Sand Dollar Develop. Group v. Michael, No. Spnh 9610-48736 (Mar. 10, 1997)

Connecticut Superior Court

Sand Dollar Develop. Group v. Michael, No. Spnh 9610-48736 (Mar. 10, 1997)

1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 704

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedMarch 10, 1997

DocketNo. SPNH 9610-48736

StatusUnpublished

This text of 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 704 (Sand Dollar Develop. Group v. Michael, No. Spnh 9610-48736 (Mar. 10, 1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sand Dollar Develop. Group v. Michael, No. Spnh 9610-48736 (Mar. 10, 1997), 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 704 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REARGUE In addition to the reasons given in my February 18, 1997 memorandum of decision, the instant case is distinguishable fromDiCostanzo v. Tripoli, 137 Conn. 513, 515 (1951), on which the defendant relies, and from the cases cited in DiCostanzo —Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603 (1950), and Wittenberg v. Brown,6 Conn. Sup. 326 (1938) — in that here, the rent did not have to be agreed upon, expressly or implicitly, each month. Rather paragraph 20 of the lease¹ fixed the rent for every month during which the defendant held over. In the context of these facts, the plaintiff's demand for increased rent was, at best, an offer which the defendant was free to reject, and did. This, however, left the rent which had been fixed pursuant to paragraph 20, as well as the month-to-month tenancy itself, extant.

Moreover, if the "lapse of time" ground in the notice to quit were invalid as the defendant claims, the first ground stated in the notice to quit would be valid: "You originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated."

The motion to reargue is denied.

BY THE COURT

Bruce L. LevinJudge of the Superior Court

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[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REARGUE In addition to the reasons given in my February 18, 1997 memorandum of decision, the instant case is distinguishable fromDiCostanzo v. Tripoli, 137 Conn. 513, 515 (1951), on which the defendant relies, and from the cases cited in DiCostanzo —Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603 (1950), and Wittenberg v. Brown,6 Conn. Sup. 326 (1938) — in that here, the rent did not have to be agreed upon, expressly or implicitly, each month. Rather paragraph 20 of the lease¹ fixed the rent for every month during which the defendant held over. In the context of these facts, the plaintiff's demand for increased rent was, at best, an offer which the defendant was free to reject, and did. This, however, left the rent which had been fixed pursuant to paragraph 20, as well as the month-to-month tenancy itself, extant.

Moreover, if the "lapse of time" ground in the notice to quit were invalid as the defendant claims, the first ground stated in the notice to quit would be valid: "You originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated."

The motion to reargue is denied.

BY THE COURT

Bruce L. LevinJudge of the Superior Court

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Bluebook (online)

1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 704, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sand-dollar-develop-group-v-michael-no-spnh-9610-48736-mar-10-1997-connsuperct-1997.

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