Sanders, D. v. Sanders, K.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided August 12, 2019·No. 1988 MDA 2018·Unpublished

Opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DUSTIN SANDERS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

KAREN SANDERS : No. 1988 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered November 6, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Civil Division at No(s):

441-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2019 Dustin Sanders ("Husband") appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County, divorcing Husband and Karen Sanders ("Wife") from the bonds of matrimony and distributing the parties' marital estate. On appeal, Husband challenges the court's equitable distribution order. After careful review, we affirm based on the opinion of the Honorable Michael F. Salisbury.

The parties were married in 2008 and separated in December 2016.

Husband is 39 years old, and Wife is 42 years old; they are both in good health. The parties share legal and physical custody of their three minor children.

On April 5, 2017, Husband filed a complaint in divorce, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301(c) -(d), and requested equitable distribution of the marital property. The trial court held hearings on April 17, 2018, and May 31, 2018.

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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The marital home was valued at $186,000.00, subject to a mortgage of $132,260.70 at the date of separation. The marital portion of Wife's Public School Employee's Retirement System ("PSERS") pension was valued at $24,012.01.1 The trial court relied upon the Wife's business evaluator to determine the value of the Husband's scrap business. Wife retained Joseph Fedeli ("Fedeli"), who valued the business at $41,000.00. Fedeli analyzed the historical profitability of the business by using the parties' tax returns. Fedeli did not consider goodwill and found that it was a commodity -based type of business when determining his valuation.

Following the hearings, the trial court entered an order on September 14, 2018, dividing the equity in the marital estate equally (50/50 division) to Husband and Wife. Husband filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's September 14, 2018, order.2 This timely appeal followed. Husband raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the court err and abuse its discretion in valuing Wife's PSERS pension by using the contributions and interest as the value instead of using the "total value" or "present value" figure as noted in the annual PSERS' statements?

1 At the date of separation, Wife's PSERS pension was valued at $45,980.85, less the value at the date of marriage ($19,484.11), less the amount from date of separation to the final statement ($2,484.53), resulting in $24,012.01.

2 On November 6, 2018, Judge Salisbury entered an amended order, correcting an error that awarded the 2003 Subaru vehicle to Wife instead of Husband and denying the remaining modification requests.

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2. Did the court err and abuse its discretion in failing to reduce the equity in the marital home by the customary six percent realtor's commission and one percent transfer tax as is required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(10.2)?

3. Did the court err and abuse its discretion in adopting Wife's expert's valuation of Husband's business?

Appellant's Brief, at 8.

Our role in reviewing equitable distribution awards is well settled.

Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a marital property distribution is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure. An abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.

McCoy v. McCoy, 888 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). We have further stated:

An abuse of discretion requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. We will not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.

To determine the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. [W]e measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a just determination of their property rights.

Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Husband first argues that, in calculating its distribution award, the court should have relied upon "total" instead of "current" valuation of Wife's PSERS pension. Appellant's Brief, at 19. Husband presented no evidence to

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substantiate his claim that Wife's PSERS pension was undervalued, as there was no appraisal conducted. N.T. Hearing, 5/31/18, at 66. Instead, Husband chose to rely on the documentation that Wife provided. During the hearing, Husband questioned Wife regarding amounts stated on her PSERS pension report, but he did not dispute them. Id. at 65-66. Because the court's distribution scheme did not require any allocation to Husband of the marital portion of Wife's pension, the court was not required to decide between an immediate offset or deferred distribution method. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(c). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the valuation of Wife's PSERS pension. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/18, at 8.

Husband next argues that section 3502(a)(10.2) of the Divorce Code requires the trial court to credit him for customary expenses associated with the sale of the marital home. Appellant's Brief, at 25. This Court has recognized "adjustment in the value of a residence for expenses associated with a contemplated sale may be an appropriate consideration in some equitable distribution cases. We neither forbid nor require the practice." See Zeigler v. Zeigler, 530 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. Super. 1987). Here, Husband asked for the property, it was awarded to him, and at no point in the record is there any indication that he planned to sell the home. The court, therefore, awarded the marital home to Husband without deductions for transfer tax and brokerage fees. We find no abuse of discretion. See Trial Court Opinion, supra at 7.

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Lastly, Husband argues that the valuation of his business conducted by Fedeli was fatally flawed. Appellant's Brief, at 29. Husband takes issue with the fact that this was Fedeli's first time testifying in a divorce case, that he had never prepared another evaluation of a scrap business, and he did not include good will in his valuation. Id. However, Husband did not object to the admission of Fedeli's valuation report, nor did he object to the qualification of Fedeli as an expert in the field of accounting and business valuations. See N.T. Hearing, 5/31/18, at 7-8. Fedeli explained how he arrived at the valuation of the business. Id. at 23-32. He sourced the information entirely

from documents provided by both parties, mainly from Husband. Id. Husband and Wife provided separate valuations and the trial court found

Fedeli's report more compelling.

This Court has consistently held that, "[i]n determining the value of marital property, the court is free to accept all, part or none of the evidence

as to the true and correct value of the property." Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 22 (Pa. Super. 2006). See Verholek v. Verholek, 741 A.2d 792 (Pa.

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