Sanchez Pinmentel v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: 24-6825
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBIN BLADMIRO SANCHEZ No. 24-6825 PINMENTEL, Agency No. A200-602-751 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 5, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Robin Bladmiro Sanchez Pinmentel petitions for review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to sua sponte reopen.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen removal

proceedings sua sponte only “for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning

behind the [BIA’s] decisions for legal or constitutional error.” Bonilla v. Lynch,

840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016). We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s

denial of a motion to reopen, and we review purely legal questions de novo. Id. at

581.

1. Petitioner argues that the BIA erred when it declined to consider

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), which he contends was a “fundamental

change in law.” The BIA did not err in concluding that Wilkinson addressed only

whether courts can review hardship determinations and did not change anything

about the standards the agency follows in making such determinations. Wilkinson,

601 U.S. at 225–26. There was accordingly no relevant change in law, and “even

if [a case] was a fundamental change, it does not follow that the BIA committed

legal or constitutional error in denying . . . relief.” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225,

1234 (9th Cir. 2020).

2. Petitioner also argues that the BIA erred when it determined that his

grandson was not a qualifying relative under statute. But even where a

grandparent is the legal guardian of and has custody of his grandchildren, a

grandchild does not count as a “child” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Moreno-

2 24-6825 Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2007). Pending adoption

petitions for grandchildren likewise do not allow grandchildren to count as

“children” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101. Id. at 1176. To the extent Petitioner

makes other arguments about the BIA’s hardship determination with respect to his

grandson, they do not relate to legal or constitutional error, and we therefore lack

jurisdiction to consider them. Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588.

3. Petitioner lastly argues that that the BIA erred when, in determining

whether to administratively close the case, it failed to apply the factors outlined in

Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (BIA 2012). To administratively close

the case, the BIA would have first needed to grant Petitioner’s motion to sua

sponte reopen. Petitioner’s argument that the BIA made a legal error in denying

him administrative closure assumes that his motion should have been reviewed as

if it were a standalone motion for administrative closure, not a motion for

reopening. Properly understood as a motion for reopening, the BIA did not apply

the wrong legal standard in evaluating it.

Petition DENIED.

3 24-6825