IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SHANJULIA SANCHEZ, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) C.A. No. N23C-02-077 KMV ) AMANDA E. HENDRIX, and ) KATHRYN A. HENDRIX, ) ) Defendants. )
Submitted: October 10, 2024 Decided: December 13, 2024
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Having considered defendant Kathryn A. Hendrix’s motion for summary
judgment and the record in this matter, it appears that:
BACKGROUND
1. On October 15, 2022, U.S. postal carrier Shanjulia Sanchez had a very
bad day.1 Around 4:30 p.m., more than halfway through her shift for the U.S. Postal
Service, Shanjulia was lugging mail to a section of row homes in Wilmington,
Delaware.2 Meanwhile, the family who lived at 730 South Broom Street (the
1 See Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1. The facts in this decision reflect the record developed through the pleadings. This background provides only the predicate necessary to this Court’s ultimate holdings; interested readers are directed to the docket in this matter for additional predicate. First names are used to avoid confusion; this Court intends no disrespect or familiarity. The lodged depositions are cited as Last Name Dep. See D.I. 23, Ex. A–C. 2 Sanchez Dep. 31:6–10. “Property”) just finished a grocery run and was returning home for a pit stop.3
Defendant Amanda Hendrix stayed in the car parked on the street to smoke a
cigarette as her husband, James Miller, and their two daughters went inside to grab
some drinks, use the bathroom, and fetch the keys for a concession stand they were
helping out with later that evening.4
2. Shanjulia arrived at the Property right after James and the girls went
inside; she then scanned a package and put it in the mailbox just outside the front
door.5 Just then, Shanjulia heard a deafening “WOOF!”6 Shanjulia recoiled at the
loud barking and, noticing the storm door was ajar, yanked it shut and hurried to the
next house.7 Then she heard a young lady’s voice call out: “[N]o, get back here!”8
But it was too late. Through her peripherals, Shanjulia spotted a black figure
bursting through the storm door.9 She screamed for help as a black pitbull named
Midnight pounced on her, tearing at her flesh.10
3 Hendrix, A. Dep. 14:17–15:10, 15:20–23. 4 Id. at 6:11–13, 15:15–18. 5 Sanchez Dep. 39:6–12. 6 Id. at 39:13–14. 7 Id. at 39:13–16. 8 Id. at 39:17–18. 9 Id. at 39:19–20. 10 Sanchez Dep. 39:20–40:1.
2 3. Hearing the shrieks of pain and cries for help, Amanda stopped
smoking and jumped out of the car to stop the attack.11 Midnight released
Shanjulia’s arm by the time Amanda got to him, but the damage was done.12 He had
bitten Shanjulia’s right shoulder, forearm, and leg.13 Amanda promptly instructed
her daughters to drag Midnight back inside as she searched for water, paper towels,
and hydrogen peroxide.14
4. Shocked and angered by the whole ordeal, Shanjulia dismissed
Amanda’s apologies and refused offers of aid.15 Instead, Amanda called her
supervisor, Tracy, to inform her about the attack.16 Tracy instructed her to return to
work if possible, so Shanjulia hobbled back to her delivery van and drove to the post
office.17 She debriefed another supervisor, Jessica, who then drove her to Saint
Francis Hospital.18
11 Hendrix, A. Dep. 16:2–10. 12 Id. at 16:8–12; Sanchez Dep. 40:2–6. 13 Sanchez Dep. 44:3–11. 14 Hendrix, A. Dep. 18:5–19, 19:1–5; Sanchez Dep. 40:7–11. 15 Hendrix, A. Dep. 18:22–23; Sanchez Dep. 40:12–19. 16 Hendrix, A. Dep. 19:6–9; Sanchez Dep. 40:12–20. 17 Hendrix, A. Dep. 19:9–12; Sanchez Dep. 48:3–12. 18 Sanchez Dep. 49:24–50:11.
3 5. The medical providers cleaned and sutured Shanjulia’s wounds, took
pictures and x-rays, then prescribed her pain medication.19 After she was released
from the hospital, Shanjulia went back to the post office to get her workers’
compensation paperwork, and then her son picked her up from work and drove her
home.20 Following the post office’s instructions, Shanjulia did not return to work
until mid-November.21 Since the attack, she often wakes up from nightmares in cold
sweats and becomes anxious whenever she sees a black dog.22
6. On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff brought this action against Amanda and
her mother, Kathryn Hendrix, who owns the Property, seeking damages related to
the incident.23 After some discovery practice, on April 30, 2024, Kathryn moved for
summary judgment (the “Motion”).24 Briefing on the Motion was completed on July
26, 2024, and an oral argument was scheduled for October 10, 2024.25 Thereafter,
the Court took this matter under advisement. This is the Court’s decision.
19 Id. at 50:18–51:9. 20 Id. at 51:12–16. 21 Id. at 54:8–11. 22 Id. at 75:3–21. 23 D.I. 1. 24 D.I. 23. 25 D.I. 24, 35, 39.
4 ANALYSIS
7. “Summary judgment is only appropriate where there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 26
“There is no right to a summary judgment.”27 “[W]hen the facts permit a reasonable
person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter
of law.”28 At this stage, this Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.29 The burden rests with the moving party.30 Here, that is
Kathryn.
8. The primary issue pending before this Court is whether Kathryn had
actual knowledge of Midnight’s vicious nature. Delaware’s dog-bite statute, 16 Del.
C. § 3053F, provides that the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by
26 Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc., 319 A.3d 878, 883 (Del. 2024) (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)); Eco-Mail, Inc. v. Firstsource Health Plans & Health Servs., LLC, 2024 WL 3738705, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2024) (first citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); and then citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469–70 (Del. 1962)). 27 Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002) (first citing Anglin v. Bergold, 565 A.2d 279 (Del. 1989); and then citing Brunswick Corp. v. Bowl-Mor Co., Inc., 297 A.2d 67, 69 (Del. 1972)) (internal quotation omitted). 28 Feaster v. Tyler, 2024 WL 4039721, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2024) (citing Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967)). 29 Northan v. Thomas, 2024 WL 2974271, at *2 (Del. Super. June 12, 2024) (citing DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1362 (Del. 1988)); Feldman v. Marks, 2024 WL 4263931, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2024) (citing Legion P’rs Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, 2021 WL 6621168, at *6 (Del. Super. Sept. 30, 2021)). 30 Feldman v. Marks, 2024 WL 4263931, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2024) (citing Radulski v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 8676027, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2020)).
5 such dog.31 This strict liability “relieves a plaintiff from ‘proving specific acts of
negligence’ and ‘protects him from certain defenses’ like that embodied in
Delaware’s comparative negligence statute.”32 An “owner” is “any person who
owns, keeps, harbors, or is the custodian of a dog.”33
9. Conversely, a landlord only owes a duty to protect an invitee from a
tenant’s dog in the landlord’s capacity as “(1) harborer of the dog or (2) as a landlord
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SHANJULIA SANCHEZ, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) C.A. No. N23C-02-077 KMV ) AMANDA E. HENDRIX, and ) KATHRYN A. HENDRIX, ) ) Defendants. )
Submitted: October 10, 2024 Decided: December 13, 2024
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Having considered defendant Kathryn A. Hendrix’s motion for summary
judgment and the record in this matter, it appears that:
BACKGROUND
