Samuel Kadyebo v. Centennial Court

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00036-CV

SAMUEL KADYEBO, APPELLANT

V.

CENTENNIAL COURT, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 2023-003242-3, Honorable Mike Hrabal, Presiding

August 28, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant Samuel Kadyebo, proceeding pro se, sued Appellee Centennial Court

for negligence. After the trial court granted Centennial Court’s traditional and no-evidence

motion for summary judgment on Kadyebo’s claims, Kadyebo filed this appeal. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket

equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We construe an appellant’s pro se brief liberally. See Giddens v. Brooks, 92

S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (“pro se pleadings and briefs

are to be liberally construed”); see also Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690

(Tex. 1989) (reviewing court construes points of error liberally to obtain just, fair, and

equitable adjudication of parties’ rights). Even so, pro se appellants are held to the same

standards as appellants who are represented by counsel. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn,

573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). The failure to provide citations, argument, and

analysis as to an appellate issue may waive the issue. See ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc.

v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010).

In his brief, Kadyebo lists three “issues presented,” which we have liberally

construed in an attempt to address his appellate complaints. However, Kadyebo’s issues

can fairly be described as disjointed, multifarious, and lacking a clear connection to any

alleged error by the trial court.2 Further, the brief fails to provide record references;

relevant legal citations; and proper, meaningful analysis applying the law to the facts.

Thus, the brief fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 38.1. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)

(appellate brief must contain, among other things, “a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”); see also

King v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 205 S.W.3d 731, 734–35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no

pet.) (appellate courts have no duty to make independent search of appellate record for

evidence to support appellant’s contentions).

2 By way of example, one issue reads: “Does Appellee: ‘Campus Living Villages’ doing ruthless

and exploitative unconscionable business in The State of Texas as ‘CENTENNIAL COURT’, have any lawful immunity against: ‘lawlessness’, ‘duty as a matter of law’ and ‘negligence’ while executing its ruthless and exploitative unscrupulous business model under Texas law[s] in the State of Texas?” 2 Accordingly, we conclude that Kadyebo has presented nothing for our review on

appeal and has waived review of his complaints. See Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am.

Life. Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (point may be waived due to inadequate

briefing); Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 01-14-00725-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8529,

at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding any

issue in appellants’ brief that could be construed as legal sufficiency challenge to no-

evidence summary judgment was inadequately briefed).

We overrule all of Kadyebo’s issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice