San Joaquin Facilities Management v. Dept. of Conservation CA5

Opinion

Filed 9/17/26 San Joaquin Facilities Management v. Dept. of Conservation CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SAN JOAQUIN FACILITIES MANAGEMENT, INC., F089182

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. BCV-23-100065)

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION et al., OPINION Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gregory A.

Pulskamp, Judge.

Alston & Bird, Matthew C. Wickersham and Jacqueline Mari Moreira for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica E. Tucker-Mohl, Brandon S. Walker and Jennifer A. Flint, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants.

-ooOoo-

A byproduct of oil production is “produced water,” i.e., “groundwater that naturally occurs in oil and gas reservoirs, is brought to the surface with the extracted oil and gas, and is separated from the hydrocarbons after extraction.” (King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, 840.) One method of disposal is to inject the treated wastewater into an underlying aquifer using a water injection well.1 (Sunflower Alliance, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 35.) Before a water injection well can be drilled and utilized, an operator must obtain approval from the Department of Conservation, Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM),2 the state agency tasked with regulating oil and gas extraction (Pub. Resources Code,3 § 3000 et seq.) and administering the underground injection control (UIC) program (§ 3130, subd. (e); Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Conservation (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 161, 167 (Center for Biological Diversity)). In particular, “before any injection occurs as part of [an] underground injection project,” CalGEM must issue a “Project Approval Letter” (PAL) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1724.6, subd. (a)), “[a] written record by which [CalGEM] documents its approval of an underground injection project, including any specific conditions applicable to the approval of that underground injection project” (id., § 1720.1, subd. (l)).

1 A water injection well is better known as a “Class II” well. (40 C.F.R.

§ 144.6(b)(1); Pub. Resources Code, § 3130, subd. (b).) In this opinion, to avoid confusion with other similar labels (see, e.g., at p. 3, post [“class 1” and “class 4” exemptions]), we use the “water injection well” wording. (Accord, Sunflower Alliance v. Department of Conservation (2026) 20 Cal.5th 22, 35, fn. 2 (Sunflower Alliance).)

2 Before January 1, 2020 (see Stats. 2019, ch. 771, § 8), CalGEM was formerly known as (1) “the Division of Oil and Gas in the Department of Natural Resources” (Stats. 1939, ch. 93, § 3002, p. 1110); (2) “the Division of Oil and Gas in the Department of Conservation” (Stats. 1965, ch. 1144, § 6, p. 2827); and (3) “the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources” (Stats. 1992, ch. 999, § 13, p. 4679).

3 Unless indicated otherwise, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Public Resources Code.

Plaintiff San Joaquin Facilities Management, Inc. (SJFM), a private corporation that operates both oil and water injection wells in the Fruitvale Oil Field, sought a PAL for its proposed project: the drilling and utilization of up to 12 new water injection wells. CalGEM determined SJFM’s proposed project was not exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.) and withheld the PAL.

SJFM petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 ordering CalGEM to set aside its determination, find the proposed project exempt from CEQA review, and issue the PAL.

Citing section 15261, subdivision (b) of the Guidelines,4 the superior court concluded the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects applied, granted SJFM’s petition, and issued the writ.

On appeal, CalGEM5 contends—among other things—substantial evidence in the administrative record established none of the CEQA exemptions raised in the legal proceedings below, i.e., the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects (Guidelines, § 15261, subd. (b)), the class 1 categorical exemption (class 1 exemption) for existing facilities (id., § 15301), and the class 4 categorical exemption (class 4 exemption) for minor alterations to land (id., § 15304), applied to SJFM’s proposal. We

4 The Guidelines refer to California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15000 et seq., “the regulations for the implementation of CEQA” (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380, fn. 2 (Muzzy Ranch), citing § 21083) “which have been developed by the Office of Planning and Research and adopted by the Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency” (Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 287–288, fn. 4). (See § 21083; Guidelines, § 15000.) “In interpreting CEQA, we accord the CEQA Guidelines great weight except where they are clearly unauthorized or erroneous.” (Muzzy Ranch, supra, at p. 380, fn. 2.)

5 CalGEM and Douglas Ito, the State Oil and Gas Supervisor (§ 3004), are the named defendants. The State Oil and Gas Supervisor oversees CalGEM. (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. County of Monterey (2023) 15 Cal.5th 135, 140, fn. 3 (Chevron).) Hence, for brevity, “CalGEM” hereafter refers to defendants en bloc.

agree the administrative record sufficiently supported a finding the proposed project was not exempt from CEQA review on any of those grounds and conclude the superior court erroneously granted SJFM’s writ petition.

SJFM cross-appeals from an August 11, 2023 order of the superior court granting CalGEM’s motion to strike SJFM’s prayer for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, an award reserved for “successful” parties. (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 250–251 (Vasquez).) Given our conclusion the court erroneously granted SJFM’s writ petition in the first place, the cross-appeal must be dismissed as moot.6 BACKGROUND

The Fruitvale Oil Field, which was discovered in the late 1920’s, is an 11,745-acre oil and gas field located partly in unincorporated Kern County and partly in the City of Bakersfield. Water injection in the area commenced in 1959. Out of the 32 water

6 SJFM filed a December 4, 2025 motion asking this court to judicially notice the following documents: (1) “[s]elected entries from the UIC Project Tracking Report on the State Water Resources Control Board’s Geotracker website showing the application status of other new or modified UIC projects that have been withheld approval by [CalGEM] for years as awaiting ‘CEQA review’ ” (Exhibit A); (2) “[a] letter, dated July 9, 2025, sent to U.S. [Environmental Protection Agency] Administrator Lee Zeldin from seven members of the U.S. House of Representatives regarding CalGEM’s management of the UIC Program” (Exhibit B); and (3) “[t]he Enrolled Bill Report from State Senator George Deukmejian to Governor Ronald Reagan, dated August 11, 1972, regarding Senate Bill [No.] 1022 [(1970 Reg. Sess.)], which amended section 3106 of the Public Resources Code” (Exhibit C). In an opposition filed February 5, 2026, CalGEM “oppose[d] the [c]ourt taking judicial notice of Exhibits A and B” but “d[id] not oppose the [c]ourt taking judicial notice of Exhibit C.” We deferred our rulings on these requests pending consideration of the appeal on its merits. Having done so, we return to this motion.

We grant SJFM’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit C in view of CalGEM’s acquiescence thereto. Conversely, we deny SJFM’s requests for judicial notice of Exhibits A and B because the information therein “is not germane to the dispositive issue we address ….” (Acosta v. Brown (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 234, 246, fn. 6.)

injection wells affiliated with the Fruitvale Oil Field, three were drilled before April 5, 1973: two in 1959 and one in 1961.

SJFM operates wells on at least two leaseholds in the Fruitvale Oil Field:

(1) “KCL-B” in Kern County; and (2) “Red Ribbon Ranch” in Bakersfield. On July 25, 2018, SJFM submitted an “APPLICATION FOR UIC [WATER] INJECTION.” (Boldface omitted.) On August 1, 2019, after California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1724.6, subdivision (a)’s PAL requirement became effective (see at p. 34, post), SJFM submitted a revised application. Both outlined SJFM’s proposal to drill up to six water injection wells in KCL-B and up to six water injection wells in Red Ribbon Ranch and specified produced water from existing and future oil wells would be piped to these new water injection wells and pumped through tubing into the Santa Margarita Formation, an exempt aquifer with an average measured depth of 4,500 feet. SJFM also provided two separate “CEQA OPERATOR CHECKLIST[S]” (boldface omitted) dated January 18, 2019. The first checklist, which concerned the six proposed water injection wells in KCL-B, indicated this “New Project” was within the scope of a final environmental impact report (EIR) certified by Kern County in November 2015.7 The second checklist, which concerned the six proposed water injections wells in Red Ribbon Ranch, indicated this “New Project” had been deemed exempt from CEQA review by a Bakersfield city planner. In a September 10, 2019 e-mail, per SJFM’s request, CalGEM

7 The November 2015 Kern County EIR became invalid on March 26, 2020, and CalGEM assumed responsibility “for the entire project.” At some point thereafter, “CalGEM reverted to being a CEQA Responsible Agency for wells located in Kern County ….” (See Guidelines, § 15381 [“ ‘Responsible agency’ means a public agency which proposes to carry out or approve a project, for which a lead agency is preparing or has prepared an EIR or negative declaration. For the purposes of CEQA, the term ‘responsible agency’ includes all public agencies other than the lead agency which have discretionary approval power over the project.”].)

