Sanas.AI Inc. v. Krisp Technologies, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 SANAS.AI INC., Case No. 25-cv-05666-RS (KAW)

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE 3/20/2026 DISCOVERY 9 v. LETTER

10 KRISP TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Re: Dkt. No. 85 11 Defendant. [Discovery Letter No. 1]

12 Plaintiff Sanas.AI, Inc. alleges that Defendant Krisp Technologies, Inc. has infringed on 13 six accent translation patents, claimed sole ownership over two co-invented patents, 14 misappropriated trade secrets, and engaged in false advertising. (Discovery Letter at 1, Dkt. No. 15 85.) Pending before the Court is the parties’ discovery letter regarding the applicability of 16 California Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.210. (Id.) Section 2019.210 provides that in any 17 action alleging misappropriating of trade secrets under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act 18 (“CUTSA”), “before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, the party alleging the 19 misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity[.]” 20 As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has waived the issue because 21 Defendant did not raise § 2019.210 in its objections to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production 22 (“RFPs”). (Discovery Letter at 1.) The parties do not dispute, however, that on the same day 23 Defendant served its timely responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Defendant also sent a letter stating that 24 it would not proceed with trade secret-related technical discovery until Plaintiff provided a 25 compliant trade secret disclosure per § 2019.210. (Id. at 4.) The Court is not inclined to impose 26 the harsh consequence of waiver under such circumstances, particularly when Plaintiff has cited 27 no authority suggesting that this is insufficient. Contrast with Philips N. Am. LLC v. Advanced 1 Aug. 6, 2021) (finding waiver where the defendant’s objections were not timely). 2 On the merits, the primary question is whether § 2019.210 -- which the parties do not 3 dispute applies to Plaintiff’s CUTSA claim -- operates to prohibit all technical discovery in this 4 case, even though Plaintiff also brings a trade secrets claim under the federal Defend Trade Secrets 5 Act (“DTSA”) and patent infringement claims. Courts, including this one, have previously found 6 that § 2019.210 postpones discovery as to DTSA claims if they were based on the 7 misappropriation of the same trade secrets underlying the CUTSA claim. See Case No. 21-cv- 8 3074-JST (KAW), Chung v. Intellectsoft Grp. Corp., Dkt. No. 94 at 3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2022); 9 Albert’s Organics, Inc. v. Holzman, No. 19-cv-07477-PJH, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135492, at *7- 10 8 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (applying § 2019.210 where there were CUTSA and DTSA claims); 11 cf. Loop AI Labs, Inc. v. Gatti, No. 15-cv-00798-HSG (DMR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170349, at 12 *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015) (staying discovery as to the CUTSA claim only because the 13 other claims were “not based on any allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets”). Such 14 courts have found that while § 2019.210 may not literally be applicable to the DTSA claims, 15 applying § 2019.210’s requirement would make sense for effective case management or to ensure 16 that a plaintiff was not trying to avoid CUTSA’s requirements. See Blockchain Innovation, LLC v. 17 Franklin Res., Inc., No. 21-cv-08787-AMO (TSH), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104537, at *5-6 (N.D. 18 Cal. June 15, 2023). 19 Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit has recently found that § 2019.210 does not apply to 20 DTSA claims. (Discovery Letter at 3.) Specifically, in Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng 21 Biztek, the Ninth Circuit found that “unlike CUTSA, DTSA does not set out requirements for the 22 specific timing or scope for identifying trade secrets. Instead, the conventional procedures under 23 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.” 149 F.4th 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2025). Further, the 24 Ninth Circuit found that § 2019.210 was “a California rule that does not control a federal trade- 25 secret claim.” Id. Applying Quintara, district courts have found that “[t]he DTSA thus does not 26 require a disclosure compliant with Section 2019.210,” such that “the DTSA claim contains one 27 fewer procedural hurdle than CUTSA.” Tesla, Inc. v. Proception, Inc., No. 25-cv-04963-SVK, 1 Joby Aero., Inc., No. 8:25-cv-554-VMC-AAS, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200675, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. 2 Sep. 17, 2025) (considering Quintara and concluding that “[t]he absence of a DTSA provision 3 incorporating discovery procedure analogous to state law statutory requirements in trade secret 4 cases supports the inference that a plaintiff whose DTSA claims proceed past the pleading stage is 5 entitled to discovery in accordance with the general discovery rules set forth in Federal Rule of 6 Civil Procedure 26”). 