Sanchez v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sanchez v. City of New York

40 A.D.3d 276, 834 N.Y.S.2d 186

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 3, 2007

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 40 A.D.3d 276 (Sanchez v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sanchez v. City of New York, 40 A.D.3d 276, 834 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael D. Stallman, J.), entered March 1, 2006, which, in an action arising out of the execution of a search warrant at plaintiffs’ home, denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the settlement of the action insofar as made on behalf of the infant plaintiff, and to sever the remainder of the action brought on behalf of the other two plaintiffs, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The record does not support the claim of infant plaintiff’s guardian, who is also the infant’s mother and a plaintiff herein, that she discovered the true extent of the infant’s emotional [277]*277injuries only after the infant was examined by a social worker, in the summer of 2005. The examination was for purposes of preparing the infant’s compromise order for the settlement that had been agreed to in open court in December 2004. The infant’s psychological injuries, including the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress syndrome, were known from the outset of the case and appropriately considered by the court in determining that the settlement was adequate. Indeed, the social worker’s July 2005 report, on which the infant primarily relies, notes that the infant was seen by Manhattan Mental Health Services on March 28, 2001 for psychiatric evaluation due to nightmares and frequent crying and was at that time diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiffs’ notice of claim, dated April 24, 2001, and verified bill of particulars, dated January 16, 2002, also assert symptoms characteristic of an individual suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Accordingly, vacatur of the settlement reached in open court was properly denied even though the infant compromise order had yet to be signed (see Perone v Nicklas, 99 AD2d 484 [1984], lv dismissed 63 NY2d 610 [1984]). We have considered and rejected plaintiffs’ other arguments. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Marlow, Sullivan, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael D. Stallman, J.), entered March 1, 2006, which, in an action arising out of the execution of a search warrant at plaintiffs’ home, denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the settlement of the action insofar as made on behalf of the infant plaintiff, and to sever the remainder of the action brought on behalf of the other two plaintiffs, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The record does not support the claim of infant plaintiff’s guardian, who is also the infant’s mother and a plaintiff herein, that she discovered the true extent of the infant’s emotional [277]*277injuries only after the infant was examined by a social worker, in the summer of 2005. The examination was for purposes of preparing the infant’s compromise order for the settlement that had been agreed to in open court in December 2004. The infant’s psychological injuries, including the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress syndrome, were known from the outset of the case and appropriately considered by the court in determining that the settlement was adequate. Indeed, the social worker’s July 2005 report, on which the infant primarily relies, notes that the infant was seen by Manhattan Mental Health Services on March 28, 2001 for psychiatric evaluation due to nightmares and frequent crying and was at that time diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiffs’ notice of claim, dated April 24, 2001, and verified bill of particulars, dated January 16, 2002, also assert symptoms characteristic of an individual suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Accordingly, vacatur of the settlement reached in open court was properly denied even though the infant compromise order had yet to be signed (see Perone v Nicklas, 99 AD2d 484 [1984], lv dismissed 63 NY2d 610 [1984]). We have considered and rejected plaintiffs’ other arguments. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Marlow, Sullivan, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

40 A.D.3d 276, 834 N.Y.S.2d 186, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanchez-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-2007.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack