Opinion
CORRIGAN, J.
In an indigent criminal defendant’s first appeal as a matter of right, the Court of Appeal must independently review the record if appointed counsel represents he or she has found no arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396] (Anders); People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 [158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071] (Wende).) We here consider whether the federal or California Constitution requires Anders/Wende procedures in an appeal from the imposition of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.).1 We conclude neither Constitution so requires and we decline to extend the procedures under our inherent authority.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
It is undisputed that appellant Ben C. suffers from a bipolar schizoaffective disorder. Evidence below established that he believed his food was being poisoned, causing his mental problems. As a consequence, he refused to eat and lost 21 pounds in a month. He also refused to take his antipsychotic medications, assaulted his father and grandmother, experienced hallucinations, masturbated publicly, and sexually assaulted female staff and patients.
After a bench trial, the court found that appellant was gravely disabled by a mental disorder and thus unable to provide for his basic needs. A conservator-ship of his person was reestablished, and the least restrictive level of placement available was found to be a closed, locked treatment facility. (§§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A), 5350.)
[536]*536Appointed counsel advised the Court of Appeal he found no issues to raise. Citing Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, he asked the court to independently review the record. The Court of Appeal appointed new counsel and requested briefing on the applicability of the Anders/Wende procedures to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act.
The Court of Appeal held the Anders/Wende procedures inapplicable, declined independent review, and affirmed the judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
II. Discussion
In Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, the United States Supreme Court addressed the responsibilities of court and counsel when counsel concludes there are no meritorious issues in a criminal defendant’s first appeal as a matter of right. “[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court—not counsel— then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” (Id. at p. 744.)2
Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, provided a gloss on Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738. “The Wende court . . . stated its view that, even if counsel believes the appeal to lack any basis in law or fact, he need not move to withdraw so long as he (1) does not advise the court of his belief and thereby disqualify himself, and (2) informs the defendant that he may request the court to relieve him if he so desires.” (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 980.)
First, we turn to the question whether Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, is directly applicable in LPS Act conservatorship appeals. In Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551 [95 L.Ed.2d 539, 107 S.Ct. 1990] (Finley), the [537]*537high court declined to extend Anders to collateral attacks upon criminal convictions. The court noted that its cases “establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.” (Finley, at p. 555.) If a defendant “has no underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel,” the defendant cannot “insist on the Anders procedures which were designed solely to protect that underlying constitutional right.” (Id. at p. 557.)
Following the reasoning of Finley, supra, 481 U.S. 551, we held in Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 952, that the Anders procedures do not apply to an indigent parent’s appeal from a juvenile court decision affecting child custody or parental status. (Id. at p. 959.) “By its very terms, Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures are limited in their applicability to appointed appellate counsel’s representation of an indigent criminal defendant—and there only in his first appeal as of right. An indigent parent adversely affected by a state-obtained decision on child custody or parental status is simply not a criminal defendant. Indeed, the proceedings in which he is involved must be deemed to be civil in nature and not criminal.” (Id. at p. 982.)
By the same reasoning, the Anders/Wende procedures are not required in appeals from LPS conservatorship proceedings. The conservatee is not a criminal defendant and the proceedings are civil in nature. (Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 884 P.2d 988] (Susan T.).)
Relying primarily on Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] (Roulet), appellant argues that Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, should nevertheless be extended to such appeals. In Roulet, this court held that “[t]he due process clause of the California Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act.” (Roulet, at p. 235.) The rationale for the decision was that “[t]he appointment of a conservator for appellant and her subsequent confinement in a mental hospital against her will deprived appellant of freedom in its most basic aspects and placed a lasting stigma on her reputation.” (Id. at p. 223.) The court rejected the respondent’s “reliance on a civil label.” (Id. at p.
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Opinion
CORRIGAN, J.
In an indigent criminal defendant’s first appeal as a matter of right, the Court of Appeal must independently review the record if appointed counsel represents he or she has found no arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396] (Anders); People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 [158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071] (Wende).) We here consider whether the federal or California Constitution requires Anders/Wende procedures in an appeal from the imposition of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.).1 We conclude neither Constitution so requires and we decline to extend the procedures under our inherent authority.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
It is undisputed that appellant Ben C. suffers from a bipolar schizoaffective disorder. Evidence below established that he believed his food was being poisoned, causing his mental problems. As a consequence, he refused to eat and lost 21 pounds in a month. He also refused to take his antipsychotic medications, assaulted his father and grandmother, experienced hallucinations, masturbated publicly, and sexually assaulted female staff and patients.
After a bench trial, the court found that appellant was gravely disabled by a mental disorder and thus unable to provide for his basic needs. A conservator-ship of his person was reestablished, and the least restrictive level of placement available was found to be a closed, locked treatment facility. (§§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A), 5350.)
[536]*536Appointed counsel advised the Court of Appeal he found no issues to raise. Citing Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, he asked the court to independently review the record. The Court of Appeal appointed new counsel and requested briefing on the applicability of the Anders/Wende procedures to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act.
The Court of Appeal held the Anders/Wende procedures inapplicable, declined independent review, and affirmed the judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
II. Discussion
In Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, the United States Supreme Court addressed the responsibilities of court and counsel when counsel concludes there are no meritorious issues in a criminal defendant’s first appeal as a matter of right. “[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court—not counsel— then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” (Id. at p. 744.)2
Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, provided a gloss on Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738. “The Wende court . . . stated its view that, even if counsel believes the appeal to lack any basis in law or fact, he need not move to withdraw so long as he (1) does not advise the court of his belief and thereby disqualify himself, and (2) informs the defendant that he may request the court to relieve him if he so desires.” (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 980.)
First, we turn to the question whether Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, is directly applicable in LPS Act conservatorship appeals. In Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551 [95 L.Ed.2d 539, 107 S.Ct. 1990] (Finley), the [537]*537high court declined to extend Anders to collateral attacks upon criminal convictions. The court noted that its cases “establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.” (Finley, at p. 555.) If a defendant “has no underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel,” the defendant cannot “insist on the Anders procedures which were designed solely to protect that underlying constitutional right.” (Id. at p. 557.)
Following the reasoning of Finley, supra, 481 U.S. 551, we held in Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 952, that the Anders procedures do not apply to an indigent parent’s appeal from a juvenile court decision affecting child custody or parental status. (Id. at p. 959.) “By its very terms, Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures are limited in their applicability to appointed appellate counsel’s representation of an indigent criminal defendant—and there only in his first appeal as of right. An indigent parent adversely affected by a state-obtained decision on child custody or parental status is simply not a criminal defendant. Indeed, the proceedings in which he is involved must be deemed to be civil in nature and not criminal.” (Id. at p. 982.)
By the same reasoning, the Anders/Wende procedures are not required in appeals from LPS conservatorship proceedings. The conservatee is not a criminal defendant and the proceedings are civil in nature. (Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 884 P.2d 988] (Susan T.).)
Relying primarily on Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] (Roulet), appellant argues that Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, should nevertheless be extended to such appeals. In Roulet, this court held that “[t]he due process clause of the California Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act.” (Roulet, at p. 235.) The rationale for the decision was that “[t]he appointment of a conservator for appellant and her subsequent confinement in a mental hospital against her will deprived appellant of freedom in its most basic aspects and placed a lasting stigma on her reputation.” (Id. at p. 223.) The court rejected the respondent’s “reliance on a civil label.” (Id. at p. 225.) “[Respondent takes false comfort in the fact that appellant’s commitment is only a ‘civil’ confinement for remedial purposes. However, these are mere labels. Appellant’s stay in Camarillo State Hospital was not any less involuntary because the state called her incarceration by one name rather than another. As the United States Supreme Court has authoritatively written, ‘commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one’s will, whether it is called “criminal” or “civil.” ’ (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 50 [18 L.Ed.2d [538]*538527, 87 S.Ct. 1428].) In a subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court reiterated that ‘civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards . . . .’ (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 365-366 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068].)” (Roulet, at pp. 224-225.)
