Sanders v. State
This text of 41 So. 466 (Sanders v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
— The defendant in this case was found guilty of the offense of rape, and sentenced to be imprisoned in the penitentiary for 10 years. The record shows that the adjourned term of the court was called to meet on July 17th, and to continue until the criminal cases on the docket were disposed of; that jurors were ordered to be summoned for three weeks; that this case was tried on July 22d; that the defendant was sentenced on July 25th. Just after the minute of sentence, there is an entry, not dated, stating that, “the defendant having given notice of appeal, and having filed his bill of exceptions in term timé, the execution of this sentence is hereby suspended,” etc. At the close of the bill of exceptions are these words: “The foregoing bill of exceptions is now signed by me, J. T. Lackland, judge of the circuit court of Monroe county, Alabama, and is now dated by me the 4th day of August, 1905, the same being within the time allowed by the order of the court for the signing of the said bill of exceptions.” The 4th day of August would be Friday of the third week of said court. While the record should be more explicit, yet we think it sufficiently appears that the bill of exceptions was signed during the term. The record states positively that the bill of exceptions was filed in term time. It could not become a part of the record and be entitled to be filed until after it was. signed. —Code, 1896, § 615.
The motion to quash the indictment, because 'more than 21 names were drawn from which to form the grand jury, was properly overruled. — Rogers v. State, 144 Ala. 32, 40 South. 572.
There was no error in allowing proof of the particular statement of the prosecutrix to her adopted fathcw, Pur-year.
The objection to the question marked 6 was properly sustained. In the form in which the question was *607 framed, it does not show that it was material. It should have been confined to the condition of the witness at the time complaint was made.
The court erred in allowing the witness, Sandy Pur-year, to testify, against the objection of the defendant, that the defendant had offered to bribe him to “squash” the proceedings. Said Puryear was not morely a witness, but, being the father by adoption of the prosecu-trix, this was not analogous to the cases where efforts were made to bribe witnesses, but was an effort to compromise the case. The decisions of this state are uniform to the effect that efforts to compromise cannot be proved as admissions against the party making them. It is true that these decisions have been in civil cases, and in one instance in a quasi criminal case of bastardy.— Martin v. State, 62 Ala. 119. But in a criminal case this court, speaking through Brickell, C. J., applies the same reasoning, and gives cogent reasons wiry courts should be careful about admitting such testimony.— Wilson v. State, 73 Ala. 527. It is true that there is no authority of law for compromising a felony, yet it. is a fact that less penalties are sometimes agreed upon be-tAveen the prosecutor and the defendant, and, hoAvever that may be, an effort to compromise is not an admission of guilt. “The true reason for excluding an offer of compromise is that it doe's not ordinarily proceed from and imply a belief that the adArersary’s claim is well founded, but rather a belief that the further prosecution of that claim, whether well founded or not,. Avould in any event cause such annoyance as is preferably avoided by the payment of the sum offered. In short, the offer implies merely a desire for peace, not a concession of Avrong done.”—2 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 1231, § 1061c. While there are decisions to the contrary in other states, yet the reason of the law, as expressed by our own court and the eminent text-writer just quoted, commends itself to- our judgment.
While charge 1, given by the court at the request of the solicitor, might have been refused, as argumentative, yet the court cannot be placed in error for giving it.— Karr v. State, 106 Ala. 1, 17 South. 328.
*608 Charges 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, requested by the defendant, were properly refused, as they were argumentative, and not based on any evidence before the court.
The judgment of the court is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
41 So. 466, 148 Ala. 603, 1906 Ala. LEXIS 280, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanders-v-state-ala-1906.