Sanchez v. Renown South Meadows Medical Center

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 LUCERO SANCHEZ, Case No. 3:21-cv-00352-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 RENOWN HEALTH, 9 Defendant. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Plaintiff Lucero Sanchez sued her employer, Defendant Renown Health, under 13 Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 2000e, 14 et seq., and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., for 15 allegedly discriminating against her and subjecting her to a hostile work environment 16 based on her national origin, failing to adequately accommodate her after she injured both 17 knees at work, and retaliating against her when she complained about the way Defendant 18 treated her—inflicting emotional distress in the process. (ECF No. 5.) Before the Court is 19 Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of only the portion of the Court’s prior order (ECF 20 No. 81 (“Prior Order”) at 12-14) denying Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 21 retaliation claim (ECF No. 83).1 Plaintiff subsequently filed an erratum (ECF No. 91) 22 effectively conceding that there is no evidence—contrary to the Court’s finding in the Prior 23 Order—supporting the pretext element of her retaliation claim, and Defendant filed a 24 motion for leave to file a surreply (ECF No. 93) to effectively highlight the implications of 25 Plaintiff’s erratum, suggesting it compels the conclusion that the Court must grant the 26 motion for reconsideration. As further explained below, the Court will grant the motion for 27 reconsideration and deny the motion for leave to file a surreply as moot. 28 2 A motion to reconsider must set forth “some valid reason why the court should 3 reconsider its prior decision” and set “forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to 4 persuade the court to reverse its prior decision.” Frasure v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 5 2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003). Reconsideration is appropriate if this Court “(1) is 6 presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision 7 was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. 8 No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). But “[a] motion for 9 reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments upon which 10 the court already has ruled.” Brown v. Kinross Gold, U.S.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 11 (D. Nev. 2005). 12 Particularly considering the content of Plaintiff’s erratum (ECF No. 91), the Court 13 finds that letting the pertinent section of its Prior Order stand would be manifestly unjust. 14 The Court found in pertinent part: 15 Plaintiff has presented the requisite very little evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. For example, Plaintiff noted in the typewritten version 16 of her diary that she was still being referred to as the ‘catering coordinator’ and being asked to perform catering tasks in 2017 (ECF No. 69-17 at 12), 17 or after her demotion at the end of 2016 (ECF No. 77-17 at 2 (noting a ‘date prepared’ as December 29, 2016)). This is at least very little evidence that 18 there was still catering work to be done, suggesting that Defendant’s explanation for the demotion could be pretextual. 19 20 (ECF No. 81 at 14.) 21 Defendant seeks reconsideration of this finding, arguing in pertinent part that the 22 page of Plaintiff’s diary upon which the Court relied was not necessarily sequential, and 23 thus does not necessarily show it was made after she was demoted, so does not 24 necessarily support the inference of pretext the Court drew in her favor. (ECF No. 83 at 25 8-12.) This same diary entry is also the only evidence Plaintiff points to in response to 26 Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, writing, “[e]ven after her demotion, Sanchez was 27 still referred to as the ‘catering coordinator’ and tasked with associated duties (ECF No. 28 69-17 at 12 and ECF No. 77-17 at 2), which shows that the demotion was been in name 2 same point in reliance on the same diary entry).) 3 But then Plaintiff filed her erratum, in which her counsel explains that Defendant’s 4 counsel recently brought to his attention another copy of the same diary entry, but dated 5 September 2016, as opposed to the undated page upon which the Court relied in its Prior 6 Order. (ECF No. 91 at 2; compare ECF No. 69-17 at 12 (lacking date) with ECF No. 91- 7 2 (including the notation “On September 2016.”).) Based on this disclosure, Plaintiff’s 8 counsel: 9 withdraws the representation to the Court based on the contents of ECF No. 69-17 page 12 made in Sanchez’s Response to Renown’s Motion for 10 Reconsideration at ECF No. 69-17 page 12 that this diary entry was from 2017. The diary entry relied on by the Court in its Order appears to be from 11 September of 2016, not 2017. 12 (ECF No. 91 at 2-3.) 13 The implication is clear: the excerpted portion of the Cour’s Prior Order cannot 14 stand because it is inaccurate. The diary entry the Court relied upon to find some evidence 15 of pretext was made in September 2016, or before Plaintiff was demoted. (Id.) It thus 16 cannot support the inference that there was at least some catering work still to be done 17 after Plaintiff was demoted. And Plaintiff has pointed to no other evidence that could 18 potentially show pretext to counter Defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for 19 Plaintiff’s demotion; that there was little catering work to be done and Plaintiff was mostly 20 performing cashiering duties anyway. (ECF No. 81 at 14.) But Plaintiff must proffer 21 evidence of pretext for her retaliation claim to survive summary judgment under these 22 circumstances. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003), 23 as amended (Jan. 6, 2004). Because she admits she cannot, her retaliation claim fails. 24 The Court will accordingly grant Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and find 25 that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. And 26 considering this resolution, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for leave to file a 27 surreply as moot. The Court does not need additional briefing to reach the conclusion in 28 reaches in this order anyway. 1 || Ill. CONCLUSION 2 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 3 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 4 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 5 || motions before the Court. 6 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 83) is 7 || granted. 8 It is further ordered that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's 9 || retaliation claim (ECF No. 5 at 11-12). 10 It is further ordered that the Court vacates only the portion of its prior order (ECF 11 || No. 81 at 12-14) denying Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. 12 It is further ordered that Defendant’s motion for leave to file a surreply (ECF No. 13 || 93) is denied as moot considering the Court's resolution of Defendant's motion for 14 || reconsideration. 15 DATED THIS 28" Day of May 2024.

17 MIRANDA M. DU 18 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28