Sanai v. Kruger

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 8 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CYRUS MARK SANAI, Solicitor, No. 25-2937 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01057-AMO v. MEMORANDUM* Judge LEONDRA KRUGER; JOSHUA P. GROBAN; MARTIN J. JENKINS; KELLI EVANS; CAROL CORRIGAN; GOODWIN LIU; Honorable PATRICIA GUERRERO, Chief Justice,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Araceli Martinez-Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 30, 2026**

Before: N.R. SMITH, BUMATAY, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Cyrus Mark Sanai, a California attorney subject to California State Bar

disciplinary proceedings, filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Justices of the California Supreme Court, alleging that the Bar disciplinary process

is constitutionally defective. We previously affirmed the district court’s dismissal

of Sanai’s claims on the basis of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971), and its denial of Sanai’s post-judgment motions under Rules 59 and 60(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Roshan v. Lawrence, No. 21-15771,

2024 WL 339100 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1139 (2025),

and cert. denied sub nom., Sanai v. Lawrence, 145 S. Ct. 1140 (2025).

Sanai now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for relief from

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).1 In his motion, Sanai argued that the Supreme

Court’s recent opinion in Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. 168 (2025), presented an

intervening change in the law that warrants vacatur of the judgment. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s denial of a

motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. Flores v.

Rosen, 984 F.3d 720, 731 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.

1 We consider only Sanai’s initial opening brief (Dkt. No. 13). See 9th Cir. R. 32- 1(a). In doing so, we decline to revisit Sanai’s arguments in support of default judgment, equitable relief, and reassignment, which we previously rejected in connection with Sanai’s first appeal. See Roshan, 2024 WL 339100, at *2 (finding Sanai’s other assignments of error were without merit); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the law of the case doctrine “generally pre[c]ludes a court from reconsidering an issue decided previously by the same court or by a higher court in the identical case”). Sanai’s motions to file oversized replacement briefs (Dkt. Nos. 14, 21, 24) are denied. See 9th Cir. R. 32- 2.

2 25-2937 Contrary to Sanai’s argument on appeal, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by failing to analyze Sanai’s motion under the six factors outlined in

Henson v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc., 943 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 2019).

Although the district court did not explicitly name any of the six Henson factors in

its decision, it engaged in the relevant equitable analysis. See Henson, 943 F.3d at

444 (providing that the factors are “well-reasoned principles that should guide

courts in exercising their discretion,” not “a rigid or exhaustive checklist” (citation

omitted)); Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2009)

(explaining that in the Rule 60(b)(1) context, the mere failure to cite the equitable

test ordinarily does not require reversal as long as the court actually engaged in the

analysis required).

Given that the first and fifth Henson factors decidedly supported the district

court’s conclusion that “nothing in Sanai’s motion . . . merits relief from

judgment,” the remaining factors were not salient to the Rule 60(b)(6) equitable

balancing under the circumstances. See Henson, 943 F.3d at 446–53 (outlining the

factors). Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to omit

discussion of those factors or other equitable considerations. See Lemoge, 587 F.3d

at 1196 (recognizing that “[b]ecause the standard under Rule 60(b) is an equitable

standard, it may follow that in some circumstances a district court may satisfy the

standard even though omitting to discuss some specified factor” (citation omitted)).

3 25-2937 AFFIRMED.2

2 Sanai’s emergency motions for an injunction or stay pending appeal (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, 28, 29), motion to expedite the appeal (Dkt. No. 18), and motions for an initial hearing en banc (Dkt. Nos. 5, 26, 27) are denied.

4 25-2937