San Lin v. Todd Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAN LIN, No. 16-72747

Petitioner, Agency No. A016-090-622

v. MEMORANDUM * TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 22, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, OWENS, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

San Lin, a native and citizen of Burma, petitions for review of a decision of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of an

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his applications for asylum, withholding

of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). See Bao Tai Nian v. Holder, 683

F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he denial of [a noncitizen] crew member’s

petition for asylum and other relief in ‘asylum-only’ proceedings is the ‘functional

equivalent’ of a final order of removal . . . within the meaning of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(1). Thus, we have jurisdiction to review [Lin’s] petition from the BIA’s

denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.”). We

deny the petition for review.

“When the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s

decision as the final agency action.” Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th

Cir. 2011) (per curium) (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th

Cir. 2006)). “We review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal and CAT

claims for substantial evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028

(9th Cir. 2019). “Under this standard, we must uphold the agency determination

unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id.

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s holding that Lin did not suffer

harm rising to the level of past persecution. See id. (“Persecution is an extreme

concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as

offensive.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Lin was hit once on

the arm by a club while he was being arrested at a student protest, was interrogated

and slapped “[t]wo or three times,” and was forced to sign a form pledging not to

2 take part in any anti-government demonstration in the future before being released.

Lin did not require medical attention for any injuries sustained during this incident.

See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The first, and often a

significant consideration [in assessing past persecution], is whether the petitioner

was subject to ‘significant physical violence,’ and, relatedly, whether he suffered

serious injuries that required medical treatment.” (quoting Nagoulko v. INS, 333

F.3d 1012, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2003))). The record does not compel the conclusion

that Lin suffered past persecution.

2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Lin did not

establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez, 918

F.3d at 1029. Lin lived in Burma for almost 11 years without suffering

persecution, and the record does not compel the conclusion that he would be

persecuted if he is removed to Burma. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1022

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a noncitizen did not have a well-founded fear of

future persecution even though he was detained, harassed, and was required to

report several times for “follow-up visits” to the police station because he “did not

suffer further problems with the government while he was in China[,] . . . was

allowed to retain his government job, and he traveled freely without interference

from the Chinese authorities”).

3. Because Lin cannot establish that he suffered past persecution or has a

3 well-founded fear of future persecution, his application for asylum fails. See

Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029. Because Lin “must satisfy a more stringent

standard” to qualify for withholding of removal, “it necessarily follows that he has

not established eligibility for withholding.” Id.

4. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Lin does not

qualify for protection under CAT. Lin has not suffered torture in the past, and the

record does not compel the conclusion that he is more likely than not to be tortured

by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, the Burmese government if he is

removed to Burma. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.

PETITION DENIED. 1

1 Lin’s Motion to Stay Removal is DENIED as moot. See Dkt. No. 1. The temporary stay will dissolve when the mandate issues.