More recently this court has recognized, however, that the analogy between criminal proceedings and proceedings under the LPS Act is imperfect at best and that not all of the safeguards required in the former are appropriate to the latter. In Susan T, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1005, we held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in LPS proceedings. “We find no similarity between the aims and objectives of the act and those of the criminal law. What we have said of commitment proceedings for the mentally retarded (§§ 6500-6513) is equally true of conservatorship proceedings under the act: ‘The commitment is not initiated in response, or necessarily related, to any criminal acts; it is of limited duration, expiring at the end of one year and any new petition is subject to the same procedures as an original commitment [citation]; the petitioner need not be a public prosecutor .... The sole state interest, legislatively expressed, is the custodial care, diagnosis, treatment, and protection of persons who are unable to take care of themselves and who for their own well being and the safety of others cannot be left adrift in the community. The commitment may not reasonably be deemed punishment either in its design or purpose. It is not analogous to criminal proceedings.’ [Citations.]” (Susan T, at p. 1015.) As the United States Supreme Court has observed: “ ‘[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.’ [Citation.] ... If detention for the purpose of protecting the community from harm necessarily constituted punishment, then all involuntary civil commitments would have to be considered punishment. But we have never so held.” (Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 363 [138 L.Ed.2d 501, 117 S.Ct. 2072] [involuntary confinement under Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act not being punitive, double jeopardy and ex post factor principles held inapplicable].)
The salient question here is whether the absence of the Anders/Wende procedures significantly increases the risk of erroneous resolutions. As we explain below, it does not. (See Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 990-991.)
Concluding that the federal due process clause did not compel the extension of Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, the Sade C. court tracked the analysis in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18 [68 L.Ed.2d 640, 101 S.Ct. 2153] (Lassiter). Lassiter held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause did not give an indigent parent the right to appointed trial [539]*539counsel in a state-initiated proceeding on parental status. Both courts balanced three factors: “(1) the private interests at stake; (2) the state’s interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the procedures in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of the appeal.” (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 987.)
The competing private interests at stake in Sade C. were those of the indigent parent and his child. The parent has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and rearing of his child. The child has a liberty interest in a stable family home. Both have an interest in the accurate and just resolution of the parent’s appeal. (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 987-989.) The state has several interests: promoting the welfare of the child, securing a just appellate resolution, reducing procedural costs and burdens, and concluding the proceedings both fairly and expeditiously. (Id. at pp. 989-990.)
We concluded in Sade C. that the absence of the Anders procedures would not significantly raise the risk of an erroneous appellate resolution. “[O]ur consideration of the many cases that have come before us on petition for review reveals that appointed appellate counsel faithfully conduct themselves as active advocates in behalf of indigent parents.” (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 990.) The experience of Division One of the Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal confirmed this conclusion. (Ibid.) In In re Brian B. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 397 [190 Cal.Rptr. 153] and In re Joyleaf W (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 865 [198 Cal.Rptr. 114], that court had applied Anders procedures to appeals from the termination of parental rights under the juvenile court law. However, having followed the procedures for more than a decade, it reassessed its position: “[W]e have discovered, to the best of our present recollection, no unbriefed issues warranting further attention.” (In re Angelica V. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1015 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 295].) Accordingly, it concluded the procedures were “unproductive” (id. at p. 1016) and overruled Brian B. and Joyleaf W. (Angelica V., at p. 1012.)
After balancing the interests of the parent, child, and state, Sade C. held that due process does not compel an extension of Anders's procedures to appeals regarding cases of child custody or parental status. “Procedures that are practically ‘unproductive,’ like those in question, need not be put into place, no matter how many and how weighty the interests that theoretically support their use.” (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 990-991.)
A similar analysis supports the conclusion that neither federal nor state due process guarantees compel an extension of Anders/Wende to conservatorship appeals.
