Sanchez, Artemio Orlando

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas·Decided May 16, 2012·No. PD-1264-11·Published

Opinion



IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS



NO. PD-1264-11
ARTEMIO ORLANDO SANCHEZ, Appellant


v.



THE STATE OF TEXAS



ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HARRIS COUNTY

Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keller, P.J., and Price, Womack, Johnson, Keasler, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Meyers, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alcala, J., not participating.

O P I N I O N



The State asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, which held that a blood-draw search warrant to be executed in a designated county may not be issued by a statutory county court judge of another county. Sanchez v. State, No. 01-10-00433-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3824 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2011). We granted the State's petition for discretionary review and will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

BACKGROUND

Appellant, Artemio Orlando Sanchez, was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Harris County shortly after midnight on March 22, 2009. The only passenger in the vehicle told officers that Appellant lost control of the vehicle, drove over a curb, and crashed into a retaining wall. Appellant admitted to operating the vehicle at the time of the accident and confirmed that he had "consumed a couple of beers" prior to the accident. During field sobriety tests, Appellant exhibited several clues of intoxication. He was arrested and transported to "central intox." Appellant refused to provide a breath sample, and an officer sought a search warrant to measure his blood alcohol content. For reasons undisclosed in the record, the warrant was signed by a statutory county court judge from Montgomery County, (1) and the warrant, on its face, commanded an officer of the peace to seize Appellant in Harris County and to draw his blood. Appellant's blood alcohol content was 0.163, which is more than twice the legal limit.

Subsequently, Appellant was charged with DWI as a second offender. He filed a motion to suppress the blood test results, but it was denied by the trial court. Appellant pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to confinement for one year in the county jail, probated for two years, and assessed a $700 fine.

On appeal, Appellant's sole issue for review contended that the statutory county court judge in Montgomery County lacked authority to issue a search warrant for Appellant's blood in Harris County. Sanchez, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3824, at *1. The First Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court because it concluded that no statutory provision expressly grants statewide authority for statutory county court judges to issue a search warrant. Id. at *18-19.

We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine whether a statutory county court judge from one county can issue a search warrant to be executed in another county. Specifically, the State's grounds for review are as follows:

(1) The court of appeals erred in holding that a statutory county court judge's authority is limited to acting solely within the county of the court.

(2) The court of appeals erred in holding that a statutory county court judge could not issue a blood search warrant for a DWI suspect located in another county.



ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES The State argues that there is no explicit geographical limitation to the jurisdiction of a statutory county court judge. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 18.01-.05. According to the State, because the Legislature placed jurisdictional limitations in some statutory provisions, but not in Chapter 18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (which addresses search warrants), the Legislature intended for statutory county courts to have statewide jurisdiction. See id. arts. 18.20-.21. Furthermore, the State asserts that, because Harris County and Montgomery County are in the same administrative judicial region, (2) the statutory scheme granting authority to statutory county court judges allows them to act outside of their county, if they are acting within their administrative region.

Alternatively, the State contends that a blood search warrant is effectively an arrest warrant, (3) so a statutory county court has authority to issue both types of warrants. The State contends that, since the warrants can be combined, both warrants are subject to statewide issuance. The State also argues that, although the warrant in this case was labeled a "search warrant," its effect was the same as an arrest warrant, thus allowing for statewide issuance. See Hinkley v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. 254, 256, 45 S.W.2d 581, 582 (1931); Powell v. State, 898 S.W.2d 821, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

In contrast, Appellant argues that the statutory county court judge in this case lacked statewide authority because the Texas Constitution and the Texas Legislature explicitly provide statewide jurisdiction for district court judges, but they do not do so for statutory county court judges. Tex. Const. art. V, § 11; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.23. Appellant also argues that, although some statutory provisions allow judges in certain county courts to exchange benches, such power is limited to their county. See Tex. Gov't Code § 25.0012. Appellant contends that, if the Legislature intended for judges of statutory county courts to have statewide authority, it would not have limited the ability of those judges to exchange benches. Appellant also points out that the Legislature excluded county courts at law from the list of magistrates designated as "conservators of the peace throughout the State." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.23.

Finally, Appellant argues that a search warrant for his blood is not the same as an arrest warrant and that, even if it were, it would not authorize the search and seizure of Appellant's blood because search warrants and arrest warrants are distinguishable, with different jurisprudence governing each. See State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (holding that drawing the blood of a defendant is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment).

ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV.

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