Sanchez v. Green Messengers, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedOctober 28, 2021
Docket5:20-cv-06538
StatusUnknown

This text of Sanchez v. Green Messengers, Inc. (Sanchez v. Green Messengers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanchez v. Green Messengers, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 HANS SANCHEZ, Case No. 5:20-cv-06538-EJD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 10 v.

11 GREEN MESSENGERS, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 31 Defendants. 12

13 Plaintiff Hans Sanchez brings a putative class action, alleging that Defendants Green 14 Messengers and Amazon.com Services failed to provide delivery drivers with adequate meal and 15 rest periods and wage statements. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 16 Defendant Amazon.com (hereinafter “Amazon”) moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 17 Complaint (“SAC”) on the grounds that the complaint fails to allege that an employment 18 relationship existed between Amazon and the Plaintiff. The Court agrees and dismisses the SAC 19 with leave to amend.1 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Defendant Green Messengers employed Plaintiff in 2019 as a delivery driver. But see 22 SAC ¶ 20, Dkt. No. 26 (stating that Plaintiff worked for “Defendants” as a “non-exempt, hourly 23 employee from approximately March 2019 until July 20, 2019, as a delivery driver.”). Plaintiff 24 alleges that he and the putative class members were not provided with meal periods of at least 25 thirty minutes for each five-hour work period due to “Defendants’” policy of not scheduling meal 26

27 1 After considering the parties papers, the Court finds this motion suitable for consideration without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 1 periods as part of each work shift, imposing too many deliveries on employees, and failing to 2 provide employees with a formal written meal and rest period policy that encouraged employees to 3 take their meal and rest periods. SAC ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that although he and the class 4 regularly were not afforded meal breaks, Defendants still automatically deducted thirty minutes 5 from their paychecks, regardless of whether they took meal breaks. SAC ¶ 23. Plaintiff further 6 alleges that he and the putative class members were not provided with rest periods of at least ten 7 minutes for each four-hour work period. SAC ¶ 26. Plaintiff also alleges that he and the putative 8 class were not paid: minimum wage for all hours worked, overtime, for business expenses, or 9 provided with accurate itemized wage statements. SAC ¶¶ 28–45. Plaintiff alleges various causes 10 of action related to these claims. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of 13 a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under 14 Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter 15 Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). A complaint may also be dismissed where it 16 presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts required to support the theory. 17 Id. A plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” but must plead sufficient facts that, if 18 true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 19 544, 545 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to 20 dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for 21 relief that is plausible on its face.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). A claim is facially 22 plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 23 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 24 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non- 25 conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 26 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”). 27 1 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of 2 all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the 3 nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). However, this Court 4 need not accept legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual 5 allegations. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 Amazon argues the SAC must be dismissed because it does not contain an allegation that 8 Amazon “employed” Plaintiff as required to show a violation of the California Labor Code. 9 Defendant Amazon’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”) at 6–9, Dkt. No. 31. 10 Plaintiff contends that he has no obligation at this phase to plead the business relationship between 11 Amazon and Green Messengers. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Amazon’s Motion to 12 Dismiss (“Opp.”) at 2–6, Dkt. No. 38. The Court disagrees. 13 An employer-employee relationship is required in order to establish liability for Labor 14 Code violations. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 268 (Cal. 2010). “Employ” means “(a) to 15 exercise control over the [plaintiff’s] wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or 16 permit [a plaintiff] to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment 17 relationship.” Id. at 278. It is possible for two defendants to “jointly employ” a plaintiff. 18 However, the “joint-employer” theory requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that each “employed” the 19 plaintiff within the meaning of one of the three alternative definitions. See Curry v. Equilon 20 Enters., LLC, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 309 (Ct. App. 2018). 21 The joint-employer doctrine recognizes that “even where business entities are separate, if 22 they share control of the terms of conditions of an individual’s employment, both companies can 23 qualify as employers.” Guitierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC, 2014 WL 5487793, at *3 24 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (citing Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 769–70 25 (9th Cir. 1979). While plaintiffs need not conclusively establish that defendants were their joint 26 employers at the pleading stage, plaintiffs “must at least allege some facts in support of this legal 27 conclusion.” Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., LLC, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 1 2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting that a plaintiff must allege more than “labels and 2 conclusions”)). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to differentiate 3 allegations against multiple defendants. Holtegaard v. Howroyd-Wright Employment Agency, 4 Inc., 2020 WL 6051328, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2020); see also Manukyan v. Cach, LLC, 2012 5 WL 6199938, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (“A court should dismiss a complaint that makes 6 undifferentiated allegations against multiple defendants, because such a complaint fails to put each 7 defendant on notice of the alleged wrongdoing.”); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended 8 Acceleration Mktg. Sales Pracs., and Prods. Liab.

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Related

Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A.
550 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Robert S. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
749 F.2d 530 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service
572 F.3d 962 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Martinez v. Combs
231 P.3d 259 (California Supreme Court, 2010)
Curry v. Equilon Enters., LLC
233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295 (California Court of Appeals, 5th District, 2018)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Navarro v. Block
250 F.3d 729 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Thompson v. Davis
295 F.3d 890 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
Ileto v. Glock Inc.
349 F.3d 1191 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

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