sent SJFM a draft PAL but cautioned the final version “may be modified based on comments from the Water Boards.[8]”

On or around January 24, 2020, CalGEM’s CEQA Unit (CEQA Unit) initiated its review of SJFM’s application. In a February 12, 2020 e-mail, CEQA Unit supervisor Cathi Slaminski advised then-State Oil and Gas Supervisor Uduak-Joe Ntuk:

“The CEQA Unit, along with Legal, have made the determination that an Initial Study … would be needed from [SJFM] for a proposed UIC project that is located partly in Unincorporated Kern Co[unty] (falls under Kern Co[unty] EIR) and partly in City of Bakersfield (doesn’t permit UIC activities). Since this project is partly located in Bakersfield (which doesn’t permit UIC activities), CalGEM must review this as a ‘Lead Agency’ under CEQA.[9]

“While the project is in an are[a] already disturbed by [oil and gas] activities and in a pre-CEQA oil field (Fruitvale), it would qualify for an exemption (both statutory & categorical) and we would normally just add on Conditions of Approval … to the permit for the project as a whole to be consistent with the mitigation measures already outlined in the Kern Co[unty] EIR; however, since the proposed project will be a[] UIC activity that’s [approximately] 40 miles from Cymric Oil Field, we decided that an Initial Study would be prudent in this situation…. [¶] … [¶] … Please let me know if you agree with our decision to move forward with the Initial Study, based on the proximity to the Cymric Oil Field where there’s been

8 On or around August 24, 2019, CalGEM forwarded SJFM’s revised application to the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board, which then performed a technical review of the proposed project spanning more than two and a half years. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1724.6, subd. (a) [“When reviewing a proposal for a new underground injection project, [CalGEM] will consult with the State Water Resources Control Board or the Regional Water Quality Control Board.”].) In a letter dated May 26, 2022, Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board stated it did not object to the project.

9 “ ‘Lead agency’ means the public agency which has the principal responsibility for carrying out or approving a project. The lead agency will decide whether an EIR or negative declaration will be required for the project and will cause the document to be prepared.” (Guidelines, § 15367.)

past & present issues with the same type of activity [SJFM] is proposing.[10]” (Boldface omitted.)

In e-mails dated February 21, 2020, CalGEM engineers informed Slaminski SJFM’s proposed water injection wells were “for water disposal only,” the cyclic steam moratorium did not apply thereto, and SJFM “do[es] not intend to cyclic-steam.” In a separate February 21, 2020 e-mail to Ntuk, Slaminski wrote:

“We found out that this new UIC well will be for Water Disposal only, and there won’t be any cyclic steaming and is therefore not included in the moratorium.

“Again, we would like to proceed with an Initial Study from [SJFM] ….” (Boldface omitted.)

In a February 24, 2020 e-mail to a CEQA Unit colleague, Slaminski remarked:

“It’s a new well & it’s controversial, so I don’t think an exemption would be appropriate. The type of Enviro[nmental] Doc[ument] will be determined once we review the [initial study] and see if there’s any significant impacts.” In a February 25, 2020 e-mail, the CEQA Unit notified SJFM “the proposed project does not qualify for an exemption” and “an Initial Study … is now required which will identify the potential for environmental impacts as a result of the proposed project and identify the type of environmental document that will need to be prepared (negative declaration, mitigated negative declaration or [EIR].” (Fn. omitted.)

In a December 7, 2020 letter to CalGEM, SJFM “intended to clarify some basic facts” “regarding the scope of the project.” The letter detailed in part:

10 Based on the record, Slaminski was likely referring to a series of continuous surface expressions at the Cymric Oil Field related to an operator’s use of cyclic steaming process. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1720.1, subds. (b) [“ ‘Cyclic steam injection well’ means an injection well that injects steam into an underground formation and then subsequently produces hydrocarbons.”], (n) [“ ‘Surface expression’ means a flow, movement, or release from the subsurface to the surface of fluid or other material such as oil, water, steam, gas, formation solids, formation debris, material, or any combination thereof, that is outside of a wellbore and that appears to be caused by injection operations.”].)

“[T]he intent of this project is to replace current water disposal wells that inject into the shallow Etchegoin [F]ormation[11] with deeper Santa Margarita injection wells…. Replacing the current injection wells with Santa Margarita injectors will benefit the field by deepening current injection to thousands of feet below the base of freshwater. The base of freshwater averages a depth of 3,000 f[ee]t measured depth … in the Fruitvale Oil Field. The Santa Margarita injection zone has an average [measured depth] of 4,500 feet….

“The project will initially consist of drilling two injection wells, one on each lease, to test the injectivity rates of the Santa Margarita [F]ormation. The proposed disposal wells will be designed to accommodate produced water disposal associated with the current oil production rates in the field. As few as three to four injection wells will be required for disposal of the current disposal demand, depending on the results of testing. If oil production rates increase in the future, additional injection wells may be drilled to accommodate increased produced water volumes, but no more than the planned 12 wells are anticipated.”

SJFM insisted “the project should be considered under an exemption to the CEQA requirements.” First, citing section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) of the Guidelines, SJFM claimed the proposal “is entitled to a statutory exemption as an ongoing project” because “injection operations have been an inherent part of operations at the [Fruitvale Oil F]ield since before CEQA,” “the replacement of injection wells is an ordinary and incidental aspect of that pre-CEQA project,” and “CalGEM does not exercise ‘a greater degree of responsibility or control over the project as a whole’ than it did when these initial approvals were first granted for the project prior to 1973.” Next, citing California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1684.2, SJFM claimed the class 4 exemption for minor alterations to land applied because “[t]he project will consist of ‘drilling operations that result only in minor alterations with negligible or no permanent effects to the existing condition of the land, water, air, and/or vegetation.’ ” Finally, citing California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1684.1, SJFM claimed the class 1 exemption for existing facilities applied because, “[o]nce the wells are drilled, the actual injection operations

11 Later, SJFM also identified the Chanac Formation.

will involve the ‘operation … or minor alteration of existing … mechanical equipment … involving negligible or no expansion of use beyond that existing previously.’ ”

SJFM submitted an initial study dated February 2021, withdrew it, and submitted a revised initial study dated July 2021.12 In these studies, SJFM reiterated its plan to “replace current water disposal wells that inject into the shallow Etchegoin [F]ormation with” new “Santa Margarita [F]ormation injection wells” “deepening current injection to 1,500 feet below the freshwater base, which occurs at an average depth of 3,000 feet below surface.” The proposed project would entail four phases: site preparation, drilling, installation of pumping equipment, and operation. Specifically, for each new water injection well, (1) one day would be dedicated to grading, watering, and compacting the drill site to establish a level and solid foundation for the drilling rig; (2) three days would be dedicated to mobilizing and demobilizing the drilling rig, drilling, installing blowout prevention equipment, cementing, mud-logging, and carrying out other related tasks; and (3) five days would be dedicated to installing piping for the transfer of wastewater from storage tanks to the injection well, constructing pumping equipment (e.g., “well head,” “electric-powered pumps”), and welding. The area “to be occupied during drilling operations for each well will occupy a temporary use area of approximately 100 x 200 f[ee]t (0.5 acres).”

In a draft “CEQA Preliminary Review” dated September 2022, CalGEM evaluated the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects, the class 1 exemption, and the class 4 exemption and determined none of them applied to SJFM’s proposal. Regarding the statutory exemption, CalGEM reasoned:

12 The February 2021 initial study did not consider three of the six proposed KCL-B injection wells that were “issued Job Cards by the County.” The July 2021 initial study focused exclusively “on the proposed injection wells located within Bakersfield City limits,” i.e., Red Ribbon Ranch.

“CalGEM considers new wells related to production to constitute a project under CEQA and th[e]s[e] well[s] would be installed after 1973…. [¶] … [W]hile CalGEM had authority prior to 1973 to prevent damage to life, health, property, and natural resources, CalGEM has increased the exercising of that authority as the impacts from oil and gas activities has continued to have an increasingly negative impact on the environment and natural resources, and therefore will ‘involve a greater degree of responsibility or control over the project.’ ”

Regarding the class 1 exemption, CalGEM reasoned:

“The proposed project consists of the drilling of new wells and associated infrastructure. Therefore, and based on the existing conditions and the documentation available for preliminary review, CalGEM does not consider the proposed project to be eligible for the Class 1 exemption.”

Regarding the class 4 exemption, CalGEM reasoned:

“[T]he project proposes non-minor alterations to land: the drilling and completion of new wells and disturbance of areas…. The project activities and their potential environmental effects are more intensive than those associated with the types of projects to which CalGEM typically applies the Class 4 exemption (e.g., reworking and plugging and abandoning wells).”13 SJFM filed its “FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS” (boldface omitted) on February 9, 2023.14 SJFM reasserted its proposed water injection project was “exempt from CEQA under several statutory and categorical exemptions,” namely (1) the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects; (2) the class 1 exemption for existing facilities; and (3) the class 4 exemption for minor alterations to land. With respect to the statutory exemption, SJFM stated, “[I]njection operations have

13 We note the record contains another draft “CEQA Preliminary Review,” which was undated and deemed the class 1 and class 4 exemptions applicable because (1) as to the former, “the project consists of a minor alteration of existing facilities, with negligible expansion of existing or former use”; and (2) as to the latter, “the project consists of private alterations to the condition of land and/or vegetation that does not involve the removal of mature, scenic trees.”

14 The record indicates SJFM filed its original complaint and petition on January 5, 2023.

been an inherent part of operations at the [Fruitvale Oil F]ield since before CEQA,” “the addition of injection wells is an ordinary and incidental aspect of that pre-CEQA project,” and CalGEM does not “exercise ‘a greater degree of responsibility or control over the project as a whole’ than [it] did when these initial approvals were first granted for the project prior to 1973.” Under the title “PRAYER FOR RELIEF” (boldface omitted), SJFM asked for—among other things—“a declaration that under a proper interpretation of the applicable statutory and categorical exemptions, the [proposed] project is exempt from CEQA”; “a writ of mandamus directing CalGEM … to determine that the [proposed p]roject is exempt from CEQA, and to process and issue the [PAL] [there]for”; and “reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this matter pursuant to sections 1021.5 or 1036 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and other pertinent law.”

On April 24, 2023, CalGEM concurrently filed a demurrer and a motion to strike.

In the former, CalGEM argued—among other things—“declaratory relief is not available to review a discretionary agency decision.” In the latter, CalGEM asked the superior court to strike—among other things—SJFM’s prayer for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1021.5 and 1036.

In an order filed August 11, 2023, the superior court sustained CalGEM’s demurrer in part with leave to amend, finding “declaratory relief cannot be used to challenge the specific decision of [CalGEM] to not find the [p]roject exempt from CEQA.” The court also granted CalGEM’s motion in part to strike SJFM’s prayer for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, finding SJFM “is pursuing an action that has direct monetary impact on [itself]” and therefore “cannot plead the elements needed to recover fees under this statute.”

SJFM filed a “SECOND AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS” (boldface omitted) on April 17, 2024. Again, SJFM invoked the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects as well as the class 1 and class 4 exemptions and sought writ relief. In an answer filed May 17, 2024, CalGEM—

among other things—countered the factual allegations in the petition “demonstrate the reasonable basis supporting [CalGEM]’s determination that the [p]roject does not qualify for” any of the exemptions raised.

In August 2024, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, SJFM filed a “MOTION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE” (boldface omitted) asking the superior court “to issue a peremptory writ of mandate to compel [CalGEM] to set aside its prior determination that the issuance of a [PAL] for [the proposed p]roject is not exempt from [CEQA], to determine that the issuance of a PAL for the [proposed p]roject is exempt from CEQA, and to direct [CalGEM] to issue the requested PAL.” SJFM argued the issuance of the PAL for the proposed water injection project “is exempt from CEQA as a negligible expansion of an existing facility” (boldface & some capitalization omitted), “is exempt as a minor alteration of land” (boldface & capitalization omitted), and “falls under the ‘ongoing project’ exemption, which provides a statutory CEQA exemption from activities that are intrinsic to the ordinary operation of a project or facility approved prior to the passage of CEQA.”

In an opposition filed September 18, 2024, CalGEM—among other things—

argued substantial evidence in the administrative record established none of the exemptions raised were applicable. CalGEM also pointed out Guidelines section 15261 subdivision (a) concerns “projects carried out by public entities, which is not occurring here,” whereas Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b) has to do with “projects carried out by private entities that received some type of entitlement prior to April 5, 1973.” In its reply, SJFM agreed Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b) governs “private projects like [SJFM]’s injection project.”

In a November 13, 2024 ruling, the superior court concluded SJFM’s proposed water injection project was “exempt from CEQA under the ongoing project exemption.”15 The court referred to section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) of the Guidelines:

“Pre-CEQA private projects are only subject to CEQA if the new approvals ‘involve a greater degree of responsibility or control over the project as a whole than did the approval or approvals prior to [April 5, 1973].’ ”

The court found (1) “injection projects have taken place” at Fruitvale Oil Field “since 1959”; (2) “[t]he ongoing injection project at the [oil] field necessarily contemplates the need to install more injection wells”; (3) “[t]he replacement of injection wells is a normal part of the ongoing operation of the oil field”; and (4) the PAL, which would “facilitate continued injection operations,” is “ ‘within the scope’ of the ongoing … injection project” and “not subject to CEQA.” On November 20, 2024, the superior court granted SJFM’s writ petition, entered judgment in favor of SJFM, and issued a peremptory writ of mandate. On January 13, 2025, CalGEM filed a notice of appeal therefrom.16 DISCUSSION

I. CalGEM’s appeal On appeal, CalGEM contends substantial evidence in the administrative record established SJFM’s proposed water injection project did not qualify for the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects, the class 1 exemption for existing facilities, or the class 4 exemption for minor alterations to land. CalGEM also contends (1) SJFM failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; (2) writ relief should not have been granted because an adequate administrative remedy was available; (3) CalGEM has independent discretionary authority to request environmental information from

15 The court also concluded the class 1 and class 4 exemptions were inapplicable.

16 SJFM subsequently filed a “MOTION TO ENFORCE THE WRIT OF MANDATE,” which was denied.

operators;17 (4) CEQA does not prohibit CalGEM from requiring an initial study even if a project is ultimately found to be exempt from CEQA; and (5) if CalGEM abused its discretion, the proper remedy was to remand the matter back to CalGEM for further reconsideration.

As explained below, we conclude the administrative record sufficiently supported a finding SJFM’s proposal was not exempt from CEQA review on any of the aforementioned grounds. As a result, we need not address CalGEM’s other contentions.

a. CEQA overview “CEQA is a comprehensive scheme designed to provide long-term protection to the environment.” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 112, citing § 21001; accord, Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 252 (Mammoth), disapproved on another ground in Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 896–899 and superseded by statute as stated in Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1216–1217 (Azusa).) “CEQA contains a ‘substantive mandate’ requiring public agencies to refrain from approving projects with significant environmental effects if ‘there are feasible alternatives or mitigation measures’ that can substantially lessen or avoid those effects.” (County of San Diego v. Grossmont-Cuyamaca Community College Dist. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 86, 98, italics omitted, quoting Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com., supra, at p. 134; see Guidelines, § 15382 [“ ‘Significant effect on the environment’ means a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in any of the physical

17 As part of this argument, CalGEM cites section 3280 et seq. (added by Stats.

2022, ch. 365, § 2). Effective January 1, 2023, CalGEM generally “shall not approve of any notice of intention under Section 3203 within a health protection zone ….” (§ 3281, subd. (a); see § 3280, subds. (b) [defining “health protection zone” as “[an] area within 3,200 feet of a sensitive receptor”] & (c)(1)–(6) [defining “sensitive receptor” to include residences, schools, daycare centers, parks, playgrounds, community resource centers, health care facilities, live-in housing, and any buildings with a business open to the public].)

conditions within the area affected by the project including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, ambient noise, and objects of historic or aesthetic significance.”].)

i. Three-step inquiry

A CEQA assessment is often represented as a three-step inquiry, though the steps themselves have been described differently. On the one hand, the California Supreme Court detailed:

“The first tier is jurisdictional, requiring that an agency conduct a preliminary review to determine whether an activity is subject to CEQA. [Citations.] An activity that is not a ‘project’ as defined in the Public Resources Code (see § 21065) and the … Guidelines (see [Guidelines,] § 15378) is not subject to CEQA. [Citation.]