[540]*540The LPS Act promotes a variety of private and public interests. Among its goals are “ending the inappropriate and indefinite commitment of the mentally ill, providing prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious mental disorders, guaranteeing and protecting public safety, safeguarding the rights of the involuntarily committed through judicial review, and providing individualized treatment, supervision and placement services for the gravely disabled by means of a conservatorship program. (§ 5001.)” (iSusan I, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) The Act also serves to protect the mentally ill from criminal victimization (§ 5001, subd. (g)) and from the myriad forms of suffering endured by those unable to care for themselves.
The liberty interests at stake in a conservatorship proceeding are significant. A person found to be gravely disabled may be involuntarily confined for up to one year, and the conservatorship may be extended for additional one-year periods, so long as the person remains gravely disabled. (§ 5361.) In addition to physical restraint, “[t]he gravely disabled person for whom a conservatorship has been established faces the loss of many other liberties ...” (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 227.)3 Moreover, a person suffering from a grave mental disorder is obviously in a poor position to influence or monitor counsel’s efforts on his behalf. Accordingly, the Legislature and this court have built several layers of important safeguards into conservatorship procedure. These safeguards are extensive and designed to serve all three of the Lassiter/Sade C. considerations. (See Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 987.)
[541]*541Before a person may be found to be gravely disabled and subject to a year-long confinement, the LPS Act provides for a carefully calibrated series of temporary detentions for evaluation and treatment. “The act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment (§5150), which may be extended by certification for 14 days of intensive treatment (§ 5250); that initial period may be extended for an additional 14 days if the person detained is suicidal. (§ 5260.) . . . [T]he 14-day certification may be extended for an additional 30-day period for further intensive treatment. (§ 5270.15.) Persons found to be imminently dangerous may be involuntarily committed for up to 180 days beyond the 14-day period. (§ 5300.) After the initial 72-hour detention, the 14-day and 30-day commitments each require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine probable cause for confinement unless the detainee has filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276.) A 180-day commitment requires a superior court order. (§ 5301.)” (Susan I, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
This series of temporary detentions may culminate in a proceeding to determine whether the person is so disabled that he or she should be involuntarily confined for up to one year. (§§ 5350, 5361.) Because of the important liberty interests at stake, correspondingly powerful safeguards protect against erroneous findings. “The proposed conservatee is entitled to demand a jury trial on the issue of his or her grave disability, and has a right to counsel at trial, appointed if necessary. (§§ 5350, 5365.) The party seeking imposition of the conservatorship must prove the proposed conservatee’s grave disability beyond a reasonable doubt and the verdict must be issued by a unanimous jury. (Conservatorship of Roulet[, supra,] 23 Cal.3d 219.)” (Susan T, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
During a one-year conservatorship, a conservatee may twice petition for rehearing. (§ 5364.)4 At a rehearing, a conservatee need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is no longer gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of Everette M. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1567, 1573 [269 Cal.Rptr. 182]; Baber v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 955, 966 [170 Cal.Rptr. 353].) The matter is tried by the court (People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 64 [284 Cal.Rptr. 288, 813 P.2d 1318]; Baber, at pp. 960-965), and the conservatee again has a right to appointed counsel (§§ 5364, 5365).
[542]*542A conservatorship automatically terminates at the end of a year. (§ 5361.) If the conservator seeks a one-year extension, “[t]he petition must include the opinion of two physicians or licensed psychologists who have a doctoral degree in psychology and at least five years of postgraduate experience in the diagnosis and treatment of emotional and mental disorders that the conservatee is still gravely disabled . . . .” (Ibid.) At a hearing to reestablish a conservatorship after its automatic expiration, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the rights to appointed counsel, to a court or jury trial, and to a unanimous jury verdict again apply. (§§ 5350, subd. (d), 5365; Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 442, 446 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 541]; Conservatorship of Delay (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037, fn. 6 [245 Cal.Rptr. 216].)