1. On October 15, 2022, U.S. postal carrier Shanjulia Sanchez had a very
bad day.1 Around 4:30 p.m., more than halfway through her shift for the U.S. Postal
Service, Shanjulia was lugging mail to a section of row homes in Wilmington,
Delaware.2 Meanwhile, the family who lived at 730 South Broom Street (the
1 See Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1. The facts in this decision reflect the record developed through the pleadings. This background provides only the predicate necessary to this Court’s ultimate holdings; interested readers are directed to the docket in this matter for additional predicate. First names are used to avoid confusion; this Court intends no disrespect or familiarity. The lodged depositions are cited as Last Name Dep. See D.I. 23, Ex. A–C. 2 Sanchez Dep. 31:6–10. “Property”) just finished a grocery run and was returning home for a pit stop.3
Defendant Amanda Hendrix stayed in the car parked on the street to smoke a
cigarette as her husband, James Miller, and their two daughters went inside to grab
some drinks, use the bathroom, and fetch the keys for a concession stand they were
helping out with later that evening.4
2. Shanjulia arrived at the Property right after James and the girls went
inside; she then scanned a package and put it in the mailbox just outside the front
door.5 Just then, Shanjulia heard a deafening “WOOF!”6 Shanjulia recoiled at the
loud barking and, noticing the storm door was ajar, yanked it shut and hurried to the
next house.7 Then she heard a young lady’s voice call out: “[N]o, get back here!”8
But it was too late. Through her peripherals, Shanjulia spotted a black figure
bursting through the storm door.9 She screamed for help as a black pitbull named
Midnight pounced on her, tearing at her flesh.10
3 Hendrix, A. Dep. 14:17–15:10, 15:20–23. 4 Id. at 6:11–13, 15:15–18. 5 Sanchez Dep. 39:6–12. 6 Id. at 39:13–14. 7 Id. at 39:13–16. 8 Id. at 39:17–18. 9 Id. at 39:19–20. 10 Sanchez Dep. 39:20–40:1.
2 3. Hearing the shrieks of pain and cries for help, Amanda stopped
smoking and jumped out of the car to stop the attack.11 Midnight released
Shanjulia’s arm by the time Amanda got to him, but the damage was done.12 He had
bitten Shanjulia’s right shoulder, forearm, and leg.13 Amanda promptly instructed
her daughters to drag Midnight back inside as she searched for water, paper towels,
and hydrogen peroxide.14
4. Shocked and angered by the whole ordeal, Shanjulia dismissed
Amanda’s apologies and refused offers of aid.15 Instead, Amanda called her
supervisor, Tracy, to inform her about the attack.16 Tracy instructed her to return to
work if possible, so Shanjulia hobbled back to her delivery van and drove to the post
office.17 She debriefed another supervisor, Jessica, who then drove her to Saint
Francis Hospital.18
11 Hendrix, A. Dep. 16:2–10. 12 Id. at 16:8–12; Sanchez Dep. 40:2–6. 13 Sanchez Dep. 44:3–11. 14 Hendrix, A. Dep. 18:5–19, 19:1–5; Sanchez Dep. 40:7–11. 15 Hendrix, A. Dep. 18:22–23; Sanchez Dep. 40:12–19. 16 Hendrix, A. Dep. 19:6–9; Sanchez Dep. 40:12–20. 17 Hendrix, A. Dep. 19:9–12; Sanchez Dep. 48:3–12. 18 Sanchez Dep. 49:24–50:11.
3 5. The medical providers cleaned and sutured Shanjulia’s wounds, took
pictures and x-rays, then prescribed her pain medication.19 After she was released
from the hospital, Shanjulia went back to the post office to get her workers’
compensation paperwork, and then her son picked her up from work and drove her
home.20 Following the post office’s instructions, Shanjulia did not return to work
until mid-November.21 Since the attack, she often wakes up from nightmares in cold
sweats and becomes anxious whenever she sees a black dog.22
6. On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff brought this action against Amanda and
her mother, Kathryn Hendrix, who owns the Property, seeking damages related to
the incident.23 After some discovery practice, on April 30, 2024, Kathryn moved for
summary judgment (the “Motion”).24 Briefing on the Motion was completed on July
26, 2024, and an oral argument was scheduled for October 10, 2024.25 Thereafter,
the Court took this matter under advisement. This is the Court’s decision.