“The second tier concerns exemptions from CEQA review. The Legislature has provided that certain projects … are exempt. [Citations.] In addition, pursuant to the Legislature’s command (see … § 21084, subd. (a)), the … Guidelines list categorical exemptions or ‘classes of projects’ that the [R]esources [A]gency[18] has determined to be exempt per se because they do not have a significant effect on the environment. [Citations.] [¶] … [¶][19]

“If a public agency properly finds that a project is exempt from CEQA, no further environmental review is necessary. [Citation.] The agency need only prepare and file a notice of exemption [citations], citing the relevant statute or section of the … Guidelines and including a brief statement of reasons to support the finding of exemption [citation]. If a project does not fall within an exemption, the agency must ‘conduct an initial study to determine if the project may have a significant effect on the environment.’ [Citation.] If there exists ‘no substantial evidence that the project or any of its aspects may cause a significant effect on the

18 Before 2009, the Natural Resources Agency was previously called the Resources Agency. (See Gov. Code, § 12805, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2008, ch. 205, § 4.)

19 The high court also mentioned “the ‘commonsense’ exemption, which applies ‘[w]here it can be seen with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment.’ [Citation.] [Citation.]” (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380.) This exemption is not relevant here.

environment’ [citation], the agency must prepare a ‘negative declaration’ that briefly describes the reasons supporting its determination [citation].

“CEQA’s third tier applies if the agency determines substantial evidence exists that an aspect of the project may cause a significant effect on the environment. In that event, the agency must ensure that a full [EIR] is prepared on the proposed project. [Citations.]” (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 380–381; see Tulare Lake Canal Co. v. Stratford Public Utility Dist. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 380, 400, fn. 1 (Tulare Lake) [“(1) CEQA applicability, (2) exemption from environmental review, and (3) environmental review”].)

Alternatively, subdivision (k) of Guidelines section 15002 provides:

“Three Step Process. An agency will normally take up to three separate steps in deciding which document to prepare for a project subject to CEQA.

“(1) In the first step the lead agency examines the project to determine whether the project is subject to CEQA at all. If the project is exempt, the process does not need to proceed any farther. The agency may prepare a notice of exemption. [Citations.]

“(2) If the project is not exempt, the lead agency takes the second step and conducts an initial study [citation] to determine whether the project may have a significant effect on the environment. If the initial study shows that there is no substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect, the lead agency prepares a negative declaration. [Citation.]

“(3) If the initial study shows that the project may have a significant effect, the lead agency takes the third step and prepares an EIR. [Citation.]” (See Tulare Lake, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 400, fn. 1 [“[T]he Guidelines’ approach recognizes three steps correlated to the document produced at the end of that step.”].)

“[T]he first step in the Guidelines encompasses the Supreme Court’s first two tiers. The Supreme Court’s third tier encompasses the Guidelines’ second and third steps—an initial study that results in the adoption of a negative declaration or leads to the third step and the preparation of an … EIR.” (Tulare Lake, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 400, fn. 1.) Both approaches make clear an exempt project is not subject to CEQA. (See Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380; Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k)(1).)

ii. Statutory exemptions

“Statutory exemptions, as the term implies, are those enacted by the Legislature.

‘Because CEQA is statutory in origin, the Legislature has the power to create exemptions from its requirements. Projects and activities can be made wholly or partially exempt, as the Legislature chooses, regardless of their potential for adverse [environmental] consequences.’ [Citations.]” (North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Westlands Water Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 832, 850 (North Coast); see Sunset Sky Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento (2009) 47 Cal.4th 902, 909 [“[T]he very purpose of the statutory CEQA exemptions is to avoid the burden of the environmental review process for an entire class of projects, even if there might be significant environmental effects.”].)

Many statutory exemptions are plainly enumerated. (See, e.g., § 21080, subd.

(b)(1)–(8), (10)–(15) [exemptions for ministerial projects; emergency projects; disapproved projects; early activities related to thermal power plants; Olympic games; rates, tolls, fares, and charges; specified mass transit projects; state and regional transportation improvement programs and county congestion management plans; projects outside California; and local implementation of state regulations under certified regulatory programs].) By contrast, the exemptions for public projects approved before November 23, 1970, and private projects approved before April 5, 1973, need further explanation.

1. Statutory exemption for public projects approved before November 23, 1970

CEQA became effective November 23, 1970, and “was intended by the Legislature to have a prospective, not retroactive, application.” (North Coast, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 855; see Stats. 1970, ch. 1433, § 1; Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955 [“[S]tatutes ordinarily are interpreted as operating prospectively in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary legislative intent.”].) Furthermore, CEQA originally did not define the term “project” (Mammoth, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 256; see Stats. 1970, ch. 1433, § 1), but “there was an impression … then public that [CEQA] did not involve private projects” (Bresnahan v. City of Pasadena (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 297, 305). (See Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1100 [“Before Mammoth, it had been ‘generally believed’ that CEQA ‘appl[ied] only to projects undertaken or funded by public agencies.’ ”].) In this manner, the Legislature created a statutory exemption for public projects approved before November 23, 1970. Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (a), which implements this exemption (see County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795, 805–806 [citing Guidelines, former § 15070]), reads:

“If a project being carried out by a public agency was approved prior to November 23, 1970, the project shall be exempt from CEQA unless either of the following conditions exists:

“(1) A substantial portion of public funds allocated for the project have not been spent, and it is still feasible to modify the project to mitigate potentially adverse environmental effects, or to choose feasible alternatives to the project, including the alternative of ‘no project’ or halting the project ….

“(2) A public agency proposes to modify the project in such a way that the project might have a new significant effect on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15261, subd. (a).)

2. Statutory exemption for private projects approved before April 5, 1973

In an opinion issued September 21, 1972, the California Supreme Court in Mammoth broadly interpreted CEQA to cover “private activity for which a permit is necessary.” (Mammoth, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 262; see id. at pp. 254–262.) However, though “[m]any private projects had been approved (post-CEQA) based on the assumption that CEQA only applied to public projects, and such approvals had been detrimentally relied upon” (North Coast, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 856, fn. 24, italics omitted), the high court denied a request to make its ruling prospective only (Mammoth, supra, at p. 272), which “gave rise to grave uncertainties concerning private projects which were under construction or in which developers had expended or committed substantial sums prior to the decision” (Friends of Lake Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 497, 509 (Lake Arrowhead)).

The Legislature—“confronted by the clear fact that many private enterprises and government agencies had acted upon the erroneous legal assumption that CEQA was inapplicable to private projects[] and that principles of equity and fairness would mandate that reasonable criteria be established to prevent the infliction of hardship” (Russian Hill Improvement Assn. v. Board of Permit Appeals (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 158, 163–164)— enacted additional CEQA provisions as emergency measures on December 5, 1972 (see Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, pp. 2270–2271) with the intent to “alleviate[] the hardships resulting from the [Mammoth] decision by grandfathering the affected approvals” (North Coast, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 856, fn. 24). (See Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1216–1217; Cooper v. County of Los Angeles (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 34, 38–39 (Cooper); Bresnahan v. City of Pasadena, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 306; Russian Hill Improvement Assn. v. Board of Permit Appeals, supra, at p. 164; Lake Arrowhead, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 509.)

Section 21065, subdivision (c) (added by Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 1 and amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 1230, § 4) incorporated Mammoth’s holding, expressly defining “project” to include activities involving “the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.” (Accord, Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a)(3); see Guidelines, § 15377, subd. (b) [“A ‘private project’ means a project which will be carried out by a person other than a governmental agency, but the project will need a discretionary approval from one or more governmental agencies for … [¶] … [¶] … [a] lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use.”].)

Section 21169 (added by Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 16) “confirmed, validated and declared legally effective” private projects “undertaken, carried out or approved” on or before December 5, 1972, and “the issuance by any public agency of any lease, permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use executed or issued” on or before December 5, 1972. An exception to this “blanket validation” (Cooper, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 39) was set forth in former section 21170 (added by Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 16 and repealed by Stats. 2022, ch. 38, §§ 5–6, eff. Jan. 1, 2023) for private projects either subject to pending CEQA litigation or adjudged noncompliant with CEQA on or before December 5, 1972.20 Finally, former section 21171 (added by Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 16 and repealed by Stats. 2022, ch. 38, §§ 5–6, eff. Jan. 1, 2023) provided a 120-day moratorium period during which CEQA “shall not apply to the issuance of any lease, permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use” for any private project until April 5, 1973.21 (See Lake Arrowhead, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 513.)

By enacting the foregoing provisions, the Legislature created a statutory exemption for private projects approved prior to April 5, 1973. Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b), which implements this exemption (North Coast, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 856, fn. 24), reads:

“A private project shall be exempt from CEQA if the project received approval of a lease, license, certificate, permit, or other entitlement for use

20 Validation would still apply to private projects subject to pending CEQA litigation “if, prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings and in good faith and in reliance upon the issuance by a public agency of any lease, permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use, substantial construction has been performed and substantial liabilities for construction and necessary materials have been incurred.” (Former § 21170, subd. (a).)

