San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District

576 F. Supp. 34, 15 Educ. L. Rep. 679, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16792
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMay 20, 1983
DocketCiv. C-78-1445 WHO
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 576 F. Supp. 34 (San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District, 576 F. Supp. 34, 15 Educ. L. Rep. 679, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16792 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

ORRICK, District Judge.

This school desegregation case, brought by the San Francisco Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), a civil rights organization representing its members, and individual black parents proceeding on behalf of their own children, charges that the defendants, the San Francisco Unified School District, its Board Members, and its Superintendent (hereinafter collectively called “the District”), and the California State Board of Education and its members, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Department of Education (hereinafter collectively called “the State”), engage in discriminatory practices and maintain a segregated school system in the City and County of San Francisco in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of California. 1 Plaintiffs also bring this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) on behalf of all children of school age who are or may in the future become eligible to attend the public schools of the District 2 and also who are entitled to do so under circumstances that afford them full and equal protection of the law. The case is now before the Court for a ruling determining whether the proposed Consent Decree (“the Decree”), annexed hereto as Exhibit A, is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the claims raised by the pleadings in this unique lawsuit. 3

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the Court holds that the Decree submitted is indeed fair, reasonable, and adequate and, given the extraordinary conditions under which it was negotiated, is unique. Accordingly, the Court orders the District and the State forthwith to implement the Decree according to its terms, including the schedules of important events set forth in the Decree itself.

I

To understand and to interpret the Decree one must have some insight into the enormous effort exerted not only by the parties themselves, principally through their able counsel, but also by the best experts on desegregation in the country, *37 and by one of the top law firms in the country, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering of Washington, D.C. Of equal or greater importance, one must remember the major goal of the Decree: to eliminate racial/ethnic segregation or identifiability in any District school program or class and to achieve throughout the system the broadest practicable distribution of students from nine racial and ethnic groups — Spanish-surnamed (comprising 17.2% of the general student population of the District), Other White (16.9%), Black (23.1%), Chinese (19.5%), Japanese (1.1%), Korean (1.0%), Filipino (8.7%), American Indian (0.6%), and Other Nonwhite (11.9%). The Court’s determination of the fairness and adequacy of this proposal is complicated by the lack of guidance by higher courts considering similarly diverse school districts.

The sine qua non of the Decree is the agreement of the District to ensure this coming school year (1983-84) that no single racial/ethnic group shall comprise more than 45 percent, of the enrollment at any school.

The evaluation of the fairness and adequacy of a consent decree can best be made against the backdrop of the entire litigation leading to its formulation. Against this backdrop, one may ascertain whether, given all the conditions existing at the time of negotiations, the bargain struck was indeed fair, reasonable, and adequate.

A

Here, the plaintiffs listed a series of specific practices or policies by which the defendants purportedly perpetuated the dual school system: constructing new schools and annexes, leasing private property for school use, and utilizing portable classrooms in order to incorporate extant residential segregation into the District; establishing feeder patterns, transfer and reassignment policies, optional and mandatory attendance zones to situate children in racially isolated schools; implementing racially discriminatory testing procedures, disciplinary policies, and tracking systems within schools and classrooms; hiring and assigning faculty and administrative personnel, and allocating financial resources in a discriminatory manner. Plaintiffs sought by way of relief a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions guaranteeing them equal education opportunity and fully desegregated schools under a court-ordered desegregation plan. 4

The parties immediately embarked upon a lengthy period of extensive discovery and trial preparation that, until the filing of the proposed consent decree on the eve of trial, consumed the better part of four and a half years. During this period, the Court convened twenty-five pretrial hearings to consider motions and to remain apprised of the status of the case. The parties exchanged seven sets of interrogatories, nine requests for admissions, and ten requests for documents, and compiled numerous volumes of deposition testimony. Plaintiffs alone assembled three thousand exhibits for trial.

The parties filed three important pretrial motions during this period of discovery *38 that served to sharpen the issues for trial and precipitate the instant proposed settlement decree. On April 13, 1979, the State defendants filed a motion for dismissal or abstention. Defendants argued in part that the Court should not decide the “unsettled” issue of state law concerning the apportionment of policy-making powers between state and local authorities. Defendants argued in the alternative that plenary authority for establishing education policy, and primary responsibility for implementing such policy, rests with the state legislature and local school districts, respectively, and not with the defendant state agencies. The Court rejected these arguments and denied defendants’ motion in a written decision filed on September 18, 1979. In that decision, the Court declined to abstain, principally because relevant California law was sufficiently clear to suggest an appropriate resolution of the issues presented. Additionally, the Court reviewed the applicable state constitutional and statutory provisions, the state court interpretive rulings thereon, and the relevant federal authorities, and concluded that the State defendants may be made to bear responsibility for the alleged segregative practices of the District.

On February 15, 1980, the District filed a motion for separate trial on the issue of whether, as of the filing of the instant complaint, they were operating a dual school system in violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants argued in that motion that the convenience of the parties and the Court would be served by examining first in a separate trial the adequacy of the desegregation plan ordered in prior litigation and continuously implemented (with amendments) by the defendants through the proceedings in this action.

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Bluebook (online)
576 F. Supp. 34, 15 Educ. L. Rep. 679, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/san-francisco-naacp-v-san-francisco-unified-school-district-cand-1983.