UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JENNIFER ANN SAMSON CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 24-1888
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SECTION “A” (5)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Jennifer Ann Samson, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying her claim for Disability Insurance BITe nISe fRitEs C(“ODMIBM”)E uNnDdEeDr Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSRAE”J)E. C FToEr Dthe following reasons, SUthSaTtA PIlNaEinDtiff's brief (rec. doc. 8) bDe ISMISSED W, tIhTeH C PoRmEmJUisDsiIoCnEer's bI.r ief (rBecA. CdKocG. R1O1)U bNeD , and Plaintiff's case be . Plaintiff filed her original application for DIB on June 10, 2020, alleging a disability onset date of March 15, 2020. (Adm. Rec. at 17, 193-96). Plaintiff alleged disability due to bipolar, boneI dd.eficiency, asthma, arthritis in her knees, foot pain, anxiety, and high cholesterol. ( at 216). Plaintiff, born on June 20, 1964, was 55 yeIadr.s old on the date she alleged onset of disability and on the date she filed her application. ( at 213). Plaintiff has a high-schoIodl. education, and she has past work experience as a housekeeper, a janitor, and a waitress. ( at 217-18). Id. Defendant initially denied Plaintiff's application on March 12, 2021. ( at 107-10). Plaintiff sought an administrative hIeda.ring, which took place on January 7, 2022 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). ( at 36-65). Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and Valerie Borja, a vocational expert (“VE”), testified at the hearing. After that hearing, on March 4, 2022, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that Plaintiff was disabled from March 15, 2020, thIed .alleged disability onset date, through December 31, 2021, the date her disability ended. ( at 13-26). Plaintiff appealed
the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, who denied review, and she then filed a civil action in this Court. (Civ. A. No. 22-4411, E.D. La.). On May 1, 2023, the District Judge reversed the ALJ’s March 4, 2022 decision and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. (Adm. Rec. at 1152-57). Specifically, the Court ordered the CommIids.sioner to reconsider Plaintiff’s past relevant work at step four of the sequential analysis. ( at 1155). On remand, the Appeals Council, by order dated June 12, 2023, vacated the March 4, 2022 decision and remanded Plaintiff’s case Itdo. an ALJ for further proceedings consistent with the District Judge’s May 1,
2023 Order. ( at 1149). The ALJ held a second hearing on January 9, 202I4d,. at which Plaintiff, still represented by counsel, and Katrina Virden, the VE, testified. ( at 1109- 1137). On April 11, 2024, the AILd.J issued an unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled since January 1, 2022. ( at 1087-1101). In that decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of Iadr.thritis of bilateral knees, bilateral hip dysplasia, bipolar disorder, and anxiety disorder. ( at 1090). The ALJ held that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or a combination of Iidm.pairments that met or medically equaled a listed
impairment under the regulations. ( at 1092). The ALJ found that Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work except that she can frequently climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; she can understand, remember, and apply simple, routine instructions; she must avoid fast-paced, quota-based work; she can interact frequently with supervisors and coworkers and ocIcda.sionally with the general public; and she can adapt to occasional changes in work setting. ( at 1094). The ALJ determined that since
January 1, 2022I,d P. laintiff has been able to perform her past relevant work as “cleaner, housekeeper.” ( at 1100). Plaintiff did not appeal to the Appeals Council, opting instead to proceed directly to federal court. Accordingly, the ALJ’s April 11, 2024 decision is the Commissioner’s final decisioInI .f o r puSrTpAoNseDsA oRf tDh iOs FC oRuErVt’IsE rWev iew.