21 This provision did not apply to private projects placed outside the ambit of section 21169 by former section 21170 and did not prohibit a public agency “from considering environmental factors in connection with the approval or disapproval of a project and from imposing reasonable fees in connection therewith” during the moratorium period. (Former § 21171.)

from a public agency prior to April 5, 1973, subject to the following provisions:

“(1) CEQA does not prohibit a public agency from considering environmental factors in connection with the approval or disapproval of a project, or from imposing reasonable fees on the appropriate private person or entity for preparing an environmental report under authority other than CEQA. Local agencies may require environmental reports for projects covered by this paragraph pursuant to local ordinances during this interim period.

“(2) Where a project was approved prior to December 5, 1972, and prior to that date the project was legally challenged for noncompliance with CEQA, the project shall be bound by special rules set forth in Section 21170 of CEQA.

“(3) Where a private project has been granted a discretionary governmental approval for part of the project before April 5, 1973, and another or additional discretionary governmental approvals after April 5, 1973, the project shall be subject to CEQA only if the approval or approvals after April 5, 1973, involve a greater degree of responsibility or control over the project as a whole than did the approval or approvals prior to that date.” (Guidelines, § 15261, subd. (b).) iii. Categorical exemptions “As directed by the Legislature in section 21084, the Guidelines adopted by the Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency to implement CEQA must include ‘a list of classes of projects that have been determined not to have a significant effect on the environment and that shall be exempt from [CEQA].’ ” (North Coast, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 851, quoting § 21084, subd. (a); see Guidelines, § 15354.) These exempt classes of projects are known as categorical exemptions (North Coast, supra, at p. 851) and are set out in Guidelines sections 15301 through 15333. (See North Coast, supra, at p. 867 [categorical exemptions “not statutory in nature”].) “A critical difference between statutory and categorical exemptions is that statutory exemptions are absolute, which is to say that the exemption applies if the project fits within its terms.” (Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 956, 966, fn. 8; accord, North Coast, supra, at p. 850.) By contrast, “categorical exemptions are subject to exceptions.” (North Coast, supra, at p. 851, italics omitted; see Guidelines, § 15300.2.)

“Since a determination that a project falls within a categorical exemption excuses any further compliance with CEQA whatsoever, [courts] must construe the[se] exemptions narrowly in order to afford the fullest possible environmental protection.” Save Our Carmel River v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 677, 697 (Save Our Carmel River); see Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 [terms in categorical exemptions lacking clearly established meanings “should not be so broadly interpreted”].) This “ensure[s] that in all but the clearest cases of categorical exemptions, a project will be subject to some level of environmental review.” (Save Our Carmel River, supra, at p. 697.)

1. Class 1 exemption

The Guidelines identify a class 1 exemption for “the operation, repair, maintenance, … or minor alteration of existing public or private structures, facilities, mechanical equipment, or topographical features, involving negligible or no expansion of existing or former use.” (Guidelines, § 15301; accord, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1684.1.) Examples of covered activities include “the addition of … bicycle lanes” to “[e]xisting highways and streets” “that do not create additional automobile lanes” (Guidelines, § 15301, subd. (c)), the “[c]onversion of a single family residence to office use” (id., subd. (n)), and the “[u]se of a single-family residence as a small family day care home” (id., subd. (p)). (Accord, Sunflower Alliance, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 45; see San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 349, 371 [city’s lease at issue “does not identify the construction of any new structures, but only refurbishment of a preexisting facility,” and “[s]uch activity falls squarely within the existing facilities exemption”]; Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Zanker (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1066 [implementation of water conservation rules “involve operation of an existing facility with only minor alteration of the facilities,” i.e., the “installation of meter mechanisms on existing meter connectors,” and “do not permit expansion of previous use” of water system].)

CalGEM’s regulations implementing CEQA, which are used in conjunction with the Guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1681), specifies the class 1 exemption’s reach “includes, but is not limited to: remedial, maintenance, conversion, and abandonment work on oil, gas, injection, and geothermal wells involving the alteration of well casing, such as perforating and casing repair, removal, or replacement; [and] installation or removal of downhole production or injection equipment, cement plugs, bridge plugs, and packers set to isolate production or injection intervals” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1684.1.)

2. Class 4 exemption

The Guidelines identify a class 4 exemption for “minor public or private alterations in the condition of land, water, and/or vegetation which do not involve removal of healthy, mature, scenic trees except for forestry and agricultural purposes.” (Guidelines, § 15304.) Examples of covered activities include “[f]illing of earth into previously excavated land with material compatible with the natural features of the site” (id., subd. (c)) and “[m]inor trenching and backfilling where the surface is restored” (id., subd. (f)). CalGEM’s implementing regulation provides: “Class 4 consists of drilling operations that result only in minor alterations with negligible or no permanent effects to the existing condition of the land, water, air, and/or vegetation.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1684.2.)

b. Standards of review “In reviewing an agency’s compliance with CEQA in the course of its legislative or quasi-legislative actions, the courts’ inquiry ‘shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.’ ” (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 426 (Vineyard), quoting § 21168.5; see Save Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 693 [public agency’s determination as to whether project was exempt from CEQA compliance “a quasi-legislative action” “where no administrative hearing was held or required”].) “Such an abuse is established ‘if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Vineyard, supra, at pp. 426–427, quoting § 21168.5.) “An appellate court’s review of the administrative record for legal error and substantial evidence in a CEQA case, as in other mandamus cases, is the same as the trial court’s: [t]he appellate court reviews the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that sense appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo.” (Vineyard, supra, at p. 427; see Association of Irritated Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1390 [“ ‘The appellate court reviews the administrative record independently; the trial court’s conclusions are not binding on it.’ ”].)

Courts “independently determin[e]” (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 427)

“matters of law” (Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 118 (Save Our Peninsula)), such as “questions of interpretation or application of the requirements of CEQA” (Save Our Peninsula, supra, at p. 118). (See Save Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 693 [“scope of a particular CEQA exemption” “presents ‘a question of law, subject to de novo review by this court’ ”].) On the other hand, an agency’s “substantive factual conclusions” (Vineyard, supra, at p. 435) “would be reviewed only for substantial evidence” (ibid.). (See Save Our Carmel River, supra, at p. 694 [“Where the record contains evidence bearing on the question whether [a] project qualifies for [an] exemption, such as reports or other information submitted in connection with the project, and the agency makes factual determinations as to whether the project fits within an exemption category, we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision.”]; 1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2018) § 5.126, p. 5–136 (rev. 3/25)22 [substantial evidence test “applies to a decision that a project does not fall within one of the exemption categories”].)

“ ‘Substantial evidence’ … means enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached.” (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a); see Stanislaus Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 144, 152 [substantial evidence not “overwhelming or overpowering evidence”].) Substantial evidence “includes fact, a reasonable assumption predicated upon fact, or expert opinion supported by fact.” (§ 21080, subd. (e)(1); accord, Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (b).) “Argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, evidence which is clearly erroneous or inaccurate, or evidence of social or economic impacts which do not contribute to or are not caused by physical impacts on the environment does not constitute substantial evidence.” (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a); accord, § 21080, subd. (e)(2).)

“The agency is the finder of fact and we must indulge all reasonable inferences from the evidence that would support the agency’s determinations and resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the agency’s decision.” (Save Our Peninsula, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 117.) “A reviewing court may neither substitute its views for those of the agency whose determination is being reviewed, nor reweigh conflicting evidence presented to that body.” (Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490,

22 The practice guide authored by Stephen L. Kostka and Michael H. Zischke has been cited favorably by our high court and other appellate districts. (See, e.g., Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1105; Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 937–940, 949.)

1497.) “The decisions of the agency are given substantial deference and are presumed correct. The parties seeking mandamus bear the burden of proving otherwise ….” (Ibid.)

c. Analysis At the outset, we acknowledge “there is no requirement [in CEQA] that the agency put its exemption decision in writing.” (San Lorenzo Valley Community Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1385; accord, Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 950, 961.) Yet, we would be remiss to ignore evidence in the administrative record divulging the CEQA Unit’s apparent rationale for informing SJFM in a February 25, 2020 e-mail “the proposed project does not qualify for an exemption” from CEQA review. An earlier February 12, 2020 e-mail from CEQA Unit supervisor Slaminski to then-State Oil and Gas Supervisor Ntuk showed the former (1) recognized the project would take place “in a pre-CEQA oil field”; (2) believed the project ordinarily “would qualify for an exemption (both statutory & categorical)”; and (3) still recommended an initial study because the project involved the use of the cyclic steaming process. Also, in a February 24, 2020 e-mail to a CEQA Unit colleague, Slaminski opined SJFM’s project was not exempt from CEQA review because the proposed water injection wells were “new” and “controversial.”

