1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 SAMUEL C. RUTHERFORD, III, Case No. 3:24-cv-05299-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 8 MOTION FOR STAY PENDING CENTRAL BANK OF KANSAS CITY, RESOLUTION OF 9 FEDERAL ACTION Defendants. 10
11 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Central Bank of Kansas City’s 12 (“CBKC”) Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of a Federal Action Brought by Numi 13 Against Plaintiff and Class Counsel. Dkt. 119. Plaintiff has filed a response in 14 opposition. Dkt. 125. Defendant has filed a reply. Dkt. 131. Having considered the 15 parties’ submissions and the record, the Court DENIES the motion. 16 I. Background 17 This action has a certified nationwide class alleging violations of the Electronic 18 Funds Transfer Act and a subclass under state-law claims based on defendant’s own 19 conduct in administrating prepaid cards that carried fees. See Dkt. 1, Complaint; Dkt. 20 56, Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class. The federal and state claims arise from the 21 same alleged actions by defendant — its assessment of fees, transfer of funds, 22 issuance of cards, and disclosures to cardholders. Dkt. 56; Dkt. 116, Order Denying 23 Defendant’s Motion to Decertify the Class. 24 1 Prior to the commencement of this suit, there was a class action involving the 2 same prepaid debit card program. In Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., No. 3:15-cv- 3 01370-MO (D. Or. 2017), Stored Value Cards, Inc., d/b/a Numi Financial (“Numi”) 4 partnered with a different bank to implement the program, and the action ended in a
5 settlement (“Brown Settlement”). 6 In this instant case, “Numi partnered with CBKC to execute and manage the 7 prepaid debit card program.” Dkt. 76, Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel; Dkt. 119 at 8 2. 9 On February 13, 2025, this Court certified a nationwide class that includes 10 members of the Brown settlement that did not file a claim. Dkt. 56 at 5 (“The class is 11 therefore not limited to those who opted out of Brown. The class definitions exclude 12 individuals who filed for and received a recovery in Brown.”). In certifying the class, the 13 Court expressly rejected the argument that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Brown 14 settlement, explaining that CBKC “is sued based on its own violations of the EFTA and
15 Washington state-law claims” and not Numi’s violations. Dkt. 56 at 5. 16 Defendant now seeks to stay this action pending resolution of a separate lawsuit 17 filed by Numi in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Case No. 18 3:25-cv-02247-YY) (the “Oregon Action”). In that action, filed December 4, 2025, Numi 19 asserts claims against plaintiff and class counsel for breach of the Brown settlement 20 agreement and tortious interference, based on Numi’s ongoing indemnification 21 obligations to defendant arising from this litigation. See Oregon Action; Dkt. 119 at 2-3. 22 Numi seeks damages and injunctive relief barring plaintiff and class counsel from further 23 pursuing this action. Id.
24 1 Defendant argues that Numi is the “de facto defendant” here because it is 2 indemnifying defendant’s costs pursuant to an agreement and faces liability to 3 defendant for any damages ultimately awarded to plaintiff and the class. Dkt. 119 at 6. 4 Defendant also contends that the Oregon action could materially affect, and potentially
5 dispose of, this case and so judicial efficiency favors resolving Numi’s claims first. Id. at 6 8; Dkt. 131, Reply at 3-4. 7 Plaintiff responds that this action targets CBKC’s own alleged misconduct, not 8 Numi’s, that courts have rejected the notion that a claim against an indemnified party 9 constitutes an indirect claim against the indemnitor, and that CBKC has failed to 10 establish the clear hardship required to justify a stay. See Dkt. 125, Plaintiff’s Response 11 to Defendant’s Motion to Stay. Plaintiff further argues that the Oregon action seeks to 12 relitigate issues already decided by this Court and that a stay would improperly delay 13 relief to a certified class. Id. 14 II. Discussion
15 A. Legal Standard 16 The court’s power to stay proceedings is “incidental to the power inherent in 17 every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time 18 and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 19 254 (1936); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A 20 district court has discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own court under 21 [Landis].”). The court must consider three factors in determining whether to issue a stay: 22 (1) the possible damage which may result from granting a stay; (2) the hardship or 23 inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward; and (3) the orderly
24 1 course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, 2 and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 3 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). “The proponent of a stay bears the burden of 4 establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) (citation omitted). If
