Sanchez v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Sanchez v. State

507 So. 2d 673, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1234, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8185

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 12, 1987

DocketNos. 86-1940, 86-1943

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 507 So. 2d 673 (Sanchez v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sanchez v. State, 507 So. 2d 673, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1234, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8185 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Sanchez appeals his convictions and sentence for credit card theft and possession of marijuana and cocaine. We affirm the final judgment subject to the modification explained below.

Sanchez first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the police officer’s stop of his vehicle for a traffic violation. We affirm the trial court’s order denying Sanchez’s motion to suppress. The officer’s “plain view” perception of a handrolled marijuana cigarette in Sanchez’s shirt pocket provided sufficient probable cause to arrest Sanchez and conduct an inventory search of Sanchez’s automobile. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, [674]*674103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983); P.L.R. v. State, 455 So.2d 363 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220, 105 S.Ct. 1206, 84 L.Ed.2d 349 (1985); Council v. State, 442 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

We agree with Sanchez that the trial court erred in categorizing the offense of credit card theft as a third-degree felony for violation of section 817.60, Florida Statutes (1985). The information clearly charged Sanchez with the unlawful receipt of a single credit card. Because the charge involves only one credit card, Sanchez must be adjudicated guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor under section 817.67(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and not a third-degree felony under section 817.67(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Sanchez is entitled to have this error in the final judgment corrected to reflect a first-degree misdemeanor although this modification does not result in any change in the sentence imposed. We remand with directions for the trial court to modify the judgment in accordance with these views.

Affirmed as modified and remanded.

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PER CURIAM.

Sanchez appeals his convictions and sentence for credit card theft and possession of marijuana and cocaine. We affirm the final judgment subject to the modification explained below.

Sanchez first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the police officer’s stop of his vehicle for a traffic violation. We affirm the trial court’s order denying Sanchez’s motion to suppress. The officer’s “plain view” perception of a handrolled marijuana cigarette in Sanchez’s shirt pocket provided sufficient probable cause to arrest Sanchez and conduct an inventory search of Sanchez’s automobile. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, [674]*674103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983); P.L.R. v. State, 455 So.2d 363 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220, 105 S.Ct. 1206, 84 L.Ed.2d 349 (1985); Council v. State, 442 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

We agree with Sanchez that the trial court erred in categorizing the offense of credit card theft as a third-degree felony for violation of section 817.60, Florida Statutes (1985). The information clearly charged Sanchez with the unlawful receipt of a single credit card. Because the charge involves only one credit card, Sanchez must be adjudicated guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor under section 817.67(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and not a third-degree felony under section 817.67(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Sanchez is entitled to have this error in the final judgment corrected to reflect a first-degree misdemeanor although this modification does not result in any change in the sentence imposed. We remand with directions for the trial court to modify the judgment in accordance with these views.

Affirmed as modified and remanded.

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507 So. 2d 673, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1234, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanchez-v-state-fladistctapp-1987.

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