We find this reasoning largely deficient. First, to the extent Slaminski suggested a project exempt from CEQA review may be subject to an initial study, this “would run counter to the three-tiered structure of CEQA review under which, if a project is … exempt ‘no further agency evaluation is required’ and no ‘initial study’ takes place.” (Apartment Assn. of Greater Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1162, 1172, fn. omitted; see Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380; Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k)(1).) Next, Slaminski wrongly assumed SJFM’s proposed water injection project involved the use of the cyclic steaming process. Though she was advised of her mistake by CalGEM engineers in February 21, 2020 e-mails, she did not withdraw her recommendation for an initial study. Slaminski then stated a finding of nonexemption may be based on the “controversial” nature of a proposal. However, “it is entirely possible, if not common, for a controversial or unpopular project to be exempt from CEQA” (McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51, 86) since “[n]othing in CEQA … requires an agency to focus on ‘controversy’ ” (ibid.).

Despite these errors, we do not terminate our inquiry into the correctness of CalGEM’s determination. “No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the [decisionmaker] to its conclusion.” (Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329; see Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 610 [“[T]here can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct.”]; see also Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 388 [“record … demonstrates” public agency “reached the correct result” “[n]otwithstanding its errors”].)23 i. Statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects The administrative record indicates both parties took the stance the Fruitvale Oil Field itself constituted an ongoing pre-CEQA private project. To avoid having to unnecessarily resolve the novel issue of whether an entire oil field, presumably involving the activities of many operators and separate approvals over time, may be treated as a single pre-CEQA project, we provisionally accept—for the sake of discussion only—the Fruitvale Oil Field may permissibly qualify as a preexisting CEQA project for the purpose of the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects implemented

23 We note Slaminski also alluded to the “new[ness]” of SJFM’s water injection wells, which informs our analysis of the class 1 exemption. (See post, p. 37.)

by Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b). Nonetheless, SJFM cannot rely on the applicable subdivision—i.e., Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b)(3)—for two reasons. First, this subdivision is invalid. Second, even if the subdivision were valid, the administrative record sufficiently established CalGEM’s issuance of a PAL involved a greater degree of responsibility or control over water injection wells at the Fruitvale Oil Field than the pre-April 5, 1973 approvals.

1. Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) is invalid There is case authority that Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) is “invalid to the extent it attempts to extend the statutory exemption.” (Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218, italics omitted; see 1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 5.14, p. 5–29 (rev. 3/25).) In Azusa, Division Seven of the Second Appellate District explained:

“First, … section 21169 prevents a project opponent from challenging, for failure to comply with CEQA, the issuance of a permit or entitlement for use after CEQA was enacted, but before December 5, 1973.[24] Section 21169 does not mention or concern ‘another or additional discretionary … approval … after April 5, 1973,’ whether or not the subsequent approval involves a ‘greater degree of responsibility or control over the project.’ While the discussion to Guidelines section 15261 asserts that this language is simply ‘administrative interpretation,’ this interpretation can only be deciphered as creating an exemption from CEQA.

“Second, Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) is unauthorized and conflicts with … section 21084, which authorizes the Secretary of the Resources Agency, and not the Office of Planning and Research, to grant an exemption from CEQA for projects. Guideline[s] section 15261 was prepared by the Office of Planning and Research, and

24 In support of this proposition, the appellate court cited Cooper, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d 34, Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 712, and Pacific Palisades Property Owners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 781. (Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1217–1218.) The court pointed out these cases involved “CEQA challenges to permits issued between the date CEQA was enacted and December 3, 1972” and “confirm[ed]” the purpose of section 21169 was to prevent such challenges. (Azusa, at p. 1217.)

while … section 21083 authorizes that office to prepare guidelines on certain subjects, identifying projects exempt from CEQA is not one of them. Instead, … section 21084 instructs the Secretary of the Resources Agency to create a list of exempt classes of projects that it has found do not have a significant effect on the environment. [Citation.]

“The Office of Planning and Resources therefore did not have authority to draft Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) to exempt those projects subject to another discretionary approval after April 5, 1973, where the subsequent approval does not involve a greater degree of responsibility or control. The Secretary of the Resources Agency has never found that such projects do not have a significant effect on the environment.” (Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219, fns. omitted.) On appeal, SJFM suggests the part of Azusa’s holding “concerning the validity of [Guidelines] section 15261[, subdivision ](b)(3) is dictum as the [c]ourt subsequently held that the regulation was inapplicable to the facts of that case.” We disagree. In Azusa, the appellate court gave two distinct reasons why the appellant could not rely on Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b)(3). First, as discussed, the provision is invalid. (See Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.) Second, even if the provision were valid, it did not apply to the facts of the case. (Id. at pp. 1219–1221.) “It is well settled that where two independent reasons are given for a decision, neither one is to be considered mere dictum, since there is no more reason for calling one ground the real basis of the decision than the other. The ruling on both grounds is the judgment of the court and each is of equal validity.” (Bank of Italy National Trust & Savings Association v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 650, italics omitted.)

2. Assuming, arguendo, Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) is valid, CalGEM’s issuance of a PAL involved a greater degree of responsibility or control over water injection wells at the Fruitvale Oil Field Under section 15261, subdivision (b)(3) of the Guidelines, a private project that “has been granted a discretionary governmental approval for part [thereof] before April 5, 1973” and “another or additional discretionary government approvals after April 5, 1973” “shall be subject to CEQA only if the approval or approvals after April 5, 1973, involve a greater degree of responsibility or control over the project as a whole than did the approval or approvals prior to that date.”

Since its enactment in 1939 (see Stats. 1939, ch. 93, p. 1067 et seq.), division 3 of the Public Resources Code (§ 3000 et seq.) has governed California’s oil and gas operations. (Accord, Chevron, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 143.) Section 3106 originally read:

“The [State Oil and Gas Supervisor] shall so supervise the drilling, operation, maintenance, and abandonment of wells as to prevent, as far as possible, damage to underground oil and gas deposits from infiltrating water and other causes, loss of oil and gas,[25] and damage to underground and surface waters suitable for irrigation or domestic purposes by the infiltration of, or the addition of, detrimental substances, by reason of the drilling, operation, maintenance, or abandonment of wells.” (Former § 3106, added by Stats. 1939, ch. 93, § 3106, p. 1112.)

A “ ‘[w]ell’ ” was initially defined as “any oil or gas well or well for the discovery of oil or gas, or any well on lands producing or reasonably presumed to contain oil or gas.” (Former § 3008, added by Stats. 1939, ch. 93, § 3008, p. 1110.) Under the inaugural section 3203, “[t]he owner or operator of any well shall, before commencing the work of drilling the well, file with the [State Oil and Gas S]upervisor or the district deputy a written notice of intention to commence drilling” (former § 3203, added by Stats. 1939, ch. 93, § 3203, pp. 1118–1119) and said notice must contain—among other things— “[t]he number or other designation by which the well shall be known” (id., former subd. (b), added by Stats. 1939, ch. 93, § 3203, p. 1119). (See Dormax Oil Co. v. Bush (1940) 42 Cal.App.2d 243, 245 [operators “not required to obtain a permit from” State Oil and Gas Supervisor “before commencing the drilling of oil wells on their property”].) Section 3203 also provided: “The number or designation by which any well heretofore drilled has been known, and the number or designation specified or any well in a notice

25 The phrase “loss of oil and gas” was later replaced with “loss of oil, gas, or reservoir energy.” (Former § 3106, as amended by Stats. 1957, ch. 405, § 7, p. 1251.)

filed as required by section 3203, shall not be changed without first obtaining a written consent of the supervisor.” (Former § 3203, added by Stats. 1939, ch. 93, § 3203, pp. 1118–1119.) In 1959, the Legislature appended the following language to section 3203, subdivision (b): “Such number or other designation shall be subject to the approval of the supervisor.” (Former § 3203, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1959, ch. 556, § 1, p. 2518.)

