San Diego Coastkeeper v. Baker Iron Works Inc.

Opinion

SAN DIEGO COASTKEEPER, a non- Case No.: 24-CV-1477 JLS (DEB) profit corporation; COASTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ORDER GRANTING JOINT FOUNDATION, a non-profit corporation, MOTION TO ENTER CONSENT DECREE Plaintiffs,

v.

BAKER IRON WORKS, INC., a (ECF No. 16) California corporation, Defendant.

Presently before the Court is the Parties’ Joint Motion to Enter Consent Decree (“Joint Mot.,” ECF No. 16). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the Motion presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. I. Factual Background The instant case was brought under the citizen suit enforcement provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (“Clean Water Act” or “CWA”). Plaintiffs San Diego Coastkeeper (“Coastkeeper”) and Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation (“CERF”) alleged Defendant Baker Iron Works, Inc.’s facility discharged “polluted storm water” to downstream waters and groundwater, and also violated “filing, monitoring, reporting, discharge, and management practice requirements, and other procedural and substantive requirements” of California’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) General Permit for Discharges of Storm Water Associated with Industrial Activities (“Permit”). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 2, 8, 9. Plaintiff Coastkeeper is a non-profit public benefit corporation committed to “protecting and restoring the San Diego region’s water quality and supply,” with a main purpose to “preserve, enhance, and protect San Diego's marine sanctuaries, coastal estuaries, wetlands, and bays from illegal dumping, hazardous spills, toxic discharges, and habitat degradation.” Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff CERF is a non-profit public benefit corporation that was established “to advocate for the protection and enhancement of coastal natural resources and the quality of life for coastal residents,” with a focus on “water quality protection and enhancement.” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs allege many of their members live and/or recreate in and around the San Dieguito River, San Dieguito Lagoon, and Pacific Ocean, which are receiving the discharged polluted storm water and are negatively impacted by these discharges. Id. ¶¶ 8, 18–20. II. Procedural Background On August 20, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated the instant action against Defendant. See Compl. Subsequently, on February 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement and Commencement of 45-Day Review, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 135.5. ECF No. 12. Plaintiffs also provided the proposed Consent Decree for the Court’s consideration upon the expiration of the 45-day review period. ECF No. 12-1 (“Consent Decree”). On April 8, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Completion of 45-Day Review Period, see ECF No. 14, and submitted a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, indicating that the United States had reviewed the proposed consent judgment and does not object to its entry by this Court, see ECF No. 14-1. Thereafter, the Court issued an Order directing the Parties to file a joint motion to enter the proposed Consent Decree, as required by Civil Local Rule 7.2(b). See ECF No. 15 (“Order”). The Court further directed the Parties to address, in such motion, how the proposed consent decree is procedurally and substantively “fair, adequate and reasonable” and “conform[s] to applicable laws[,]” and how the proposed decree furthers the objectives of the “law upon which the complaint was based.” Order at 2 (citations omitted). On April 29, 2025, the Parties filed the instant Joint Motion. “A consent decree is ‘essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial policing.’” United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983)); see Lares v. Reliable Wholesale Lumber, Inc., No. 8:18-CV-0157-JLS-AGR, 2018 WL 6219936, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2018) (“Consent decrees are hybrids of private settlement agreements and public judgements.”). “It is not a decision on the merits or the achievement of the optimal outcome for all parties, but is the product of negotiation and compromise.” Oregon, 913 F.2d at 580. “Before approving a consent decree, a district court must be satisfied that it is at least fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.” Id. “In applying the ‘fair, adequate and reasonable’ standard, courts examine both procedural and substantive fairness.” United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 776 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1024–25 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 1990)); see United States v. Coeur D’Alenes Co., 767 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e require a district court to review a proposed consent decree for the purpose of determining whether it is fair—not only procedurally, but also substantively.”). “In addition, because it is a form of judgment, a consent decree must conform to applicable laws.” Oregon, 913 F.2d at 580. When reviewing a consent decree, a court must independently review its terms and avoid “rubber stamp approval.” See United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 50 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1995). The approval of a proposed consent decree rests within the sound discretion of the court. See Oregon, 913 F.2d at 580. / / / / / / Under the proposed Consent Decree, Defendant is required to develop and implement mutually agreed upon Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) to comply with the Permit and engage in an iterative process to determine their efficacy. See generally Consent Decree. Plaintiffs are also permitted to conduct one annual site inspection per year for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the Consent Decree and Permit. Id. ¶ 30. The Consent Decree provides that Defendant will submit a payment totaling $5,000 to I Love a Clean San Diego, a public charity, to fund environmental project activities, id. ¶ 33, and Defendant will pay $40,000 to Plaintiffs to “partially reimburse plaintiffs for their investigation fees and costs, expert/consultant fees and costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and other costs associated with investigating and filing the lawsuit, and negotiating the resolution of this matter,” id. ¶ 34. Finally, the Consent Decree requires Defendant to pay an additional $3,500 per year to Plaintiffs for the duration of the Consent Decree, to allow for Plaintiffs’ ongoing monitoring. Id. ¶ 32. I. Procedural Fairness The Court first considers whether the proposed Consent Decree is the “product of a procedurally fair process.” Montrose, 50 F.3d at 746. “To measure procedural fairness, a court should ordinarily look to the negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor, openness, and bargaining balance.” Cannons, 899 F.2d at 86; San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. 