5 there is “even a fair possibility” that a stay will harm the opposing party, the movant 6 “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity.” Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112. As 7 defendant is the proponent of a stay, it “bears the burden of establishing its 8 need.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708. 9 1. Possible Damage to Plaintiff and Class 10 If plaintiff's claim has merit, granting a stay could harm the public interest in 11 allowing the allegedly harmful conduct to continue. See, e.g., DOT Operating Auth., Inc. 12 v. LAV Permit, Inc., No. 24-cv-3183-SPG-AS, 2025 WL 1090929, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13 20, 2025) (finding prejudice where further damage could continue if a stay was granted). 14 According to plaintiff, “CBKC’s release card programs generated more than $6 million in
15 fees through both weekly and monthly fee structures, and nearly a quarter of a million 16 class members lost their entire deposits to those fees.” Dkt. 125 at 1-2. 17 Defendant argues there is no damage in granting the stay because “[t]his class is 18 composed entirely of members of the Brown class who, through the Brown settlement, 19 have already had the chance to obtain redress for their alleged injuries” and any delay 20 in obtaining relief “is due to each individual class member’s failure to submit a claim in 21 Brown.” Dkt. 131 at 3. However, the fact that class members did not submit claims in 22 Brown does not diminish their interest in the timely adjudication of claims that this Court 23 has already found are not barred by that settlement or eliminate the prejudice
24 1 associated with indefinite delay in a certified class action. Furthermore, the Court has 2 already held EFTA’s legislative purposes warrant continued class treatment, regardless 3 of the response rate in Brown. Dkt. 116, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Decertify 4 the Class.
5 Additionally, harm may occur when a court asks one litigant, “to stand aside while 6 a litigant in another court settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” 7 Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. Staying this case would require plaintiff and the putative class 8 “stand aside” while another Court resolves issues defendant hopes will reduce or 9 eliminate its liability. This factor therefore favors plaintiff. 10 2.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 SAMUEL C. RUTHERFORD, III, Case No. 3:24-cv-05299-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 8 MOTION FOR STAY PENDING CENTRAL BANK OF KANSAS CITY, RESOLUTION OF 9 FEDERAL ACTION Defendants. 10
11 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Central Bank of Kansas City’s 12 (“CBKC”) Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of a Federal Action Brought by Numi 13 Against Plaintiff and Class Counsel. Dkt. 119. Plaintiff has filed a response in 14 opposition. Dkt. 125. Defendant has filed a reply. Dkt. 131. Having considered the 15 parties’ submissions and the record, the Court DENIES the motion. 16 I. Background 17 This action has a certified nationwide class alleging violations of the Electronic 18 Funds Transfer Act and a subclass under state-law claims based on defendant’s own 19 conduct in administrating prepaid cards that carried fees. See Dkt. 1, Complaint; Dkt. 20 56, Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class. The federal and state claims arise from the 21 same alleged actions by defendant — its assessment of fees, transfer of funds, 22 issuance of cards, and disclosures to cardholders. Dkt. 56; Dkt. 116, Order Denying 23 Defendant’s Motion to Decertify the Class. 24 1 Prior to the commencement of this suit, there was a class action involving the 2 same prepaid debit card program. In Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., No. 3:15-cv- 3 01370-MO (D. Or. 2017), Stored Value Cards, Inc., d/b/a Numi Financial (“Numi”) 4 partnered with a different bank to implement the program, and the action ended in a
5 settlement (“Brown Settlement”). 6 In this instant case, “Numi partnered with CBKC to execute and manage the 7 prepaid debit card program.” Dkt. 76, Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel; Dkt. 119 at 8 2. 9 On February 13, 2025, this Court certified a nationwide class that includes 10 members of the Brown settlement that did not file a claim. Dkt. 56 at 5 (“The class is 11 therefore not limited to those who opted out of Brown. The class definitions exclude 12 individuals who filed for and received a recovery in Brown.”). In certifying the class, the 13 Court expressly rejected the argument that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Brown 14 settlement, explaining that CBKC “is sued based on its own violations of the EFTA and
15 Washington state-law claims” and not Numi’s violations. Dkt. 56 at 5. 16 Defendant now seeks to stay this action pending resolution of a separate lawsuit 17 filed by Numi in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Case No. 18 3:25-cv-02247-YY) (the “Oregon Action”). In that action, filed December 4, 2025, Numi 19 asserts claims against plaintiff and class counsel for breach of the Brown settlement 20 agreement and tortious interference, based on Numi’s ongoing indemnification 21 obligations to defendant arising from this litigation. See Oregon Action; Dkt. 119 at 2-3. 22 Numi seeks damages and injunctive relief barring plaintiff and class counsel from further 23 pursuing this action. Id.
24 1 Defendant argues that Numi is the “de facto defendant” here because it is 2 indemnifying defendant’s costs pursuant to an agreement and faces liability to 3 defendant for any damages ultimately awarded to plaintiff and the class. Dkt. 119 at 6. 4 Defendant also contends that the Oregon action could materially affect, and potentially
5 dispose of, this case and so judicial efficiency favors resolving Numi’s claims first. Id. at 6 8; Dkt. 131, Reply at 3-4. 7 Plaintiff responds that this action targets CBKC’s own alleged misconduct, not 8 Numi’s, that courts have rejected the notion that a claim against an indemnified party 9 constitutes an indirect claim against the indemnitor, and that CBKC has failed to 10 establish the clear hardship required to justify a stay. See Dkt. 125, Plaintiff’s Response 11 to Defendant’s Motion to Stay. Plaintiff further argues that the Oregon action seeks to 12 relitigate issues already decided by this Court and that a stay would improperly delay 13 relief to a certified class. Id. 14 II. Discussion
15 A. Legal Standard 16 The court’s power to stay proceedings is “incidental to the power inherent in 17 every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time 18 and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 19 254 (1936); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A 20 district court has discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own court under 21 [Landis].”). The court must consider three factors in determining whether to issue a stay: 22 (1) the possible damage which may result from granting a stay; (2) the hardship or 23 inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward; and (3) the orderly
24 1 course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, 2 and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 3 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). “The proponent of a stay bears the burden of 4 establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) (citation omitted). If
5 there is “even a fair possibility” that a stay will harm the opposing party, the movant 6 “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity.” Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112. As 7 defendant is the proponent of a stay, it “bears the burden of establishing its 8 need.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708. 9 1. Possible Damage to Plaintiff and Class 10 If plaintiff's claim has merit, granting a stay could harm the public interest in 11 allowing the allegedly harmful conduct to continue. See, e.g., DOT Operating Auth., Inc. 12 v. LAV Permit, Inc., No. 24-cv-3183-SPG-AS, 2025 WL 1090929, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13 20, 2025) (finding prejudice where further damage could continue if a stay was granted). 14 According to plaintiff, “CBKC’s release card programs generated more than $6 million in
15 fees through both weekly and monthly fee structures, and nearly a quarter of a million 16 class members lost their entire deposits to those fees.” Dkt. 125 at 1-2. 17 Defendant argues there is no damage in granting the stay because “[t]his class is 18 composed entirely of members of the Brown class who, through the Brown settlement, 19 have already had the chance to obtain redress for their alleged injuries” and any delay 20 in obtaining relief “is due to each individual class member’s failure to submit a claim in 21 Brown.” Dkt. 131 at 3. However, the fact that class members did not submit claims in 22 Brown does not diminish their interest in the timely adjudication of claims that this Court 23 has already found are not barred by that settlement or eliminate the prejudice
24 1 associated with indefinite delay in a certified class action. Furthermore, the Court has 2 already held EFTA’s legislative purposes warrant continued class treatment, regardless 3 of the response rate in Brown. Dkt. 116, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Decertify 4 the Class.
5 Additionally, harm may occur when a court asks one litigant, “to stand aside while 6 a litigant in another court settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” 7 Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. Staying this case would require plaintiff and the putative class 8 “stand aside” while another Court resolves issues defendant hopes will reduce or 9 eliminate its liability. This factor therefore favors plaintiff. 10 2. Hardship to Defendant 11 Defendant argues that it would suffer “significant damage and hardship” if 12 required to proceed with this case in parallel with the Oregon federal action brought by 13 Numi against plaintiff and class counsel. Dkt. 119 at 7. According to defendant, the 14 Oregon court must first determine whether the claims asserted here are barred by the
15 “broad release language in the Brown settlement agreement,” as well as whether 16 discovery efforts directed at Numi, including the subpoena served on Numi and any 17 efforts to enforce it violate that agreement. Id. Defendant contends that, absent a stay, 18 CBKC would be forced to continue “defending against potentially improper claims and 19 demands” that the Oregon court may ultimately conclude are prohibited by the Brown 20 settlement. Id. Defendant further asserts that resolving the Oregon action first would 21 avoid “wastefulness” and that, regardless of the outcome, a ruling from the court 22 overseeing the Brown settlement on the scope of the release “will no doubt be helpful in 23 guiding the proper course of discovery and trial in this case going forward.” Id. at 7-8.
24 1 Being required to litigate a case, however, even one that may ultimately be 2 affected by another proceeding, does not by itself constitute sufficient hardship to 3 warrant a stay. Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (“[B]eing required to defend a suit, without 4 more, does not constitute a ‘clear case of hardship or inequity’ within the meaning of
5 Landis.”); see also Reed v. Autonation, Inc., No. CV 16-8916-BROAGRX, 2017 WL 6 10592157, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017) (finding that, while there was a possibility 7 plaintiff's class claims would be mooted, defendant failed to meet their burden when 8 their “clear case of hardship or inequity” was defending the suit and the burden of 9 discovery.). 10 Furthermore, defendant underscores that Numi is bearing the costs of defense 11 and indemnification. See Dkt. 119; Dkt 131. Hardship borne by a nonparty indemnitor 12 does not satisfy CBKCs’ burden as the movant. Batoff v. Charbonneau, 130 F. Supp. 3d 13 957, 968 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (holding a claim against an indemnified party does not operate 14 as an “indirect claim” against the indemnitor.) This factor therefore favors plaintiff.
15 3. Judicial Economy and the Orderly Course of Justice 16 CBKC argues that a stay would promote judicial efficiency because the Oregon 17 action may resolve threshold issues concerning the scope of the Brown settlement and 18 Numi’s indemnification obligations, potentially limiting or disposing of this case. Dkt. 119 19 at 8. However, this Court has already determined that the Brown settlement does not 20 bar the claims asserted here and that CBKC is sued based on its own alleged violations 21 of the EFTA and Washington law. 22 The timing of the respective proceedings further weighs against a stay. 23 Defendant does not propose a defined or limited duration for the requested stay of the
24 1 entire case. The Oregon action will likely involve motion practice and additional 2 discovery, resulting in an indefinite pause in a case that has already been pending since 3 April 18, 2024 and has been certified for class treatment. 4 Additionally, this case has a summary judgment deadline of March 13, 2026. Dkt.
5 109. By contrast, the Oregon action was filed in December 2025 and remains at a 6 preliminary stage. Granting a stay at this point would halt a certified class action with a 7 rapidly approaching dispositive deadline in in favor of awaiting developments in newly 8 filed litigation with an uncertain duration. The mere prospect of a favorable ruling 9 sometime in the future for defendant is not enough to warrant a stay. Reed, 2017 WL 10 10592157, at *5. Waiting until the Oregon case is resolved does not promote judicial 11 efficiency or the orderly administration of justice. 12 The Court finds that the Landis factors favor denying the Motion to Stay. 13 III. Conclusion 14 For these reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s Motion to Stay (Dkt. 119).
15 16 Dated this 9th day of February, 2026. 17 18 A 19 Theresa L. Fricke 20 United States Magistrate Judge
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