The function of a district court on judicial review is limited to determining whether there is “substantial evidence” in the record, as a whole, to support the final decision of the
Commissioner as trier of fact, and wSheeether the CommissionBerro wapnp vl.i eAdp ftehle appropriate legal standards to evaMluaarttein tehze ve. vCihdaetnecre. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Carri, e1r9e2 v .F S.3udll i4v9a2n, 496 (5th Cir. 1999); , 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); , 944 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1991). If the CoMmamrtiisnseiozner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm them. , 64 F.3d at 173. “Substantial evidence” is that which is relevanRt iacnhdar sdusfofnic ievn. tP feorra ale sreasonable mind to accept asM aasdteeqrsuoante v .t oB asrunphpaortrt a conclusion. , 402 U.S. 389, 401(1971); , 309 F.3d 26S7pe, l2lm72a n( 5v.t hSh Cailra.l a2002). It is more than a
scintilla but may be less than a preponderance. , 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary See Boyd v. Apfel choices or medical findings exist to support the Commissioner's decision. , 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2002). A district court may not try the issues de nCoavroey, rve. -Awpefieglh the evidence, or substitute
its own Rjuipdlgemy ev.n tC hfoart etrhat of the Commissioner. Sp,e 2ll3m0a Fn.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000); , 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995); , 1 F.3d at 360. The Commissioner is entitled to make any finding that is suppoSreteed A rbkya nsusabss vta. Ontkilaalh eovmidaence, regardless of whether other conclusions are also permissible. , 503 U.S. 91, 112-C1a3r (e1y992). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. , 230 F.3d at 135. Any of the RCiopmlemy issioner's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. , 67 F.3d at 555. Despite this Court's limited function on review, the Court must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine
the reasonaAbnlethnoenssy vo. fS uthlleiv adnecision reached and whether substaVnitlliaa lv .e Svuidlleivnacne exists to support it. , 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992); , 895 F.2d 1II0I.1 9, 1E0N2T2 I(T5LthE MCiEr.N 1T9 9T0O) .B ENEFITS UNDER THE ACT
To be considered disabled and eligible for disability benefits under the Act, Plaintiff must show an inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered disabled only if a physical or mental impairment is so severe that the claimant is unable not only to do previous work, but cannot, considering age, education and work experience, participate in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in significant volume in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the area in which the claimant lives, whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired if she or he
applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that provide procedures for evaluating a claim and determining disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 - 404.1599 & Appendices, §§ 416.901t-416.988 (1995). The regulations include a five-step evaluation process for determining wIdh.ether an impairment prGevreeenntss paa pne vr.s oShna flraolma engaging in any substantial gainful activity. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; , 38 F.3d 23S2h,a 2v3e 6v .( A5pthfe Clir. 1994). In , 238 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth Circuit restated the five-step procedure to make a disability determination under the Social Security Act:
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” To determine whether a claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to disability benefits, a five-step analysis is employed. First, the claimant must not be presently working at any substantial gainful activity. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe. An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it “significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Third, the claimant's impairment must meet or equal an impairment listed in the appendix to the regulations. Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from returning to his past relevant work. Fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any relevant work, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education and past work experience. At steps one through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to show he is disabled. If the claimant acquits this responsibility, at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite of his existing impairments. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant must then prove he in fact cannot perform the alternate work. Id. Crowley v. Apfel at 594 (quoting , 197 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999)). If the ALJ determines that a Plaintiff is not disabled under step five of the five-part test, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has a “residual functional capacity,” given the
claimant's age, educLaetigogne, tat nvd. Cphaastt ewrork experience, to perform other work available in the national economy. , 67 F.3d 558, 564 n.11 (5th Cir. 1995). Step five also requires the CoImdm. issioner to use the medical-vocational guidelines to make a disability determination. The four elements of proof weighed to determine whether evidence of disability is substantial are: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant's subjMecatirvtein eevz ivd.e Cnhcae toefr pain and disability; and (4) claimant's age, education, and work history. , 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1Id9.95). “The Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence.” IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL
There are three issues on appeal:
(1) Whether the ALJ failed to apply the medical improvement standard.
(2) Whether the ALJ erred in identifying Plaintiff’s past relevant work.
V. (A3N) ALYWSIhSe OthFe Tr HsuEb IsStSaUntEiaSl OevNi dAePnPcEe AsuLp ports the ALJ’s decision.
(1) Whether the ALJ failed to apply the medical improvement standard.
Plaintiff notes that ALJ White – the author of the first decision that was partially favorable to Plaintiff – found medical improvement as of January 1, 2022. (Adm. Rec. at 27- 29). Plaintiff contends, however, that because ALJ White’s decision was vacated as to the time period beginning January 1, 2022, ALJ Morgan – the author of the second, unfavorable decision – had to determine whether there was medical improvement as of January 1, 2022.