07-CV-01955-BAS-WVG, 2017 WL 2655285, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2017). “The district court’s role in reviewing the essentially private agreement among the parties is ‘limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties.’” Oregon, 913 F.2d at 586 (quoting Officers for Just. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)). Here, according to the Parties, the proposed Consent Decree is the result of “serious, extensive negotiations in good faith for almost five months.” Joint Mot. at 5. And the Parties were represented by experienced legal and technical staff, who approved the terms of the settlement. Id. There is nothing in the record to suggest the consent decree resulted from anything other than “good faith, arms-length negotiations.” See Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581; see also Ecological Rts. Found. v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., No. 24-CV-1614- RSH-MMP, 2024 WL 4495530, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2024). II. Substantive Fairness and Reasonableness Next, the Court considers whether the proposed Consent Decree is “substantively fair to the parties in light of a reasonable reading of the facts.” Montrose, 50 F.3d at 746. “Substantive fairness introduces into the equation concepts of corrective justice and accountability: a party should bear the cost of the harm for which it is legally responsible.” Cannons, 899 F.2d at 87. The relevant standard is not whether the settlement “is one which the court itself might have fashioned, or considers as ideal[.]” Id. at 84. “Rather, the court’s approval is nothing more than ‘an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.” Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581 (quoting Officers for Just., 688 F.2d at 625)). “As long as the consent decree comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, furthers the objectives upon which the law is based, and does not violate[] the statute upon which the complaint was based, the parties’ agreement may be entered by the court.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendant violates the CWA and the Permit, including failing to (1) implement BMPs to achieve pollutant reduction standards, (2) sample storm water discharges, and (3) prepare and implement Exceedance Response Action plans, among others. See Compl. The Consent Decree, in turn, requires structural and non-structural BMPs designed to reduce pollutant discharges from the facility. Consent Decree ¶ 15. Further, under the Decree, Defendant must develop a monitoring program consistent with the Permit. Id. ¶16. And the Consent Decree requires Defendant to prepare and submit to Plaintiffs a plan for exceedances. Id. ¶ 24. Thus, the Court is satisfied the Consent Decree comes within the scope of the pleadings. The Parties also contend the proposed Consent Decree furthers the goals of the CWA without protracted and expensive litigation. The Court agrees. The CWA strives “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). To accomplish that goal, compliance with an issued Permit is statutorily required and crucial. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342. And the Consent Decree reflects negotiated terms to bring Defendant in compliance with the Permit. The Consent Decree also requires Defendant to make a payment to a local nonprofit working to clean the waterways into which Defendant’s facility discharges. Consent Decree ¶ 33. The Court agrees this payment furthers the goals of the CWA by funding cleanup efforts in the waters receiving the discharges, thereby restoring the integrity of the waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). And this payment is reasonable, considering it is in lieu of civil penalties which, according to the Parties, could be up to $66,712 per day per violation. Joint Mot. at 8 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); and then citing 40 C.F.R. § 19.4). The negotiated resolution as to Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is also aligned with the CWA’s objectives, as the statute allows for the recovery of attorneys’ fees. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); see also United States v. Electron Hydro, LLC, No. C20-1746-JCC, 2022 WL 1607941, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2022) (holding that “by awarding attorney fees to Plaintiffs, the Consent Decree aligns with the CWA’s fee-shifting provision, another important part of its enforcement regime” (citation omitted)). And Plaintiffs’ request for $40,000 is not, on its face, unreasonable, in light of the months of investigation, negotiation, and other efforts involved. See Ecological Rts. Found., 2024 WL 4495530, at *4 (finding for the purposes of approving a consent decree, the Court “need not enter the minefield of hours, rates, and lodestar calculations and adjustments because no fee petition is at issue” (quotation omitted)). Finally, the Consent Decree is in the public interest by conserving party and judicial resources while improving water quality. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the proposed Consent Decree is fair, reasonable, and equitable, and that there is no indication it violates the law or public policy. See Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1355. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 1. The Joint Motion to Enter Consent Decree (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED. 2. The Proposed Consent Decree (ECF No. 12-1) is ENTERED and attached to this Order as Attachment A. 3. The Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter for the duration of the Consent Decree for enforcement purposes until its termination. this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE the case. Il Dated: June 23, 2025 jae Lb monaitenus- on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge