Sanchez-Quiles v. SHHS
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
November 10, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1151
LUIS SANCHEZ-QUILES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
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___________________
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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LCDA. Cristina Munoz Gandara on brief for appellant.
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Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney, Jose Vazquez
____________________ _____________
Garcia, Assistant United States Attorney, and Jessie M. Klyce,
______ ________________
Assistant Regional Counsel, Region I, Department of Health and
Human Services, on brief for appellee.
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__________________
Per Curiam. Claimant Luis Sanchez-Quiles appeals from a
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district court judgment which affirms the decision of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services denying his claim for
social security disability benefits during the insured period
between July 2, 1971 and December 31, 1974. Claimant alleges
that he suffered from severe back, heart, and mental impairments
during that time period. We have thoroughly reviewed the
record and the parties' briefs on appeal and are persuaded that
the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant's contention that the combination of his back, heart,
and mental impairments was, in essence, equivalent to the
listings for vertebrogenic, heart, and somatoform disorders, is
meritless. Findings of medical equivalence must be based on
"medical findings that are at least equal in severity and
duration to the listed findings." 20 C.F.R. 404.1526.
Claimant's alleged impairments are not supported by medical
findings from the insured period that approximate the
aforementioned listings in severity or duration.
Claimant's contention that the ALJ erred by failing to
evaluate his pain as a nonexertional impairment also is
unavailing. To be sure, "[p]ain may be a nonexertional factor to
be considered in combination with exertional limitations, even
though it may also serve as a separate and independent ground for
disability." Da Rosa v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
_______ _______________________________________
803 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1986)(per curiam). "Where pain is
considered as a separate ground for disability ... it must be
severe enough to prevent the claimant from engaging in any
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substantial gainful employment. Where pain is considered in
2
combination with exertional limitations, however, it need only be
found significant enough to prevent the claimant from engaging in
the full range of jobs contemplated by the exertional category
for which the claimant otherwise qualifies." Gagnon v. Secretary
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of Health and Human Services, 666 F.2d 662, 666 n. 8 (1st Cir.
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1981).
The ALJ found that claimant's complaints of pain were
credible only to the extent that they precluded the performance
of more than sedentary work because (1) the medical evidence
concerning his back impairment, particularly Dr. Arturo Feria's
report, disclosed a full range of motion, little in the way of
positive clinical findings, and an inability to "work hard, carry
light weights, and climb scaffolds and stairs," (2) the medical
evidence disclosed no objective basis for claimant's chest pain
complaints, since his myocardial infarction did not occur until
June 1975, and a "careful study" of progress notes indicated that
claimant's pain was "occasional," (3) claimant's activities
during the insured period, which included multiple trips between
the United States and Puerto Rico, and claimant's testimony that
he experienced at least some relief with medications, indicated
that claimant's pain allegations were not fully credible.
It is true that the ALJ did not explicitly address
claimant's pain as a nonexertional limitation. Nevertheless, we
think his decision implies that claimant's pain did not
significantly reduce his access to jobs at the sedentary level
and thus did not preclude reliance on the grid.1 So construed,
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1 Where "a nonexertional limitation ...[is] found to impose
no significant restriction on the range of work a claimant is
exertionally able to perform, reliance on the Grid remains
3
the ALJ's decision is supportable. The record indicates that
claimant sought treatment for back pain on only two occasions
(August and November) in 1971 and two occasions (March and
September) in 1972. There appears to be a significant gap in
treatment between September 1972 and August 1983.2 The 1974
records indicate that claimant sought treatment more frequently
but not so much as to suggest the presence of a continuous
impairment. In short, the AlJ's conclusion that claimant's pain
was "occasional" appears to be correct.3 The claimant's
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