4,
1997. Sanders signed the modification consent order, indicating his consent to the terms of
that order, which required him to pay child support in the amount of $63.00 per month, per
child, regardless of his employment status. Sanders requested and received hardship
adjustments of withholding amounts for past-due support on six occasions between 1997 and
2000. In 1998, Sanders requested an administrative review on the CSED’s interception of
his federal income tax refund. The administrative review was convened on May 12, 1998,
but Sanders did not appear in person or by telephone.
¶9 On April 19, 2002, Sanders instituted an action in state District Court, challenging the
CSED’s efforts to enforce the child support obligation contained in the tribal court’s
dissolution decree. On January 3, 2003, the District Court held a hearing on the matter. On
March 14, 2003, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, dismissing Sanders’ cause of action against the CSED. In doing so, the District Court
concluded that issues regarding the validity of the tribal court’s dissolution decree were res
judicata, having been determined by the Northern Cheyenne Appellate Court and the federal
courts. The District Court also concluded that the Northern Cheyenne Appellate Court’s
4 affirmation of Sanders’ child support obligation was res judicata. Further, the District Court
concluded that Sanders could not assert a statute of limitations challenge to the CSED’s child
support collection actions because he waived the defense during the last contested case
action when he failed to request a hearing. Finally, the District Court determined that
Sanders owed past-due child support in the amount of $21,224.45, but later amended the
calculation and determined that Sanders owed $19,011.45. The calculation accounted for,
inter alia: (1) child support payments made to Lonebear by Jack Badhorse, who was
Lonebear’s common law husband for a period of time after the dissolution of her marriage
with Sanders; and, (2) public assistance benefits received by Lonebear.
¶10 The CSED undertook enforcement action against Sanders, proceeding based on an
incorrect calculation of his debt. Consequently, Sanders filed a motion in the District Court
for a hearing on the issue. The CSED acknowledged the error and modified its enforcement
efforts accordingly. Thus, the District Court denied Sanders’ motion for a hearing, finding
the issue moot. Sanders now appeals to this Court, challenging the District Court’s
conclusions of law.
5 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct.
Hedges v. Woodhouse, 2000 MT 220, ¶ 8, 301 Mont. 180, ¶ 8, 8 P.3d 109, ¶ 8.
DISCUSSION
¶12 1. Did the District Court correctly conclude that the CSED was entitled to enforce the child support provisions of the tribal court’s dissolution decree?
¶13 Sanders argues that the child support provisions of the tribal court’s decree are
invalid, and thus the District Court improperly condoned the CSED’s enforcement of those
provisions. In supporting this argument, Sanders presents an array of contentions. First, he
claims that the tribal court decree was obtained without due process of law, and that
enforcement of the decree further violates his due process rights. Sanders fails to cite to
legal authority or present specific argument supporting these claims, as required by Rule
23(a)(4), M.R.App.P. Thus, we decline to address these arguments. Gollehon v. State, 1999
MT 210, ¶ 10, 296 Mont. 6, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d 395, ¶ 10.
¶14 Sanders also argues that the CSED is “imposing ex-post facto laws” upon him; that
the documentation of the tribal court proceeding is insufficient; that further proceedings in
the tribal court were necessary; that the tribal court judge should not have presided over the
dissolution proceeding; and, that neither the District Court or the CSED have shown a
compelling interest to honor the tribal court’s decree. We decline to address these
contentions because they are not supported by citation to legal authority, as required by Rule
23(a)(4), M.R.App.P. Gollehon, ¶ 10. Nor are these arguments presented with the precision
6 required of appellate briefing. As we have previously held, this Court is not obligated to
develop legal analysis that may lend support to a litigant’s position. In re Estate of Bayers,
