Sanders, Chief Clerk, Etc. v. Talbott, Auditor

72 S.W.2d 758, 255 Ky. 50, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 185
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)·Decided June 15, 1934·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT BY

DRURY, COMMISSIONER

Affirming.

Mr. J. Erwin Sanders is the chief clerk of the House of Representatives. As such officer, and as authorized1 *51 by subdivision 2 of section 1991, Kentucky Statutes, on May 25, 1934, he drew a. requisition on the appellee, J. Dan Talbott, auditor of Kentucky, for $182, for his services as such chief clerk, for seven days from May 16th to May 22d, inclusive. The auditor refused to honor the requisition, whereupon Mr. Sanders asked the Franklin circuit court, by mandamus, to compel him to do so, and upon that relief being denied. Mr. Sanders has prosecuted this appeal.

This controversy has resulted in part from an architectural difference between our present state capitol and the one occupied when our present Constitution was adopted. There was but one door to the House chamber of the capitol then in use and not anticipating a changed condition under which the House of Representatives might sit in a House chamber having more than one door, the constitutional convention wrote into section 249 of our present Constitution a provision that the House of Representatives should never elect, appoint, employ, or pay for exceeding one doorkeeper, and now since the House of Representatives meets in our present Capitol, which has more than one door to the House chamber, it has found itself in need of more doorkeepers to enable it to prevent such intrusion into the chamber as would seriously hamper it in the orderly conduct of its deliberations. The coming of typewriters, stenographers, dictaphones, etc., and the quickened tempo of things generally has vastly increased the volume of legislative business coming before the General Assembly for its consideration, as is clearly shown by the fact that the published acts of the four regular sessions of the General Assembly in the years 1894, 1896, 1898, and 3900 aggregate but 802 pages, while those of the regular session of 1934 alone consists of 1,106 pages, and the aggregate of the last four regular sessions is 4,003 pages. ' Thus we see the General Assembly is now doing five times as much work as formerly. These rapidly multiplying activities have caused the General Assembly to need more help than it is permissible for it to employ under section 249 of the Constitution. Thus there has arisen the problem of the “extra help.” This problem, in first one phase and another, has reached this court in the following cases: McDonald v. Norman, Auditor, 95 Ky. 593, 26 S. W. 808, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 137; Walker v. Coulter, Auditor, 113 Ky. 814, 68 S. W. 1108, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 530; James, Auditor, v. Cromwell, 129 *52 Ky. 508, 112 S. W. 611, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 1024; Shanks, Auditor, v. Julian, 213 Ky. 291, 280 S. W. 1081; Shanks, Auditor, v. Howes, 214 Ky. 613, 283 S. W. 966.

A history of section 249, Kentucky Constitution, and a review of the cases that had before then arisen under it, may be found in Shanks v. Julian, supra. That the General Assembly needs this “extra help” is not seriously disputed. Certainly its solemn determination of that need should not be set aside except for the constitutional mandate which we must all obey.

In Shanks, Auditor, v. Julian, 213 Ky. 291, 280 S. W. 1081, the employment of this “extra help” pursuant to a joint resolution of both Houses was held ineffectual because of section 249 of the Constitution. Thereupon the General Assembly, by chapter 69 of the Acts of 1926, so amended section 1991, Kentucky Statutes, as to increase the pay of help it was permitted to employ, with a tacit understanding that the permissible help whose pay was thus increased would use such increase to pay for other help which the General Assembly needed, but was not permitted to elect, appoint, employ,, or pay for, by section 249 of our Constitution.

In Shanks, Auditor, v. Howes, 214 Ky. 613, 283 S. W. 966, this increase in the pay of the permissible help was held valid. By that amendment of section 1991, Kentucky Statutes, the pay of the chief clerk of the House of Representatives was increased to $26 per day. Mr. Sanders, as chief clerk of the present House of Representatives has during this, the year 1934, drawn the' following’ sums for the following services:

73 days of regular session at $26.00 per day under provision of section 1991 Ky. Stats. $1,898.00'

7 days of special session, May 9th to 15th, inclusive, at $26.00 per day, under provision of section 1991 Ky. Stats. 182.00'

Keeping, preserving and furnishing journal of regular session of House of Representatives 7,305 pages at 25c per page, under section 1989a-l Ky. Stats. 1,826.25

30 days comparing journal and reading proof at $26.00 per day, under section 1989a-2 Ky. Stats. 780.00

Bonus voted him at regular session. 300.00

Total $4,986.25

*53 Thus when Sanders presented his requisition for services during the present extra session, for the seven days from May 16th to May 22d, inclusive, the auditor declined to pay it, because by so doing the amount drawn from the treasury by Mr. Sanders during 1934 would amount to $5,168.25, which would be $168.25 more pay than any public officer, except the Governor, is permitted to receive in any one year. See section 246, Ky. Const.

This section of our Constitution has been construed' in the following cases: Shipp v. Rodes, 196 Ky. 523, 245 S. W. 157; Shipp v. Bradley, 210 Ky. 51, 275 S. W. 1; Com. v. Nunnelley, 211 Ky. 409, 277 S. W. 506; Carl v. Thiel, 211 Ky. 328, 277 S. W. 485; Davis v. Walker, 212 Ky. 379, 279 S. W. 654; Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37, 41 S. W. (2d) 651; Taylor v. Todd, 241 Ky. 605, 44 S. W. (2d) 606; Com. v. Coleman, 245 Ky. 673, 54 S. W. (2d) 42; Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183, 56 S. W. (2d) 959; City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96, 61 S. W. (2d) 1092; Breathitt County v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743, 63 S. W. (2d) 920.

Is the Chief Clerk of the House a Public Officer?

Mr. Sanders argues he is not a public officer, as that term is used in section 246 of our Constitution. In Shanks, Auditor, v. Howes, 214 Ky. 613, 283 S. W. 966, 968, after giving an elaborate reason for so doing, we held:

“The chief clerk of the House of Representatives is a ‘public officer’ within the meaning of that term as used in section 235 of the Constitution.”

Having so held, as regards section 235, Kentucky Constitution, it would be very difficult to find a reason for holding otherwise, as regards section 246 of the same document. In that case Howes was held not to be within the operation of section 235, not because he was not a public officer, but because he was not a public officer having a fixed term, and could be summarily removed at any time without notice and without cause.

The Present Plan of Operations.

It is stipulated that this resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives at its regular 1934 session:

“Be It Resolved by the House of Representatives That the Speaker be and he is hereby empowered *54

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Sanders, Chief Clerk, Etc. v. Talbott, Auditor, 72 S.W.2d 758, 255 Ky. 50, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 185 (Ky. 1934).

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