San Millan v. United States

153 F. Supp. 370, 139 Ct. Cl. 485, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 106
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1957
DocketNo. 182-54
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 153 F. Supp. 370 (San Millan v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
San Millan v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 370, 139 Ct. Cl. 485, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 106 (cc 1957).

Opinion

LittletoN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff brings suit to recover disability retired pay of which plaintiff alleges he was deprived by the arbitrary actions of the Department of the Army.

Plaintiff contends that on the facts established by the record in this case, he had become totally and permanently incapacitated for active duty by reason of a disability incurred as an incident of his active military service and was therefore entitled to disability retirement and pay at the time of his separation from the service on March 20,1946.

Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to establish facts which would warrant such conclusions and, in addition, that plaintiff may not recover in any event because this court lacks jurisdiction of his claim for the reasons that (1) under applicable law, only the President or his administrative officers may determine whether or not a military officer is incapacitated for active service and (2) plaintiff’s claim is [487]*487barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to suits in this court because his separation from active duty took place more than six years prior to the filing of his petition.

Considering first defendant’s argument concerning the bar of the statute of limitations, the majority of the court has for some time past taken the position that a suit for disability retired pay is not barred where the claim is based on an alleged arbitrary refusal to grant a hearing or, if a hearing has been granted, on an alleged arbitrary determination that the plaintiff was not permanently incapacitated for active service by reason of service incurred disability at the time of his separation from active duty where the refusal or determination occurred within six years of the filing of the petition. On the basis of those decisions, plaintiff’s claim is not barred since the alleged arbitrary actions of the Adjutant General all took place within six years of the filing of plaintiff’s petition herein.1

With reference to defendant’s other jurisdictional argument, it seems to be defendant’s position that the Department of the Army has a sort of exclusive jurisdiction to determine eligibility for disability retirement benefits in the same manner as the Veterans’ Administration has exclusive jurisdiction to determine finally all questions of law or fact concerning eligibility for benefits or payments under acts administered by the Veterans’ Administration. (See 54 Stat. 1193, 1197)

The statutes covering disability retirement and disability retirement pay confer no such exclusive •jurisdiction on the administering government agency. While it is true that this court cannot confer the status of disability retirement on a member or former member of the armed forces, any more than it can restore a wrongfully discharged civil service employee to his job with the Federal Government, it has long been held that this court has jurisdiction to render judgment for the pay which was denied the claimant by the arbitrary or capricious actions of the administrative agency [488]*488of the Government. Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167; Uhley v. United States, 137 C. Cls. 275; Gordon v. United States, 129 C. Cls. 270; Suter v. United States, decided this day, ante, p. 466.

The next question is whether or not the Army acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying plaintiff a hearing and in refusing to confer upon plaintiff the status of disability retirement, with pay. Plaintiff contends that such actions of the Army were arbitrary and capricious because the record in this case establishes that at the time of plaintiff’s separation from military service on March 20, 1946, he was totally and permanently incapacitated for active military service by reason of a disability incurred in line of duty. The facts established by the record are set forth in detail in the findings of fact and will only be summarized herein.

Plaintiff, who for 19 years had been a member of the National Guard in Puerto Bico, was called to active duty in the Army of the United States on October 15, 1940. Prior to that time plaintiff had enjoyed good health and had led an active business and social life. He was a man of slight build, being approximately 5 feet 6 inches in height, and at the time of his pre-induction physical examination in December 1940, his weight was 127% pounds. Beginning sometime in 1943, and continuing throughout the remainder of plaintiff’s active military service, he complained to brother officers of abdominal pain. He neither sought nor received medical treatment from the Army physicians or from private physicians for these symptoms while on active duty because the pain would finally disappear without the need for treatment. While plaintiff was stationed in Hawaii during the last year of his service, he continued to suffer with these pains but told brother officers that he did not want to report to the hospital for treatment because such action on his part might have a bad effect on the morale of the men under his command.

Despite plaintiff’s abdominal discomfort, at the time of his terminal physical examination in December 1945, plaintiff’s weight had increased to 131 pounds and his chest and waist measurements had also increased. The report of his examination showed him to be qualified in all ways for full [489]*489military service. Plaintiff does not suggest that the examination was superficial. Plaintiff’s terminal leave expired on March 20,1946, and he was released from active service, not by reason of physical disability.

In April 1946, plaintiff returned to work as a field engineer for his former employer, the Puerto Eico Construction Administration. In May 1946, plaintiff consulted a private physician, Dr. Fernandez, in Puerto Eico, in connection with his abdominal pain. Dr. Fernandez usually treated plaintiff in plaintiff’s home and diagnosed plaintiff’s ailment as a suspected duodenal ulcer.

In November 1946, plaintiff ceased working for the Puerto Eico Eeconstruction Administration because of the increased intensity and frequency of his attacks of abdominal pain, and in June 1941, plaintiff entered the San Patricio Veterans’ Hospital in Puerto Eico for examination and treatment.

During plaintiff’s hospitalization in June 1947, gastrointestinal X-rays were taken and his stool was examined, both with negative results. Insofar as his abdominal symptoms were concerned, the diagnosis of the Veterans’ Hospital was that the pain was caused by psychoneurosis, anxiety.

In the summer of 1947, plaintiff and his family moved to Falls Church, Virginia, where plaintiff has since lived. Plaintiff then became the patient of Dr. Podolnick, a private physician, who treated him for nervous spasm of the intestines with anti-spasmodic drugs and sedatives until the winter of 1948. During that time plaintiff continued to lose weight, had poor appetite, and suffered from increasing abdominal pain. He did not attempt to work until late in 1948, when he secured a job as salesman for Sears Eoebuck and Company, in Arlington, Virginia.

In January 1949, plaintiff entered Mt. Alto Veterans’ Hospital in Washington, D. C., where he again received a complete physical examination, including gastro-intestinal X-rays. By that time plaintiff’s weight had gone down to about 100 pounds.

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Bluebook (online)
153 F. Supp. 370, 139 Ct. Cl. 485, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/san-millan-v-united-states-cc-1957.