Sammy Edward Simpson, II v. Ashely Barksdale

• Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00482
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

SAMMY EDWARD SIMPSON, II, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-CV-482-RAH-CSC ) ASHELY BARKSDALE, ) ) Defendant. ) RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while incarcerated at Butner Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina. Doc. 1. By Order entered October 14, 2025, the Court informed Plaintiff that he must submit either the $405.00 in required fees or a properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 2. However, on November 3, 2025, that Order was returned as undeliverable and marked “Return to Sender, Refused, Unable to Forward.” See Doc. 3. The Federal Bureau of Prisons website indicates that Plaintiff was released from custody in July 2025, and Plaintiff’s whereabouts are now unknown. A district court “may . . . dismiss a case under its inherent authority, which it possesses as a means of managing its own docket so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” McNair v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 1301, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). The authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to comply with court orders and failure to prosecute is longstanding and acknowledged by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (finding this authority “necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts.”); see also

Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion” (citations omitted)). A court’s dismissal under its inherent authority “can be either with or without prejudice to refiling.” McNair, 143 F.4th at 1306. Dismissal with prejudice as a sanction “is warranted only upon a ‘clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that

lesser sanctions would not suffice.’” Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985)); accord McNair, 143 F.4th at 1306. “A dismissal without prejudice, by contrast, doesn’t require a finding of willfulness or bad faith because its consequences are less severe.” McNair, 143 F.4th at 1306.

Because Plaintiff’s whereabouts are unknown, the Court does not have a mailing address at which to reach Plaintiff, and the Court has not received any correspondence from Plaintiff since July 2025, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice. It is further ordered that, on or before December 9, 2025, the parties may file

objections to this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation. Additionally, such failure waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc),1 overruled by Douglass v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),

superseded by statute, Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 111-16, 123 Stat. 1608 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2009)); accord 11th Cir. R. 3-1. DONE this 25th day of November, 2025.

/s/ Charles S. Coody CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., the Court adopted as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before September 30, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (“We reserve for future consideration the effect on Eleventh Circuit Law of other categories of decisions by the old Fifth Circuit-for example, decisions handed down by the old Fifth after September 30, 1981 in cases submitted to the court for decision before October 1 . . . .” Id. at 1209 n.5); see also Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982) (regarding Fifth Circuit decisions issued after October 1, 1981 as binding precedent if they are “made by a non-unit panel of the Former Fifth, the full en banc court of the Former Fifth, or Unit B panel of the Former Fifth Circuit”).