San Francisco Baykeeper v. Sunnyvale

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 22, 2025·No. 5:20-cv-00824·Unknown

Opinion

SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER, Case No. 5:20-cv-00824-EJD

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION v.

CITY OF SUNNYVALE, et al., Re: ECF No. 391 Defendants.

Following the conclusion of the bench trial in this Clean Water Act case, but before the Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Cities of Sunnyvale and Mountain View asked the Court for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court granted permission, and the Cities moved for reconsideration of the Court’s prior summary judgment order on two issues. First, the Cities asked the Court to reconsider its holding that San Francisco Baykeeper had established violations of the Cities’ water quality permit on three days in early 2019. Second, the Cities asked the Court to reconsider its holding that Stevens Creek and Calabazas Creek are waters of the United States (WOTUS) that fall within the Clean Water Act’s purview. Because the Cities have not presented “new evidence” for the purposes of reconsideration, the Court DENIES the Cities’ motion. By now, the parties and the Court are well-acquainted with the background of this case, so the Court recounts only that which is necessary to understand this Order. In 2020, Baykeeper filed suit against the Cities of Sunnyvale and Mountain View, alleging that they violated the terms of their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) relevant part, the Court held that Baykeeper had established the Cities violated Limitation B.2 of the NPDES permit on three days: January 17, February 4, and February 13, 2019. ECF No. 139 at 35. The Court also held that Stevens Creek and Calabazas Creek were WOTUS. Id. at 20–21. A few months later, the Supreme Court decided Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023), which clarified the definition of WOTUS. The Court allowed the Cities to file a motion for reconsideration of its WOTUS ruling based on Sackett. ECF No. 183. Ultimately the Court held that Sackett did not change its earlier conclusions. ECF No. 199. More recently, three categories of evidence surfaced at trial that the Cities say warrant reconsideration. First, there was additional testimony about a change in applicable water quality standards that occurred in 2019. The Cities claim that this change renders Baykeeper’s water quality testing insufficient to support violations of Limitation B.2. Second, a witness testified at trial that one of the labs Baykeeper had used for testing no longer had records of the underlying raw data. ECF No. 377 at 2. According to the Cities, this called the reliability of that lab’s tests into question, thus calling the Court’s finding of Limitation B.2 violations into question as well. Finally, the Cities presented trial evidence of flow rates and precipitation in Stevens Creek and Calabazas Creek. ECF No. 391-3 at 11–13. The Cities say that this is new evidence that casts doubt on the Court’s earlier WOTUS holding. Based on this purportedly new evidence, the Cities move for reconsideration. A district court has the power to reconsider its prior orders “at any time prior to final judgment.” Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). This is true even if trial has concluded so long as judgment has not yet been entered. Gray v. Hudson, 28 F.4th 87, 102–03 (9th Cir. 2022). That said, reconsideration should not be freely granted. Rather, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” appropriate only in “highly unusual circumstances.” Kona Enters. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 977, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In the “interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources,” courts should grant reconsideration “sparingly.” Id. Reconsideration should not be granted unless there is newly discovered evidence, Here, the Cities invoke the exception for newly discovered evidence. But not all new evidence qualifies. Evidence is not newly discovered for purposes of reconsideration simply because it was not known to a party earlier; the evidence must have been such that the party “could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence” earlier. Frederick S. Wyle Pro. Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 764 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Rsch. Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1963)). A. Violations of Limitation B.2 1. Changed Water Quality Standards The Cities first argue that testimony at trial shows that new water quality standards—the Bacteria Provisions—took effect in the middle of Baykeeper’s program of water quality testing. Baykeeper conducted tests on January 17, January 23, February 1, February 4, February 13, and February 19, 2019. Wren Decl. ¶ 37, ECF No. 82. The Cities argue that the Bacteria Provisions took effect on February 4, 2019, meaning that three tests were conducted under the old water quality standards while the other three were conducted under the newer Bacteria Provisions. Since, say the Cities, three tests are not enough to establish a violation of water quality standards under either regime, the Court must reconsider its finding of a violation. This argument rests on the premise that the Bacteria Provisions became effective on February 4, 2019. That is a faulty premise. February 4, 2019 is the date on which California’s Office of Administrative Law approved the Bacteria Provisions. Ex. 1149 at 2, ECF No. 391-18. However, the Bacteria Provisions did not become effective until they also received EPA approval. 40 C.F.R. § 131.21(c) (a state-approved water quality standard does not become the applicable standard under the Clean Water Act until the EPA approves it); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (“If the [EPA] Administrator . . . determines that such [State-approved] standard meets the requirements of this chapter, such standard shall thereafter be the water quality standard for the applicable waters of that State.”); Ex. 1036 at 18, ECF No. 391-13 (“[T]he Bacteria Provisions become effective upon adoption by the State Water Board and approval by the state Office of Administrative Law so the Bacteria Provisions did not become effective until then. Ex. 1149 at 1. As such, the Cities’ argument fails. 2. Reliability of Testing Results Next, the Cities argue that testimony about the lack of raw data underlying some of Baykeeper’s water quality testing results creates factual disputes about the reliability of those results. From the Cities’ perspective, these disputes require the Court to vacate its earlier summary judgment. Ultimately, this argument fails because the lack of underlying data is not “new evidence” for purposes of reconsideration. It is true that the Cities did not have this evidence until trial, but they could have discovered the same information at summary judgment with reasonable diligence. See Frederick S. Wyle., 764 F.2d at 609. The Cities received the testing that they now challenge at least by the time Baykeeper filed its motion for partial summary judgment on August 26, 2021. Wren Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 82-1. At that point, the Cities easily could have asked for the underlying raw data if they had any concerns about the accuracy of the tests. And if the Cities had asked for the underlying data at that time, they likely would have received it. The lab’s document retention policy provided that such data would be held for five years. Trial Tr. (Vol. I) at 46:9–47:23. Since the tests were conducted in 2019, Wren Decl. ¶ 37, that underlying data would have been available at the summary judgment stage in late 2021.

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Related

Amarel v. Connell
102 F.3d 1494 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bildman
768 F. Supp. 3 (District of Columbia, 1991)
Sackett v. EPA
598 U.S. 651 (Supreme Court, 2023)