Sanchez v. Abbott Laboratories

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: September 25, 2023
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01436
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 GRACIELA SANCHEZ, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general 11 public similarly situated; No. 2:20-cv-01436-TLN-AC

12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER 14 v. 15 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, an Illinois Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, 16 inclusive;

17 Defendants.

19 20 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Graciela Sanchez’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to 21 Strike Affirmative Defenses from Defendant’s Answer to the First Amended Complaint. (ECF 22 No. 31.) Defendant Abbott Laboratories (“Defendant”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 38.) 23 Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 41.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part 24 and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s motion. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendant, alleging the following wage and 3 hour claims: (1) unpaid overtime; (2) unpaid meal period premiums; (3) unpaid rest period 4 premiums; (4) unpaid minimum wages; (5) final wages not timely paid; (6) noncompliant wage 5 statements; (7) unreimbursed business expenses; and (8) violation of California Business & 6 Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended 7 Complaint (“FAC”) on March 18, 2021. (ECF No. 20-1.) Defendant filed its Answer to 8 Plaintiff’s FAC on April 9, 2021. (ECF No. 30.) On April 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant 9 motion seeking to strike many of Defendant’s affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 31.) 10 II. STANDARD OF LAW 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a 12 pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 13 “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that 14 must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney- 15 Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Rule 12(f) motions, however, are 16 “generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance of pleading in federal 17 practice, and because they are often used as a delaying tactic.” Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 18 N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003). “Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to 19 strike lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. Unless it would prejudice the 20 opposing party, courts freely grant leave to amend stricken pleadings. Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 21 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 22 In Wyshak, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading 23 an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak, 607 F.2d 24 at 827. Under the fair notice standard, a defendant is only required to “state the nature and 25 grounds for the affirmative defense” rather than plead a detailed statement of the facts upon 26 which the defense is based. Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 564 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 27 “On the other hand, an affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it clearly lacks merit 28 ‘under any set of facts the defendant might allege.’” Id. (quotation omitted). The pleadings are 1 only required to describe each defense in “general terms” if it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the 2 nature of the defense. Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015). For 3 well-established defenses, merely naming them may be sufficient. See Ganley v. Cnty. of San 4 Mateo, No. 06-cv-3923-TEH, 2007 WL 902551, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007). 5 This Court has previously found that the heightened pleading standard set forth in Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) does 7 not apply to affirmative defenses asserted in a defendant’s answer. Dodson v. Gold Country 8 Foods, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-0336-TLN-DAD, 2013 WL 5970410 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013). “If a 9 court is in doubt as to whether the challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or law, the motion 10 to strike should be denied, leaving the assessment of the sufficiency of the allegations for 11 adjudication on the merits after proper development of the factual nature of the claims through 12 discovery.” Springer v. Fair Isaac Corp., No. 14-CV-02238-TLN-AC, 2015 WL 7188234, at *2 13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015) (citing Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974–75 14 (9th Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s motion under the Wyshack “fair 15 notice” standard. 16 III. ANALYSIS 17 Plaintiff argues Defendant’s affirmative defenses 1, 4–6, 8–10, 12–13, 16–19, 21, 30, 33, 18 and 35–36 should be stricken as legally insufficient, factually insufficient, redundant, impertinent, 19 or immaterial. (ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff also argues the Court should strike Defendant’s prayer for 20 relief. (Id.) The Court will address Plaintiff’s arguments in turn. 21 A. Affirmative Defense 1 22 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s first affirmative defense asserting failure to state a 23 claim because it is not a proper affirmative defense. (ECF No. 31 at 11.) In opposition, 24 Defendant concedes that district courts are split over whether failure to state a claim is a proper 25 affirmative defense but argues that the “courts that refuse to strike this defense . . . heed both the 26 plain language of the Rules and their intent more faithfully.” (ECF No. 38 at 11.) 27 The Court agrees with Plaintiff. “Failure to state a claim is not a proper affirmative 28 defense but, rather, asserts a defect in [plaintiff’s] prima facie case . . . [and] is more properly 1 brought as a motion.” Estate of Haile Neil v. Cnty. of Colusa, No. 2:19-cv-02441-TLN-DB, 2023 2 WL 3977055, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2023) (quoting Powell v. Union Pac. R. Co., 864 3 F.Supp.2d 949, 962–63 (E.D. Cal. 2012)). 4 Because failure to state a claim is not a proper affirmative defense, Plaintiff’s motion to 5 strike Defendant’s first affirmative defense is hereby GRANTED without leave to amend. 6 B. Affirmative Defense 8 7 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s eighth affirmative defense asserting failure to satisfy 8 class action prerequisites because Plaintiff argues such an assertion should instead be pleaded as 9 “a failure of Plaintiff’s prima facie case.” (ECF No. 31 at 11.) In opposition, Defendant 10 withdraws its eighth affirmative defense and reserves the right to argue that Plaintiff has failed to 11 prove class action prerequisites as part of her prima facie case. (ECF No. 38 at 12.) 12 Based on Defendant’s withdrawal, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike 13 Defendant’s eighth affirmative defense without leave to amend. 14 C. Affirmative Defense 9 15 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s ninth affirmative defense alleging lack of standing, 16 arguing she adequately alleges her injury. (ECF No. 31 at 12.) In opposition, Defendant argues 17 such merits-based arguments are inappropriate on a motion to strike. (ECF No. 38 at 13.) 18 This Court previously declined to strike lack of standing as an affirmative defense. 19 Brooks v. Tapestry, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00156-TLN-JDP, 2022 WL 3229779, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20 10, 2022). In Brooks, the plaintiff argued the Court should strike down the defendant’s 21 affirmative defense as to standing because “a defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not 22 met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.” Id. In opposition, the defendant argued 23 that “lack of standing can be used as an affirmative defense because discovery will reveal the 24 extent of Plaintiff’s injury and Plaintiff’s claims will not succeed if she does not show injury.” Id. 25 Citing a recent case, this Court agreed with the defendant and declined to strike the lack of 26 standing defense. Id. (citing Peacock v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-00568-TLN- 27 CKD, 2022 WL 446201, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2022)). Likewise, the Court declines to strike 28 Defendant’s lack of standing defense in the instant case. 1 Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s ninth affirmative 2 defense.1 3 D. Affirmative Defense 10 4 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s tenth affirmative defense asserting lack of 5 manageability. (ECF No. 31 at 12 (citing Garcia v. Schlumberger Lift Sols., LLC, No. 1:18-cv- 6 01261-DAD-JLT, 2020 WL 903208, at *2, *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020)).) Defendant argues that 7 Plaintiff misrepresents Garcia as the Garcia court did not strike the defendant’s defense based on 8 lack of manageability but instead allowed the defendant leave to amend to add that defense. 9 (ECF No. 38 at 12.) 10 The Court agrees with Defendant. While Garcia noted manageability is not an 11 affirmative defense per se, Garcia granted the defendants leave to amend to add manageability as 12 an affirmative defense since “the plaintiff has not shown that such a defense is not viable under 13 any set of facts.” Garcia, 2020 WL 903208, at *3 (noting that denial of leave to amend to add the 14 manageability defense would be inappropriate given the “extreme liberality” of Rule 15); see 15 Dodson, 2013 WL 5970410, at *2 (“[A]n affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it 16 clearly lacks merit ‘under any set of facts the defendant might allege.’”). Similarly, because 17 Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s tenth affirmative defense is not viable under any set of 18 facts, the Court declines to strike Defendant’s manageability defense. 19 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s tenth affirmative 20 defense. 21 E. Affirmative Defenses 13, 16, and 30 22 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s thirteenth (lack of injury), sixteenth 23 (noncompensable work), and thirtieth (no employment relationship) affirmative defenses as 24 improper because, such as with Defendant’s first, eighth, ninth, and tenth affirmative defenses, 25 they concern elements of Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 31 at 12–13, 18.) In opposition, Defendant 26 argues that asking the Court to “make factual determinations that go to [the] merits of the case” is 27 1 The same reasoning would apply to the two corresponding affirmative defenses based on 28 lack of injury (Affirmative Defense 13) and noncompensable work (Affirmative Defense 16). 1 “not appropriate under a Rule 12(f) motion to strike.” (ECF No. 38 at 13 (quoting Guifu Li v. A 2 Perfect Franchise, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-01189-LHK, 2011 WL 2971046, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 3 2011)).) 4 The Court agrees with Defendant and declines to address the merits of Defendant’s 5 defenses under a Rule 12(f) motion to strike. See Storz Mgmt. Co. v. Carey, No. 2:18-cv-00068- 6 TLN-DB, 2022 WL 2181661, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2022) (“The discretion of whether to 7 grant a motion to strike is soundly with the Court.”). As the movant, Plaintiff fails to offer any 8 supporting authority for striking these defenses. See id. (denying plaintiffs’ motion to strike 9 affirmative defenses because they “fail to . . . provide sufficient authority to support dismissing 10 [those] affirmative defenses”). 11 Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s thirteenth, 12 sixteenth, and thirtieth affirmative defenses. 13 F. Affirmative Defenses 4, 6, 17, 18, 19, 35, and 36 14 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s fourth (no willful violation), sixth (substantial 15 compliance), seventeenth (noncompensable time), eighteenth (inadvertence or clerical error), 16 nineteenth (no harm or injury), thirty-fifth (preliminary or post-liminary activities), and thirty- 17 sixth (practice not unfair) affirmative defenses as factually insufficient to place Plaintiff on notice 18 of Defendant’s defenses. (ECF No. 31 at 15–20.) In opposition, Defendant argues that such 19 questions of fact are inappropriate for courts to resolve on a motion to strike. (ECF No. 38 at 17.) 20 Previously, this Court found an affirmative defense “pleaded with just a single sentence” 21 to be sufficiently pleaded. Springer, 2015 WL 7188234, at *4. In Springer, “Defendant merely 22 stated, ‘Plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands from asserting the claims, and each of 23 them.’” Id. Nonetheless, this Court found that “[t]his statement, despite being vague and general, 24 [did] put Plaintiff on notice of Defendant’s intentions to claim an affirmative defense under the 25 doctrine of unclean hands.” Id. Similarly, the Court finds Defendant’s fourth, sixth, seventeenth, 26 eighteenth, nineteenth, thirty-fifth, and thirty-sixth affirmative defenses to adequately place 27 Plaintiff on notice of Defendant’s defenses to Plaintiff’s claims. 28 /// 1 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s fourth, sixth, 2 seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, thirty-fifth, and thirty-sixth affirmative defenses. 3 G. Affirmative Defenses 5, 12, 21, and 33 4 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s fifth (good faith dispute), twelfth (de minimis time), 5 twenty-first (unjust penalties), and thirty-third (unjust enrichment) affirmative defenses as 6 factually devoid and immaterial in the context of “statutorily mandated” Labor Code violations. 7 (ECF No. 31 at 14–15, 17–18.) In opposition, Defendant contends Wyshack’s fair notice standard 8 only requires that defendants describe affirmative defenses in “general terms” while Plaintiff’s 9 concession that only “certain” Labor Code provisions carry statutory mandates recognizes that a 10 good faith dispute exists for at least some provisions. (ECF No. 38 at 14.) 11 For the same reasons previously stated, the Court agrees with Defendant and finds these 12 defenses to be factually sufficient under Wyshack’s fair notice standard. Furthermore, “[f]ederal 13 courts are very reluctant to determine disputed or substantial issues of law … on a motion to 14 strike.” Kaur v. City of Lodi, No. 2:14-cv-00828-TLN-AC, 2016 WL 627308, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 15 Feb. 17, 2016) (explaining that only notice, not proof, is required at this juncture in litigation). 16 Accordingly, the issue of which labor code violations carry statutory mandates is a dispute that 17 the Court declines to determine at this juncture. 18 Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s fifth, twelfth, 19 twenty-first, and thirty-third affirmative defenses. 20 H. Defendant’s Prayer for Relief 21 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s Prayer for Relief as both procedurally and 22 substantively deficient. (ECF No. 31 at 20.) More specifically, Plaintiff — without citing to any 23 authority — asserts Defendant inappropriately includes a Prayer for Relief in its Answer instead 24 of as a counterclaim and alleges Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees is unsupported under 25 California law. (Id.) In opposition, Defendant points to Rule 54(d)(1), which allows for costs to 26 the prevailing party and for attorney’s fees to be sought by motion. (ECF No. 38 at 18.) 27 As the movant, Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that Defendant’s prayer for relief is 28 substantively “unsupported” or procedurally deficient. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 1 | Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant’s prayer for relief. 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's 4 | Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 31.) The Court STRIKES the first and eighth affirmative 5 | defenses without leave to amend. The motion is DENIED in all other respects. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Date: September 22, 2023 8 () jf 9 “ ! Vu 10 Troy L. Nuhlep> United States District Judge

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