Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
2-5-2004
Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Mtr Amer Inc Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 03-1427
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Recommended Citation "Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Mtr Amer Inc" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 965. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/965
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu. PRECEDENTIAL 18 th and Arch Streets UNITED STATES COURT OF Philadelphia, PA 19103 APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Attorneys for Appellant
No. 03-1427
Michael D. Donovan, Esq. (ARGUED) SHAM ELL SAMUEL-BASSETT, on David A. Searles, Esquire behalf of herself and all others similarly Donovan Searles, LLC situated, 1845 Walnut Street, Suite 1100 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Appellees James A. Francis, Esquire v. Francis & Mailman, P.C. 100 S. Broad Street, 19 th Floor KIA M OTORS AMERICA, INC., Philadelphia, PA 19110
Appellant Alan M . Feldman, Esquire ____________ Feldman Shepherd, Wohlgelernter & Tanner APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 1845 Walnut Street, 25th floor STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE Philadelphia, PA 19103 EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA Attorneys for Appellees (D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-00703 ) District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner ____________ ____________ OPINION Argued November 3, 2003 Before: McKEE, SMITH and WEIS, Circuit Judges. WEIS, Circuit Judge. In this diversity removal Filed February 5, 2004 case involving a claim of a defect in an ________________ automobile, the District Court adopted the purchase price of the car as the Joseph Kernen, Esquire (ARGUED) overriding factor in assessing the Neal W alters, Esquire jurisdictional amount in controversy. No Piper Rudnick, LLP allowance was made for the value of the 3400 Two Logan Square car with the defect, nor was any
1 reduction made for the plaintiff s use of 143 F. Supp 2d. 503 (E.D. Pa. 2001). the vehicle. Finding the record Following further inadequate for determining the amount in proceedings, the Court certified a class controversy, we will remand for further consisting of residents of Pennsylvania proceedings. who purchased or leased model years The plaintiff purchased a 1997-2001 KIA Sephia automobiles for model year 2000 KIA Sephia automobile personal, fam ily or household purposes. on October 27, 1999. Dissatisfied with Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., the performance of the car, she filed a 212 F.R.D. 271 (E.D. Pa. 2002). class action against the manufacturer, Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Kia, in the Court of Common Pleas of Procedure 23(f), we granted defendant s Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania on petition to appeal the class certification January 17, 2001. The complaint alleges order. that because of a design defect in the I. Jurisdiction braking system, plaintiff returned the car Rule 23(f) provides that a for repairs on five separate occasions Court of Appeals, in its discretion, may between January 12, 2000 and August permit an appeal from an order of the 22, 2000. In four instances, the brake District Court granting class certification. rotors and pads had to be replaced even The scope of this review is a narrow one. though the vehicle had been driven less See McKowan v. Lowe & Co., Ltd. v. than 17,000 m iles. Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 390 (3d Cir. Despite her requests for 2002)(the Advisory Committee notes rescission of the purchase contract, or “explicitly describe Rule 23(f) as not correction of the braking problem, she extending to any other type of order, asserts the defendant failed to meet its even where that order has some impact obligations. The complaint asks for on another portion of Rule 23”). certification of a class consisting of Although the appeal in this Pennsylvania residents who purchased or case is limited to the certification issue, leased KIA Sephia model automobiles in we are obliged to examine subject matter the years before she filed the suit. jurisdiction. Generally speaking, an The defendant removed the interlocutory order on jurisdiction per se case to the Eastern District of by the District Court is not appealable. Pennsylvania on February 12, 2001 Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. In USA, asserting diversity between the parties 111 F.3d 343, 347 (3d Cir. 1996). and an amount in controversy exceeding However, the fact that review under Rule $75,000. The District Court denied the 23(f) is restricted does not relieve the plaintiff s motion to remand, rejecting her court from the duty of inquiry into its post-removal assertion that she did not jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bender v. seek damages in excess of $74,999. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 534, 541 (1986); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
2 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); Employers Ins. of U.S.C. § 1332. Our standard of review is Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 plenary. Packard v. Provident Nat l F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990). Even if the Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1044 (3d Cir. parties have not raised the issue, a Court 1993). of Appeals should examine its authority Removal of cases from sua sponte during its review of the case. state to federal courts is governed by 28 See, e.g., Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., U.S.C. § 1441. In diversity suits, the 620 F.2d 957, 960 (3d. Cir. 1980); requirement of an amount in controversy Kessler v. Nat’l Enters., 347 F.3d 1076 exceeding $75,000 applies to removed (8 th Cir. 2003) ($1,666,626.26 judgment cases as well as to litigation filed vacated for lack of jurisdiction after three originally in the federal court. 28 U.S.C. appeals on various issues). § 1447(c) requires that, in removed In the case before us, the cases, [i]f at any time before final parties did not brief the amount in judgment it appears that the district court controversy, but did address the subject lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case in supplemental submissions filed in shall be remanded. response to our request. However, the In Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul parties would have us address the Mercury Insurance Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d certification issue before scrutinizing Cir. 1999), we reviewed many of our subject matter jurisdiction. In Amchem opinions addressing the amount in Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, controversy issue. Therefore, we will 612 (1997), the Supreme Court only briefly summarize the principles set concluded that because the class forth in that case. It is important to bear certification rulings were dispositive as in mind that parties may not confer to all parties it would address them first subject matter jurisdiction by consent. rather than the jurisdictional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 303 Some of the Amchem class members U.S. 226, 229 (1938); Liberty Mut. Ins. unquestionably satisfied the Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742 jurisdictional monetary floor. Thus, the (3d Cir. 1995); United Indus. Workers v. certification issues common to all were Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d logically antecedent and merited priority 162, 168 (3d Cir. 1993). because they applied to all members of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is to be the class, whereas the question as to the strictly construed against removal, Boyer amount in controversy concerned only v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, some of the members. 111 (3d Cir. 1990), so that the The circumstances here are Congressional intent to restrict federal quite different and we will follow the diversity jurisdiction is honored. This usual sequence of looking first to subject policy has always been rigorously matter jurisdiction, which in this case is enforced by the courts. St. Paul Mercury based on diversity of citizenship. 28 Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
3 283, 288 (1938). plaintiff’s] losses at over $75,000.” II. Standard of Review Chaparro v. State Farm Ins. Co., 1999 The party asserting WL 961035, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. 1999). In jurisdiction bears the burden of showing International Fleet Auto Sales, Inc. v. that at all stages of the litigation the case National Auto Credit & Agency Rent-A- is properly before the federal court. See Car, 1999 WL 95258, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Packard, 994 F.2d at 1045. Articulation 1999), the District Court equated the of the standard to be applied and the “reasonable probability” standard to the extent of the burden to meet that “legal certainty” approach. Several requirement have caused some disparity District Courts have applied the legal in District Court opinions within this certainty standard. See, e.g., Circuit. McDonough v. Crum & Forster Pers. In Irving v. Allstate Ins., 1992 WL 114951, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Indemnity Co., 97 F. Supp 2d. 653, 654 1992). 2 (E.D. Pa. 2000), the District Court The Middle District of explained that “[c]ourts in the Third Pennsylvania has employed a two-step Circuit are unencumbered by consistency process involving both parties. See in their characterization of a defendant’s Orndorff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 896 F. burden of proving the amount in Supp. 173, 175 (M.D. Pa. 1995)(adopting controversy on a motion to remand.” In the approach taken by De Aguilar v. that case, the preponderance of the Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5 th Cir. evidence standard was used.1 1995)). Under this formula, if the Other Courts have used a defendant establishes a basis for “reasonable probability” test, which requires the defendant to show that “a 2 reasonable jury likely could value [the See also, e.g., Johnson v. Costco Wholesale, 1999 WL 740690, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1999); McNamara v. Philip Morris 1 Opinions in other District Cos., 1999 WL 554592, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Court cases filed within this Circuit have 1999); Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co., 856 followed the preponderance standard. See, F. Supp. 207, 219-220 (D. N.J. 1992); e.g., Carrick v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 252 Carson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 1991 F. Supp 2d. 116, 119 (M.D. Pa. 2003); WL 147469 (E.D. Pa. 1991). See also Earley Fosbenner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 v. Innovex (N. Am.) Inc., 2002 WL WL 1231761 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Kobaissi v. 1286639, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2002)(noting that Am. Country Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp 2d. 488, judges of the Eastern District of 489 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2000); McFadden v. State Pennsylvania have applied a preponderance Farm Ins. Co., 1999 WL 715162 (E.D. Pa. of the evidence standard but explaining that 1999); Imperial Spirits, USA, Inc. V. Trans [a]n action may not be remanded to state Marine Int l Corp., 1999 WL 172292 (D. N.J. court unless it is apparent to a legal certainty 1999); Garcia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 910 F. that the plaintiff s claim cannot meet the Supp. 160, 165 (D. N.J. 1995). amount in controversy requirement. ).
4 asserting that the requisite amount in Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) the plaintiff, in controversy has been met, the plaintiff seeking a remand to the state court, must then prove “to a legal certainty that amended the complaint after removal to the claim is really for less than the allege damages less than the federal jurisdictional amount” in order to support jurisdictional amount. The Court stated remand. Id. that the rule for determining whether the Other versions have case involves the requisite amount as included: (1) the District Court “make[s] whether from the face of the pleadings, it an independent appraisal of the value of is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the the claim,” Neff v. Gen. Motors Corp., plaintiff cannot recover the amount 163 F.R.D. 478, 482 n.5 (E.D. Pa. claimed, or if, from the proofs, the court 1995)(citing Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 is satisfied to a like certainty that the F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993)); Bishop v. plaintiff never was entitled to recover Gen. Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, that amount. Id. at 289. If not, the suit 299-300, 300 n.6 (D. N.J. 1996)(utilizing must be dismissed. a similar standard); (2) adoption of the Some courts have found inverted legal certainty approach, in inconsistencies between Red Cab and which the defendant must prove to a McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance legal certainty that the plaintiff’s Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178 (1936). damages are not less than $75,000, In the latter case, the Supreme Court held DiTullio v. Universal Underwriters Ins. that the party alleging jurisdiction [must] Co., 2003 WL 21973324, at *3-*4 (E.D. justify his allegations by a preponderance Pa. 2003); and (3) remanding a case of the evidence. McNutt, 298 U.S. at “because ambiguity exists and doubt 189. In that case, although a challenge to remains regarding the sufficiency of the the amount in controversy had been amount in controversy.” Stuessy v. raised in the pleadings, no evidence or Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 690, 692 findings in the trial court addressed that (E.D. Pa. 1993). issue. In that respect, Red Cab differs Many of the variations are because these factual findings had been purely semantical and we have found no made. case where the result would have been Rather than reading different had one of the variations articulations of the standard as variations, described been used. However, we think we believe that the holdings in these two it would be helpful if consistent language cases may be reconciled. In many were used by the District Courts within instances the amount in controversy will this Circuit. be determined in whole or in part by state The Supreme Court has law. For example, if state law denies discussed the nature of a defendant’s recovery for punitive damages, the burden of proof in a removal case. In St. federal court would be required to Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab disregard the value of such a claim
5 asserted to be included within the made the District Courts adhere to the jurisdictional amount. See Packard, 994 “legal certainty” test cited in such cases F.2d at 1046. In deciding applicable as Meritcare, 166 F.3d 214; Packard, 994 state law, the preponderance of the F.2d 1039; Bloom v. Barry, 755 F.2d 356 evidence standard would have no utility. (3d Cir. 1985); and Nelson v. Keefer, In many cases, however, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971). disputes over factual matters may be We recognize that involved. In resolving those issues, the requiring a defendant to show to a legal McNutt preponderance of the evidence certainty that the amount in controversy standard would be appropriate.3 Once exceeds the statutory minimum may lead findings of fact have been made, the to somewhat bizarre situations. As the court may determine whether Red Cab s Court observed in Shaw v. Dow Brands, legal certainty test for jurisdiction has Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7 th Cir. 1993), been met. oral argument presented a comic scene: In short, despite the use by plaintiff s personal injury lawyer protests some courts of such phrases as “more up and down that his client s injuries are likely than not,” “substantial likelihood,” as minor and insignificant as can be, and “reasonable probability,” 4 we while attorneys for the manufacturer recommend that when the relevant facts paint a sob story about how plaintiff s life are not in dispute or findings have been has been wrecked. It would not be a surprise that when the time came for assessment of damages the parties would 3 once again switch their views by some A pretrial ruling on jurisdictional facts should not be made if it 180 degrees. constitutes a decision on the merits. See Because of the m anner in Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock which the claims for damages were Co., 513 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1995); Jaconski stated in the complaint here, the District v. Avisun Corp., 359 F.2d 931, 935 (3d Cir. Court was required to apply state law in 1966); 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. converting the categories to monetary Miller, Federal Practice And Procedure sums. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. §1350 (2d ed. 1990). Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1961) (In 4 diversity cases courts must look to state See Gafford v. Gen. Elec. law to determine the nature and extent of Co., 997 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1993) (reviewing various tests used by courts). See also Alice the right to be enforced). In fairness to M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity the District Court, our review of the Actions When the Amount in Controversy record indicates that the parties did not Cannot be Determined from the Face of provide much assistance in this endeavor. Plaintiff s Complaint: The Need for Judicial Having concluded that the and Statutory Reform to Preserve legal certainty test is appropriate, we turn Defendant s Equal Access to Federal Courts, to the jurisdictional problem. In her 62 Mo. L. Rev. 681 (1997).
6 motion to remand, plaintiff contended treble damages, and attorneys fees. In that the complaint filed in the state court the alternative, she sought to rescind the established that her claims did not meet contract. the required amount of $75,000. In calculating the damages Although this was the plaintiffs clearly recoverable under the statute, the District stated position, it did not resolve the Court began with the base purchase price jurisdictional issue because the defendant of the automobile, $13,370, and added has a right to resort to a federal forum if registration, title and filing fees, sales it can establish that the jurisdictional tax, service contract cost and expenses of requirements have been satisfied. See, financing to reach a total of $22,095. e.g., Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 294. Samuel-Bassett, 143 F. Supp 2d. at 507. III. Scope of Damages The Court concluded that giving the In removal cases, damages claims the broadest possible determining the amount in controversy reading and trebling the $22,095 which begins with a reading of the complaint Plaintiff is obligated to pay for her filed in the state court. Unlike many automobile over five years in addition to instances in which a specific amount is attorneys fees and out-of-pocket requested, the ad damnum clause in this expenses, would clearly total an amount complaint is stated in terms of categories in excess of $75,000. Id. The District of damages. Because the diversity Court did not explain the computation statute speaks in terms of dollars, we underlying its conclusion. must translate the categories plaintiff The Consumer Protection cites into monetary sums. Law does not specify how actual Count I of the complaint damages should be measured and we alleges that the defendant violated the therefore turn to relevant state appellate Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and rulings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Consumer Protection Law (the Court has not yet had the occasion to Consumer Protection Law ). Pa. Stat. interpret the statutory term. The Superior Ann. tit. 73 § 201-9.2(a) (W est 2003). Court, an intermediate appellate court, The statute allows recovery of actual has utilized the purchase price of a damages and reasonable attorneys fees, vehicle as a starting point for calculating treble damages and such additional relief damages. From that amount, various as [the court] deems necessary or proper. sums have been deducted to arrive at the Id. Because this claim offers the highest actual damages. See Stokes v. Gary potential recovery to the plaintiff, we Barbera Enters., 783 A.2d 296, 299 (Pa. will discuss it first. Super. Ct. 2001); Young v. Dart, 630 The plaintiff sought A.2d 22, 26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). damages for loss of value of the car, In Stokes, the plaintiff depreciation in resale value, repair costs, proved that the car dealer had tampered expense of repair attempts, loss of use, with the odometer and misrepresented
7 that a van was new. Stokes, 783 A.2d at Act. In that case, we remanded for 297. In determining the damage award, reevaluation of the plaintiff s loss under the trial court began with the amount of the state s Lemon Law. Id. at 588-89. monthly payments made by the plaintiff The District Court in Suber began and and added the down payment, the value ended its analysis with the sticker price of the trade-in and the amount necessary of the van. We noted that under the to pay off the loan. Id. at 298. From this Lemon Law a claimant was required to total the following amounts were return the car and that because the value subtracted: (1) half of the monthly of the vehicle had not been established, payments the plaintiff had made (to the issue should be reviewed on remand. reflect usage), (2) an additional $4000 Id. at 585 n.7. We recognize that in for usage and (3) a trade-in credit that the discussing damages, Suber was applying plaintiff received for the van when he New Jersey law, not the Pennsylvania purchased a new car. Id. The Superior Consumer Protection Law, and, hence, is Court affirmed. Id. at 299. not determinative here. In Young v. Dart, the In Werwinski v. Ford plaintiff purchased a car from a dealer Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 668, 670 (3d who concealed the fact that the vehicle Cir. 2002), the panel concluded that had been involved in a collision and had defendant had established removal numerous hidden defects. Young, 630 jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiffs A.2d at 23. Recognizing that the complained that their automobile had a Consumer Protection Law “does not set defective transmission. The Court forth a formula for the assessment of pointed out that the plaintiffs sought to actual damages,” the Superior Court held recover com pensatory damages and in that the trial court did not err by looking addition all or part of the sums to the method used under the Automobile [plaintiffs] paid to purchase or lease their Lemon Law. See id. at 26-27. See also automobiles. Id. at 666. Moreover, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73 § 1955 (W est 2003). plaintiffs demanded that the defendant The trial court used the $12,800.68 disgorge its ill-gotten profits received purchase price as a starting point, and from the sale of the subject vehicles subtracted $4,858.20 for Young’s usage and/or make full restitution. Id. at 667. between the date of purchase and the The Court concluded, because of these trial, as well as requiring the return of the provisions, the complaint clearly leaves car. Young, 630 A.2d at 27. The the door open for them later to demand plaintiff was also awarded some minor reimbursement for the purchase price of consequential damages. the cars. Id. In Suber v. Chrysler Corp., We observe that in the 104 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 1997), we were briefs in that case the parties cited four faced with somewhat similar issues district court opinions and did not call under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud the panel s attention to the two Superior
8 Court cases interpreting relevant aspects “total sales price” of $22,095 was a of the Consumer Protection Law. beginning point. Samuel-Bassett, 143 F. District court rulings on Pennsylvania Supp 2d. at 508. This figure included the law are not authoritative and must yield price of the car, financing charges, sales to rulings of the state Supreme Court or, tax, license, title and filing fees, as well if none exist, consider decisions of the as a service contract. Id. In addition, the state s intermediate appellate courts in Court referred to, but did not cite specific predicting how the state s highest court amounts of such expenses as costs as would rule. Gares v. Willingboro repairs, rental cars and attorneys’ fees. Township, 90 F.3d 720 (3d Cir. 1996). Id. The District Court concluded that, In any event, the plaintiffs complaint in considering these unquantified costs and the case before us does not contain the trebling the price of the car, the additional claims for damages which plaintiff’s recovery “would clearly total Werwinski relied upon in finding that the an amount in excess of $75,000.” Id. jurisdictional amount had been met. IV. The Consumer Protection Law Claim 164-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), the Superior As noted earlier, the Court, noting Werwinski s holding, stated we specifically decline to address Chrysler s District Court here began its invitation to address two particularly vexing computations under the Consumer questions: (1) application of the economic Protection Law 5 by assuming that the loss doctrine . . . Pennsylvania trial courts have rejected Werwinski s prediction that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply 5 The order certifying the the economic loss rule in claims under the class also dismissed Count I. The District Consumer Protection Law. See, e.g., Court cited the Werwinski ruling that the Oppenheimer v. York Int’l, 2002 WL economic damages doctrine barred recovery 31409949, at *5 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2002); under the Consumer Protection Law. The Zwiercan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2002 WL dismissal is interlocutory and is not before 31053838, at *7 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2002). See us in view of the limited review under Rule also Balderston v. Medtronic Sofamor 23(f). Danek, Inc., 285 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. Application of the economic 2002) (“[i]n construing claims under the loss doctrine to claims under the Consumer CPL, Pennsylvania courts have Protection Law has been questioned. The distinguished purchases made for business Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not reasons which are not actionable from those addressed the issue. In O Keefe v. made for ‘personal, family or household Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, use.’”). 277 (E.D. Pa. 2003), the District Court Of course, in this case if the observed that the Superior Court, post- District Court s re-assessment of plaintiff s Werwinski, had approved treble damages damages results in an amount less than under the Consumer Protection Law. In $75,000, as seems likely, then the Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, Werwinski ruling need not be addressed.
9 Conspicuously absent from plaintiff’s usage of the vehicle. To test the calculation were deductions for the the upper limits of the range for the value of the car and allowance for its use jurisdictional amount, Angus v. Shiley, reductions applied by the Superior Court Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993), of Pennsylvania in similar cases. In the the resulting computation may be trebled plaintiff s complaint she seeks out-of- under the Consumer Protection Law. pocket reimbursement of repairs but no Metz v. Quaker Highlands, Inc., 714 amounts were stated. In this connection, A.2d 447 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (treble it would appear that if the expense of a damages may be awarded in a rescission service contract is considered as an item case). of loss, the amounts paid for repairs Attorneys fees awarded covered by the terms of that agreement under the Consumer Protection Law are should not be considered as actual to be reasonable. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73 § damage to the plaintiff. 201-9.2(a). As the Superior Court has The fact remains that the explained in McCauslin v. Reliance amount in controversy has not been Finance Co., 751 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. properly established. The computations Super. Ct. 2000), [t]he term reasonable here are inadequate and fail to conform does impart a sense of proportionality with the Pennsylvania statutory language between an amount of damages and an of actual damages as applied by the state award of attorneys fees. 6 We also point appellate court. Although the damages conceivably could be trebled, the record does not establish the multiplicand for 6 We are impressed with the such an award. New Jersey Superior Court s appraisal of the Some observations may be value of a case in certifying a class action helpful on remand. Rescinding the involving the brakes on the same model of contract apparently would provide Kia cars. According to the Court: plaintiff with the most advantageous result because it would place her in the [T]he evidence here is that same position she was in before for the repair of a brake purchasing the vehicle. That remedy system of this nature, you re speaking in terms of a few would require plaintiff to return the hundred dollars. Nothing vehicle to the dealer, who should assume even coming close to $1,000. the outstanding balance of the loan. How many of the 8,455 Defendant would pay plaintiff the total members would seek, amount of installment payments made by individually, to claim her, the out-of-pocket repair costs that recompense of that small she incurred, and incidental expenses. sum? To ask the question, I From this sum must be subtracted a think answered in terms of reasonable amount to reflect the qualification. Little v. KIA Motors of America ,UNN-L-
10 out that under the Consumer Protection Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2714(c), 2715, Law no punitive damages other than the 2A519(d). However, punitive damages discretionary authority to treble is are not recoverable in an action based permitted. McCauslin, 751 A.2d at 685 solely on breach of contract. Thorsen v. ( although the Act does allow the Court to Iron & Glass Bank, 476 A.2d 928, 932 impose up to treble damages for actual (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Johnson v. damages sustained, it does not otherwise Hyundai Motor Am., 698 A.2d 631, 639 confer a right to punitive damages. ). (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). The counts presented by The purchase price of a the plaintiff appear to be in the motor vehicle serves as prima facie alternative and the parties have not evidence of value, but standing alone, as suggested that, expect for the trebling it does here, does not provide sufficient provided by the Consumer Protection data to establish value. Price v. Law, there can be more than one Chevrolet Motor Div. of Gen. Motors recovery for the harm. Although Count I Corp., 765 A.2d 800, 811 (Pa. Super. Ct. would seem to be the one to offer the 2000). The record before us fails to most, although questionable, potential to establish the value of the automobile reach the $75,000 mark, we shall briefly with and without the brake defect. Even discuss the other claims. adding consequential damages to a V. The U.C.C. Claim conjectural estimate of value here fails to Under Pennsylvania law establish anything near $75,000. the measure of damages for breach of Accordingly, the breach of warranty warranty under the Uniform Commercial count fails to provide federal court Code is the difference at the time and jurisdiction. place of acceptance between the value of VI. The Magnuson-M oss W arranty the goods accepted and the value they Improvement Act would have had if they had been as The Magunson-Moss Act warranted, unless special circumstances provides that a consumer who is show proximate damages of a different damaged by the failure of a supplier, amount. 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § warrantor, or service contractor to 2714(b) (West 2003). comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, In addition to actual implied warranty, or service contract damages, plaintiffs may also recover may bring suit for damages and other incidental and consequential damages legal and equitable relief. 15 U.S.C. § resulting from a breach of warranty. 13 2310(d)(1) (2003). Suit may be filed in state or federal court. Id. However, federal 800-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law jurisdiction for a Magnuson-Moss Act Div. filed August 20, 2003). claim does not exist unless the am ount in
11 controversy exceeds $50,000, and, if the for fact-finding on the amount in suit is brought as a class action, the controversy. We repeat the admonition number of named plaintiffs is at least expressed in our case law that in order to 100. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3). carry out the Congressional intent to In Voelker v. Porsche Cars limit jurisdiction in diversity cases, North America, Inc., 348 F.3d 639, 643 doubts must be resolved in favor of (7 th Cir. 2003), an automobile warranty remand. See, e.g., Boyer v. Snap-On case, the Court of Appeals said that the Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. party asserting federal jurisdiction must 1990); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. allege the cost of the replacement Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985). vehicle, minus both the present value of Moreover, estimations of the amounts the allegedly defective vehicle and the recoverable must be realistic. The value that the plaintiff received from the inquiry should be objective and not based allegedly defective vehicle. The facts in on fanciful, pie-in-the-sky, or simply that Magnuson-Moss case differ from wishful amounts, because otherwise the those present here, but the requirements policy to limit diversity jurisdiction will of allowance for usage and establishing be frustrated. the difference in value, rather than Accordingly, the order of simply the purchase price are the same. certification will be vacated and the case Treble damages may not be remanded to the District Court for a assessed in a M agnuson-Moss count. determination of subject matter Nor may attorneys fees be recovered. jurisdiction. Suber, 104 F.3d at 588 n.12. It is clear that the amount recoverable under the claim here does not exceed $50,000 and this case cannot be maintained in the federal courts on an independent jurisdictional basis. There is no need to address supplemental jurisdiction at this point. By way of equitable relief, plaintiff asks that members of the putative class be notified and warned about the brake system defect. Because we must look to the jurisdictional status of the named plaintiff, it is obvious that injunctive relief is not appropriate. VII. Conclusion We conclude that the case must be remanded to the District Court