Samuel Durwood Brians, et al. v. Tamra Fallman, et al.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided March 31, 2026·No. 3:26-cv-01197·Unknown

Opinion

SAMUEL DURWOOD BRIANS, et al., Case No. 26-cv-01197-JSC

Plaintiffs, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE v. TO AMEND

TAMRA FALLMAN, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff Samuel Durwood Brians, a California prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) proceeding without an attorney, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 The complaint names four defendants: Tamra Fallman-Berling and Jamie Walker, two employees of the Del Norte County Superior Court; Angelina Countess, a process server; and Andrea McCovey, a PBSP employee. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted in a separate order. For the reasons discussed below, the complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim capable of judicial determination. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Brians alleges he received “Confidential Legal Mail” that had been opened before he received it. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The mail had been “filed at the Superior Court of California, County of Del Norte by [Defendant] Tamara Fallman-Berling on behalf of [Mr. Brians’s] wife (Hazel Cajusay).” (Id.) Defendant Countess, a process server, delivered the mail to PBSP, where

1 The complaint lists three additional plaintiffs, whom Plaintiff describes as “my wife, her sister, and her niece.” (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) These additional plaintiffs did not sign the complaint, and they are addressed below. Unless otherwise specified, the term “Plaintiff” in this order refers only Defendant McCovey, a PBSP employee, “signed for” it. (Id. at 3.) He alleges the mail “contained personal financial information,” which “was left OPEN and EXPOSED to any criminal” during the nine days between its arrival at PBSP and Brians receiving it. (Id.) He states he is in “fear for my wife, her sister, and her niece because of the FACT that the financial information contained in the Confidential Legal Mail being left OPEN & EXPOSED.” (Id.) He alleges that in addition to his mail being opened, he “did not sign for it.” (Id.) He also alleges he “was DENIED my full 30 days to ‘CONTEST’ the petition due to the mishandling of these LEGAL DOCUMENTS.” (Id.) He seeks to have “the court hold themselves and every defendant involved accountable,” and he seeks money damages. (Id.) STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. To state a claim that is plausible on its defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). I. Opening of Mail Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the opening of his mail, even when liberally construed in his favor, do not state a plausible claim for the violation of his constitutional rights. Prisoners do enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). Prison officials may inspect mail for contraband without violating a prisoner's constitutional rights. Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding inspection of incoming mail); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding inspection of outgoing and incoming mail). If the mail is “legal mail,” prisoners as have “a protected First Amendment interest in having [it] opened only in their presence.” Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center, 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). Mail from a court to a prisoner, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not “legal mail” subject to this additional First Amendment protection. See id.; Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that correspondence from a court to a litigant is not legal mail because court documents are public documents). Thus, prison officials may open and inspect mail to a prisoner from courts outside the prisoner’s presence. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211; Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094. Because Plaintiff alleges the mail he received that had been opened consisted of court filings sent to him by a state court, under Keenan and Hayes, it did not constitute “legal mail” that prison officials could not open without him being present. Thus, even liberally construing the complaint, it does not support a reasonable inference Defendants violated his First Amendment rights. clear that the opened mail was not, as a matter of law, legal mail that had to be opened in his presence under the First Amendment. Thus, leave to amend this claim is not granted. B. Delay in Receiving Mail Plaintiff’s allegations Defendants denied him a “full 30 days” to “contest” a state court “petition” (ECF No. 1 at 3) also do not state a plausible claim for the violation of his constitutional rights. Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). Such a violation occurs when action by prison officials hinder a prisoner’s ability to litigate a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions

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Samuel Durwood Brians, et al. v. Tamra Fallman, et al., (N.D. Cal. 2026).

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