1999 MT 154, ¶ 19, 295 Mont. 89, ¶ 19, 983 P.2d 339, ¶ 19.
¶15 Sanders further claims that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Sanders, 864 F.2d 630,
invalidated the child enforcement provisions of the tribal court’s decree. In fact, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Sanders’ contentions regarding the validity of the tribal court’s decree. The
court primarily addressed an issue of jurisdiction, concluding that the tribal court had
jurisdiction over the marriage dissolution action. Thus, we must reject Sanders’ argument,
as it misconstrues the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
¶16 We conclude that the validity of the decree has been determined by all courts of
appropriate authority. As noted above, the tribal appellate court upheld Sanders’ child
support obligations when it affirmed the tribal court’s dissolution decree “in all other
aspects.” The record in this case does not demonstrate that any tribal court has vacated or
amended the dissolution decree. Sanders presents various arguments challenging the District
Court’s conclusion that the decisions rendered in the tribal court system are res judicata.
The record does not support these contentions. Moreover, Sanders does not support these
contentions with citation to legal authority or specific argument, as required by Rule
23(a)(4), M.R.App.P. Accordingly, we find no merit in Sanders’ challenge to the validity
of the child support provisions contained in the tribal court’s decree, and therefore conclude
that the District Court properly upheld the CSED’s enforcement efforts.
7 ¶17 2. Did the District Court correctly conclude that Sanders was barred from asserting a statute of limitations argument?
¶18 Sanders argues that the District Court improperly precluded him from asserting a
statute of limitations argument in challenging the CSED’s enforcement efforts. In support
of this argument, Sanders claims that he was not aware of his right to assert a statute of
limitations argument when he received the CSED’s Supplemental Notice of Intent to
Withhold Income, and suggests that the CSED should have informed him of such. Further,
Sanders argues that his due process rights were violated when the District Court precluded
him from asserting a statute of limitations argument. We decline to address these contentions
because Sanders provides no supporting legal authority as required by Rule 23(a)(4),
M.R.App.P. Gollehon, ¶ 10.
¶19 Section 37.62.909(4) of the Administrative Rules of Montana provides that “[w]hen
requesting a hearing, the person must include with the request a brief statement of any
affirmative defense the party may have to the contested case notice.” Sanders had the
opportunity to request a hearing and assert a statute of limitations argument upon his receipt
of the CSED’s Supplemental Notice of Intent to Withhold Income. Because he did not do
so, we conclude that the District Court properly prohibited Sanders from asserting a statute
of limitations argument in challenging the CSED’s enforcement efforts.
8 ¶20 3. Did the District Court correctly conclude that the CSED retains authority to enforce Sanders’ child support obligation despite the termination of Lonebear’s public assistance benefits?
¶21 In 1981, Lonebear assigned her support rights to the State of Montana in exchange for
public assistance benefits, which were terminated and reinstated periodically until November
of 1997, when the benefits terminated permanently. Sanders asserts that the CSED lost its
authority to enforce his child support obligation when Lonebear’s assignment of her support
rights terminated.
¶22 Under § 53-2-613(2), MCA, the assignment of child support rights by a recipient of
public assistance occurs by operation of law. Under § 53-2-613(3)(c), MCA, the assignment
remains in effect with respect to the amount of any unpaid support obligation accrued under
the assignment that was owed prior to the termination of public assistance to a recipient.
Moreover, § 40-5-203(1), MCA, allows the CSED to enforce child support obligations on
behalf of individuals who are not receiving public assistance benefits. Thus, we conclude
the District Court correctly determined that the CSED retains authority to enforce Sanders’
child support obligation.
CONCLUSION
¶23 In conclusion, we note that Sanders raises several other arguments. He claims to have
suffered racial discrimination in the tribal court proceedings, which he characterizes as a
“parade of horribles.” Further, he argues that his child support obligation has been
adequately satisfied. Finally, he presents a vague argument regarding the issue of comity,
and contests his child support obligation based on an alleged “de facto adoption” of his
9 children by Jack Badhorse. Sanders fails to support these contentions with citation to legal
authority or specific argument, as required by Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P. As such, we
decline to address these contentions. Gollehon, ¶ 10.
¶24 We conclude that Sanders has failed to demonstrate any error in the District Court’s
conclusions of law. Accordingly, we affirm.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY /S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER /S/ JOHN WARNER /S/ BRIAN MORRIS