Sanders v. D.C. Government
This text of Sanders v. D.C. Government (Sanders v. D.C. Government) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED
JUN 2 5 2013
C|erk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HEYWARD CARZELL SANDERS, ) Courts for the District of Columbia ) Plaintiff, ) ) v ) Civil Action No. f q ' j ) 13 <@ DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on review of the plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se civil complaint. The Court will grant the application, and dismiss the
complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that the District of Columbia has violated the Racketeer lnfluenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") by conspiring with others to cause him to "lose all of his real estate properties." Compl. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that some of these properties were sold at tax sale at prices below market value and transferred to new owners without court intervention and in a manner inconsistent with established procedures for tax sales. See generally ia’. at 4-9. According to plaintiff, "[s]omeone in the District Govemment had to be pushing all their illegal paperwork," ia'. at 9, and he blames the District "for letting all parties enjoy the benefit of doing unethical real estate, which put plaintiff s good properties in a bad way to be lost, which effected his way of life, financially, physically and more." Ia'. at 13. But the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint appears to be that the D.C. government passively allowed others to commit crimes by
allowing "illegal paperwork" to be filed concerning real estate transactions.
A plaintiff establishes a RICO violation by showing "(l) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." W. Ass0cs. Ltd. P ’ship v. Market Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 633 (D.C. Cir. 200l) (citing 18 U.S.C. § l96l(l)(B)). A "pattern ofracketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), and these predicate acts include a host of offenses punishable under certain state and federal statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § l96l(l)(B). These predicate acts must be "related, and . . . pose a threat to continued criminal activity." H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (l989). RICO has a four-year statute of limitations that commences on the date the plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered the injury. Rotella v. Wooa', 528 U.S. 549, 553 (2000).
The Court finds that the complaint fails to state a RICO claim upon which relief can be granted. Although plaintiff lists several acts which may qualify as predicate acts, see Compl. at 2, it is unclear which and whether the District of Columbia is alleged to have violated these provisions. Nor is it clear that there is a pattern of racketeering activity insofar as plaintiff is alleged to be the sole injured party. See W. Ass0cs. Lla'. ex rel. Ave. Ass0cs. Ltd. v. Mkt. Square Ass0cs., 235 F.3d 629, 634 (D.C. Cir. 200l) (plaintiff failed to allege a "pattern of racketeering activity" where plaintiff only alleges "a single scheme, a single injury, and a single victim"); Zernik v. U.S. Dep ’t of Justice, 630 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2009). Moreover, although plaintiff generally alleges that the D.C. government conspired with a number of other parties, he fails to allege who within the D.C. government engaged in such conspiracy, or allege sufficient facts conceming any meeting of the minds between anyone within the D.C. government and the f other alleged co-conspirators. See Roa’riguez v. Ea'itor in Chiej: Legal Times, 285 F. App’x 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirrning dismissal of conspiracy claim where plaintiffs
"allegations include no facts suggesting ‘unity of purpose’ or a ‘meeting of the minds’ among the
defendants, a necessary element of a conspiracy"). Lastly, because the complaint is silent as to the dates of the alleged predicate acts, it is not clear that the complaint is timely filed within the
four-year statute of limitations. For these reasons, the complaint will be dismissed without
prejudice. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/C%ai:
United Statbs District Judge
DATECVlT/FLO 03
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