7 The Court agrees that § 2019.210 does not automatically apply to DTSA claims following 8 Quintara, even if CUTSA claims are pled. While Quintara did not involve a case that had both 9 CUTSA and DTSA claims, its analysis makes clear that DTSA does not have the same disclosure 10 requirements that apply to CUTSA claims. That said, Quintara also does not appear to prohibit a 11 court’s use of its wide discretion to manage discovery, under which a court could still require 12 compliance with § 2019.210 before allowing discovery on trade secret-related claims. See 13 Blockchain Innovation, LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104537, at *5. 14 Here, however, the Court does not believe that requiring compliance with § 2019.210 15 before allowing all technical discovery is warranted in this case because Plaintiff has pled separate 16 patent infringement claims. Courts have found that discovery related to claims that are separate 17 from the trade secrets claims -- including disclosure of technical documents -- should still go 18 forward, even when trade secret-related discovery was stayed. E.g., Space Data Corp. v. X, No. 19 16-cv-03260-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109842, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2017) 20 (permitting discovery of core technical documents in connection with patent infringement claims, 21 even though such discovery could overlap with discovery pertaining to trade secrets); Masimo 22 Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. SACV 20-48 JVS (JDEx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161589, at *6 (C.D. 23 Cal. July 14, 2020) (permitting discovery relating to patent infringement claims even though trade 24 secret discovery was stayed and the defendant had argued that the trade secrets related to the same 25 subject matter as the asserted patents); see also Commure, Inc. v. Canopy Works, Inc., No. 24-cv- 26 02592-NW (VKD), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75048, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2025) (declining to 27 stay discovery even if discovery related to other claims “happen to overlap with its trade secret 1 and the Court has no desire to invite disputes regarding whether discovery is ‘trade secret-related’ 2 or not”). Moreover, the presiding judge has now set a deadline for claim construction discovery. 3 (See Dkt. No. 92.) Staying technical discovery needed for Plaintiff’s patent infringement claims 4 because of a California statute that applies only to trade secret claims thus risks delaying case 5 deadlines. 6 Significantly, Defendant does not suggest that the RFPs or technical discovery at issue is 7 limited only to Plaintiff’s trade secret claims. (Discovery Letter at 5.) Rather, Defendant appears 8 to argue that § 2019.210 prohibits discovery of information that relates to both a trade secret and 9 wholly unrelated claims. (See id. (citing M/A-COM Technology Solutions, Inc. v. Litrinium, No. 10 SA CV 19-00220-JVS (JDEx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171453, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2019).) 11 The Court is not persuaded. As the cases above demonstrate, the issue is not whether the 12 discovery may pertain to both trade secret and not trade secret-related claims, but whether the 13 claims themselves are related. Thus, courts have declined to stay discovery as to claims that “are 14 not based on any allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets.” Loop AI Labs, Inc., 2015 U.S. 15 Dist. LEXIS 170349, at *13; see Space Data Corp., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109842, at *11-12;. 16 In turn, Defendant makes no suggestion that in this case, the patent claim (which is presumably 17 based on information that has been made public through the patent process) is based on 18 misappropriation of its trade secrets (which presumably have not been made public due to their 19 secret nature). Thus, the Court ORDERS Defendant to produce documents responsive to 20 Plaintiff’s RFPs within 21 days of the date of this order. 21 The Court notes the parties’ dispute regarding whether Plaintiff’s § 2019.210 disclosure is 22 sufficient. Defendant, however, provides no specifics as to why Plaintiff’s disclosure is 23 insufficient, instead pointing to a prior motion to compel that was terminated by the Court. 24 (Discovery Letter at 4; see also Dkt. No. 82.) Defendant is not permitted to incorporate a motion 25 that was terminated as procedurally improper in lieu of making actual arguments. The Court 26 ORDERS the parties to meet and confer as to Plaintiff’s § 2019.210 disclosure. To provide 27 guidance, the Court finds that trade secrets such as 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, and 38 appear to be sufficiently ] secrets such as 8 and 37 appear insufficient, as they refer to a “process” or “limitations” without 2 || providing any information as to what is required by that process or limitation. In meeting and 3 conferring, the parties are reminded that § 2019.210’s reasonable particularity requirement “does 4 || not mean that the party alleging misappropriation has to define every minute detail of its claimed 5 || trade secret at the outset of the litigation.” Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 6 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 835-36 (2005). 7 This order disposes of Dkt. No. 85. 9 || Dated: April 1, 2026 . Tm 10 DIS A. WESTMORE 1 United States Magistrate Judge a 12

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