Finally, in an appeal of a conservatorship, the conservatee is entitled to the appointment of counsel, as occurred in this case. The rules of court also create safeguards to ensure active advocacy on appeal. A Court of Appeal must now evaluate an attorney’s qualifications for appointment, divide its appointments list into at least two levels based on experience and qualifications, match an attorney with the demands of the case, and review and evaluate the performance of appointed counsel to determine whether they should remain on the list at the same level, be placed on a different level, or be deleted from the list. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.300.)5
If a conservatorship is sustained on appeal, all safeguards remain in effect. The conservatorship still automatically expires at the end of a year. If a conservator seeks a new one-year commitment, the conservator again bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The conservatee again has the rights to appointed counsel, a jury trial, and a unanimous verdict. If the conservatorship is reestablished, the conservatee has renewed rehearing and appellate rights.
By establishing the layers of protections described, the Legislature, this court, and the Judicial Council have vigilantly guarded against erroneous conclusions in conservatorship proceedings. These procedures reflect an extension of many safeguards also afforded to criminal defendants, while [543]*543taking into account the essential differences between the two systems. Ordinarily, once a criminal judgment and sentence are final, the trial court loses jurisdiction to correct error. (But see Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d).) The criminal defendant’s only recourse then is to the courts of review. The LPS scheme is quite different because of the one-year limit on commitments and the ability of the conservatee to return twice to the trial court for reconsideration during that 12-month period.
As a result, the trial court’s ongoing supervision remains focused on a conservatee’s current needs and condition, in a manner quite different from that followed in a criminal context. Allowing continuing trial court attention ensures much more direct and appropriate intervention. It strikes the Lassiter/Sade C. balance in a qualitatively different way. It provides the conservatee with a more immediate avenue for modification than that afforded by the more cumbersome appellate review. And it keeps the focus primarily on the conservatee’s current needs and progress, rather than on a retrospective consideration of conditions that may no longer exist. For all these reasons we conclude that the current approach provides a panoply of safeguards appropriately geared to the specific goals and interests involved. The extension of Anders/Wende is thus not required.
Appellant’s equal protection claim rests on the premise that criminal defendants and LPS conservatees are similarly situated. The premise fails. Criminal defendants face punishment, but an LPS commitment “ ‘may not reasonably be deemed punishment either in its design or purpose.’ ” (Susan T, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1015.)
Finally, appellant urges us to extend Anders/Wende procedures under our inherent power to declare rules of California appellate procedure. We decline to do so. Both the individual and the community have a profound interest in the calibrated and appropriate treatment of those who suffer from grave mental impairment. While placement in a secure setting is a burden on freedom, it is imposed, on a time-limited basis, to protect both the patient and his neighbors. Society has an obligation to ensure that freedom is not impinged upon unnecessarily or for an inappropriate period. The extensive framework of modulated intervention, under the supervision of both mental health professionals and the courts, has been created to provide that assurance. Adding yet another layer of review would be an undue expansion in cases that have been so extensively supervised, under the full panoply of protections afforded by jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the assistance of at least two appointed counsel. We decline to extend a system of review that is not constitutionally compelled and that we, ourselves, have recognized has been subject to “ ‘consistent and severe criticism’ ” from its inception. (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 979, fn. 7.)
[544]*544We offer the following guidance for the Courts of Appeal. If appointed counsel in a conservatorship appeal finds no arguable issues, counsel need not and should not file a motion to withdraw. Instead, counsel should (1) inform the court he or she has found no arguable issues to be pursued on appeal; and (2) file a brief setting out the applicable facts and the law.6 Such a brief will provide an adequate basis for the court to dismiss the appeal on its own motion.7 Dismissal of an appeal raising no arguable issues is not inconsistent with article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution requiring that decisions determining causes “be in writing with reasons stated.”8 Nothing is served by requiring a written opinion when the court does not actually decide any contested issues.
We disapprove Conservatorship of Margaret L. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 675 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 542] and Conservatorship of Besoyan (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 34 [226 Cal.Rptr. 196] insofar as they held that Anders/Wende procedures apply to appeals in conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act.
III. Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Chin, J., concurred.