19 Id. at 50:18–51:9. 20 Id. at 51:12–16. 21 Id. at 54:8–11. 22 Id. at 75:3–21. 23 D.I. 1. 24 D.I. 23. 25 D.I. 24, 35, 39.
4 ANALYSIS
7. “Summary judgment is only appropriate where there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 26
“There is no right to a summary judgment.”27 “[W]hen the facts permit a reasonable
person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter
of law.”28 At this stage, this Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.29 The burden rests with the moving party.30 Here, that is
Kathryn.
8. The primary issue pending before this Court is whether Kathryn had
actual knowledge of Midnight’s vicious nature. Delaware’s dog-bite statute, 16 Del.
C. § 3053F, provides that the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by
26 Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc., 319 A.3d 878, 883 (Del. 2024) (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)); Eco-Mail, Inc. v. Firstsource Health Plans & Health Servs., LLC, 2024 WL 3738705, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2024) (first citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); and then citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469–70 (Del. 1962)). 27 Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002) (first citing Anglin v. Bergold, 565 A.2d 279 (Del. 1989); and then citing Brunswick Corp. v. Bowl-Mor Co., Inc., 297 A.2d 67, 69 (Del. 1972)) (internal quotation omitted). 28 Feaster v. Tyler, 2024 WL 4039721, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2024) (citing Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967)). 29 Northan v. Thomas, 2024 WL 2974271, at *2 (Del. Super. June 12, 2024) (citing DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1362 (Del. 1988)); Feldman v. Marks, 2024 WL 4263931, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2024) (citing Legion P’rs Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, 2021 WL 6621168, at *6 (Del. Super. Sept. 30, 2021)). 30 Feldman v. Marks, 2024 WL 4263931, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2024) (citing Radulski v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 8676027, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2020)).
5 such dog.31 This strict liability “relieves a plaintiff from ‘proving specific acts of
negligence’ and ‘protects him from certain defenses’ like that embodied in
Delaware’s comparative negligence statute.”32 An “owner” is “any person who
owns, keeps, harbors, or is the custodian of a dog.”33
9. Conversely, a landlord only owes a duty to protect an invitee from a
tenant’s dog in the landlord’s capacity as “(1) harborer of the dog or (2) as a landlord
of the dog’s owner and only if Defendant had knowledge of the dog’s vicious
propensities.”34 Put differently, “[t]he imposition of liability on a landlord occurs
when the landlord ‘knows of the animal’s dangerous propensities and the landlord
has the power, through its control over the premises, to remove or confine the
animal.’”35
31 16 Del. C. § 3053F (“The owner of a dog is liable in damages for any injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by such dog, unless the injury, death, or loss was caused to the body or property of a person who, at the time, was committing or attempting to commit a trespass or other criminal offense on the property of the owner, or was committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense against any person, or was teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog.”). 32 Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536, 540 (Del. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). 33 16 Del. C. § 3041F(7); Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc., 319 A3d 878, 887–88 (Del. 2024). 34 Dougherty v. Hibbits, 2015 WL 5168157, at *3 (Del. Super. 2015) (quoting Smith v. Isaacs, 1999 WL 587350, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 21, 1999)) (emphasis in original). 35 Id. at *3 (quoting Kirshner v. Wilm. Hous. Auth., 1997 WL 587350, at *1 (Del. Sept. 11, 1997)).