Plaintiff complains that he did not do so, using instead the more typical five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled as of that date. In short, Plaintiff maintains that ALJ Morgan used the wrong legal standard to evaluate whether she is disabled. When an ALJ finds a claimant entitled to a closed period of disability – as ALJ White did – thSeee A TLeJ aagpupeli ve.s A tshter umeedical improvement standard to articulate wheWn athteer csl ov.s Beda rpnehraiordt ends. , 342 F. App’x 962, 963 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing , 276 F.3d 716, 718-19 (5th Cir. 2002)). The Commissioner may terminate disability benefits
if there is substantial evidence demonstrating that (1) there has been medical improvement related to the abSieliet yid t.o work, and (2) the individsueael aisl snoo Gwr ieagbole v t. oS uelnligvaagne in substantial gainful activity. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)); , 940 F.2d 942, 943-44 (5th Cir. 1991). Medical improvement is related to a claimant’s ability to work if there has been a decrease in the severity of her imSpeea iTrmeaegnute and an increase in the claimant’s functional capacity to do basic work activities. , 342 F. App’x at 963 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(3)). In the March 4, 2022 partially-favorable decision, ALJ White found Plaintiff disabled
for a closed period of disability from March 15, 2020, the alleged disability onset date, through December 31, 2021, the date her disability ended. (Adm. Rec. at 13-29). Plaintiff appealed that decision to the District Judge, and the case was remanded for further Id. administrative proceedings. ( at 1152-57). After a second administrative hearing, ALJ Morgan issued a decision on ApIdri.l 11, 2024, finding Plaintiff not disabled from January 1, 2022 through April 11, 2022. ( at 1084-101). As noted, Plaintiff now contends that ALJ
Morgan failed to “apply the medical improvement standard” when he found her not disabled beginning January 1, 2022. However, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. The Court concludes that ALJ Morgan was not required to determine whether medical improvement had occurred. Rather, he was required to determine whether substantial evidence supported whether Plaintiff was disabled beginning January 1, 2022. Here, although substantial evidence supports Plaintiff’s closed period of disability, the District Judge found thIadt. remand was required for the ALJ to reconsider Plaintiff’s past relevant work
at step four. ( at 1152-57). Specifically, the Court held that “the record evidence indicates that the server job may not qualify as past relevant work becaIdu.se Plaintiff may not have performed this job at substantial gainful activity (SGA) levels.” ( at 1155). Thus, the Court remanded Plaintiff’s case for further administrative proceedings to determine whether she had any work experience that qualifies as past relevant work,I nd.ot to redetermine whether ALJ White’s finding that medical improvement had occurred. ( at 1155). On June 12,w 2i0th2 3re, sthpeec At ptop etahles iCssouuen ocifl ’dsi soarbdielirt ys poenc iafnicda lalyft evra cJaatneuda rAyL 1J ,W 2h0i2t2e’s MIadr.ch 4, 2020 decision “ .” ( at
1160) (emphasis added). The Appeals Council explicitly instructed the ALJ to: • Further evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairments from January 1, 2022, onward in accordance with the special technique described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. • Give further consideration to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) from January 1, 2022, and forward. • Give further consideration to whether the claimant has past relevant work and, if so, can perform it as of January 1, 2022 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(a)-(b)). • And if warranted, obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert.
(Adm. Rec. at 1161). ALJ MorganId a.cknowledged the Appeals Council’s order and specifically complied with its instructions. ( at 1087). The Appeals Council did not order ALJ Morgan to determine whether medical improvement had occurred, nor did it ask ALJ Morgan to revisit ALJ White’s determination that Plaintiff had a closed period of disability that ended on December 31, 2021. Neither did the District Judge ask the Commissioner or ALJ Morgan to do so. ALJ Morgan complied with the Appeals Council’s remand order and was not required to determine whether medical improvement had occurred as of January 1, 2022, as that portion of the previous decision was supported by substantial evidence in ALJ White’s decision. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this argument does not warran(t2 r)e manWdh teot thheer A tLhJe. ALJ erred in identifying Plaintiff’s past relevant work.
Plaintiff argues that the cleaner, housekeeper job does not meet the criteria for past relevant work. To qualify as past relevant work, the job in question must have been performed within the last 15 years, lasted long enough for the pSeereson to have learned how to do it, and must have been substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565(a). By failing to argue otherwise, Plaintiff concedes that her work as a cleaner, housekeeper was performed within the prior 15 years, was performed at SGA levels, and was performed long enough to learn how perform it. However, she contends that the cleaner, housekeeper job does not constitute past relevant work because she “never worked as a cleaner/housekeeper.” (Rec. doc. 8 at 6). Plaintiff’s argument is disingenuous. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) provides that the duties of a cleaner,
housekeeper include cleaning rooms and halls in commercial establishments such as hotels, restaurants, clubs, beauty parlors, and dormitories, or performing any combination of the following duties: sorting, counting, folding, marking, or carrying linens. DOT Index Code 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783. I Tdh. is job also requires performing other duties as described under Cleaner (any industry). The DOT indicates that the cleaner (any industry) job requires vacuuming, emptying trash, and sweeping. DOT Index Code 389.683-010, 1991 WL 673279. In her work history report, Plaintiff reported that she worked as a janitor, which required her – in her own description – to clean doctor’s offices, clinic buildings, dust, sweep,
vacuum, mop, clean and supply restrooms, take out trash, store and maintain supply rooms, clean commercial buildings, offices, wipe down areas, and clean windows and mirrors. (Adm. Rec. at 231-32). Absent a challenge to its veracity at the administrative level, it is appropriSaetee Vfoilrl at hve. SAuLlJl itvoa nrely on Plaintiff’s description of her past work in her disability report. , 895 F.2d 1019, 1022-1023 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that it is claimant’s burden to prove inability to perform former work). When the ALJ asked the VE to classify Plaintiff’s past work, she testified that the cleaner, housekeeper job is classified as light, unskilled work, with a specific vocational
preparation of 2. (Adm. Rec. at 1132-33). The VE further clarified that while the cleaner, hIodu.sekeeper job is classified as light work, Plaintiff actually performed the job as medium. ( at 1133). After the ALJ presented a hypothetical that was consistent with the RFC finding, thIde. VE testified that Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as a cleaner, housekeeper. ( at 1133). Based on the VE’s testimony the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing Ihde. r past relevant work as a cleaner, housekeeper as actually and generally
performed. ( at 1100). The ALJ further noted that this Idw.ork satisfies the recency, durational, and earnings requirement of past relevant work. ( at 1100). Indeed, despite Plaintiff’s protestations, she admits that her earnings constituted SGA in 2017 – the year in which she actually performed work as a janitor. (Rec. doc. 8 at 6; Adm. Rec. at 218). The Court finds that the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony, and substantial evidence supports his step-four findSieneg C. a rIenyd eve. dA,p ftehle ALJ may properly rely upon the testimony and conclusions of a VE. , 230 F.3d 131, 145 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e agree with the majority of the circuits that the ALJ may rely upon the vocational
expert's testimony provided that the record reflects an adequate basis for doing so.”). The ALJ also noted that, despite having the opportunity to question the VE at the hearing, Plaintiff’s representative did not elicit any testimony regarding her purported inability to perform her past work as a cleaner, housekeeper. (Adm. Rec. at 1100). The time to challenge the reliability of the VE’s testSimeeo Bniye sitse kd vu.r Binegrr ythheil ladministrative hearing when the VE is subject to cross-examination. , 587 U.S. 97, 107 (2019) (“Even without specific data, an applicant may probe the strength of testimony by asking an expert about, for example, her sources and methods – where she got the information at issue and how she
analyzed it and derived her conclusions.”). The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of proof that she cannot perform her past relevant work as a cleaner, housekeeper and even failed to take the opportunity to do so. There was no error here. (3) Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
Having reviewed the ALJ’s decision and the record, the Court finds that the ALJ specifically discussed the evidence that he considered when assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. He
first explained that he was “only to address the issue of disability beginning January 1, 2022, iadn.d not re-adjudicate Plaintiff’s functioning prior to that date.” (Adm. Rec. at 1095) (citing at 1156-1162). He specifically noted that since January 1, 2022, the evidence, including Plaintiff’s own testimIodn.y, demonstrated that there has been improvement in Plaintiff’s physical condition. ( at 1095). Although Plaintiff complained of knee pain, she Iodn. ly treated her sympsteoem Gsr iwegitoh over-the-counter medications – such as Motrin – and ice. ( at 1095, 1120-21); , 940 F.2d at 944-45 (finding that the use of only over-the-counter pain relievers suggests that the severity of pain is not so great as to preclude work activity).
Plaintiff further testified that she no longer used her knee brace, and that after January 1, 2022, she no longer sought cortisone injections for her alleged knee pain. (Adm. Rec. at 1095). The ALJ further found that there were no treIadt.ment recorsdees afrlosom G arnie goorthopedist or pain management specialist since January 1, 2022. ( at 1095); , 940 F.2d at 945 (finding that a lack of treatment may support a finding of non-disability). Further, while the treatment records from November 2023 showed “positive clinical signs related to her knee impairment,” in November 2023, Plaintiff had a normal gait. (Adm. Rec. at 1095-96, 1510).
And while there were no medical source opinions from tIhde. relevant period, the ALJ considered the opinion evidence from before January 1, 2022. ( at 1097). The ALJ noted that in December 2020, consultative examiner, Dr. Scott Sondes, M.D., opined that Plaintiff did not reqIudi.re an assistive device for walking, which was supported by the doctor’s clinical findings. ( at 1096). This finding was consistent with PlaintifIfd’s. own hearing testimony when she denied needing an assistive device to stand or walk. ( at 679, 1092). Notably,
the examination by Sondes also showed that Plaintiff could move on and off the examination table, squat, bend, anIdd. stoop without difficulty, and she could perform heel and toe walking without difficulty. ( at 679). Plaintiff also had full range of motion in all joIindt.s, with no radiation of pain on movement, muscle spasm, tenderness, or radiculopathy. ( ). The ALJ also considered the opinions of the state medical consultants, who opined in December 2020 and May 2021 that Plaintiff retained the abiIlidt.y to perform medium work, except she could frequently climb, kneel, crouch, and crawl. ( at 82-84, 97-98, 1096). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to perform work at the medium level of
exertion is consistIedn. t with the record as a whole, including the medical evidence after January 1, 2022. ( at 82-84, 95-96). The ALJ noted that Iidn. March 2022, Plaintiff reported that she walked daily, which helped her to lose weight. ( at 1097, 1423). The progress notes from LCMC Health further reveaIdle.d that Plaintiff displayed normal range of motion despite her complaints of joint pain. ( at 1097, 1426). In JuIlyd .2023, Plaintiff complained of bilateral knee pain and pain when bending and squatting. ( at 1097). However, while her physical examination revealed crepitus in bothI kdn.ees, Nurse Practitioner Leah N. Bowers noted that she retained normal range of motion. ( at 1097, 1368). Although Plaintiff was
referred to an orthopedist, the record shows that four months later, the ALJ noItde.d that no new treatment was recommended other than to exercise and lose weight. ( at 1097, 1371). Thus, based on the record as a whole, the ALJ properly found that the evidence Id. supports a medium RFC. ( at 1097). However, the ALJ addedI da. dditional postural limitations to accommodate Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. ( at 1094, 1097). Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Mark
Skellie, Psy.D, who opined that Plaintiff has a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple and detailed instructions; a mild limitation in maintaining attention or performing simple, repetitive tasks or complex, multi-step tasks for two-hour blocks of time; a moderate limitation in sustaining effort and persistence at a normal pace over a 40- hour workweek; a moderate-to-severe limitation in her ability to relate to others; and a severe limitaIdti.on in her ability to tolerate the stress/pressures associated with daily work demands. ( at 683-688, 1097). In March 2021, the state agency medical consultants opined that Plaintiff can sustain attention in two-hour increments when performing simple
and routine work-reIlda.ted tasks; follow simple-work like procedures; and make simple work- related decisions. ( at 86, 1098). The ALJ concluded that these opinions were consistent with evidence generateIdd .after January 1, 2022, which warranted limiting Plaintiff to “only simple instructions.” ( at 1098). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s ability to work with this limitation is consistent with her abilIidty. to read, write, count money, do simple arithmetic, and her good memory and recall. ( at 679, 686, 1261, 1268, 1275, 1282-83, 1298-99, 1098). Although Skellie opined that Plaintiff could follow multi-stepI di.nstructions, the ALJ
noted that Plaintiff reported needing to read things several times. ( at 1098). Thus, he found that because her comprehension is likely to “Idde.crease with task complexity,” limiting her to only simple instructions was appropriate. ( at 1098). Although Skellie observed that Plaintiff exhibited signs of distractibility during the examination, the ALJ noted that the evidence shoIwd.ed Plaintiff had normal attention and concentration with logical thought processes. ( atI d6.86, 1098). In October 2022, Plaintiff also reported having impaired