In 1961, the Legislature added new language to section 3106 “clarif[ying] that in order to eliminate waste and increase recovery, oil leases and contracts that are silent about oil production methods and practices would be ‘deemed’ to allow all practices approved by the [State Oil and Gas S]upervisor.” (Chevron, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 144, quoting Stats. 1961, ch. 2074, § 1, p. 4331.) Practices contemplated by this amendment included “the injection of air, gas, water or other fluids into the productive strata ….” (Former § 3106, as amended by Stats. 1961, ch. 2074, § 1, p. 4332.) In 1970, the Legislature amended section 3106 again, inserting new language calling for the State Oil and Gas Supervisor “to ‘prevent, as far as possible, damage to life, health, property, and natural resources ….’ ” (Chevron, supra, at p. 144, quoting Stats. 1970, ch. 799, § 1, p. 1514.) For the first time, CalGEM was ascribed “the dual purpose of ensuring the state has adequate oil and gas resources, while protecting the environment.” (Chevron, supra, at p. 144.)

More statutory amendments were passed in 1972, which became effective March 7, 1973. (Stats. 1972, p. A-5.) The following language was appended to section 3106: “In order to best meet oil and gas needs in California, the [State Oil and Gas S]upervisor shall administer this division so as to encourage the wise development of the oil and gas resources.” (Stats. 1972, ch. 898, § 7, p. 1595.)26 The definition of

26 Current section 3106, subdivision (d) largely retains this language with minimal revisions.

“ ‘[w]ell’ ” was expanded to explicitly include “any well drilled for the purpose of injecting fluids or gas for stimulating oil or gas recovery, repressuring or pressure maintenance of oil or gas reservoirs, or disposing of oilfield waste fluids or any well drilled within or adjacent to an oil or gas pool for the purpose of obtaining water to be used in production stimulation or repressuring operations.” (Former § 3008, as amended by Stats. 1972, ch. 898, § 1, p. 1594, italics added.)27 In addition, the following language was added to section 3203: “Drilling shall not commence until approval is given by the [State Oil and Gas S]upervisor or the district deputy; if the supervisor or the district deputy fails to give the owner or operator written response to the notice within 10 working days, such failure shall be considered as an approval of the notice ….” (Former § 3203, as amended by Stats. 1972, ch. 898, § 13, pp. 1595–159628; see Resources Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1022 (1972 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 11, 1972, p. 1 [“The bill also provides that approval of the supervisor must be received by an operator prior to commencing drilling … operations ….”].) Legislative history shows these amendments were intended “to clarify the authority of the State Oil and Gas Supervisor and to strengthen the role of [CalGEM] in dealing with environmental problems.” (Resources Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1022, supra, at p. 1; accord, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. County of Monterey (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 153, 165, affd. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 135.)

CalGEM first promulgated the regulations implementing section 3000 et seq. in 1974. (See Register 74, No. 7 (Feb. 15, 1974).) California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1724.6, which was filed February 18, 1978, originally read:

27 Current section 3008, subdivision (a), which largely retains this language with minimal revisions, also includes “any well used to inject or withdraw gas from an underground storage facility.”

28 Current section 3203, subdivision (a) largely retains this language with minimal revisions.

“Approval must be obtained from [CalGEM] before any subsurface injection or disposal project can begin. The operator requesting approval for such a project must provide to the appropriate division district deputy any data that, in the judgment of the [State Oil and Gas S]upervisor, are pertinent and necessary for the proper evaluation of the proposed project.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, former § 1724.6, Register 78, No. 7 (Feb. 17, 1978) p. 94.16.2.9.)

“In 1983, [the United States Environmental Protection Agency] granted California primacy over underground injections associated with oil and gas production, pursuant to the primacy provision requiring the state to prove its program will be effective in preventing injections endangering drinking water sources.” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.)29 Accordingly, in 1984, California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1724.6 was amended to specify a subsurface injection or disposal project “includes all [United States Environmental Protection Agency] [water injection] wells and air- and gas-injection wells.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, former § 1724.6, Register 84, No. 52 (Dec. 28, 1984) p. 94.16.)

In 2019, CalGEM promulgated new regulations “appl[ying] to underground injection projects and injection wells in existence prior to the effective date” of April 1,

29 “Congress enacted the [federal] Safe Drinking Water Act … in 1974 to establish uniform quality standards for the public water systems in the United States and to reduce contamination in drinking water.” (Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 703, citing 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq.; cf. Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256, 268 [California’s Safe Drinking Water Act enacted in 1976].) “The [UIC] program in a given state may be administered by [the United States Environmental Protection Agency], or the state may apply [thereto] for primary enforcement responsibility for the program, referred to as primacy.” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 167, citing 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(b) & (c).). A state may obtain primacy by demonstrating either (1) its UIC program “meets requirements set forth in [the United States Environmental Protection Agency]’s regulations” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, at p. 167, citing 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(b)(1)(A)(i)); or (2) “with respect to injections associated with oil and gas production, by demonstrating its program meets certain statutory requirements and will be effective in ‘prevent[ing] underground injection which endangers drinking water sources’ ” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, at p. 167, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4(a)(2)).

2019, “as well as new underground injection projects and injection wells.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1724.5, Register 2019, No. 6 (Feb. 6, 2019).) Current California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1724.6, subdivision (a), which was filed February 6, 2019, and became effective April 1, 2019, introduced the PAL prerequisite:

“(a) Operators shall obtain a [PAL] from [CalGEM] for each underground injection project before any injection occurs as part of the underground injection project. The operator requesting approval for such a project must provide the appropriate [CalGEM] district deputy with the data specified in [California Code of Regulations, title 14,] Section 1724.7[30] and any data that, in the judgment of [CalGEM], are pertinent and necessary for the proper evaluation of the project. When reviewing a proposal for a new underground injection project, [CalGEM] will consult with the State Water Resources Control Board or the Regional Water Quality Control Board.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1724.6, Register 2019, No. 6 (Feb. 6, 2019).) In the instant case, the administrative record demonstrates water injection at the Fruitvale Oil Field started in 1959. The first two water injection wells were drilled in 1959 and the third was drilled in 1961, but the other 29 arrived after April 5, 1973. SJFM submitted its initial application for its water injection project on July 25, 2018, and then a revised application on August 1, 2019, after the PAL requirement took effect. As revealed by the preceding statutory and regulatory history, CalGEM’s responsibility and/or control over water injection wells intensified over time. (Cf. Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220 [comparing authority of regional water board over sewage and waste in 1960 versus 1995].) Under the original enactment of section 3000 et seq., though CalGEM had a duty to supervise the drilling, operation, maintenance, and abandonment of wells, an operator was merely obligated to file a written notice of intention with the agency to proceed with drilling. Following a 1959 amendment, this notice was conditioned on CalGEM’s approval, which was limited to “[t]he number or

30 This mandatory information includes, “at a minimum,” “[a]n engineering study,” “[a] geologic study,” and “[a]n injection plan.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1724.7, subd. (a)(1)–(3).)

other designation by which the well shall be known” (as presented in said notice). (Former § 3203, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1959, ch. 556, § 1, p. 2518.) A 1970 amendment then directed CalGEM “to prevent, as far as possible, damage to life, health, property, and natural resources ….” (Former § 3106, as amended by Stats. 1970, ch. 799, § 1, p. 1514.) The 1972 amendments (which became effective Mar. 7, 1973) made clear (1) CalGEM’s oversight extended to “any well drilled for the purpose of injecting fluids … for … disposing of oilfield waste fluids” (former § 3008, as amended by Stats. 1972, ch. 898, § 1, p. 1594); and (2) operators needed to not only file written notices of intention with but also obtain approval—express or implicit—from CalGEM before any drilling could begin (former § 3203, as amended by Stats. 1972, ch. 898, § 13, pp. 1595–1596). After former section 21171’s moratorium period expired April 5, 1973, CalGEM promulgated the implementing regulations and administered the state’s UIC program. Eventually, California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1724.6 set forth the comprehensive process for obtaining a PAL from CalGEM. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1724.6, subd. (a).) Because the issuance of a PAL entailed “substantially more responsibility” (Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220, italics omitted) and “substantially greater control” (ibid., italics omitted) over water injection wells in the Fruitvale Oil Field than approvals obtained in 1959 and 1961, the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects cannot apply.

On appeal, SJFM—citing North Coast—contends “the requested PAL approval is an intrinsic and normal part of the ongoing oilfield operations.” This is the same argument raised by SJFM and accepted by the superior court below. (See North Coast, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 857 [“The key issue in analyzing the exemption is whether the challenged action is ‘a normal, intrinsic part of the ongoing operation’ of a project approved prior to CEQA, rather than an expansion or modification thereof.”].) North Coast, however, is inapposite. In that case, the original pre-CEQA project involved water delivery facilities operated by a public entity and this court examined the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA public projects set forth in Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (a). (See North Coast, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 855–867.) Moreover, the phrase “ ‘normal, intrinsic part of the ongoing operation’ ” (id. at p. 857) is lifted from Nacimiento Regional Water Management Advisory Com. v. Monterey County Water Resources Agency (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 200 (Nacimiento). That case likewise concerned a public project approved before CEQA’s enactment (i.e., a dam built by a government agency) and analyzed Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (a). (See Nacimiento, supra, at pp. 201, 204–205.) North Coast’s quotation is taken from the following paragraph:

“The construction of the dam and its operation as a reservoir is an ongoing project under Guidelines, section 15261. Because the 1991 release schedule is a normal, intrinsic part of the ongoing operation of the reservoir project which does not constitute a modification thereof, it is exempt from environmental review under CEQA.” (Nacimiento, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 205, italics added.)

For additional context, the succeeding paragraph pronounced:

“Whether an activity requires environmental review depends upon whether it expands or enlarges project facilities or whether it merely monitors and adjusts the operation of existing facilities to meet fluctuating conditions. [Citations.]” (Nacimiento, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 205.)

In our view, Nacimiento tethered the “normal, intrinsic part of the ongoing operation” test to the language of Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (a)(2): the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA public projects does not apply where “[a] public agency proposes to modify the project in such a way that the project might have a new significant effect on the environment.” Notably, comparable language is nowhere to be found in Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b), which implements the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects. (See Trancas Property Owners Assn. v. City of Malibu (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1061 [“[T]he use of different words in the regulation suggests that different meanings were intended ….”]; cf. Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings

Corp. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 334, 343 [“ ‘[W]hen different words are used in contemporaneously enacted, adjoining subdivisions of a statute, the inference is compelling that a difference in meaning was intended.’ ”].)31 ii. Categorical exemptions On appeal, SJFM asserts:

“Even if this [c]ourt finds that the ongoing project exemption does not apply to this project, the [c]ourt may affirm the [t]rial [c]ourt’s judgment if it is correct on any ground. [Citations.] In addition to the statutory exemption for ongoing projects, SJFM’s requested PAL application must also be treated as categorically exempt under two categories: the Class 1 exemption for existing facilities and the Class 4 exemption for minor alterations to land.”

We have considered both categorical exemptions and likewise conclude neither applied to SJFM’s proposal.

“It is clear from the wording of the class 1 exemption that it is concerned with negligible ‘expansion[s] of … use,’ and that ‘use’ refers to the ‘existing or former’ use of the existing structures or facilities implicated in the project at issue. [Citation.]” (Sunflower Alliance, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 45, italics added.) Hence, the exemption would sensibly apply to “remedial, maintenance, conversion, and abandonment work on oil, gas, injection, and geothermal wells” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1684.1) but not to “the construction of any new structures” (San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 371). Here, substantial evidence in the administrative record shows SJFM proposed to drill up to 12 new water injection wells, not merely remedy, maintain, convert, or abandon existing ones.

31 SJFM and the superior court’s erroneous conflation has occurred before. In County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, the Third Appellate District mistakenly relied upon Nacimiento in its analysis of Guidelines section 15261, subdivision (b). (See County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, supra, at pp. 968–969.)

As for the class 4 exemption, what constitutes a minor alteration to land is not explicitly defined in either Guidelines section 15304 or California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1684.2, but the former identifies the “[f]illing of earth into previously excavated land with material compatible with the natural features of the site” (Guidelines, § 15304, subd. (c)) and “[m]inor trenching and backfilling where the surface is restored” (id., subd. (f)) as illustrative. (See Dubin v. United States (2023) 599 U.S. 110, 124 [“ ‘Under the familiar interpretative canon noscitur a sociis, “a word is known by the company it keeps.” ’ ”].) Here, substantial evidence in the administrative record shows the proposed water injection wells would pump produced water through tubing into the Santa Margarita Formation, an exempt aquifer with an average measured depth of 4,500 feet. Such an undertaking is markedly dissimilar to the foregoing exemplars. (See California Farm Bureau Federation v. California Wildlife Conservation Bd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 173, 192 [conversion of agricultural land into wildlife habitat requiring— among other things—“the installation of 1,500 feet of pipeline” did not “ ‘fall within the definition of “minor alterations to land” ’ ”].) While California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 1684.2 accommodates “drilling operations that result only in minor alterations” (see § 3724.1 [“An owner or operator may submit to the [State Oil and Gas S]upervisor for approval a written program to drill a shallow well or wells for temperature-gradient monitoring purposes. In order to qualify under this section, … the maximum total depth of each of these wells shall not exceed 250 feet.”]), we refuse to adopt an expansive meaning of “minor alterations to land” that encompasses multiple drillings to an average depth of 4,500 feet. (See Save Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 697 [“Since a determination that a project falls within a categorical exemption excuses any further compliance with CEQA whatsoever, [courts] must construe the[se] exemptions narrowly in order to afford the fullest possible environmental protection.”]; Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 [terms in categorical exemptions lacking clearly established meanings “should not be so broadly interpreted”].)

SJFM—quoting Surfrider Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 151, 155 (Surfrider)—counters “[a] project may be ‘exempt from CEQA due to the combined application of two types of exemptions.’ ” In Surfrider, the California Department of Parks and Recreation (the Department) raised parking fees and imposed new fees at various locations throughout the state park system, some of which were in the coastal zone. (Id. at p. 154.) The Department filed a notice of exemption, deeming “the collection of the fees was exempt from CEQA pursuant to a[ statutory] exemption for fees charged by a public agency for the purpose of meeting operating expenses.” (Ibid., citing § 21080, subd. (b)(8); Guidelines, § 15273, subd. (a).) The Department then decided to install fee collection devices. (Surfrider, supra, at p. 154.) It filed another notice of exemption, deeming “installation of the devices was exempt from CEQA pursuant to [the class 3 categorical] exemption for construction of small structures.” (Ibid., citing Guidelines, § 15303.) Thereafter, the Department filed applications with the California Coastal Commission (the Commission) for permits to install devices at several state park beaches, which were approved. (Surfrider, supra, at pp. 154–155.) The plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate, contending—among other things—the Commission “had erred in determining that the installation of the devices was exempt from CEQA ….” (Id. at p. 155.) The superior court denied the writ petition (ibid.) and Division Five of the First Appellate District affirmed the judgment (id. at p. 159). The appellate court explained:

“The Commission’s action was exempt from CEQA due to the combined application of two types of exemptions. First, CEQA prescribes a statutory exemption for the ‘approval’ of fees charges by public agencies for the purpose of meeting operating expenses. [Citations.] It is perhaps debatable whether the Commission’s approval of the device installations included approval of the Department’s underlying decision to impose fees, but if it did, the fee exemption clearly applied.

“Second, there is a ‘categorical’ exemption from CEQA for construction of small structures. [Citations.] It is undisputed that the fee collection devices are small structures within the meaning of this exemption.” (Surfrider, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 155–156.) In the instant case, SJFM would have us “combine[]” the class 1 and class 4 exemptions in the following manner: (1) find the class 4 exemption applicable because the drilling of water injection wells constituted a minor alteration of land (contrary to our actual conclusion); and (2) overlook the dispositive fact none of these proposed wells exist yet and find the class 1 exemption somehow applicable. Surfrider does not stand for such an approach nor will we endorse it. (See Save Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 697 [categorical exemptions must be construed narrowly “to afford the fullest possible environmental protection”].) II. SJFM’s cross-appeal “Upon a motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party … in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5; accord, Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 250; see Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 390 [statute “codifies California’s version of the private attorney general doctrine”].) “A court may award attorney fees … only if the statute’s requirements are satisfied. Thus, a court may award fees only to ‘a successful party’ …. [Citation.]” (Vasquez, supra, at pp. 250–251.)

SJFM cross-appeals from the superior court’s August 11, 2023 order granting CalGEM’s motion to strike SJFM’s prayer for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Since we conclude the court erroneously granted SJFM’s writ petition, SJFM cannot be a “successful” party entitled to such an award. “ ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citation.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214; see Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8 [“ ‘A “reviewing court has inherent power, on motion or its own motion, to dismiss an appeal which it cannot or should not hear and determine.” ’ ”].)

DISPOSITION

The November 20, 2024 judgment is reversed. The superior court is directed to (1) vacate the order granting the peremptory writ of mandate; and (2) enter an order denying the writ petition. The cross-appeal from the August 11, 2023 order is dismissed as moot. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendants Department of Conservation, Geologic Energy Management Division and Douglas Ito in his capacity as State Oil and Gas Supervisor.

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

SNAUFFER, J.