6 10. Here, Kathryn claims Shanjulia “cannot identify any factual dispute or
evidence to suggest negligence on the part of Kathryn.” Shanjulia contends that
Kathryn is liable through her capacity as landlord of the Property.36 Citing
Wilmington Country Club v. Cowee, Shanjulia asserts that Kathryn, as landlord, “had
a duty to provide Shanjulia with safe ingress and egress to the property.”37 Although
Cowee deals with a motor vehicle accident on a country club’s private roadway, it is
analogous; and this Court recognizes the standard for property owners owing a duty
to warn invitees of open and obvious dangers.38
11. Here, it is undisputed that James—not Kathryn—is the owner of
Midnight. 39 Thus, strict liability does not apply to Kathryn. But, because she is the
landlord of the Property, the remaining issue is whether Kathryn knew of Midnight’s
vicious propensities. Shanjulia thinks so. In support, she asserts that Kathryn’s
deposition testimony shows that she knew about Midnight’s vicious nature.40
Kathryn disagrees contending that she testified generally about whether a dog could
be protective and vicious if it thought someone was harming its owners. 41 Kathryn
36 D.I. 24 ¶ 1–2. 37 Id. ¶ 1 (citing Wilm. Country Club v. Cowee, 747 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2000)). 38 Cowee, 747 A.2d at 1089–90. 39 Hendrix, A. Dep. at 6:11, 9:10–19. 40 D.I. 24 ¶ 3. 41 Hendrix, K. Dep. at 39:24–40:18.
7 further argues that such testimony was in response to hypotheticals posed by
opposing counsel instead of a clear understanding of Midnight’s vicious
propensities.42
12. Although Kathryn has not resided at the Property since February
2020—before Midnight moved in and nearly three years before the incident—she
testified that she visits the Property often.43 Kathryn claims she never noticed or
heard stories about Midnight acting viciously;44 yet her daughter, Amanda, testified
that Midnight barks at delivery persons.45 Amanda also admitted that Midnight was
involved in another incident where he jumped over their fence and attacked a
neighbor’s dog, which prompted animal control to conduct a second visit.46 Amanda
further stated that because another incident would require putting Midnight down,
he now lives with a relative in New York.47
42 D.I. 35 at 2. 43 Hendrix, K. Dep. at 6:13–14, 7:3–9. 44 Id. at 44:2–13 (“Q: Were you ever aware of any prior aggressive tendencies of that dog, Midnight, before this incident? A. No. Q. Did anybody ever tell you that he went after anybody or broke through the screen door or the storm door? A. No. Did you ever hear of him being aggressive, or barking at, or trying to attack mail carriers before this incident? A. No.”) (emphasis removed). 45 Hendrix, A. Dep. 28:17–24 (“Q. Did the dog bark when the mail person came to the door? A. Yes. When the mail person comes, when Amazon comes. Q. He tends to bark every time somebody comes to the door? A. Not usually, but usually with delivery services.”) (emphasis removed). 46 Id. at Dep. 21:3–11. Id. at Dep. 22:4–11. But see Hendrix, K. Dep. 17:13–18:17 (Kathryn testified that 47
Amanda’s family moved to New York and Midnight still lives with them).
8 13. Another fact also moves the needle away from summary judgment—
the need for a storm door. The record evinces that one of Amanda’s daughters may
have left the storm door unlatched, unleashing Midnight on unlucky passersby and
postal workers.48 But why was a secondary barrier installed in the first place? 49 It
is unclear exactly when Kathryn installed the additional barrier. If the storm door
was already part of the house before Kathryn moved out because she owned dogs
previously, this decision would be easy. On the other hand, if Kathryn installed the
storm door after Midnight moved in, that may give a reasonable juror pause. Thus,
the date the storm door was installed is highly probative.
14. Following the October 10, 2024 hearing, this Court instructed the
parties to provide clarity on when the storm door was installed. No updates have
been provided to date. Consequently, like a dog after a rainstorm, genuine issues as
to the material facts in this case are still muddy.
CONCLUSION
15. This Court finds factual disputes exist and summary judgment is
inappropriate. The better course is to proceed to trial, where the factual predicate to
determine whether Kathryn had actual knowledge of Midnight’s vicious propensities
48 Sanchez Dep. 36:6–10. 49 See Hendrix, K. Dep. 29:12–30:12 (“It adds the additional barrier of another door between the mail carrier and any animals.”)
9 can be explored and the credibility of all involved can be judged. Accordingly, the
Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________ _
The Honorable Kathleen M. Vavala
Original to Prothonotary. cc. Stephen A. Hampton, Esquire Kenneth M. Doss, Esquire