concentration. ( at 1099, 1314). Due to moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or maintaining Ipda.ce, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff should be limited to no fast- paced, quota-based work. ( at 1098). Finally, the ALJ concluded that the medical evidence supported a findinIdg .of frequent interaction with supervisors and coworkers and occasionally with the public. ( at 679, 686, 1099, 1280, 1308, 1508). Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the ALJ provided a sufficient basis for his assessed limitations. Indeed, “[t]he Commissioner’s decision is granted great deference and will not be disturbed unless the reviewing court cannot find substantial evidence in the
record to Ssueep pLoergtg tehtet Cvo. mChmatisesrioner’s decision or finds that the Commissioner made an error of law.” , 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). Moreover, as the party challenging the ComJomniesss ivo. nHeerc’ks ledrecision, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that any error was harmful. , 702 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The burden of proof on the claimant is heavy.”). Fifth Circuit case law also establishes that “[p]rocedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required. This CourMt awyisll vn. oBto wvaecnate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party have been affected.” , 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has not demonstrated any affect on her substantial
rights by the ALJ’s decision. Subsumed within this issue is Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record. The Fifth Circuit has described the duty to develop the record fully and See Bfariorlcyk avs . reCqhuaitreirng that the ALJ reach “an informed decision based on sufficient facts.” , 84 F.3d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1996). This Court has found that the administrative record contained sufficient evidence for the ALJ to properly assess Plaintiff’s
disability status, and, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, another medical opinion was not required for an adequately developed record. Plaintiff’s testimony and the evidence of rIedc.ord, which the ALJ referenced, was sufficient for the ALJ to make an informed decision. ( at 1094-1100). Plaintiff’s speculation that another opinion was required to assess Plaintiff’s RFC is irrelevant undeSr etehe framework of § 404.1520c, which specifically bars deference to medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Likewise, a consultative evaluation is unnecessary as there was sufficient evidence in the record to determine that Plaintiff was not disabled after January 1, 2022. Thus, despite Plaintiff’s assertion that there
was no evidence “whatsoever,” there was more than ample evidence provided in the record for the ALJ to make an informed decision. Indeed, although the ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record, the ALJ is not required to act as the claimant’s counsel or produce evidence for the claimant. Plaintiff bearSse ethe burden of proving she was disabled by providing evidence to support her allegations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 404.1529(a). “It is not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a Sbeee tBteorw epno svi.t Yiounc kteor tprovide information about her own medical constitution, to do so.” . 482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5 (1987).
The Court finds that the ALJ in this case did not need opinion evidence to render his decision because there was sufficient evidence for him to make an informed decision without it. In addition, the Court cannot reverse the decision of an ALJ for failure to fully and fairly dSeeev eClaorpe yt hve. Arpefceolrd unless the claimant shows that she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure. , 230 F.3d 131, 142 (5th Cir. 2000). To establish prejudice, a claimant must demonstr Iadt.e that she “could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the
results.” Here, Plaintiff only speculates that additional opinion evidence would help her case, and the ALJ was not required to go on a fishing expedition in an effort to help Plaintiff. Plaintiff points the Court to no additional evidence that would have altered the results, and she has thus failed to carry her burden. Finally, despite Plaintiff’s insistence that she somehow remained disabled after January 1, 2022, she failed to cite one piece of medical evidence to support her claims. Ultimately, it remains Plaintiff’s burden to provide evidence to support her allegations that her condition continued to impose disabling limitations after January 1, 2022. Here, Plaintiff
failed to meet her burden of prSoeveing that her condition preTchlourdteodn hve. Src ahbeiilkiteyr to sustain work activity after January 1, 2022. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c); , 663 F.2d 1312, 1316 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that it is a plaintiff’s burden to provide medical evidence in support of her claim). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled after January 1, 2022. VI. Conclusion
FITo r ItSh e RfoErCeOgoMinMgE rNeaDsEoDns , REJECTED
that SPUlSaTinAtiIfNf'Es Dbrief (rec. doc. 8) beD ISMISSED W, ItThHe CPoRmEJmUiDssIiCoEner's brief (rec. doc. 11) be , and Plaintiff's case be . NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the parDtoyu hgalsa sbse ve.n U sneirtveedd S wtaittehs nAouttioce. Athssaotc s.uch consequences will result from a failure to object. , 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).1 s t April New Orleans, Louisiana, this ____ day of ____________________________, 2025.
MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE