1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO, LTD., et Case No. 24-cv-06567-JST al., 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 9 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO v. CONSIDER WHETHER ANOTHER 10 PARTY'S MATERIAL SHOULD BE CM HK, LTD., SEALED 11 Defendant. Re: ECF No. 177 12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ administrative motion to consider whether another party's 14 material should be sealed in its amended complaint. ECF No. 177. Defendant filed a response 15 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5(f). ECF No. 179. The Court will deny the motion without 16 prejudice. 17 18 I. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A party seeking to seal a document filed with the court must (1) comply with Civil Local 20 Rule 79-5; and (2) rebut the “a strong presumption in favor of access” that applies to all 21 documents other than grand jury transcripts or pre-indictment warrant materials. Kamakana v. 22 City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotations 23 omitted). 24 With respect to the first prong, Local Rule 79-5 requires, as a threshold, a request that 25 (1) “establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are privileged, protectable as a trade secret 26 or otherwise entitled to protection under the law”; and (2) is “narrowly tailored to seek sealing 27 only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b). An administrative motion to seal must also fulfill 1 allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a 2 document, or portions thereof, are sealable.” Civil L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). 3 With respect to the second prong, the showing required to overcome the strong 4 presumption of access depends on the type of motion to which the document is attached. “[A] 5 ‘compelling reasons’ standard applies to most judicial records. This standard derives from the 6 common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 7 and documents.’” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 n.7 (1978)). To overcome this strong 9 presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record must “articulate compelling reasons 10 supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public 11 policies favoring disclosure.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79 (internal citations omitted). 12 On the other hand, records attached to motions that are only “tangentially related to the 13 merits of a case” are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 14 Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, a party need only make a 15 showing under the good cause standard of Rule 26(c) to justify the sealing of the materials. Id. at 16 1097. A court may, for good cause, keep documents confidential “to protect a party or person 17 from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 18 A district court must “articulate [the] . . . reasoning or findings underlying its decision to 19 seal.” Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 20 2374 (2012). 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 Because the materials sought to be sealed are contained within an amended complaint, the 23 Court applies the “compelling reasons” standard. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. S. Glazers Wine & 24 Spirits, LLC, No. 8:24-CV-02684-FWS-ADS, 2025 WL 819070, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2025) 25 (applying the “compelling reasons” standard to a complaint because that document “is the 26 foundation of a lawsuit” and “more than tangentially related to [the] merits” of the case (citation 27 modified)). “‘[C]ompelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and 1 improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, 2 circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 3 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. The Nixon Court also noted that the “common-law right of inspection has 4 bowed before the power of a court to insure that its records” are not used as “sources of business 5 information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” 435 U.S. at 598. 6 The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has identified a trade secret in this context as 7 “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and 8 which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use 9 it.” In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Restatement of Torts 10 § 757, cmt. b). In that case, applying Kamakana and Nixon, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district 11 court for refusing to seal information that qualified under this standard. In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 12 Fed. App’x at 569. The Federal Circuit has similarly concluded that under Ninth Circuit law, 13 detailed product-specific financial information, customer information, and internal reports are 14 appropriately sealable under the “compelling reasons” standard where that information could be 15 used to the company’s competitive disadvantage. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 16 1214, 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 17 Defendant here seeks to seal portions of paragraphs 11, 17–18, 20–21, 55, 58–59, 67–91, 18 93–94, 96–103, 106–15, 117, 119, 121, 122, 125–26 in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. ECF No. 19 179 at 4–8. Defendant contends that those paragraphs contain confidential business information, 20 including excerpts of agreements between CyWee Group Ltd. (an entity alleged to be related to 21 Defendant) and various third parties, including licensing and settlement agreements. ECF No. 22 179-1 ¶¶ 5–9; Am Compl. ¶¶ 11, 17. Defendant claims that the amended complaint also contains 23 Defendant’s and CyWee Motion Group, Ltd.’s confidential financial and business strategy 24 information. ECF No. 179-1 ¶ 10. 25 Defendant categorizes the information it seeks to seal as “Confidential Licensing 26 Agreement,” “Confidential material of a third-party,” “Confidential business information,” 27 “personal information of a non-party,” “financial information not subject to public disclosure,” 1 disclosure,” or “financial records of non-party entities.” ECF No. 179 at 4–8. It provides little 2 other explanation for its sealing requests. Those descriptions do not suffice to provide a 3 “compelling reason” for the pleading to be sealed. See Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 4 10-cv-05072-VC, 2016 WL 11730952, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (“conclusory statements 5 that publication of the information ‘could pose significant commercial harm to [the party seeking 6 to maintain information under seal]’ . . . does not come close to establishing compelling reasons to 7 conceal this material from the public”). 8 Defendant also makes no argument about why disclosure of any of the information sought 9 to be sealed would be harmful to itself or a third party. See ECF No. 179. And it provides no 10 explanation how it has safeguarded this information outside of confidentiality designations. See 11 Civil L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A) (explaining that a confidentiality designation “is not sufficient to 12 establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable”). It appears that some of the 13 information contained in the amended complaint could be properly sealed, see Rodman v. Safeway 14 Inc., No.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO, LTD., et Case No. 24-cv-06567-JST al., 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 9 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO v. CONSIDER WHETHER ANOTHER 10 PARTY'S MATERIAL SHOULD BE CM HK, LTD., SEALED 11 Defendant. Re: ECF No. 177 12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ administrative motion to consider whether another party's 14 material should be sealed in its amended complaint. ECF No. 177. Defendant filed a response 15 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5(f). ECF No. 179. The Court will deny the motion without 16 prejudice. 17 18 I. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A party seeking to seal a document filed with the court must (1) comply with Civil Local 20 Rule 79-5; and (2) rebut the “a strong presumption in favor of access” that applies to all 21 documents other than grand jury transcripts or pre-indictment warrant materials. Kamakana v. 22 City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotations 23 omitted). 24 With respect to the first prong, Local Rule 79-5 requires, as a threshold, a request that 25 (1) “establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are privileged, protectable as a trade secret 26 or otherwise entitled to protection under the law”; and (2) is “narrowly tailored to seek sealing 27 only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b). An administrative motion to seal must also fulfill 1 allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a 2 document, or portions thereof, are sealable.” Civil L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). 3 With respect to the second prong, the showing required to overcome the strong 4 presumption of access depends on the type of motion to which the document is attached. “[A] 5 ‘compelling reasons’ standard applies to most judicial records. This standard derives from the 6 common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 7 and documents.’” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 n.7 (1978)). To overcome this strong 9 presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record must “articulate compelling reasons 10 supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public 11 policies favoring disclosure.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79 (internal citations omitted). 12 On the other hand, records attached to motions that are only “tangentially related to the 13 merits of a case” are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 14 Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, a party need only make a 15 showing under the good cause standard of Rule 26(c) to justify the sealing of the materials. Id. at 16 1097. A court may, for good cause, keep documents confidential “to protect a party or person 17 from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 18 A district court must “articulate [the] . . . reasoning or findings underlying its decision to 19 seal.” Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 20 2374 (2012). 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 Because the materials sought to be sealed are contained within an amended complaint, the 23 Court applies the “compelling reasons” standard. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. S. Glazers Wine & 24 Spirits, LLC, No. 8:24-CV-02684-FWS-ADS, 2025 WL 819070, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2025) 25 (applying the “compelling reasons” standard to a complaint because that document “is the 26 foundation of a lawsuit” and “more than tangentially related to [the] merits” of the case (citation 27 modified)). “‘[C]ompelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and 1 improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, 2 circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 3 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. The Nixon Court also noted that the “common-law right of inspection has 4 bowed before the power of a court to insure that its records” are not used as “sources of business 5 information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” 435 U.S. at 598. 6 The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has identified a trade secret in this context as 7 “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and 8 which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use 9 it.” In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Restatement of Torts 10 § 757, cmt. b). In that case, applying Kamakana and Nixon, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district 11 court for refusing to seal information that qualified under this standard. In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 12 Fed. App’x at 569. The Federal Circuit has similarly concluded that under Ninth Circuit law, 13 detailed product-specific financial information, customer information, and internal reports are 14 appropriately sealable under the “compelling reasons” standard where that information could be 15 used to the company’s competitive disadvantage. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 16 1214, 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 17 Defendant here seeks to seal portions of paragraphs 11, 17–18, 20–21, 55, 58–59, 67–91, 18 93–94, 96–103, 106–15, 117, 119, 121, 122, 125–26 in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. ECF No. 19 179 at 4–8. Defendant contends that those paragraphs contain confidential business information, 20 including excerpts of agreements between CyWee Group Ltd. (an entity alleged to be related to 21 Defendant) and various third parties, including licensing and settlement agreements. ECF No. 22 179-1 ¶¶ 5–9; Am Compl. ¶¶ 11, 17. Defendant claims that the amended complaint also contains 23 Defendant’s and CyWee Motion Group, Ltd.’s confidential financial and business strategy 24 information. ECF No. 179-1 ¶ 10. 25 Defendant categorizes the information it seeks to seal as “Confidential Licensing 26 Agreement,” “Confidential material of a third-party,” “Confidential business information,” 27 “personal information of a non-party,” “financial information not subject to public disclosure,” 1 disclosure,” or “financial records of non-party entities.” ECF No. 179 at 4–8. It provides little 2 other explanation for its sealing requests. Those descriptions do not suffice to provide a 3 “compelling reason” for the pleading to be sealed. See Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 4 10-cv-05072-VC, 2016 WL 11730952, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (“conclusory statements 5 that publication of the information ‘could pose significant commercial harm to [the party seeking 6 to maintain information under seal]’ . . . does not come close to establishing compelling reasons to 7 conceal this material from the public”). 8 Defendant also makes no argument about why disclosure of any of the information sought 9 to be sealed would be harmful to itself or a third party. See ECF No. 179. And it provides no 10 explanation how it has safeguarded this information outside of confidentiality designations. See 11 Civil L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A) (explaining that a confidentiality designation “is not sufficient to 12 establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable”). It appears that some of the 13 information contained in the amended complaint could be properly sealed, see Rodman v. Safeway 14 Inc., No. 11-cv-03003-JST, 2014 WL 12787874, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2014) (sealing 15 “internal, nonpublic information discussing [the defendant’s] pricing strategy, business 16 decisionmaking, and financial records, which would expose [the defendant] to competitive harm if 17 disclosed”), but the Court cannot evaluate explanations Defendant hasn’t given. 18 The Court also finds that the requested sealing is not sufficiently tailored. For example, 19 Defendant seeks to seal information in ¶¶ 18, 20, 21, 58 that is left unsealed in ¶ 16. See Am. 20 Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18, 20, 21, 58. Defendant seeks to seal other portions of the amended complaint 21 without any apparent indication that disclosure of the information would be harmful. See Am. 22 Compl. ¶¶ 55, 61, 63 (mentioning individuals’ roles in CyWee), Am. Compl. ¶ 66 (referencing 23 publicly available patent information). 24 CONCLUSION 25 The Court denies Defendant’s motion to seal without prejudice. ECF No. 179. Defendant 26 may refile an amended response within seven days of this Order. If Defendant does not amend its 27 response within seven days, the Court will not consider the documents as to which the motion is 1 fourteen days from the date of this Order. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: May 6, 2026 4 ______________________________________ 5 JON S. TIGAR United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27